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THE

WORKS

OF

THE RIGHT HONOURABLE

EDMUND BURKE.

A NEW EDITION.

VOL. II.

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OBSERVATIONS

ON

A LATE PUBLICATION,

INTITULED,

THE PRESENT STATE OF THE NATION.

" O Tite, ſi quid ego adjuvero curamve levaſſo,
" Quæ nunc te coquit, et verſat ſub pectore fixa,
" Ecquid erit pretii? ENN. ap. CIC.

1769.

OBSERVATIONS

ON

A LATE PUBLICATION,

INTITULED,

THE PRESENT STATE OF THE NATION.

PARTY diviſions, whether on the whole operating for good or evil, are things inſeparable from free government. This is a truth which, I believe, admits little diſpute, having been eſtabliſhed by the uniform experience of all ages. The part a good citizen ought to take in theſe diviſions, has been a matter of much deeper controverſy. But God forbid, that any controverſy relating to our eſſential morals ſhould admit of no deciſion. It appears to me, that this queſtion, like moſt of the others which regard our duties in life, is to be determined by our ſtation in it. Private men may be wholly neutral, and entirely innocent; but they who are legally inveſted with publick truſt, or ſtand on the high ground of rank and dignity, which is truſt implied, can hardly in any caſe remain indifferent, without the certainty of ſinking into inſignificance; and thereby in ef-

fect deſerting that poſt in which, with the fulleſt authority, and for the wiſeſt purpoſes, the laws and inſtitutions of their country have fixed them. However, if it be the office of thoſe who are thus circumſtanced, to take a decided part, it is no leſs their duty that it ſhould be a ſober one. It ought to be circumſcribed by the ſame laws of decorum, and balanced by the ſame temper, which bound and regulate all the virtues. In a word, we ought to act in party with all the moderation which does not abſolutely enervate that vigour, and quench that fervency of ſpirit, without which the beſt wiſhes for the publick good muſt evaporate in empty ſpeculation.

It is probably from ſome ſuch motives that the friends of a very reſpectable party in this kingdom have been hitherto ſilent. For theſe two years paſt, from one and the ſame quarter of politicks, a continual fire has been kept upon them; ſometimes from the unwieldy column of quartos and octavos; ſometimes from the light ſquadrons of occaſional pamphlets and flying ſheets. Every month has brought on its periodical calumny. The abuſe has taken every ſhape which the ability of the writers could give it; plain invective, clumſy raillery, miſrepreſented anecdote.* No method of

* Hiſtory of the Minority. Hiſtory of the Repeal of the Stamp-act. Conſiderations on Trade and Finance. Political Regiſter, &c. &c.

vilifying

vilifying the meaſures, the abilities, the intentions, or the perſons which compoſe that body, has been omitted.

On their part nothing was oppoſed but patience and character. It was a matter of the moſt ſerious and indignant affliction to perſons, who thought themſelves in conſcience bound to oppoſe a miniſtry, dangerous from it very conſtitution, as well as its meaſures, to find themſelves, whenever they faced their adverſaries, continually attacked on the rear by a ſet of men, who pretended to be actuated by motives ſimilar to theirs. They ſaw that the plan long purſued with but too fatal a ſucceſs, was to break the ſtrength of this kingdom; by frittering down the bodies which compoſe it; by fomenting bitter and ſanguinary animoſities, and by diſſolving every tie of ſocial affection and publick truſt. Theſe virtuous men, ſuch I am warranted by publick opinion to call them, were reſolved rather to endure every thing, than co-operate in that deſign. A diverſity of opinion upon almoſt every principle of politicks had indeed drawn a ſtrong line of ſeparation between them and ſome others. However, they were deſirous not to extend the misfortune by unneceſſary bitterneſs; they wiſhed to prevent a difference of opinion on the commonwealth from feſtering into rancorous and incurable hoſtility. Accordingly they endeavoured that all paſt controverſies ſhould be for-

gotten; and that enough for the day ſhould be the evil thereof. There is however a limit at which forbearance ceaſes to be a virtue. Men may tolerate injuries, whilſt they are only perſonal to themſelves. But it is not the firſt of virtues to bear with moderation the indignities that are offered to our country. A piece has at length appeared, from the quarter of all the former attacks, which upon every publick conſideration demands an anſwer. Whilſt perſons more equal to this buſineſs may be engaged in affairs of greater moment, I hope I ſhall be excuſed, if, in a few hours of a time not very important, and from ſuch materials as I have by me (more than enough however for this purpoſe), I undertake to ſet the facts and arguments of this wonderful performance in a proper light. I will endeavour to ſtate what this piece is; the purpoſe for which I take it to have been written; and the effects (ſuppoſing it ſhould have any effect at all) it muſt neceſſarily produce.

This piece is called, *The preſent State of the Nation*. It may be conſidered as a ſort of digeſt of the avowed maxims of a certain political ſchool, the effects of whoſe doctrines and practices this country will feel long and ſeverely. It is made up of a farrago of almoſt every topick which has been agitated in parliamentary debate, or private converſation, on national affairs, for theſe ſeven laſt

years.

years. The oldeſt controverſies are hauled out of the duſt with which time and neglect had covered them. Arguments ten times repeated, a thouſand times anſwered before, are here repeated again. Publick accounts formerly printed and re-printed revolve once more, and find their old ſtation in this ſober meridian. All the common-place lamentations upon the decay of trade, the increaſe of taxes, and the high price of labour and proviſions, are here retailed again and again in the ſame tone with which they have drawled through columns of Gazetteers and Advertiſers for a century together. Paradoxes which affront common ſenſe, and unintereſting barren truths which generate no concluſion, are thrown in to augment unweildy bulk, without adding any thing to weight. Becauſe two accuſations are better than one, contradictions are ſet ſtaring one another in the face, without even an attempt to reconcile them. And to give the whole a ſort of portentous air of labour and information, the table of the houſe of commons is ſwept into this grand reſervoir of politicks.

As to the compoſition, it bears a ſtriking and whimſical reſemblance to a funeral ſermon, not only in the pathetick prayer with which it concludes, but in the ſtyle and tenor of the whole performance. It is piteouſly doleful, nodding every now and then towards dullneſs; well ſtored

with pious frauds, and, like moſt diſcourſes of the ſort, much better calculated for the private advantage of the preacher than the edification of the hearers.

The author has indeed ſo involved his ſubject, that it is frequently far from being eaſy to comprehend his meaning. It is happy for the publick that it is never difficult to fathom his deſign. The apparent intention of this author is to draw the moſt aggravated, hideous, and deformed picture of the ſtate of this country, which his querulous eloquence, aided by the arbitrary dominion he aſſumes over fact, is capable of exhibiting. Had he attributed our misfortunes to their true cauſe, the injudicious tampering of bold, improvident, and viſionary miniſters at one period, or to their ſupine negligence and traiterous diſſenſions at another, the complaint had been juſt, and might have been uſeful. But far the greater and much the worſt part of the ſtate which he exhibits is owing, according to his repreſentation, not to accidental and extrinſick miſchiefs attendant on the nation, but to its radical weakneſs and conſtitutional diſtempers. All this however is not without purpoſe. The author is in hopes, that, when we are fallen into a fanatical terror for the national ſalvation, we ſhall then be ready to throw ourſelves, in a ſort of precipitate truſt, ſome ſtrange diſpoſition of the mind jumbled up of preſumption and deſpair, into

into the hands of the moſt pretending and forward undertaker. One ſuch undertaker at leaſt he has in readineſs for our ſervice. But let me aſſure this generous perſon, that however he may ſucceed in exciting our fears for the publick danger, he will find it hard indeed to engage us to place any confidence in the ſyſtem he propoſes for our ſecurity.

His undertaking is great. The purpoſe of this pamphlet, and at which it aims directly or obliquely in every page, is to perſuade the publick of three or four of the moſt difficult points in the world—that all the advantages of the late war were on the part of the Bourbon alliance; that the peace of Paris perfectly conſulted the dignity and intereſt of this country; and that the American Stamp-act was a maſter-piece of policy and finance; that the only good miniſter this nation has enjoyed ſince his Majeſty's acceſſion, is the Earl of Bute; and the only good managers of revenue we have ſeen are Lord Deſpenſer and Mr. George Grenville; and under the deſcription of men of virtue and ability, he holds them out to us as the only perſons fit to put our affairs in order. Let not the reader miſtake me: he does not actually name theſe perſons; but, having highly applauded their conduct in all its parts, and heavily cenſured every other ſet of men in the kingdom, he then recommends us to his men of virtue and ability.

Such

Such is the author's ſcheme. Whether it will anſwer his purpoſe, I know not. But ſurely that purpoſe ought to be a wonderfully good one, to warrant the methods he has taken to compaſs it. If the facts and reaſonings in this piece are admitted, it is all over with us. The continuance of our tranquillity depends upon the compaſſion of our rivals. Unable to ſecure to ourſelves the advantages of peace, we are at the ſame time utterly unfit for war. It is impoſſible, if this ſtate of things be credited abroad, that we can have any alliance; all nations will fly from ſo dangerous a connexion, leſt, inſtead of being partakers of our ſtrength, they ſhould only become ſharers in our ruin. If it is believed at home, all that firmneſs of mind, and dignified national courage, which uſed to be the great ſupport of this iſle againſt the powers of the world, muſt melt away, and fail within us.

In ſuch a ſtate of things can it be amiſs, if I aim at holding out ſome comfort to the nation; another ſort of comfort indeed, than that which this writer provides for it; a comfort, not from its phyſician, but from its conſtitution; if I attempt to ſhew that all the arguments upon which he founds the decay of that conſtitution, and the neceſſity of that phyſician, are vain and frivolous? I will follow the author cloſely in his own long career, through the war, the peace, the finances, our trade, and our

our foreign politicks: not for the ſake of the particular meaſures which he diſcuſſes; that can be of no uſe; they are all decided; their good is all enjoyed, or their evil incurred: but for the ſake of the principles of war, peace, trade, and finances. Theſe principles are of infinite moment. They muſt come again and again under conſideration; and it imports the publick, of all things, that thoſe of its miniſters be enlarged, and juſt, and well confirmed, upon all theſe ſubjects. What notions this author entertains, we ſhall ſee preſently; notions in my opinion very irrational, and extremely dangerous; and which, if they ſhould crawl from pamphlets into counſels, and be realized from private ſpeculation into national meaſures, cannot fail of haſtening and compleating our ruin.

This author, after having paid his compliment to the ſhewy appearances of the late war in our favour, is in the utmoſt haſte to tell you that theſe appearances were *fallacious*, that they were no more than an *impoſition*.—I fear I muſt trouble the reader with a pretty long quotation, in order to ſet before him the more clearly this author's peculiar way of conceiving and reaſoning:

" Happily (the K.) was then adviſed by miniſ-
" ters, who did not ſuffer themſelves to be daz-
" zled by the glare of brilliant appearances; but,
" knowing them to be *fallacious*, they wiſely re-
" ſolved to profit of their ſplendor before our
" enemies

" enemies ſhould alſo *diſcover the impoſition.*—The " increaſe in the exports was found to have been " occaſioned chiefly by the demands of *our own* " *fleets and armies*, and, inſtead of bringing wealth " to the nation, was to be paid for by oppreſſive " taxes upon the people of England. While the " Britiſh ſeamen were conſuming on board our " men of war and privateers, foreign ſhips and " foreign ſeamen were employed in the tranſpor- " tation of our merchandize; and the carrying " trade, ſo great a ſource of wealth and marine, " *was entirely engroſſed by the neutral nations.* The " number of Britiſh ſhips annually arriving in our " ports was reduced 1756 ſail, containing 92,559 " tons, on a medium of the ſix years war, com- " pared with the ſix years of peace preceding it.— " The conqueſt of the Havannah had, indeed, " ſtopped the remittance of ſpecie from Mexico to " Spain; but it had not enabled England to ſeize " it: on the contrary, our merchants ſuffered by " the detention of the galleons, as their *correſpon-* " *dents in Spain were diſabled from paying them for* " *their goods ſent to America. The loſs of the trade* " *to old Spain was a farther bar to an influx of ſpecie*; " and the attempt upon Portugal had not only " deprived us of an import of bullion from thence, " but the payment of our troops employed in its " defence was a freſh drain opened for the diminu- " tion of our circulating ſpecie.—The high pre-

" miums

" miums given for new loans had ſunk the price " of the old ſtock near a third of its original value, " ſo that the purchaſers had an obligation from " the ſtate to re-pay them with an addition of " 33 *per cent.* to their capital. Every new loan " required new taxes to be impoſed; new taxes " muſt add to the price of our manufactures *and* " *leſſen their conſumption among foreigners.* The de- " cay of our trade muſt neceſſarily *occaſion a de-* " *creaſe of the publick revenue*; and a deficiency of " our funds muſt either be made up by freſh taxes, " which would only add to the calamity, or our " national credit muſt be deſtroyed, by ſhewing " the publick creditors the inability of the nation " to re-pay them their principal money.—Bounties " had already been given for recruits which ex- " ceeded the year's wages of the plowman and " reaper; and as theſe were exhauſted, and *huſ-* " *bandry ſtood ſtill for want of hands*, the manufac- " turers were next to be tempted to quit the anvil " and the loom by higher offers.—*France, bankrupt* " *France, had no ſuch calamities impending over her*; " *her diſtreſſes were great, but they were immediate* " *and temporary*; *her want of credit preſerved her* " *from a great increaſe of debt, and the loſs of her ul-* " *tramarine dominions leſſened her expences. Her co-* " *lonies had, indeed, put themſelves into the hands of* " *the Engliſh*; *but the property of her ſubjects had been* " *preſerved by capitulations, and a way opened for* " *making*

" *making her thoſe remittances, which the war had be-*
" *fore ſuſpended, with as much ſecurity as in the time*
" *of peace.*—Her armies in Germany had been hi-
" therto prevented from ſeizing upon Hanover;
" but they continued to encamp on the ſame
" ground on which the firſt battle was fought;
" and, as it muſt ever happen from the policy of
" that government, *the laſt troops ſhe ſent into the*
" *field were always found to be the beſt, and her fre-*
" *quent loſſes only ſerved to fill her regiments with better*
" *ſoldiers. The conqueſt of Hanover became therefore*
" *every campaign more probable.* It is not to be
" noted, that the French troops received ſubſiſtence
" only, for the laſt three years of the war; and
" that, although large arrears were due to them at
" its concluſion, the charge was the leſs during its
" continuance."*

If any one be willing to ſee to how much greater lengths the author carries theſe ideas, he will recur to the book. This is ſufficient for a ſpecimen of his manner of thinking. I believe one reflection uniformly obtrudes itſelf upon every reader of theſe paragraphs. For what purpoſe in any cauſe ſhall we hereafter contend with France? can we ever flatter ourſelves that we ſhall wage a more ſucceſsful war? If, on our part, in a war the moſt proſperous we ever carried on, by ſea and by land,

* P. 6, 7, 8, 9, 10.

and

and in every part of the globe, attended with the unparalleled circumſtance of an immenſe increaſe of trade and augmentation of revenue; if a continued ſeries of diſappointments, diſgraces, and defeats, followed by publick bankruptcy, on the part of France; if all theſe ſtill leave her a gainer on the whole balance, will it not be downright phrenzy in us ever to look her in the face again, or to contend with her any, even the moſt eſſential points, ſince victory and defeat, though by different ways, equally conduct us to our ruin? Subjection to France without a ſtruggle will indeed be leſs for our honour, but on every principle of our author it muſt be more for our advantage. According to his repreſentation of things, the queſtion is only concerning the moſt eaſy fall. France had not diſcovered, our ſtateſman tells us, at the end of that war, the triumphs of defeat, and the reſources which are derived from bankruptcy. For my poor part, I do not wonder at their blindneſs. But the Engliſh miniſters ſaw further. Our author has at length let foreigners alſo into the ſecret, and made them altogether as wiſe as ourſelves. It is their own fault if *(vulgato imperii arcano)* they are impoſed upon any longer. They now are apprized of the ſentiments which the great candidate for the government of this great empire entertains; and they will act accordingly.

They

They are taught our weakneſs and their own advantages.

He tells the world*, that if France carries on the war againſt us in Germany, every loſs ſhe ſuſtains contributes to the atchievement of her conqueſt. If her armies are three years unpaid, ſhe is the leſs exhauſted by expence. If her credit is deſtroyed, ſhe is the leſs oppreſſed with debt. If her troops are cut to pieces, they will by her policy (and a wonderful policy it is) be improved, and will be ſupplied with much better men. If the war is carried on in the colonies, he tells them that the loſs of her ultramarine dominions leſſens her expences,† and enſures her remittances:

Per damna, per cædes, ab ipſo
Ducit opes animumque ferro.

if ſo, what is it we can do to hurt her?—It will be all an *impoſition*, all *fallacious*. Why the reſult muſt be—*Occidit, occidit ſpes omnis & fortuna noſtri nominis.*

The only way which the author's principles leave for our eſcape, is to reverſe our condition into that of France, and to take her loſing cards into our hands. But though his principles drive him

* P. 9, 10. † P. 9.

to

to it, his politicks will not ſuffer him to walk on this ground. Talking at our eaſe and of other countries, we may bear to be diverted with ſuch ſpeculations; but in England we ſhall never be taught to look upon the annihilation of our trade, the ruin of our credit, the defeat of our armies, and the loſs of our ultramarine dominions (whatever the author may think of them), to be the high road to proſperity and greatneſs.

The reader does not, I hope, imagine that I mean ſeriouſly to ſet about the refutation of theſe uningenious paradoxes and reveries without imagination. I ſtate them only that we may diſcern a little in the queſtions of war and peace, the moſt weighty of all queſtions, what is the wiſdom of thoſe men who are held out to us as the only hope of an expiring nation. The preſent miniſtry is indeed of a ſtrange character: at once indolent and diſtracted. But if a miniſterial ſyſtem ſhould be formed, actuated by ſuch maxims as are avowed in this piece, the vices of the preſent miniſtry would become their virtues; their indolence would be the greateſt of all publick beneſits, and a diſtraction that entirely defeated every one of their ſchemes would be our only ſecurity from deſtruction.

To have ſtated theſe reaſonings is enough, I preſume, to do their buſineſs. But they are accompanied with facts and records, which may ſeem of a little more weight. I truſt however that the

facts of this author will be as far from bearing the touchſtone, as his arguments. On a little enquiry, they will be found as great an impoſition as the ſucceſſes they are meant to depreciate; for they are all either falſe or fallaciouſly applied; or not in the leaſt to the purpoſe for which they are produced.

Firſt the author, in order to ſupport his favourite paradox, that our poſſeſſion of the French colonies was of no detriment to France, has thought proper to inform us, that * "they put themſelves "into the hands of the Engliſh." He uſes the ſame aſſertion, in nearly the ſame words, in another place; † "her colonies had put themſelves into "our hands." Now, in juſtice not only to fact and common ſenſe, but to the incomparable valour and perſeverance of our military and naval forces thus unhandſomely traduced, I muſt tell this author, that the French colonies did not "put themſelves into the hands of the Engliſh." They were compelled to ſubmit; they were ſubdued by dint of Engliſh valour. Will the five years war carried on in Canada, in which fell one of the principal hopes of this nation, and all the battles loſt and gained during that anxious period, convince this author of his miſtake? Let him inquire of Sir Jeffery Amherſt, under whoſe conduct that war

* P. 9. † P. 6.

was

was carried on; of Sir Charles Saunders, whoſe ſteadineſs and preſence of mind ſaved our fleet, and were ſo eminently ſerviceable in the whole courſe of the ſiege of Quebec; of General Monckton, who was ſhot through the body there, whether France "put her colonies into the hands of the Engliſh."

Though he has made no exception, yet I would be liberal to him; perhaps he means to confine himſelf to her colonies in the Weſt Indies. But ſurely it will fare as ill with him there as in North America, whilſt we remember that in our firſt attempt at Martinico we were actually defeated; that it was three months before we reduced Guadaloupe; and that the conqueſt of the Havannah was atchieved by the higheſt conduct, aided by circumſtances of the greateſt good fortune. He knows the expence both of men and treaſure at which we bought that place. However, if it had ſo pleaſed the peace-makers, it was no dear purchaſe; for it was deciſive of the fortune of the war and the terms of the treaty: the duke of Nivernois thought ſo; France, England, Europe, conſidered it in that light; all the world, except the then friends of the then miniſtry, who wept for our victories, and were in haſte to get rid of the burthen of our conqueſts. This author knows that France did not put thoſe colonies into the hands of England; but

he well knows who did put the moſt valuable of them into the hands of France.

In the next place, our author* is pleaſed to conſider the conqueſt of thoſe colonies in no other light than as a convenience for the remittances to France, which he aſſerts that the war had before ſuſpended, but for which a way was opened (by our conqueſt) as ſecure as in time of peace. I charitably hope he knows nothing of the ſubject. I referred him lately to our commanders for the reſiſtance of the French colonies; I now wiſh he would apply to our cuſtom-houſe entries, and our merchants, for the advantages which we derived from them.

In 1761, there was no entry of goods from any of the conquered places but Guadaloupe; in that year it ſtood thus:

	£.
Imports from Guadaloupe, value,	482,179

In 1762, when we had not yet delivered up our conqueſts, the account was,

	£.
Guadaloupe, - - -	513,244
Martinico, - - -	288,425
Total imports in 1762, value,	£.801,669

* P. 9.

In

In 1763, after we had delivered up the sovereignty of these islands, but kept open a communication with them, the imports were,

	£.
Guadaloupe, - - -	412,303
Martinico, - - -	344,161
Havannah, - - -	249,386
Total imports in 1763, value, £.	1,005,850

Besides, I find in the account of bullion imported and brought to the Bank, that during that period in which the intercourse with the Havannah was open, we received at that one shop, in treasure, from that one place, £. 559,810; in the year 1763, £. 389,450; so that the import from these places in that year amounted to £. 1,395,300.

On this state the reader will observe, that I take the imports from, and not the exports to, these conquests, as the measure of the advantages which we derived from them. I do so for reasons which will be somewhat worthy the attention of such readers as are fond of this species of inquiry. I say therefore I choose the import article, as the best, and indeed the only standard we can have, of the value of the West India trade. Our export

entry does not comprehend the greateſt trade we carry on with any of the Weſt India iſlands, the ſale of negroes: nor does it give any idea of two other advantages we draw from them; the remittances for money ſpent here, and the payment of part of the balance of the North American trade. It is therefore quite ridiculous, to ſtrike a balance merely on the face of an exceſs of imports and exports, in that commerce; though, in moſt foreign branches, it is, on the whole, the beſt method. If we ſhould take that ſtandard, it would appear, that the balance with our own iſland is, annually, ſeveral hundred thouſand pounds againſt this country.* Such is its aſpect on the cuſtom-houſe entries; but we know the direct contrary to be the fact. We know that the Weſt Indians are always indebted to our merchants, and that the value of every ſhilling of Weſt India produce is Engliſh property. So that our import from them, and not our export, ought always to be conſidered as their true value; and this corrective ought to be applied

	£.
* Total imports from the Weſt Indies in 1764,	2,909,411
Exports to ditto in ditto, - -	896,511
Exceſs of imports, - - -	£. 2,012,900

In this, which is the common way of ſtating the balance, it will appear upwards of two millions againſt us, which is ridiculous.

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to all general balances of our trade, which are formed on the ordinary principles.

If poſſible, this was more emphatically true of the French Weſt India Iſlands, whilſt they continued in our hands. That none, or only a very contemptible part of the value of this produce, could be remitted to France, the author will ſee, perhaps with unwillingneſs, but with the cleareſt conviction, if he conſiders, that in the year 1763, *after we had ceaſed to export* to the iſles of Guadaloupe and Martinico, and to the Havannah, and after the colonies were free to ſend all their produce to Old France and Spain, if they had any remittance to make; he will ſee, that we imported from thoſe places, in that year, to the amount of £. 1,395,300. So far was the whole annual produce of theſe iſlands from being adequate to the payments of their annual call upon us, that this mighty additional importation was neceſſary, though not quite ſufficient, to diſcharge the debts contracted in the few years we held them. The property, therefore, of their whole produce, was ours; not only during the war, but even for more than a year after the peace. The author, I hope, will not again venture upon ſo raſh and diſcouraging a propoſition, concerning the nature and effect of thoſe conqueſts, as to call them a convenience to the remittances of France; he ſees by this ac-

count, that what he aſſerts is not only without foundation, but even impoſſible to be true.

As to our trade at that time, he labours with all his might to repreſent it as abſolutely ruined, or on the very edge of ruin. Indeed, as uſual with him, he is often as equivocal in his expreſſion, as he is clear in his deſign. Sometimes he more than inſinuates a decay of our commerce in that war; ſometimes he admits an encreaſe of exports; but it is in order to depreciate the advantages we might appear to derive from that encreaſe, whenever it ſhould come to be proved againſt him. He tells you, * "that it was chiefly occaſioned by the de-"mands of our own fleets and armies, and, inſtead "of bringing wealth to the nation, was to be paid "for by oppreſſive taxes upon the people of Eng-"land." Never was any thing more deſtitute of foundation. It might be proved with the greateſt eaſe, from the nature and quality of the goods exported, as well as from the ſituation of the places to which our merchandiſe was ſent, and which the war could no wiſe affect, that the ſupply of our fleets and armies could not have been the cauſe of this wonderful increaſe of trade: its cauſe was evident to the whole world; the ruin of the trade of France, and our poſſeſſion of her colonies. What wonderful effects this cauſe produced, the

* P. 6.

reader

reader will ſee below;* and he will form on that account ſome judgment of the author's candour or information.

Admit however that a great part of our export, though nothing is more remote from fact, was

1754.		£.	s.	d.
* Total export of Britiſh goods,	value,	8,317,506	15	3
Ditto of foreign goods in time,	-	2,910,836	14	9
Ditto of ditto out of time, -	-	559,485	2	10
Total exports of all kinds. .	-	11,787,828	12	10
Total imports, - -	-	8,093,472	15	0
Balance in favour of England,	-	£. 3,694,355	17	10

1761.		£.	s.	d.
Total export of Britiſh goods,	-	10,649,581	12	6
Ditto of foreign goods in time,	-	3,553,692	7	1
Ditto of ditto out of time, -	-	355,015	0	2
Total exports of all kinds, -	-	14,558,288	19	9
Total imports, - -	-	9,294,915	1	6
Balance in favour of England,	-	£. 5,263,373	18	3

Here is the ſtate of our trade in 1761, compared with a very good year of profound peace: both are taken from the authentick entries at the cuſtom-houſe. How the author can contrive to make this encreaſe of the export of Engliſh produce agree with his account of the dreadful want of hands in England, p. 9, unleſs he ſuppoſes manufactures to be made without hands, I really do not ſee. It is painful to be ſo frequently obliged to ſet this author right in matters of fact. This ſtate will fully refute all that he has ſaid or inſinuated upon the difficulties and decay of our trade, p. 6, 7, and 9.

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owing to the ſupply of our fleets and armies; was it not ſomething?—was it not peculiarly fortunate for a nation, that ſhe was able from her own boſom to contribute largely to the ſupply of her armies militating in ſo many diſtant countries? The author allows that France did not enjoy the ſame advantages. But it is remarkable throughout his whole book, that thoſe circumſtances which have ever been conſidered as great benefits, and deciſive proofs of national ſuperiority, are, when in our hands, taken either in diminution of ſome other apparent advantage, or even ſometimes as poſitive misfortunes. The opticks of that politician muſt be of a ſtrange conformation, who beholds every thing in this diſtorted ſhape.

So far as to our trade. With regard to our navigation, he is ſtill more uneaſy at our ſituation, and ſtill more fallacious in his ſtate of it. In his text, he affirms it "to have been *entirely* engroſſed by the neutral nations."* This he aſſerts roundly and boldly, and without the leaſt concern; although it coſt no more than a ſingle glance of the eye upon his own margin to ſee the full refutation of this aſſertion. His own account proves againſt him, that in the year 1761, the Britiſh ſhipping amounted to 527,557 tons—the foreign to no more than 180,102. The medium of his ſix years

* P. 7. See alſo p. 13.

Britiſh,

Britiſh, 2,449,555 tons—foreign only 905,690. This ſtate (his own) demonſtrates that the neutral nations did not *entirely engroſs our navigation.*

I am willing from a ſtrain of candour to admit that this author ſpeaks at random; that he is only ſlovenly and inaccurate, and not fallacious. In matters of account, however, this want of care is not excuſable: and the difference between neutral nations entirely engroſſing our navigation, and being only ſubſidiary to a vaſtly augmented trade, makes a moſt material difference to his argument. From that principle of fairneſs, though the author ſpeaks otherwiſe, I am willing to ſuppoſe he means no more than that our navigation had ſo declined as to alarm us with the probable loſs of this valuable object. I ſhall however ſhew, that his whole propoſition, whatever modifications he may pleaſe to give it, is without foundation; that our navigation was not decreaſed; that, on the contrary, it was greatly increaſed in the war; that it was encreaſed by the war; and that it was probable the ſame cauſe would continue to augment it to a ſtill greater height; to what an height it is hard to ſay, had our ſucceſs continued.

But firſt I muſt obſerve, I am much leſs ſolicitous whether his fact be true or no, than whether his principle is well eſtabliſhed. Caſes are dead things, principles are living and productive. I then affirm that, if in time of war our trade had

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the good fortune to encreaſe, and at the ſame time a large, nay the largeſt, proportion of carriage had been engroſſed by neutral nations, it ought not in itſelf to have been conſidered as a circumſtance of diſtreſs. War is a time of inconvenience to trade; in general it muſt be ſtraitened, and muſt find its way as it can. It is often happy for nations that they are able to call in neutral navigation. They all aim at it. France endeavoured at it, but could not compaſs it. Will this author ſay, that in a war with Spain, ſuch an aſſiſtance would not be of abſolute neceſſity? that it would not be the moſt groſs of all follies to refuſe it?

In the next place, his method of ſtating a medium of ſix years of war, and ſix years of peace, to decide this queſtion, is altogether unfair. To ſay, in derogation of the advantages of a war, that navigation is not equal to what it was in time of peace, is what hitherto has never been heard of. No war ever bore that teſt but the war which he ſo bitterly laments. One may lay it down as a maxim, that an average eſtimate of an object in a ſteady courſe of riſing or of falling, muſt in its nature be an unfair one; more particularly if the cauſe of the riſe or fall be viſible, and its continuance in any degree probable. Average eſtimates are never juſt but when the object fluctuates, and no reaſon can be aſſigned why it ſhould not continue ſtill to fluctuate. The author chuſes to allow nothing

nothing at all for this: he has taken an average of ſix years of the war. He knew, for every body knows, that the firſt three years were on the whole rather unſucceſsful; and that, in conſequence of this ill ſucceſs, trade ſunk, and navigation declined with it; but *that grand deluſion* of the three laſt years turned the ſcale in our favour. At the beginning of that war (as in the commencement of every war), traders were ſtruck with a ſort of panick. Many went out of the freighting buſineſs. But by degrees, as the war continued, the terror wore off; the danger came to be better appreciated, and better provided againſt; our trade was carried on in large fleets, under regular convoys, and with great ſafety. The freighting buſineſs revived. The ſhips were fewer, but much larger; and though the number decreaſed, the tonnage was vaſtly augmented; inſomuch that in 1761 the *Britiſh* ſhipping had riſen by the author's own account 527,557 tons.—In the laſt year he has given us of the peace it amounted to no more than 494,772; that is, in the laſt year of the war it was 32,785 tons more than in the correſpondent year of his peace average. No year of the peace exceeded it except one, and that but little.

The fair account of the matter is this. Our trade had, as we have juſt ſeen, encreaſed to ſo aſtoniſhing a degree in 1761, as to employ Britiſh and foreign ſhips to the amount of 707,659 tons, which

which is 149,500 moee than we employed in the laſt year of the peace.—Thus our trade encreaſed more than a fifth; our Britiſh navigation had encreaſed likewiſe with this aſtoniſhing encreaſe of trade, but was not able to keep pace with it; and we added about 120,000 ton of foreign ſhipping to the 60,000, which had been employed in the laſt year of the peace. Whatever happened to our ſhipping in the former years of the war, this would be no true ſtate of the caſe at the time of the treaty. If we had loſt ſomething in the beginning, we had then recovered, and more than recovered, all our loſſes. Such is the ground of the doleful complaints of the author, that *the carrying trade was wholly engroſſed by the neutral nations.*

I have done fairly, and even very moderately, in taking this year, and not his average, as the ſtandard of what might be expected in future, had the war continued. The author will be compelled to allow it, unleſs he undertakes to ſhew; firſt, that the poſſeſſion of Canada, Martinico, Guadaloupe, Grenada, the Havannah, the Philippines, the whole African trade, the whole Eaſt India trade, and the whole Newfoundland fiſhery, had no certain inevitable tendency to encreaſe the Britiſh ſhipping; unleſs, in the ſecond place, he can prove that thoſe trades were, or might, by law or indulgence, be carried on in foreign veſſels; and unleſs, thirdly, he can demonſtrate that the premium

mium of inſurance on Britiſh ſhips was riſing as the war continued. He can prove not one of theſe points. I will ſhew him a fact more that is mortal to his aſſertions. It is the ſtate of our ſhipping in 1762. The author had his reaſons for ſtopping ſhort at the preceding year. It would have appeared, had he proceeded farther, that our tonnage was in a courſe of uniform augmentation, owing to the freight derived from our foreign conqueſts, and to the perfect ſecurity of our navigation from our clear and decided ſuperiority at ſea. This, I ſay, would have appeared from the ſtate of the two years:

1761. Britiſh,	- -	527,557 tons.
1762. Ditto,	- -	559,537 tons.
1761. Foreign,	- -	180,102 tons.
1762. Ditto,	- -	129,502 tons.

The two laſt years of the peace were in no degree equal to theſe. Much of the navigation of 1763 was alſo owing to the war; this is manifeſt from the large part of it employed in the carriage from the ceded iſlands, with which the communication ſtill continued open. No ſuch circumſtances of glory and advantage ever attended upon a war. Too happy will be our lot, if we ſhould again be forced into a war, to behold any thing that ſhall reſemble them; and if we were not then the better

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for them, it is not in the ordinary courſe of God's providence to mend our condition.

In vain does the author declaim on the high premiums given for the loans during the war. His long note ſwelled with calculations on that ſubject (even ſuppoſing the moſt inaccurate of all calculations to be juſt) would be entirely thrown away, did it not ſerve to raiſe a wonderful opinion of his financial ſkill in thoſe who are not leſs ſurprized than edified, when, with a ſolemn face and myſterious air, they are told that two and two make four. For what elſe do we learn from this note? That the more expence is incurred by a nation, the more money will be required to defray it; that, in proportion to the continuance of that expence, will be the continuance of borrowing; that the encreaſe of borrowing and the encreaſe of debt will go hand in hand; and laſtly, that the more money you want, the harder it will be to get it; and that the ſcarcity of the commodity will enhance the price. Who ever doubted the truth, or the inſignificance, of theſe propoſitions? what do they prove? that war is expenſive, and peace deſirable. They contain nothing more than a common-place againſt war; the eaſieſt of all topicks. To bring them home to his purpoſe, he ought to have ſhewn, that our enemies had money upon better terms; which he has not ſhewn, neither can he. I ſhall ſpeak more fully to this point in another

another place. He ought to have ſhewn, that the money they raiſed, upon whatever terms, had procured them a more lucrative return. He knows that our expenditure purchaſed commerce and conqueſt: theirs acquired nothing but defeat and bankruptcy.

Thus the author has laid down his ideas on the ſubject of war. Next follow thoſe he entertains on that of peace. The treaty of Paris upon the whole has his approbation. Indeed, if his account of the war be juſt, he might have ſpared himſelf all further trouble. The reſt is drawn on as an inevitable concluſion.* If the houſe of Bourbon had the advantage, ſhe muſt give the law; and the peace, though it were much worſe than it is, had ſtill been a good one. But, as the world is yet *deluded* on the ſtate of that war, other arguments are neceſſary; and the author has in my opinion very ill ſupplied them. He tells of many things we have got, and of which he has made out a kind of bill. This matter may be brought within a very narrow compaſs, if we come to conſider the requiſites of a good peace under ſome plain diſtinct heads. I apprehend they may be reduced to theſe: 1. Stability; 2. Indemnification; 3. Alliance.

As to the firſt, the author more than obſcurely hints in ſeveral places, that he thinks the peace not

* P. 12, 13.

likely to laſt. However, he does furniſh a ſecurity; a ſecurity, in any light, I fear, but inſufficient; on his hypotheſis, ſurely a very odd one. * "By ſtipulating for the entire poſſeſſion of the "continent, (ſays he) the reſtored French iſlands "are become in ſome meaſure dependent on the "Britiſh empire; and the good faith of France in "obſerving the treaty guaranteed by the value at "which ſhe eſtimates their poſſeſſion."* This author ſoon grows weary of his principles. They ſeldom laſt him for two pages together. When the advantages of the war were to be depreciated, then the loſs of the ultramarine colonies lightened the expences of France, facilitated her remittances, and therefore *her coloniſts put them into our hands*. According to this author's ſyſtem, the actual poſſeſſion of thoſe colonies ought to give us little or no advantage in the negotiation for peace; and yet the chance of poſſeſſing them on a future occaſion gives a perfect ſecurity for the preſervation of that peace.† The conqueſt of the Havannah, if it did not ſerve Spain, rather diſtreſſed England, ſays our author.‡ But the moleſtation which her galleons may ſuffer from our ſtation in Penſacola

* P. 17. † P. 6.

‡ "Our merchants ſuffered by the detention of the galleons, "as their correſpondents in Spain were diſabled from paying "them for their goods ſent to America." State of the Nation, p. 7.

gives

gives us advantages, for which we were not allowed to credit the nation for the Havannah itſelf; a place ſurely full as well ſituated for every external purpoſe as Penſacola, and of more internal benefit than ten thouſand Penſacolas.

The author ſets very little by conqueſts;* I ſuppoſe it is becauſe he makes them ſo very lightly. On this ſubject he ſpeaks with the greateſt certainty imaginable. We have, according to him, nothing to do, but to go and take poſſeſſion, whenever we think proper, of the French and Spaniſh ſettlements. It were better that he had examined a little what advantage the peace gave us towards the invaſion of theſe colonies, which we did not poſſeſs before the peace. It would not have been amiſs if he had conſulted the public experience, and our commanders, concerning the abſolute certainty of thoſe conqueſts on which he is pleaſed to found our ſecurity. And if, after all, he ſhould have diſcovered them to be ſo very ſure, and ſo very eaſy, he might, at leaſt, to preſerve conſiſtency, have looked a few pages back, and (no unpleaſing thing to him) liſtened to himſelf, where he ſays,† "that the moſt ſucceſsful enterprize "could not compenſate to the nation for the waſte "of its people, by carrying on war in unhealthy "climates." A poſition which he repeats again,

* P. 12, 13. † P. 6.

p. 9. So that, according to himſelf, his ſecurity is not worth the ſuit; according to fact, he has only a chance, God knows what a chance, of getting at it; and therefore, according to reaſon, the giving up the moſt valuable of all poſſeſſions, in hopes to conquer them back, under any advantage of ſituation, is the moſt ridiculous ſecurity that ever was imagined for the peace of a nation. It is true his friends did not give up Canada; they could not give up every thing; let us make the moſt of it. We have Canada, we know its value. We have not the French any longer to fight in North America; and, from this circumſtance, we derive conſiderable advantages. But here let me reſt a little. The author touches upon a ſtring, which ſounds under his fingers but a tremulous and melancholy note. North America was once indeed a great ſtrength to this nation, in opportunity of ports, in ſhips, in proviſions, in men. We found her a ſound, an active, a vigorous member of the empire. I hope, by wiſe management, ſhe will again become ſo. But one of our capital preſent misfortunes is, her diſcontent and diſobedience. To which of the author's favourites this diſcontent is owing, we all know but too ſufficiently. It would be a diſmal event, if this foundation of his ſecurity, and indeed of all our public ſtrength, ſhould, in reality, become our weakneſs; and if all the powers of this empire, which ought

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to fall with a compacted weight upon the head of our enemies, ſhould be diſſipated and diſtracted by a jealous vigilance, or by hoſtile attempts upon one another. Ten Canadas cannot reſtore that ſecurity for the peace, and for every thing valuable to this country, which we have loſt along with the affection and the obedience of our colonies. He is the wiſe miniſter, he is the true friend to Britain, who ſhall be able to reſtore it.

To return to the ſecurity for the peace. The author tells us, that the original great purpoſes of the war were more than accompliſhed by the treaty. Surely he has experience and reading enough to know that, in the courſe of a war, events may happen, that render its original very far from being its principal purpoſe. This original may dwindle by circumſtances, ſo as to become not a purpoſe of the ſecond or even the third magnitude. I truſt this is ſo obvious, that it will not be neceſſary to put caſes for its illuſtration. In that war, as ſoon as Spain entered into the quarrel, the ſecurity of North America was no longer the ſole nor the foremoſt object. The *Family Compact* had been I know not how long before in agitation. But then it was that we ſaw produced into day-light and action the moſt odious and moſt formidable of all the conſpiracies againſt the liberties of Europe, that ever has been framed. The war with Spain was the firſt fruits of that league;

and a ſecurity againſt that league ought to have been the fundamental point of a pacification with the powers who compoſe it. We had materials in our hands to have conſtructed that ſecurity in ſuch a manner as never to be ſhaken. But how did the virtuous and able men of our author labour for this great end? They took no one ſtep towards it. On the contrary they countenanced, and indeed, as far as it depended on them, recognized it in all its parts; for our plenipotentiary treated with thoſe who acted for the two crowns, as if they had been different miniſters of the ſame monarch. The Spaniſh miniſter received his inſtructions, not from Madrid; but from Verſailles.

This was not hid from our miniſters at home, and the diſcovery ought to have alarmed them, if the good of their country had been the object of their anxiety. They could not but have ſeen that the whole Spaniſh monarchy was melted down into the cabinet of Verſailles. But they thought this circumſtance an advantage; as it enabled them to go through with their work the more expeditiouſly. Expedition was every thing to them; becauſe France might happen during a protracted negotiation to diſcover the great impoſition of our victories.

In the ſame ſpirit they negotiated the terms of the peace. If it were thought adviſable not to take any poſitive ſecurity from Spain, the moſt obvious

obvious principles of policy dictated that the burthen of the ceſſions ought to fall upon France; and that every thing which was of grace and favour ſhould be given to Spain. Spain could not, on her part, have executed a capital article in the family compact, which obliged her to compenſate the loſſes of France. At leaſt ſhe could not do it in America; for ſhe was expreſsly precluded by the treaty of Utrecht from ceding any territory or giving any advantage in trade to that power. What did our miniſters? They took from Spain the territory of Florida, an object of no value except to ſhew our diſpoſitions to be quite equal at leaſt towards both powers; and they enabled France to compenſate Spain by the gift of Louiſiana; loading us with all the harſhneſs, leaving the act of kindneſs with France, and opening thereby a door to the fulfilling of this the moſt conſolidating article of the family compact. Accordingly that dangerous league, thus abetted and authorized by the Engliſh miniſtry without an attempt to invalidate it in any way, or in any of its parts, exiſts to this hour; and has grown ſtronger and ſtronger every hour of its exiſtence.

As to the ſecond component of a good peace, *compenſation*, I have but little trouble; the author has ſaid nothing upon that head. He has nothing to ſay. After a war of ſuch expence, this ought to have been a capital conſideration. But on what

he has been ſo prudently ſilent, I think it is right to ſpeak plainly. All our new acquiſitions together, at this time, ſcarce afford matter of revenue either at home or abroad, ſufficient to defray the expence of their eſtabliſhments; not one ſhilling towards the reduction of our debt. Guadaloupe or Martinico alone would have given us material aid; much in the way of duties, much in the way of trade and navigation. A good miniſtry would have conſidered how a renewal of the *Aſſiento* might have been obtained. We had as much right to aſk it at the treaty of Paris as at the treaty of Utrecht. We had incomparably more in our hands to purchaſe it. Floods of treaſure would have poured into this kingdom from ſuch a ſource; and, under proper management, no ſmall part of it would have taken a publick direction, and have fructified an exhauſted exchequer.

If this gentleman's hero of finance, inſtead of flying from a treaty, which, though he now defends, he could not approve, and would not oppoſe; if he, inſtead of ſhifting into an office, which removed him from the manufacture of the treaty, had, by his credit with the then great director, acquired for us theſe, or any of theſe objects, the poſſeſſion of Guadaloupe or Martinico, or the renewal of the *Aſſiento*, he might have held his head high in his country; becauſe he would have performed real ſervice; ten thouſand times more

more real ſervice, than all the œconomy of which this writer is perpetually talking, or all the little tricks of finance which the experteſt juggler of the treaſury can practiſe, could amount to in a thouſand years. But the occaſion is loſt; the time is gone, perhaps, for ever.

As to the third requiſite, *alliance*, there too the author is ſilent. What ſtrength of that kind did they acquire? They got no one new ally; they ſtript the enemy of not a ſingle old one. They diſguſted (how juſtly, or unjuſtly, matters not) every ally we had; and from that time to this, we ſtand friendleſs in Europe. But of this naked condition of their country, I know ſome people are not aſhamed. They have their ſyſtem of politicks; our anceſtors grew great by another. In this manner theſe virtuous men concluded the peace; and their practice is only conſonant to their theory.

Many things more might be obſerved on this curious head of our author's ſpeculations. But, taking leave of what the writer ſays in his ſerious part, if he be ſerious in any part, I ſhall only juſt point out a piece of his pleaſantry. No man, I believe, ever denied that the time for making peace is that in which the beſt terms may be obtained. But what that time is, together with the uſe that has been made of it, we are to judge by ſeeing whether terms adequate to our advantages,

and

and to our neceſſities, have been actually obtained. —Here is the pinch of the queſtion, and to which the author ought to have ſet his ſhoulders in earneſt. Inſtead of doing this, he ſlips out of the harneſs by a jeſt; and ſneeringly tells us, that, to determine this point, we muſt know the ſecrets of the French and Spaniſh cabinets,* and that parliament was pleaſed to approve the treaty of peace without calling for the correſpondence concerning it. How juſt this ſarcaſm on that parliament may be, I ſay not; but how becoming in the author, I leave it to his friends to determine.

Having thus gone through the queſtions of war and peace, the author proceeds to ſtate our debt, and the intereſt which it carried, at the time of the treaty, with the unfairneſs and inaccuracy, however, which diſtinguiſh all his aſſertions, and all his calculations. To detect every fallacy, and rectify every miſtake, would be endleſs. It will be enough to point out a few of them, in order to ſhew how

* Something however has tranſpired in the quarrels among thoſe concerned in that tranſaction. It ſeems the *good Genius* of Britain ſo much vaunted by our author, did his duty nobly. Whilſt we were gaining ſuch advantages, the court of France was aſtoniſhed at our conceſſions. "J'ai apporté à Verſailles, il eſt "vrai, les ratifications du Roi d'Angleterre *à voſtre grand étonne-* "*ment, et à celui de bien d'autres.* Je dois cela au bontés du Roi "d'Angleterre, à celles de Milord Bute, à Monſ. le Comte de "Viry, à Monſ. le Duc de Nivernois, et en fin à mon ſcavoir "faire." Lettres, &c. du Chev. D'Eon, p. 51.

unſafe

unſafe it is to place any thing like an implicit truſt in ſuch a writer.

The intereſt of debt contracted during the war is ſtated by the author at £.2,614,892. The particulars appear in pages 14 and 15. Among them is ſtated the unfunded debt, £.9,975,017, ſuppoſed to carry intereſt on a medium at 3 *per cent.* which amounts to £.299,250. We are referred to the *Conſiderations on the Trade and Finances of the Kingdom*, p. 22, for the particulars of that unfunded debt. Turn to the work, and to the place referred to by the author himſelf, if you have a mind to ſee a clear detection of a capital fallacy of this article in his account. You will there ſee that this unfunded debt conſiſts of the nine following articles: the remaining ſubſidy to the Duke of Brunſwick; the remaining *dedommagement* to the Landgrave of Heſſe; the German demands; the army and ordnance extraordinaries; the deficiencies of grants and funds; Mr. Touchet's claim; the debts due to Nova Scotia and Barbadoes; Exchequer bills; and Navy debt. The extreme fallacy of this ſtate cannot eſcape any reader who will be at the pains to compare the intereſt money, with which he affirms us to have been loaded, in his *State of the Nation*, with the items of the principal debt to which he refers in his *Conſiderations*. The reader muſt obſerve, that of this long liſt of nine articles, only two, the exchequer bills, and part of the navy debt,

carried

carried any intereſt at all. The firſt amounted to £. 1,800,000; and this undoubtedly carried intereſt. The whole navy debt indeed amounted to £. 4,576,915; but of this only a *part* carried intereſt. The author of the *Conſiderations*, &c. labours to prove this very point in p. 18; and Mr. G. has always defended himſelf upon the ſame ground, for the inſufficient proviſion he made for the diſcharge of that debt. The reader may ſee their own authority for it.*

* "The navy bills are not due till ſix months after they have "been iſſued; ſix months alſo of the ſeamens wages by act of "parliament muſt be, and in conſequence of the rules preſcribed "by that act, twelve months wages generally, and often much "more, are retained; and there has been beſides at all times a "large arrear of pay, which, though kept in the account, could "never be claimed, the perſons to whom it was due having left "neither aſſignees nor repreſentatives. The preciſe amount of "ſuch ſums cannot be aſcertained; but they can hardly be reckoned leſs than 13 or 14 hundred thouſand pounds. On 31ſt "Dec. 1754, when the navy debt was reduced nearly as low as "it could be, it ſtill amounted to 1,296,567*l.* 18*s.* 11¾*d.* conſiſting chiefly of articles which could not then be diſcharged; "ſuch articles will be larger now, in proportion to the encreaſe "of the eſtabliſhment; and an allowance muſt always be made "for them in judging of the ſtate of the navy debt, though they "are not diſtinguiſhable in the account. In providing for that "which is payable, the principal object of the legiſlature is always to diſcharge the bills, for they are the greateſt article; "they bear an intereſt of 4 *per cent.*; and, when the quantity of "them is large, they are a heavy incumbrance upon all money "tranſactions."

Mr.

Mr. G. did in fact provide no more than £. 2,150,000 for the diſcharge of theſe bills in two years. It is much to be wiſhed that theſe gentlemen would lay their heads together, that they would conſider well this matter, and agree upon ſomething. For when the ſcanty proviſion made for the unfunded debt is to be vindicated, then we are told it is a very *ſmall part* of that debt which carries intereſt. But when the publick is to be repreſented in a miſerable condition, and the conſequences of the late war to be laid before us in dreadful colours, then we are to be told that the unfunded debt is within a trifle of ten millions, and ſo large a portion of it carries intereſt that we muſt not compute leſs than 3 *per cent.* upon the *whole.*

In the year 1764, parliament voted £. 650,000 towards the diſcharge of the navy debt. This ſum could not be applied ſolely to the diſcharge of bills carrying intereſt; becauſe part of the debt due on ſeamens wages muſt have been paid, and ſome bills carried no intereſt at all. Notwithſtanding this, we find by an account in the Journals of the houſe of commons, in the following ſeſſion, that the navy debt carrying intereſt was, on the 31ſt of December, 1764, no more than £. 1,687,442. I am ſure therefore that I admit too much when I admit the navy debt carrying intereſt, after the creation of the navy annuities in the year 1763, to have been £. 2,200,000. Add the exchequer bills; and the whole

whole unfunded debt carrring intereſt will be four millions inſtead of ten; and the annual intereſt paid for it at 4 *per cent.* will be £. 160,000 inſtead of £. 299,250. An error of no ſmall magnitude, and which could not have been owing to inadvertency.

The miſrepreſentation of the increaſe of the peace eſtabliſhment is ſtill more extraordinary than that of the intereſt of the unfunded debt. The increaſe is great undoubtedly. However, the author finds no fault with it, and urges it only as a matter of argument to ſupport the ſtrange chimerical propoſals he is to make us in the cloſe of his work for the encreaſe of revenue. The greater he made that eſtabliſhment, the ſtronger he expected to ſtand in argument: but, whatever he expected or propoſed, he ſhould have ſtated the matter fairly. He tells us that this eſtabliſhment is near £. 1,500,000 more than it was in 1752, 1753, and other years of peace. This he has done in his uſual manner, by aſſertion, without troubling himſelf either with proof or probability. For he has not given us any ſtate of the peace eſtabliſhment in the years 1753 and 1754, the time which he means to compare with the preſent. As I am obliged to force him to that preciſion, from which he always flies as from his moſt dangerous enemy, I have been at the trouble to ſearch the Journals in the period between the two laſt wars: and I find that

that the peace eſtabliſhment, conſiſting of the navy, the ordnance, and the ſeveral incidental expences, amounted to £. 2,346,594. Now is this writer wild enough to imagine, that the peace eſtabliſhment of 1764 and the ſubſequent years, made up from the ſame articles, is £. 3,800,000 and upwards? His aſſertion however goes to this. But I muſt take the liberty of correcting him in this groſs miſtake, and from an authority he cannot refuſe, from his favourite work, and ſtanding authority, the Conſiderations. We find there, p. 43,* the peace eſtabliſhment of 1764 and 1765 ſtated at £. 3,609,700. This is near two hundred thouſand pounds leſs than that given in The State of the Nation. But even from this, in order to render

* Navy - - - -	1,450,900
Army - - - -	1,268,500
Ordnance - - - -	174,600
The four American governments -	19,200
General ſurveys in America - -	1,600
Foundling Hoſpital - - -	38,000
To the African committee - -	13,000
For the civil eſtabliſhment on the coaſt of Africa	5,500
Militia - - - -	100,000
Deficiency of land and malt - -	300,000
Deficiency of funds - - -	202,400
Extraordinaries of the army and navy -	35,000
Total	£. 3,609,700

the

the articles which compoſe the peace eſtabliſhment in the two periods correſpondent (for otherwiſe they cannot be compared), we muſt deduct firſt, his articles of the deficiency of land and malt, which amount to £.300,000. They certainly are no part of the eſtabliſhment; nor are they included in that ſum, which I have ſtated above for the eſtabliſhment in the time of the former peace. If they were proper to be ſtated at all, they ought to be ſtated in both accounts. We muſt alſo deduct the deficiencies of funds, £.202,400. Theſe deficiencies are the difference between the intereſt charged on the publick for monies borrowed, and the produce of the taxes laid for the diſcharge of that intereſt. Annual proviſion is indeed to be made for them by parliament: but in the enquiry before us, which is only what charge is brought on the publick by intereſt paid or to be paid for money borrowed, the utmoſt that the author ſhould do, is to bring into the account the full intereſt for all that money. This he has done in p. 15; and he repeats it in p. 18, the very page I am now examining, £.2,614,892. To comprehend afterwards in the peace eſtabliſhment the deficiency of the fund created for payment of that intereſt, would be laying twice to the account of the war part of the ſame ſum. Suppoſe ten millions borrowed at 4 *per cent.* and the fund for payment of the intereſt to produce no more than £.200,000.

£. 200,000. The whole annual charge on the publick is £. 400,000. It can be no more. But to charge the intereſt in one part of the account, and then the deficiency in the other, would be charging £. 600,000. The deficiency of funds muſt therefore be alſo deducted from the peace eſtabliſhment in the Conſiderations; and then the peace eſtabliſhment in that author will be reduced to the ſame articles with thoſe included in the ſum I have already mentioned for the peace eſtabliſhment before the laſt war, in the year 1753, and 1754.

		£.
Peace eſtabliſhment in the Conſiderations - - -		3,609,700
Deduct deficiency of land and malt - -	300,000	
Ditto of funds - -	202,400	
		502,400
		3,107,300
Peace eſtabliſhment before the late war, in which no deficiencies of land and malt, or funds are included - - - -		2,346,594
	Difference £.	760,706

Being about half the ſum which our author has been pleaſed to ſuppoſe it.

Let us put the whole together. The author ſtates,

	£.
Difference of peace eſtabliſhment before and ſince the war - - - -	1,500,000
Intereſt of debt contracted by the war - - - - -	2,614,892
	4,114,892

The *real* difference in the peace eſtabliſhment is	760,706	
The actual intereſt of the funded debt, including that charged on the ſinking fund -	2,315,642	
The actual intereſt of unfunded debt at moſt	160,000	
Total intereſt of debt contracted by the war -	2,475,642	
Encreaſe of peace eſtabliſhments, and intereſt of new debt - - -		3,236,348
Error of the author £.		878,544

It is true, the extraordinaries of the army have been found conſiderably greater than the author of

of the Conſiderations was pleaſed to foretel they would be. The author of The Preſent State avails himſelf of that encreaſe, and, finding it ſuit his purpoſe, ſets the whole down in the peace eſtabliſhment of the preſent times. If this is allowed him, his error perhaps may be reduced to £.700,000. But I doubt the author of the Conſiderations will not thank him for admitting £.200,000 and upwards, as the peace eſtabliſhment for extraordinaries, when that author has ſo much laboured to confine them within £.35,000.

Theſe are ſome of the capital fallacies of the author. To break the thread of my diſcourſe as little as poſſible, I have thrown into the margin many inſtances, though God knows far from the whole, of his inaccuracies, inconſiſtencies, and want of common care. I think myſelf obliged to take ſome notice of them, in order to take off from any authority this writer may have; and to put an end to the deference which careleſs men are apt to pay to one who boldly arrays his accounts, and marſhals his figures, in perfect confidence that their correctneſs will never be examined.*

However,

* Upon the money borrowed in 1760, the premium of one *per cent.* was for 21 years, not for 20; this annuity has been paid eight years inſtead of ſeven; the ſum paid is therefore £.640,000 inſtead of £.560,000; the remaining term is worth 10 years and

However, for argument, I am content to take his ſtate of it. The debt was and is enormous.

a quarter inſtead of 11 years;* its value is £.820,000 inſtead of £.880,000; and the whole value of that premium is £.1,460,000 inſtead of 1,440,000. The like errors are obſervable in his computation on the additional capital of three *per cent.* on the loan of that year. In like manner, on the loan of 1762, the author computes on five years payment inſtead of ſix; and ſays in expreſs terms, that take 5 from 19, and there remains 13. Theſe are not errors of the pen or the preſs; the ſeveral computations purſued in this part of the work with great diligence and earneſtneſs prove them errors upon much deliberation. Thus the premiums in 1759 are caſt up £.90,000 too little, an error in the firſt rule of arithmetic. "The annuities borrowed in 1756 and 1758 are," ſays he, "to continue till redeemed by parliament." He does not take notice that the firſt are irredeemable till February 1771, the other till July 1782. In this the amount of the premiums is computed on the time which they have run. Weakly and ignorantly; for he might have added to this, and ſtrengthened his argument, ſuch as it is, by charging alſo the value of the additional one *per cent.* from the day on which he wrote to at leaſt that day on which theſe annuities become redeemable. To make ample amends, however, he has added to the premiums of 15 *per cent.* in 1759, and three *per cent.* in 1760, the annuity paid for them ſince their commencement; the fallacy of which is manifeſt; for the premiums in theſe caſes can be neither more nor leſs than the additional capital for which the publick ſtands engaged, and is juſt the ſame whether five or 500 years annuity has been paid for it. In private life, no man perſuades himſelf that he has borrowed £.200, becauſe he happens to have paid 20 years intereſt on loan of £.100.

* See Smart and Demoivre.

The

The war was expenſive. The beſt œconomy had not perhaps been uſed. But I muſt obſerve, that war and œconomy are things not eaſily reconciled; and that the attempt of leaning towards parſimony in ſuch a ſtate may be the worſt management, and in the end the worſt œconomy in the world, hazarding the total loſs of all the charge incurred, and of every thing along with it.

But *cui bono* all this detail of our debt? has the author given a ſingle light towards any material reduction of it? Not a glimmering. We ſhall ſee in its place what ſort of thing he propoſes. But before he commences his operations, in order to ſcare the publick imagination, he raiſes by art magick a thick miſt before our eyes, through which glare the moſt ghaſtly and horrible phantoms:

Hunc igitur terrorem animi tenebraſque neceſſe eſt,
Non radii ſolis, neque lucida tela diei
Diſcutiant, ſed naturæ ſpecies ratioque.

Let us therefore calmly, if we can for the fright into which he has put us, appreciate thoſe dreadful and deformed gorgons and hydras, which inhabit the joyleſs regions of an imagination, fruitful in nothing but the production of monſters.

His whole repreſentation is founded on the ſuppoſed operation of our debt, upon our manufactures, and our trade. To this cauſe he attributes

a certain ſuppoſed dearneſs of the neceſſaries of life, which muſt compel our manufacturers to emigrate to cheaper countries, particularly to France, and with them the manufacture. Thence conſumption declining, and with it revenue. He will not permit the real balance of our trade to be eſtimated ſo high as £.2,500,000; and the intereſt of the debt to foreigners carries off £.1,500,000 of that balance. France is not in the ſame condition. Then follow his wailings and lamentings, which he renews over and over, according to his cuſtom—a declining trade, and decreaſing ſpecie—on the point of becoming tributary to France—of loſing Ireland—of having the colonies torn away from us.

The firſt thing upon which I ſhall obſerve is,* what he takes for granted as the cleareſt of all propoſitions, the emigration of our manufacturers to France. I undertake to ſay that this aſſertion is totally groundleſs, and I challenge the author to bring any ſort of proof of it. If living is cheaper in France, that is, to be had for leſs ſpecie, wages are proportionably lower. No manufacturer, let the living be what it will, was ever known to fly for refuge to low wages. Money is the firſt thing which attracts him. Accordingly our wages attract artificers from all parts of the world. From

* P. 30, 31, 32.

two

two ſhillings to one ſhilling, is a fall, in all mens imaginations, which no calculation upon a difference in the price of the neceſſaries of life can compenſate. But it will be hard to prove, that a French artificer is better fed, cloathed, lodged, and warmed, than one in England; for that is the ſenſe, and the only ſenſe, of living cheaper. If, in truth and fact, our artificer fares as well in all theſe reſpects as one in the ſame ſtate in France—how ſtands the matter in point of opinion and prejudice, the ſprings by which people in that claſs of life are chiefly actuated? The idea of our common people, concerning French living, is dreadful; altogether as dreadful as our author's can poſſibly be of the ſtate of his own country; a way of thinking that will hardly ever prevail on them to deſert to France.*

But, leaving the author's ſpeculations, the fact is, that they have not deſerted; and of courſe the manufacture cannot be departed, or departing, with them. I am not indeed able to get at all the details of our manufactures; though, I think, I have taken full as much pains for that purpoſe as our author. Some I have by me; and they do

* In a courſe of years a few manufacturers have been tempted abroad; not by cheap living, but by immenſe premiums, to ſet up as maſters, and to introduce the manufacture. This muſt happen in every country eminent for the ſkill of its artificers, and has nothing to do with taxes and the price of proviſions.

not hitherto, thank God, ſupport the author's complaint, unleſs a vaſt encreaſe of the quantity of goods manufactured be a proof of loſing the manufacture. On a view of the regiſters in the Weſt-riding of Yorkſhire, for three years before the war, and for the three laſt, it appears, that the quantities of cloths entered were as follow:

	Pieces broad.	Pieces narrow.
1752.	60,724	72,442
1753.	55,358	71,618
1754.	56,070	72,394
	172,152	216,454

	Pieces broad.	Pieces narrow.
1765.	54,660	77,419
1766.	72,575	78,893
1767.	102,428	78,819
3 years, ending 1767,	229,663	235,131
3 years, ending 1754,	172,152	216,454
Encreaſe,	57,511	18,677

In this manner this capital branch of manufacture has encreaſed, under the encreaſe of taxes; and

and this not from a declining, but from a greatly flouriſhing period of commerce. I may ſay the ſame on the beſt authority of the fabrick of thin goods at Halifax; of the bays at Rochdale; and of that infinite variety of admirable manufactures that grow and extend every year among the ſpirited, inventive, and enterprizing traders of Mancheſter.

A trade ſometimes ſeems to periſh when it only aſſumes a different form. Thus the coarſeſt woollens were formerly exported in great quantities to Ruſſia. The Ruſſians now ſupply themſelves with theſe goods. But the export thither of finer cloths has encreaſed in proportion as the other has declined. Poſſibly ſome parts of the kingdom may have felt ſomething like a languor in buſineſs. Objects like trade and manufacture, which the very attempt to confine would certainly deſtroy, frequently change their place; and thereby, far from being loſt, are often highly improved. Thus ſome manufactures have decayed in the weſt and ſouth, which have made new and more vigorous ſhoots when tranſplanted into the north. And here it is impoſſible to paſs by, though the author has ſaid nothing upon it, the vaſt addition to the maſs of Britiſh trade, which has been made by the improvement of Scotland. What does he think of the commerce of the city of Glaſgow, and of the manufactures of Paiſley and all the adjacent country?

has

has this any thing like the deadly aſpect and *facies Hippocratica* which the falſe diagnoſtick of our ſtate phyſician has given to our trade in general? has he not heard of the iron works of ſuch magnitude even in their cradle which are ſet up on the Carron, and which at the ſame time have drawn nothing from Sheffield, Birmingham, or Wolverhampton?

This might perhaps be enough to ſhew the entire falſity of the complaint concerning the decline of our manufactures. But every ſtep we advance, this matter clears up more; and the falſe terrors of the author are diſſipated, and fade away as the light appears. "The trade and manufactures of "this country (ſays he) going to ruin, and a di- "minution of our *revenue from conſumption* muſt "attend the loſs of ſo many ſeamen and artificers." Nothing more true than the general obſervation: nothing more falſe than its application to our circumſtances. Let the revenue on conſumption ſpeak for itſelf:

	£.
Average of net exciſe, ſince the new duties, three years ending 1767,	4,590,734
Ditto before the new duties, three years ending 1759,	3,261,694
Average encreaſe,	£. 1,329,040

Here

Here is no diminution. Here is, on the contrary, an immenſe encreaſe. This is owing, I ſhall be told, to the new duties, which may encreaſe the total bulk, but at the ſame time may make ſome diminution of the produce of the old. Were this the fact, it would be far from ſupporting the author's complaint. It might have proved that the burthen lay rather too heavy; but it would never prove that the *revenue from conſumption* was impaired, which it was his buſineſs to do. But what is the real fact? Let us take, as the beſt inſtance for the purpoſe, the produce of the old hereditary and temporary exciſe granted in the reign of Charles the Second, whoſe object is that of moſt of the new impoſitions, from two averages, each of eight years.

	£.
Average, firſt period, eight years, ending 1754,	525,317
Ditto, ſecond period, eight years, ending 1767,	538,542
Encreaſe,	£. 13,225

I have taken theſe averages as including in each, a war and a peace period; the firſt before the impoſition of the new duties, the other ſince thoſe impoſitions; and ſuch is the ſtate of the oldeſt branch of

of the revenue from conſumption. Beſides the acquiſition of ſo much new, this article, to ſpeak of no other, has rather encreaſed under the preſſure of all thoſe additional taxes to which the author is pleaſed to attribute its deſtruction. But as the author has made his grand effort againſt thoſe moderate, judicious, and neceſſary levies, which ſupport all the dignity, the credit, and the power of his country, the reader will excuſe a little further detail on this ſubject; that we may ſee how little oppreſſive thoſe taxes are on the ſhoulders of the publick, with which he labours ſo earneſtly to load its imagination. For this purpoſe we take the ſtate of that ſpecifick article upon which the two capital burthens of the war leaned the moſt immediately, by the additional duties on malt, and upon beer:

	Barrels.
Average of ſtrong beer, brewed in eight years before the additional malt and beer duties, - - - -	3,895,059
Average of ſtrong beer, eight years ſince the duties, - - -	4,060,726
Encreaſe in the laſt period,	165,667

Here is the effect of two ſuch daring taxes as 3*d.* by the buſhel additional on malt, and 3*s.* by the barrel

barrel additional on beer. Two impoſitions laid without remiſſion one upon the neck of the other; and laid upon an object which before had been immenſely loaded. They did not in the leaſt impair the conſumption: it has grown under them. It appears that, upon the whole, the people did not feel ſo much inconvenience from the new duties as to oblige them to take refuge in the private brewery. Quite the contrary happened in both theſe reſpects in the reign of King William; and it happened from much ſlighter impoſitions.* No people can long conſume a commodity for which they are not well able to pay. An enlightened reader laughs at the inconſiſtent chimera of our author, of a people univerſally luxurious, and at the ſame time oppreſſed with taxes and declining in trade. For my part, I cannot look on theſe duties as the author does. He ſees nothing but the burthen. I can perceive the burthen as well as

* Although the publick brewery has conſiderably encreaſed in this latter period, the produce of the malt tax has been ſomething leſs than in the former; this cannot be attributed to the new malt tax. Had this been the cauſe of the leſſened conſumption, the publick brewery, ſo much more burthened, muſt have felt it more. The cauſe of this diminution of the malt tax, I take to have been principally owing to the greater dearneſs of corn in the ſecond period than in the firſt, which, in all its conſequences, affected the people in the country much more than thoſe in the towns. But the revenue from conſumption was not on the whole impaired, as we have ſeen in the foregoing page.

he;

he; but I cannot avoid contemplating alſo the ſtrength that ſupports it. From thence I draw the moſt comfortable aſſurances of the future vigour, and the ample reſources, of this great miſrepreſented country; and can never prevail on myſelf to make complaints which have no cauſe, in order to raiſe hopes which have no foundation.

When a repreſentation is built on truth and nature, one member ſupports the other, and mutual lights are given and received from every part. Thus, as our manufacturers have not deſerted, nor the manufacture left us, nor the conſumption declined, nor the revenue ſunk; ſo neither has trade, which is at once the reſult, meaſure, and cauſe of the whole, in the leaſt decayed, as our author has thought proper ſometimes to affirm, conſtantly to ſuppoſe, as if it were the moſt indiſputable of all propoſitions. The reader will ſee below the comparative ſtate of our trade* in three of the beſt

* Total imports, value,		Exports ditto,
	£.	£.
1752. -	7,889,369 -	11,694,912
1753. -	8,625,029 -	12,243,604
1754. -	8,093,472 -	11,787,828
Total,	£.24,607,870 -	35,726,344
		24,607,870
	Exports exceed imports,	11,118,474
	Medium balance,	£.3,706,158

Total

years before our encreaſe of debt and taxes, and with it the three laſt years ſince the author's date of our ruin.

In the laſt three years the whole of our exports was between 44 and 45 millions. In the three years preceding the war, it was no more than from 35 to 36 millions. The average balance of the former period was £.3,706,000; of the latter, ſomething above four millions. It is true, that whilſt the impreſſions of the author's deſtructive war continued, our trade was greater than it is at preſent. One of the neceſſary conſequences of the peace was, that France muſt gradually recover a part of thoſe markets of which ſhe had been originally in poſſeſſion. However, after all theſe deductions, ſtill the groſs trade in the worſt year of the preſent is better than in the beſt year of any former period of peace. A very great part of

	Total imports, value, £.	Exports, ditto, £.
1764.	10,319,946	16,164,532
1765.	10,889,742	14,550,507
1766.	11,475,825	14,024,964
Total,	£.32,685,513	44,740,003
		32,685,513
Exports exceed,		12,054,490
Medium balance for three laſt years,		£.4,018,163

our

our taxes, if not the greateſt, has been impoſed ſince the beginning of the century. On the author's principles, this continual encreaſe of taxes muſt have ruined our trade, or at leaſt entirely checked its growth. But I have a manuſcript of Davenant, which contains an abſtract of our trade for the years 1703 and 1704; by which it appears, that the whole export from England did not then exceed £.6,552,019. It is now conſiderably more than double that amount. Yet England was then a rich and flouriſhing nation.

The author endeavours to derogate from the balance in our favour as it ſtands on the entries, and reduces it from four millions as it there appears to no more than £.2,500,000. His obſervation on the looſeneſs and inaccuracy of the export entries is juſt; and that the error is always an error of exceſs, I readily admit. But becauſe, as uſual, he has wholly omitted ſome very material facts, his concluſion is as erroneous as the entries he complains of.

On this point of the cuſtom-houſe entries I ſhall make a few obſervations. 1ſt. The inaccuracy of theſe entries can extend only to FREE GOODS, that is, to ſuch Britiſh products and manufactures, as are exported without drawback and without bounty; which do not in general amount to more than two-thirds at the very utmoſt of the whole export even of *our home products*. The valuable articles

articles of corn, malt, leather, hops, beer, and many others, do not come under this objection of inaccuracy. The article of CERTIFICATE GOODS re-exported, a vaſt branch of our commerce, admits of no error (except ſome ſmaller frauds which cannot be eſtimated), as they have all a drawback of duty, and the exporter muſt therefore correctly ſpecify their quantity and kind. The author therefore is not warranted from the known error in ſome of the entries, to make a general defalcation from the whole balance in our favour. This error cannot affect more than half, if ſo much, of the export article. 2dly. In the account made up at the inſpector general's office, they eſtimate only the original coſt of Britiſh products as they are here purchaſed; and on foreign goods, only the prices in the country from whence they are ſent. This was the method eſtabliſhed by Mr. Davenant; and, as far as it goes, it certainly is a good one. But the profits of the merchant at home, and of our factories abroad, are not taken into the account: which profit on ſuch an immenſe quantity of goods exported and re-exported cannot fail of being very great: five *per cent.* upon the whole, I ſhould think a very moderate allowance. 3dly. It does not comprehend the advantage ariſing from the employment of 600,000 tons of ſhipping, which muſt be paid by the foreign conſumer, and which, in many bulky articles of commerce, is

equal to the value of the commodity. This can ſcarcely be rated at leſs than a million annually. 4thly, The whole import from Ireland and America, and from the Weſt Indies, is ſet againſt us in the ordinary way of ſtriking a balance of imports and exports; whereas the import and export are both our own. This is juſt as ridiculous, as to put againſt the general balance of the nation, how much more goods Cheſhire receives from London, than London from Cheſhire. The whole revolves and circulates through this kingdom, and is, ſo far as it regards our profit, in the nature of home trade, as much as if the ſeveral countries of America and Ireland were all pieced to Cornwall. The courſe of exchange with all theſe places is fully ſufficient to demonſtrate that this kingdom has the whole advantage of their commerce. When the final profit upon a whole ſyſtem of trade reſts and centers in a certain place, a balance ſtruck in that place merely on the mutual ſale of commodities is quite fallacious. 5thly, The cuſtom-houſe entries furniſh a moſt defective, and indeed ridiculous idea, of the moſt valuable branch of trade we have in the world, that with Newfoundland. Obſerve what you export thither; a little ſpirits, proviſion, fiſhing lines, and fiſhing hooks. Is this *export* the true idea of the Newfoundland trade in the light of a beneficial branch of commerce? nothing leſs. Examine our imports from thence; it

ſeems,

ſeems, upon this vulgar idea of exports and imports, to turn the balance againſt you. But your exports to Newfoundland are your own goods. Your import is your own food; as much your own, as that you raiſe with your ploughs out of your own ſoil; and not your loſs, but your gain; your riches, not your poverty. But ſo fallacious is this way of judging, that neither the export nor import, nor both together, ſupply any idea approaching to adequate of that branch of buſineſs. The veſſels in that trade go ſtrait from Newfoundland to the foreign market; and the ſale there, not the import here, is the meaſure of its value. That trade which is one of your greateſt and beſt is hardly ſo much as ſeen in the cuſtom-houſe entries; and it is not of leſs annual value to this nation than £.400,000. 6thly, The quality of your imports muſt be conſidered as well as the quantity. To ſtate the whole of the foreign import *as loſs*, is exceedingly abſurd. All the iron, hemp, flax, cotton, Spaniſh wool, raw ſilk, woollen and linen yarn, which we import, are by no means to be conſidered as the matter of a merely luxurious conſumption; which is the idea too generally and looſely annexed to our import article. Theſe above-mentioned are materials of induſtry, not of luxury, which are wrought up here, in many inſtances, to ten times, and more, of their original value. Even where they are not ſubſervient to

our exports, they ſtill add to our internal wealth, which conſiſts in the ſtock of uſeful commodities, as much as in gold and ſilver. In looking over the ſpecifick articles of our export and import, I have often been aſtoniſhed to ſee for how ſmall a part of the ſupply of our conſumption, either luxurious or convenient, we are indebted to nations properly foreign to us.

Theſe conſiderations are entirely paſſed over by the author; they have been but too much neglected by moſt who have ſpeculated on this ſubject. But they ought never to be omitted by thoſe who mean to come to any thing like the true ſtate of the Britiſh trade. They compenſate, and they more than compenſate, every thing which the author can cut off with any appearance of reaſon for the over-entry of Britiſh goods; and they reſtore to us that balance of four millions, which the author has thought proper on ſuch a very poor and limited comprehenſion of the object to reduce to £.2,500,000.

In general this author is ſo circumſtanced, that to ſupport his theory he is obliged to aſſume his facts: and then, if you allow his facts, they will not ſupport his concluſions. What if all he ſays of the ſtate of this balance were true? did not the ſame objections always lie to cuſtom-houſe entries? do they defalcate more from the entries of 1766 than from thoſe of 1754? If they prove us ruined,

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we were always ruined. Some ravens have always indeed croaked out this kind of ſong. They have a malignant delight in preſaging miſchief, when they are not employed in doing it: they are miſerable and diſappointed at every inſtance of the publick proſperity. They overlook us like the malevolent being of the poet:

Tritonida conſpicit arcem
Ingeniis, opibuſque, et feſta pace virentem;
Vixque tenet lacrymas quia nil lacrymable cernit.

It is in this ſpirit that ſome have looked upon thoſe accidents that caſt an occaſional damp upon trade. Their imaginations entail theſe accidents upon us in perpetuity. We have had ſome bad harveſts. This muſt very diſadvantageouſly affect the balance of trade, and the navigation of a people, ſo large a part of whoſe commerce is in grain. But, in knowing the cauſe, we are morally certain, that, according to the courſe of events, it cannot long ſubſiſt. In the three laſt years, we have exported ſcarcely any grain; in good years, that export hath been worth twelve hundred thouſand pounds and more; in the two laſt years, far from exporting, we have been obliged to import to the amount perhaps of our former exportation. So that in this article the balance muſt be £.2,000,000 againſt us; that is, one million in the

ceaſing of gain, the other in the encreaſe of expenditure. But none of the author's promiſes or projects could have prevented this misfortune; and, thank God, we do not want him or them to relieve us from it; although, if his friends ſhould now come into power, I doubt not but they will be ready to take credit for any encreaſe of trade or exciſe, that may ariſe from the happy circumſtance of a good harveſt.

This connects with his loud laments and melancholy prognoſtications concerning the high price of the neceſſaries of life and the products of labour. With all his others, I deny this fact; and I again call upon him to prove it. Take average and not accident, the grand and firſt neceſſary of life is cheap in this country; and that too as weighed, not againſt labour, which is its true counterpoiſe, but againſt money. Does he call the price of wheat at this day, between 32 and 40 ſhillings *per* quarter in London, dear?* He muſt know that fuel (an object of the higheſt order in the neceſſaries of life, and of the firſt neceſſity in almoſt every kind of manufacture) is in many of our provinces cheaper than in any part of the globe. Meat is on the whole not exceſſively dear, whatever its price may be at particular times and from

* It is dearer in ſome places, and rather cheaper in others; but it muſt ſoon all come to a level.

particular

particular accidents. If it has had any thing like an uniform riſe, this enhancement may eaſily be proved not to be owing to the encreaſe of taxes; but to uniform encreaſe of conſumption and of money. Diminiſh the latter, and meat in your markets will be ſufficiently cheap in account, but much dearer in effect: becauſe fewer will be in a condition to buy. Thus your apparent plenty will be real indigence. At preſent, even under temporary diſadvantages, the uſe of fleſh is greater here than any where elſe; it is continued without any interruption of Lents or meagre days; it is ſuſtained and growing even with the encreaſe of our taxes. But ſome have the art of converting even the ſigns of national proſperity into ſymptoms of decay and ruin. And our author, who ſo loudly diſclaims popularity, never fails to lay hold of the moſt vulgar popular prejudices and humours, in hopes to captivate the crowd. Even thoſe peeviſh diſpoſitions which grow out of ſome tranſitory ſuffering, thoſe paſſing clouds which float in our changeable atmoſphere; are by him induſtriouſly figured into frightful ſhapes, in order firſt to terrify and then to govern the populace.

It was not enough for the author's purpoſe to give this falſe and diſcouraging picture of the ſtate of his own country. It did not fully anſwer his end, to exaggerate her burthens, to depreciate her ſucceſſes, and to vilify her character. Nothing had

been done, unleſs the ſituation of France were exalted in proportion as that of England had been abaſed. The reader will excuſe the citation I make at length from his book; he out-does himſelf upon this occaſion. His confidence is indeed unparalleled, and altogether of the heroick caſt:

"If our rival nations were in the ſame circumſtances with ourſelves, the *augmentation of our taxes would produce no ill conſequences:* if we were obliged to raiſe our prices, they muſt, from the ſame cauſes, do the like, and could take no advantage by under-ſelling and under-working us. But the alarming conſideration to Great Britain is, *that France is not in the ſame condition.* Her diſtreſſes, during the war, were great, but they were immediate; her want of credit, as has been ſaid, compelled her to impoveriſh her people, by raiſing the greateſt part of her ſupplies within the year; *but the burthens ſhe impoſed on them were, in a great meaſure, temporary, and muſt be greatly diminiſhed by a few years of peace.* She could procure no conſiderable loans, therefore ſhe has mortgaged no *ſuch oppreſſive taxes as thoſe Great Britain has impoſed in perpetuity for payment of intereſt.* Peace muſt, therefore, ſoon re-eſtabliſh her commerce and manufactures, eſpecially as the comparative *lightneſs of taxes*, and the cheapneſs of living, in that country, muſt make France an aſylum for Britiſh manufacturers and artificers."

"ficers." On this the author reſts the merit of his whole ſyſtem. And on this point I will join iſſue with him. If France is not at leaſt in the *ſame condition*, even in that very condition which the author falſely repreſents to be ours, if the very reverſe of his propoſition be not true, then I will admit his State of the Nation to be juſt; and all his inferences from that ſtate to be logical and concluſive. It is not ſurprizing, that the author ſhould hazard our opinion of his veracity. That is a virtue on which great ſtateſmen do not perhaps pique themſelves ſo much: but it is ſomewhat extraordinary, that he ſhould ſtake on a very poor calculation of chances, all credit for care, for accuracy, and for knowledge of the ſubject of which he treats. He is raſh and inaccurate, becauſe he thinks he writes to a publick ignorant and inattentive. But he may find himſelf in that reſpect, as in many others, greatly miſtaken.

In order to contraſt the light and vigorous condition of France with that of England, weak, and ſinking under her burthens, he ſtates in his tenth page, that France had raiſed £.50,314,378 ſterling *by taxes within the ſeveral years* from the year 1756 to 1762 both incluſive. An Engliſhman muſt ſtand aghaſt at ſuch a repreſentation: To find France able to *raiſe within the year* ſums little inferior to all that we were able even to *borrow* on intereſt with all the reſources of the greateſt and moſt

moſt eſtabliſhed credit in the world! Europe was filled with aſtoniſhment when they ſaw England *borrow* in one year twelve millions. It was thought, and very juſtly, no ſmall proof of national ſtrength and financial ſkill, to find a fund for the payment of the intereſt upon this ſum. The intereſt of this, computed with the one *per cent.* annuities, amounted only to £.600,000 a year. This, I ſay, was thought a ſurprizing effort even of credit. But this author talks, as of a thing not worth proving, and but juſt worth obſerving, that France in one year raiſed ſixteen times that ſum without borrowing, and continued to raiſe ſums not far from equal to it for ſeveral years together. Suppoſe ſome Jacob Henriques had propoſed, in the year 1762, to prevent a perpetual charge on the nation by raiſing ten millions within the year. He would have been conſidered, not as a harſh financier, who laid an heavy hand on the publick; but as a poor viſionary, who had run mad on ſupplies and taxes. They who know that the whole land tax of England, at 4*s.* in the pound, raiſes but two millions; will not eaſily apprehend that any ſuch ſums as the author has conjured up can be raiſed even in the moſt opulent nations. France owed a large debt, and was incumbered with heavy eſtabliſhments, before that war. The author does not formally deny that ſhe borrowed ſomething in every year of its continuance; let him produce

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the funds for this aſtoniſhing annual addition to all her vaſt preceding taxes, an addition equal to the whole exciſe, cuſtoms, land and malt taxes of England taken together.

But what muſt be the reader's aſtoniſhment, perhaps his indignation, if he ſhould find that this great financier has fallen into the moſt unaccountable of all errors, no leſs an error than that of miſtaking the *identical ſums borrowed by France upon intereſt, for ſupplies raiſed within the year.* Can it be conceived that any man only entered into the firſt rudiments of finance ſhould make ſo egregious a blunder; ſhould write it, ſhould print it; ſhould carry it to a ſecond edition: ſhould take it not collaterally and incidentally, but lay it down as the corner-ſtone of his whole ſyſtem, in ſuch an important point as the comparative ſtates of France and England? But it will be ſaid, that it was his misfortune to be ill-informed. Not at all. A man of any looſe general knowledge, and of the moſt ordinary ſagacity, never could have been miſinformed in ſo groſs a manner; becauſe he would have immediately rejected ſo wild and extravagant an account.

The fact is this: the credit of France, bad as it might have been, did enable her (not to raiſe within the year) but to *borrow* the very ſums the author mentions; that is to ſay, 1,106,916,261 livres, making, in the author's computation, £.50,314,378.

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The credit of France was low; but it was not annihilated. She did not derive, as our author chooſes to aſſert, any advantages from the debility of her credit. Its conſequence was the natural one: ſhe borrowed; but ſhe borrowed upon bad terms, indeed on the moſt exorbitant uſury.

In ſpeaking of a foreign revenue, the very pretence to accuracy would be the moſt inaccurate thing in the world. Neither the author nor I can with certainty authenticate the information we communicate to the publick, nor in an affair of eternal fluctuation arrive at perfect exactneſs. All we can do, and this we may be expected to do, is to avoid groſs errors and blunders of a capital nature. We cannot order the proper officer to lay the accounts before the houſe. But the reader muſt judge on the probability of the accounts we lay before him. The author ſpeaks of France as raiſing her ſupplies for war by taxes within the year; and of her debt, as a thing ſcarcely worthy of notice. I affirm that ſhe borrowed large ſums in every year; and has thereby accumulated an immenſe debt. This debt continued after the war infinitely to embarraſs her affairs; and to find ſome means for its reduction was then and has ever ſince been the firſt object of her policy. But ſhe has ſo little ſucceeded in all her efforts, that the *perpetual* debt of France is at this hour little ſhort of £.100,000,000 ſterling; and ſhe ſtands charged with at leaſt

40,000,000

40,000,000 of Engliſh pounds on life-rents and tontines. The annuities paid at this day at the Hotel de Ville of Paris, which are by no means her ſole payments of that nature, amount to 139,000,000 of livres, that is, to 6,318,000 pounds; beſides *billets au porteur*, and various detached and unfunded debts, to a great amount, and which bear an intereſt.

At the end of the war, the intereſt payable on her debt amounted to upwards of ſeven millions ſterling. M. de la Verdy, the laſt hope of the French finances, was called in, to aid in the reduction of an intereſt, ſo light to our author, ſo intolerably heavy upon thoſe who are to pay it. After many unſucceſsful efforts towards reconciling arbitrary reduction with publick credit, he was obliged to go the plain high road of power, and to impoſe a tax of 10 *per cent.* upon a very great part of the capital debt of that kingdom; and this meaſure of preſent eaſe, to the deſtruction of future credit, produced about £.500,000 a year, which was carried to their *Caiſſe d'amortiſſement* or ſinking fund. But ſo unfaithfully and unſteadily has this and all the other articles which compoſe that fund been applied to their purpoſes, that they have given the ſtate but very little even of preſent relief, ſince it is known to the whole world that ſhe is behind-hand on every one of her eſtabliſhments. Since the year 1763, there has been no operation

operation of any conſequence on the French finances: and in this enviable condition is France at preſent with regard to her debt.

Every body knows that the principal of the debt is but a name; the intereſt is the only thing which can diſtreſs a nation. Take this idea, which will not be diſputed, and compare the intereſt paid by England with that paid by France:

	£.
Intereſt paid by France, funded and unfunded, for perpetuity or on lives, after the tax of 10 *per cent.*	6,500,000
Intereſt paid by England, as ſtated by the author, p. 27 - - -	4,600,000
Intereſt paid by France exceeds that paid by England, - - -	£.1,900,000

The author cannot complain, that I ſtate the intereſt paid by England as too low. He takes it himſelf as the extremeſt term. Nobody who knows any thing of the French finances will affirm that I ſtate the intereſt paid by that kingdom too high. It might be eaſily proved to amount to a great deal more: even this is near two millions above what is paid by England.

There are three ſtandards to judge of the good condition of a nation with regard to its finances. 1ſt, The relief of the people. 2d, The equality of ſupplies

ſupplies to eſtabliſhments. 3d, The ſtate of public credit. Try France on all theſe ſtandards.

Although our author very liberally adminiſters relief to the people of France, its government has not been altogether ſo gracious. Since the peace, ſhe has taken off but a ſingle *vingtieme*, or ſhilling in the pound, and ſome ſmall matter in the capitation. But, if the government has relieved them in one point, it has only burthened them the more heavily in another. The *Taille**, that grievous and deſtructive impoſition, which all their financiers lament, without being able to remove or to replace, has been augmented no leſs than ſix millions of livres, or 270,000 pounds Engliſh. A further augmentation of this or other duties is now talked of; and it is certainly neceſſary to their affairs: ſo exceedingly remote from either truth or verſimilitude is the author's amazing aſſertion, *that the burthens of France in the war were in a great meaſure temporary, and muſt be greatly diminiſhed by a few years of peace.*

In the next place, if the people of France are not lightened of taxes, ſo neither is the ſtate diſburthened of charges. I ſpeak from very good information, that the annual income of that ſtate is at this day 30 million of livres, or £.1,350,000

* A tax rated by the intendant in each generality on the preſumed fortune of every perſon below the degree of a gentleman.

ſterling,

ſterling, ſhort of a proviſion for their ordinary peace eſtabliſhment; ſo far are they from the attempt or even hope to diſcharge any part of the capital of their enormous debt. Indeed under ſuch extreme ſtraitneſs and diſtraction labours the whole body of their finances, ſo far does their charge outrun their ſupply in every particular, that no man, I believe, who has conſidered their affairs with any degree of attention or information, but muſt hourly look for ſome extraordinary convulſion in that whole ſyſtem; the effect of which on France, and even on all Europe, it is difficult to conjecture.

In the third point of view, their credit. Let the reader caſt his eye on a table of the price of French funds, as they ſtood a few weeks ago, compared with the ſtate of ſome of our Engliſh ſtocks, even in their preſent low condition:

French.		Britiſh.	
5 *per cents* - -	63	*Bank ſtock*, 5½	159
4 *per cent.* (not taxed)	57	4 *per cent.* conſ.	100
3 *per cent.* ditto	49	3 *per cent.* conſ.	88

This ſtate of the funds of France and England is ſufficient to convince even prejudice and obſtinacy, that if France and England are not in the ſame condition (as the author affirms they are not) the difference is infinitely to the diſadvantage of France.

France. This depreciation of their funds has not much the air of a nation lightening burthens and diſcharging debts.

Such is the true comparative ſtate of the two kingdoms in thoſe capital points of view. Now as to the nature of the taxes which provide for this debt, as well as for their ordinary eſtabliſhments, the author has thought proper to affirm that "they are comparatively light;" that "ſhe "has mortgaged no ſuch oppreſſive taxes as ours:" his effrontery on this head is intolerable. Does the author recollect a ſingle tax in England to which ſomething parallel in nature, and as heavy in burthen, does not exiſt in France; does he not know that the lands of the nobleſſe are ſtill under the load of the greater part of the old feudal charges, from which the gentry of England have been relieved for upwards of 100 years, and which were in kind, as well as burthen, much worſe than our modern land tax? Beſides that all the gentry of France ſerve in the army on very ſlender pay, and to the utter ruin of their fortunes; all thoſe who are not noble, have their lands heavily taxed. Does he not know that wine, brandy, ſoap, candles, leather, ſalt-petre, gunpowder, are taxed in France? Has he not heard that government in France has made a monopoly of that great article of *ſalt?* that they compel the people to take a certain quantity of it, and at a certain rate, both rate and quan-

tity fixed at the arbitrary pleasure of the imposer?* that they pay in France the *Taille*, an arbitrary imposition on presumed property? that a tax is laid in fact and name, on the same arbitrary standard, upon the acquisitions of their *industry?* and that in France a heavy *capitation-tax* is also paid, from the highest to the very poorest sort of people? have we taxes of such weight, or any thing at all of the compulsion, in the article of *salt?* do we pay any *taillage*, any *faculty-tax*, any *industry-tax?* do we pay any *capitation-tax* whatsoever? I believe the people of London would fall into an agony to hear of such taxes proposed upon them as are paid at Paris. There is not a single article of provision for man or beast, which enters that great city, and is not excised; corn, hay, meal, butchers meat, fish, fowls, every thing. I do not here mean to censure the policy of taxes laid on the consumption of great luxurious cities. I only state the fact. We should be with difficulty brought to hear of a tax of 50*s.* upon every ox sold in Smithfield. Yet this tax is paid in Paris. Wine, the lower sort of wine, little better than English small beer, pays 2*d.* a bottle.

* Before the war it was sold to, or rather forced on, the consumer, at 11 sous, or about 5*d.* the pound. What it is at present, I am not informed. Even this will appear no trivial imposition. In London, salt may be had at a penny farthing per pound from the last retailer.

We

We indeed tax our beer: but the impoſition on ſmall beer is very far from heavy. In no part of England are eatables of any kind the object of taxation. In almoſt every other country in Europe they are exciſed, more or leſs. I have by me the ſtate of the revenues of many of the principal nations on the continent; and, on comparing them with ours, I think I am fairly warranted to aſſert, that England is the moſt lightly taxed of any of the great ſtates of Europe. They whoſe unnatural and ſullen joy ariſes from a contemplation of the diſtreſſes of their country will revolt at this poſition. But if I am called upon, I will prove it beyond all poſſibility of diſpute; even though this proof ſhould deprive theſe gentlemen of the ſingular ſatisfaction of conſidering their country as undone; and though the beſt civil government, the beſt conſtituted, and the beſt managed revenue that ever the world beheld, ſhould be thoroughly vindicated from their perpetual clamours and complaints. As to our neighbour and rival France, in addition to what I have here ſuggeſted, I ſay, and when the author chooſes formally to deny, I ſhall formally prove it, that her ſubjects pay more than England, on a computation of the wealth of both countries; that her taxes are more injudiciouſly and more oppreſſively impoſed; more vexatiouſly collected: come in a ſmaller proportion to the royal coffers, and are leſs applied by far to the publick

ſervice. I am not one of thoſe who chooſe to take the author's word for this happy and flouriſhing condition of the French finances, rather than attend to the changes, the violent puſhes, and the deſpair of all her own financiers. Does he chooſe to be referred for the eaſy and happy condition of the ſubject in France to the remonſtrances of their own parliaments, written with ſuch an eloquence, feeling, and energy, as I have not ſeen exceeded in any other writings? The author may ſay, their complaints are exaggerated, and the effects of faction. I anſwer, that they are the repreſentations of numerous, grave, and moſt reſpectable bodies of men, upon the affairs of their own country. But, allowing that diſcontent and faction may pervert the judgment of ſuch venerable bodies in France, we have as good a right to ſuppoſe that the ſame cauſes may full as probably have produced from a private, however reſpectable perſon, that frightful, and, I truſt I have ſhewn, groundleſs repreſentation of our own affairs in England.

The author is ſo conſcious of the dangerous effects of that repreſentation, that he thinks it neceſſary, and very neceſſary it is, to guard againſt them. He aſſures us, "that he has not made that "diſplay of the difficulties of his country, to ex- "poſe her counſels to the ridicule of other ſtates, "or to provoke a vanquiſhed enemy to inſult her; "nor to excite the people's rage againſt their go- "vernors,

"vernors, or ſink them into a deſpondency of "the publick welfare." I readily admit this apology for his intentions. God forbid I ſhould think any man capable of entertaining ſo execrable and ſenſeleſs a deſign. The true cauſe of his drawing ſo ſhocking a picture is no more than this; and it ought rather to claim our pity than excite our indignation; he finds himſelf out of power; and this condition is intolerable to him. The ſame ſun which gilds all nature, and exhilarates the whole creation, does not ſhine upon diſappointed ambition. It is ſomething that rays out of darkneſs, and inſpires nothing but gloom and melancholy. Men in this deplorable ſtate of mind, find a comfort in ſpreading the contagion of their ſpleen. They find an advantage too; for it is a general popular error to imagine the loudeſt complainers for the publick to be the moſt anxious for its welfare. If ſuch perſons can anſwer the ends of relief and profit to themſelves, they are apt to be careleſs enough about either the means or the conſequences.

Whatever this complainant's motives may be, the effects can by no poſſibility be other than thoſe which he ſo ſtrongly, and I hope truly, diſclaims all intention of producing. To verify this, the reader has only to conſider how dreadful a picture he has drawn in his 32d page of the ſtate of this kingdom; ſuch a picture as, I believe, has hardly

been applicable, without ſome exaggeration, to the moſt degenerate and undone commonwealth that ever exiſted. Let this view of things be compared with the proſpect of a remedy which he propoſes in the page directly oppoſite and the ſubſequent. I believe no man living could have imagined it poſſible, except for the ſake of burleſquing a ſubject, to propoſe remedies ſo ridiculouſly diſproportionate to the evil, ſo full of uncertainty in their operation, and depending for their ſucceſs in every ſtep upon the happy event of ſo many new, dangerous, and viſionary projects. It is not amiſs, that he has thought proper to give the publick ſome little notice of what they may expect from his friends, when our affairs ſhall be committed to their management. Let us ſee how the accounts of diſeaſe and remedy are balanced in his State of the Nation. In the firſt place, on the ſide of evils, he ſtates, " an impoveriſhed and heavily burthened " publick. A declining trade and decreaſing ſpecie. " the power of the crown never ſo much extended " over the great; but the great without influence " over the lower ſort. Parliament loſing its re- " verence with the people. The voice of the mul- " titude ſet up againſt the ſenſe of the legiſlature; " a people luxurious and licentious, impatient of " rule, and deſpiſing all authority. Government " relaxed in every ſinew, and a corrupt ſelfiſh ſpirit " pervading the whole. An opinion of many,

" that

" that the form of government is not worth con-
" tending for. No attachment in the bulk of the
" people towards the conſtitution. No reverence
" for the cuſtoms of our anceſtors. No attach-
" ment but to private intereſt, nor any zeal but
" for ſelfiſh gratifications. Trade and manufac-
" tures going to ruin. Great Britain in danger
" of becoming tributary to France, and the deſcent
" of the crown dependent on her pleaſure. Ire-
" land in caſe of a war to become a prey to France;
" and Great Britain, unable to recover Ireland,
" cede it by treaty (the author never can think of
" a treaty without making ceſſions), in order to
" purchaſe peace for herſelf. The colonies left ex-
" poſed to the ravages of a domeſtick, or the con-
" queſt of a foreign enemy."—Gloomy enough, God knows. The author well obſerves,* *that a mind not totally devoid of feeling cannot look upon ſuch a proſpect without horror; and an heart capable of humanity muſt be unable to bear its deſcription.* He ought to have added, that no man of common diſcretion ought to have exhibited it to the publick, if it were true; or of common honeſty, if it were falſe.

But now for the comfort; the day-ſtar which is to ariſe in our hearts; the author's grand ſcheme for totally reverſing this diſmal ſtate of things, and

* P. 31.

making us * "happy at home and reſpected abroad, "formidable in war and flouriſhing in peace."

In this great work he proceeds with a facility equally aſtoniſhing and pleaſing. Never was financier leſs embarraſſed by the burthen of eſtabliſhments, or with the difficulty of finding ways and means. If an eſtabliſhment is troubleſome to him, he lops off at a ſtroke juſt as much of it as he chooſes. He mows down, without giving quarter, or aſſigning reaſon, army, navy, ordnance, ordinary, extraordinaries; nothing can ſtand before him. Then, when he comes to provide, Amalthea's horn is in his hands; and he pours out with an inexhauſtible bounty, taxes, duties, loans, and revenues, without uneaſineſs to himſelf, or burthen to the publick. Inſomuch that, when we conſider the abundance of his reſources, we cannot avoid being ſurprized at his extraordinary attention to ſavings. But it is all the exuberance of his goodneſs.

This book has ſo much of a certain tone of power, that one would be almoſt tempted to think it written by ſome perſon who had been high in office. A man is generally rendered ſomewhat a worſe reaſoner for having been a miniſter. In private, the aſſent of liſtening and obſequious friends; in publick, the venal cry and prepared vote of a

* P. 33.

paſſive

paſſive ſenate, confirm him in habits of begging the queſtion with impunity, and aſſerting without thinking himſelf obliged to prove. Had it not been for ſome ſuch habits, the author could never have expected that we ſhould take his eſtimate for a peace eſtabliſhment ſolely on his word.

This eſtimate which he gives,* is the great ground-work of his plan for the national redemption; and it ought to be well and firmly laid, or what muſt become of the ſuperſtructure? One would have thought the natural method in a plan of reformation would be, to take the preſent exiſting eſtimates as they ſtand; and then to ſhew what may be practicably and ſafely defalcated from them. This would, I ſay, be the natural courſe; and what would be expected from a man of buſineſs. But this author takes a very different method. For the ground of his ſpeculation of a preſent peace eſtabliſhment, he reſorts to a former ſpeculation of the ſame kind, which was in the mind of the miniſter of the year 1764. Indeed it never exiſted any where elſe. † "The plan," ſays he, with his uſual eaſe, "has been already formed, "and the outline drawn, by the adminiſtration of "1764. I ſhall attempt to fill up the void and ob- "literated parts, and trace its operation. The "ſtanding expence of the preſent (his projected)

* P. 33. † P. 33.

"peace

" peace eſtabliſhment *improved by the experience of* " *the two laſt years may be thus eſtimated*;" and he eſtimates it at £.3,468,161.

Here too it would be natural to expect ſome reaſons for condemning the ſubſequent actual eſtabliſhments, which have ſo much tranſgreſſed the limits of his plan of 1764, as well as ſome arguments in favour of his new project; which has in ſome articles exceeded, in others fallen ſhort, but on the whole is much below his old one. Hardly a word on any of theſe points, the only points however that are in the leaſt eſſential; for unleſs you aſſign reaſons for the encreaſe or diminution of the ſeveral articles of publick charge, the playing at eſtabliſhments and eſtimates is an amuſement of no higher order, and of much leſs ingenuity, than *Queſtions and commands*, or *What is my thought like?* To bring more diſtinctly under the reader's view this author's ſtrange method of proceeding, I will lay before him the three ſchemes; *viz.* the idea of the miniſters in 1764, the actual eſtimates of the two laſt years as given by the author himſelf, and laſtly the new project of his political millennium:

	£.
Plan of eſtabliſhment for 1764, as by Conſiderations, p. 43, - -	*3,609,700

* The figures in the Conſiderations are wrong caſt up; it ſhould be £.3,608,700.

Medium

	£.
Medium of 1767 and 1768, as by State of the Nation, p. 29 and 30,	3,919,375
Preſent peace eſtabliſhment, as by the project in State of the Nation, p. 33.	3,468,161

It is not from any thing our author has any where ſaid, that you are enabled to find the ground, much leſs the juſtification, of the immenſe difference between theſe ſeveral ſyſtems: you muſt compare them yourſelf, article by article; no very pleaſing employment, by the way, to compare the agreement or diſagreement of two chimeras. I now only ſpeak of the compariſon of his own two projects. As to the latter of them, it differs from the former, by having ſome of the articles diminiſhed, and others encreaſed.* I find the chief article of reduction ariſes from the ſmaller deficiency of land and malt, and of the annuity funds, which he brings down to £.295,561 in his new eſtimate, from £.502,400, which he had allowed for thoſe articles in the Conſiderations. With this *reduction*, owing, as it muſt be, merely to a ſmaller deficiency of funds, he has nothing at all to do. It can be no work and no merit of his. But with regard to the *encreaſe*, the matter is very different. It is all his own; the publick is loaded (for any thing we can ſee to the contrary) entirely *gratis*.

* Conſiderations, p. 43. State of the Nation, p. 33.

The

The chief articles of the encreaſe are on the navy,* and on the army and ordnance extraordinaries; the navy being eſtimated in his *State of the Nation* £.50,000 a year more, and the army and ordnance extraordinaries £.40,000 more, than he had thought proper to allow for them in that eſtimate in his *Conſiderations*, which he makes the foundation of his preſent project. He has given no ſort of reaſon, ſtated no ſort of neceſſity, for this additional allowance, either in the one article or the other. What is ſtill ſtronger, he admits that his allowance for the army and ordnance extras is too great, and expreſsly refers you to the *Conſiderations*;† where, far from giving £.75,000 a year to that ſervice, as the *State of the Nation* has done, the author apprehends his own ſcanty proviſion of £.35,000 to be by far too conſiderable, and thinks it may well admit of further reductions.‡ Thus, according

* Conſiderations, p. 43. State of the Nation, p. 33. † P. 34.

‡ The author of the State of the Nation, p. 34, informs us, that the ſum of £. 75,000, allowed by him for the extras of the army and ordnance, is far leſs than was allowed for the ſame ſervice in the years 1767 and 1768. It is ſo undoubtedly, and by at leaſt £.200,000. He ſees that he cannot abide by the plan of the Conſiderations in this point, nor is he willing wholly to give it up. Such an enormous difference as that between £.35,000 and £.300,000 puts him to a ſtand. Should he adopt the latter plan of encreaſed expence, he muſt then confeſs, that he had, on a former occaſion, egregiouſly trifled with the publick; at the ſame

according to his own principles, this great œconomiſt falls into a vicious prodigality; and is as far in his eſtimate from a conſiſtency with his own principles as with the real nature of the ſervices.

Still, however, his preſent eſtabliſhment differs from its archetype of 1764, by being, though raiſed in particular parts, upon the whole about £.141,000 ſmaller. It is improved, he tells us, by the experience of the two laſt years. One would have concluded that the peace eſtabliſhment of theſe two years had been leſs than that of 1764, in order to ſuggeſt to the author his improvements, which enabled him to reduce it. But how does that turn out?

ſame time all his future promiſes of reduction muſt fall to the ground. If he ſtuck to the £.35,000, he was ſure that every one muſt expect from him ſome account how this monſtrous charge came to continue ever ſince the war, when it was clearly unneceſſary; how all thoſe ſucceſſions of miniſters (his own included) came to pay it, and why his great friend in parliament, and his partizans without doors, came not to purſue to ruin, at leaſt to utter ſhame, the authors of ſo groundleſs and ſcandalous a profuſion. In this ſtrait he took a middle way; and, to come nearer the real ſtate of the ſervice, he outbid the Conſiderations, at one ſtroke, £.40,000; at the ſame time he hints to you, that you may *expect* ſome benefit alſo from the original plan. But the author of the Conſiderations will not ſuffer him to eſcape it. He has pinned him down to his £.35,000; for that is the ſum he has choſen, not as what he thinks will probably be required, but as making the moſt ample allowance for every poſſible contingency. See that author, p. 42 and 43.

Peace

	£.
Peace eſtabliſhment * 1767 and 1768, medium, - - - -	3,919,375
Ditto, eſtimate in the Conſiderations, for 1764, - - -	3,609,700
Difference -	£.309,675

A vaſt encreaſe inſtead of diminution. The experience then of the two laſt years ought naturally to have given the idea of an heavier eſtabliſhment; but this writer is able to diminiſh by encreaſing, and to draw the effects of ſubtraction from the operations of addition. By means of theſe new powers, he may certainly do whatever he pleaſes. He is indeed moderate enough in the uſe of them, and condeſcends to ſettle his eſtabliſhments at £.3,468,161 a year.

However, he has not yet done with it; he has further ideas of ſaving, and new reſources of revenue. Theſe additional ſavings are principally two: 1ſt. *It is to be hoped*,† ſays he, that the ſum of £.250,000 (which in the eſtimate he allows for

* He has done great injuſtice to the eſtabliſhment of 1768; but I have not here time for this diſcuſſion; nor is it neceſſary to this argument.

† P. 34.

the

the deficiency of land and malt) will be leſs by £.37,924.*

2d, That the ſum of £.20,000 allowed for the Foundling Hoſpital, and £.1,800 for American Surveys, will ſoon ceaſe to be neceſſary, as the ſervices will be compleated.

What follows with regard to the reſources,† is very well worthy the reader's attention. "Of this "eſtimate," ſays he, "upwards of £.300,000 "will be for the plantation ſervice; and that ſum, "*I hope*, the people of Ireland and the colonies "*might be induced* to take off Great Britain, and "defray between them, in the proportion of "£.200,000 by the colonies, and £.100,000 by "Ireland."

* In making up this account, he falls into a ſurprizing error of arithmetick. "The deficiency of the land-tax in the year "1754 and 1755,* when it was at 2*s.* amounted to no more, on "a medium, than £.49,372; to which, if we add *half the ſum*, "it will give us £.79,058 as the peace deficiency at 3*s.*

	£.
Total, - - - -	49,372
Add the half, - - -	24,686
Reſult,	£.74,058

Which he makes £.79,058. This is indeed in diſfavour of his argument; but we ſhall ſee that he has ways, by other errors, of reimburſing himſelf.

† P. 34.

* P. 33.

Such

Such is the whole of this mighty ſcheme. Take his reduced eſtimate, and his further reductions, and his reſources all together, and the reſult will be; He will *certainly* lower the proviſion made for the navy. He will cut off largely (God knows what or how) from the army and ordnance extraordinaries. He may be *expected* to cut off more. He *hopes* that the deficiencies on land and malt will be leſs than uſual; and he *hopes* that America and Ireland might be *induced* to take off £.300,000 of our annual charges.

If any of theſe Hopes, Mights, Inſinuations, Expectations, and Inducements, ſhould fail him, there will be a formidable gaping breach in his whole project. If all of them ſhould fail, he has left the nation without a glimmering of hope in this thick night of terrors which he has thought fit to ſpread about us. If every one of them, which, attended with ſucceſs, would ſignify any thing to our revenue, can have no effect but to add to our diſtractions and dangers, we ſhall be if poſſible in a ſtill worſe condition from his projects of cure than he repreſents us from our original diſorders.

Before we examine into the conſequences of theſe ſchemes, and the probability of theſe ſavings, let us ſuppoſe them all real and all ſafe, and then ſee what it is they amount to, and how he reaſons on them:

Deficiency

	£.
Deficiency on land and malt, leſs by	37,000
Foundling Hoſpital - - .	20,000
American Surveys, - - -	1,800
	£.58,800

This is the amount of the only articles of ſaving he ſpecifies; and yet he chooſes to aſſert * "that "we may venture on the credit of them to reduce "the ſtanding expences of the eſtimate (from "£.3,468,161) to £.3,300,000;" that is, for a ſaving of £.58,000, he is not aſhamed to take credit for a defalcation from his own ideal eſtabliſhment in a ſum of no leſs than £.168,161! Suppoſe even that we were to take up the eſtimate of the Conſiderations (which is however abandoned in the State of the Nation), and reduce his £.75,000 extraordinaries to the original £.35,000, ſtill all theſe ſavings joined together give us but £.98,000; that is, near £.70,000 ſhort of the credit he calls for, and for which he has neither given any reaſon, nor furniſhed any data whatſoever for others to reaſon upon.

Such are his ſavings, as operating on his own project of a peace eſtabliſhment. Let us now conſider them as they affect the exiſting eſtabliſhment

* P. 43.

and our actual ſervices. He tells us, the ſum allowed in his eſtimate for the navy is "£.69,321 "leſs than the grant for that ſervice in 1767; but "in that grant £.30,000 was included for the pur- "chaſe of hemp, and a ſaving of about £.25,000 "was made in that year." The author has got ſome ſecret in arithmetick. Theſe two ſums put together amount, in the ordinary way of computing, to £.55,000, and not to £.69,321. On what principle has he choſen to take credit for £.14,321 more? To what this ſtrange inaccuracy is owing, I cannot poſſibly comprehend; nor is it very material, where the logick is ſo bad, and the policy ſo erroneous, whether the arithmetick be juſt or otherwiſe. But in a ſcheme for making this nation "happy at home and reſpected abroad, for- "midable in war and flouriſhing in peace," it is ſurely a little unfortunate for us, that he has picked out the *Navy*, as the very firſt object of his œconomical experiments. Of all the public ſervices, that of the navy is the one in which tampering may be of the greateſt danger, which can worſt be ſupplied upon an emergency, and of which any failure draws after it the longeſt and heavieſt train of conſequences. I am far from ſaying, that this or any ſervice ought not to be conducted with œconomy. But I will never ſuffer the ſacred name of œconomy to be beſtowed upon arbitrary defalcation of charge. The author tells us himſelf,

"that

" that to ſuffer the navy to rot in harbour for want " of repairs and marines, would be to invite de- " ſtruction." It would be ſo. When the author talks therefore of ſavings on the navy eſtimate, it is incumbent on him to let us know, not what ſums he will cut off, but what branch of that ſervice he deems ſuperfluous. Inſtead of putting us off with unmeaning generalities, he ought to have ſtated what naval force, what naval works, and what naval ſtores, with the loweſt eſtimated expence, are neceſſary to keep our marine in a condition commenſurate to its great ends. And this too not for the contracted and deceitful ſpace of a ſingle year, but for ſome reaſonable term. Every body knows that many charges cannot be in their nature regular or annual. In the year 1767 a ſtock of hemp, &c. was to be laid in; that charge intermits, but it does not end. Other charges of other kinds take their place. Great works are now carrying on at Portſmouth, but not of greater magnitude than utility; and they muſt be provided for. A year's eſtimate is therefore no juſt idea at all of a permanent peace eſtabliſhment. Had the author opened this matter upon theſe plain principles, a judgment might have been formed, how far he had contrived to reconcile national defence with publick œconomy. Till he has done it, thoſe who had rather depend on any man's reaſon than the greateſt man's authority will not give him cre-

dit on this head, for the ſaving of a ſingle ſhilling. As to thoſe ſavings which are already made, or in courſe of being made, whether right or wrong, he has nothing at all to do with them; they can be no part of his project, conſidered as a plan of reformation. I greatly fear that the error has not lately been on the ſide of profuſion.

Another head is the ſaving on the army and ordnance extraordinaries, particularly in the American branch. What or how much reduction may be made, none of us, I believe, can with any fairneſs pretend to ſay; very little, I am convinced. The ſtate of America is extremely unſettled; more troops have been ſent thither; new diſpoſitions have been made; and this augmentation of number, and change of diſpoſition, has rarely, I believe, the effect of leſſening the bill for extraordinaries, which, if not this year, yet in the next we muſt certainly feel. Care has not been wanting to introduce œconomy into that part of the ſervice. The author's great friend has made, I admit, ſome regulations; his immediate ſucceſſors have made more and better. This part will be handled more ably and more minutely at another time: but no one can cut down this bill of extraordinaries at his pleaſure. The author has given us nothing, but his word, for any certain or conſiderable reduction; and this we ought to be the more cautious in taking, as he has promiſed great ſavings in his

Conſiderations,

Conſiderations, which he has not choſen to abide by in his *State of the Nation*.

On this head alſo of the American extraordinaries, he can take credit for nothing. As to his next, the leſſening of the deficiency of the land and malt tax, particularly of the malt tax; any perſon the leaſt converſant in that ſubject cannot avoid a ſmile. This deficiency ariſes from charge of collection, from anticipation, and from defective produce. What has the author ſaid on the reduction of any head of this deficiency upon the land tax? On theſe points he is abſolutely ſilent. As to the deficiency on the malt tax, which is chiefly owing to a defective produce, he has, and can have, nothing to propoſe. If this deficiency ſhould be leſſened by the encreaſe of malting in any years more than in others, (as it is a greatly fluctuating object), how much of this obligation ſhall we owe to this author's miniſtry? will it not be the caſe under any adminiſtration? muſt it not go to the general ſervice of the year, in ſome way or other, let the finances be in whoſe hands they will? But why take credit for ſo extremely reduced a deficiency at all? I can tell him, he has no rational ground for it in the produce of the year 1767; and I ſuſpect will have full as little reaſon from the produce of the year 1768. That produce may indeed become greater, and the defici-

ency of courſe will be leſs. It may too be far otherwiſe. A fair and judicious financier will not, as this writer has done, for the ſake of making out a ſpecious account, ſelect a favourable year or two, at remote periods, and ground his calculations on thoſe. In 1768 he will not take the deficiencies of 1753 and 1754 for his ſtandard. Sober men have hitherto (and muſt continue this courſe to preſerve this character) taken indifferently the mediums of the years immediately preceding. But a perſon who has a ſcheme from which he promiſes much to the publick ought to be ſtill more cautious; he ſhould ground his ſpeculation rather on the loweſt mediums; becauſe all new ſchemes are known to be ſubject to ſome defect or failure not foreſeen; and which therefore every prudent propoſer will be ready to allow for, in order to lay his foundation as low and as ſolid as poſſible. Quite contrary is the practice of ſome politicians. They firſt propoſe ſavings, which they well know cannot be made, in order to get a reputation for œconomy. In due time they aſſume another, but a different method, by providing for the ſervice they had before cut off or ſtraitened, and which they can then very eaſily prove to be neceſſary. In the ſame ſpirit they raiſe magnificent ideas of revenue on funds which they know to be inſufficient. Afterwards, who can blame them,

them, if they do not ſatisfy the public deſires? They are great artificers; but they cannot work without materials.

Theſe are ſome of the little arts of great ſtateſmen. To ſuch we leave them, and follow where the author leads us, to his next reſource, the Foundling-hoſpital. Whatever particular virtue there is in the mode of this ſaving, there ſeems to be nothing at all new, and indeed nothing wonderfully important in it. The ſum annually voted for the ſupport of the Foundling-hoſpital has been in a former parliament limited to the eſtabliſhment of the children then in the hoſpital. When they are apprenticed, this proviſion will ceaſe. It will therefore fall in more or leſs at different times; and will at length ceaſe entirely. But, until it does, we cannot reckon upon it as the ſaving on the eſtabliſhment of any given year: nor can any one conceive how the author comes to mention this, any more than ſome other articles, as a part of a *new* plan of œconomy which is to retrieve our affairs. This charge will indeed ceaſe in its own time. But will no other ſucceed to it? Has he ever known the publick free from ſome contingent charge, either for the juſt ſupport of royal dignity, or for national magnificence, or for publick charity, or for publick ſervice? does he chuſe to flatter his readers that no ſuch will ever return? or does he in good earneſt declare, that let the rea-

ſon, or neceſſity, be what they will, he is reſolved not to provide for ſuch ſervices?

Another reſource of œconomy yet remains, for he gleans the field very cloſely, £.1,800 for the American ſurveys. Why what ſignifies a diſpute about trifles? he ſhall have it. But while he is carrying it off, I ſhall juſt whiſper in his ear, that neither the ſaving that is allowed, nor that which is doubted of, can at all belong to that future propoſed adminiſtration, whoſe touch is to cure all our evils. Both the one and the other belong equally (as indeed all the reſt do) to the preſent adminiſtration, to any adminiſtration; becauſe they are the gift of time, and not the bounty of the exchequer.

I have now done with all the minor preparatory parts of the author's ſcheme, the ſeveral articles of ſaving which he propoſes. At length comes the capital operation, his new reſources. Three hundred thouſand pounds a year from America and Ireland.—Alas! alas! if that too ſhould fail us, what will become of this poor undone nation? The author, in a tone of great humility, *hopes* they may be induced to pay it. Well, if that be all, we may hope ſo too: and for any light he is pleaſed to give us into the ground of this hope, and the ways and means of this inducement, here is a ſpeedy end both of the queſtion and the revenue.

It is the conſtant cuſtom of this author, in all his writings, to take it for granted, that he has given

given you a revenue, whenever he can point out to you where you may have money, if you can contrive how to get at it; and this ſeems to be the maſter-piece of his financial ability. I think however, in his way of proceeding, he has behaved rather like an harſh ſtep-dame, than a kind nurſing mother to his country. Why ſtop at £.300,000? If his ſtate of things be at all founded, America and Ireland are much better able to pay £.600,000, than we are to ſatisfy ourſelves with half that ſum. However, let us forgive him this one inſtance of tenderneſs towards Ireland and the colonies.

He ſpends a vaſt deal of time, * in an endeavour to prove, that Ireland is able to bear greater impoſitions. He is of opinion, that the poverty of the lower claſs of people there is, in a great meaſure, owing to *a want* of judicious taxes; that a land tax will enrich her tenants; that taxes are paid in England which are not paid there; that the colony trade is encreaſed above £.100,000 ſince the peace; that ſhe *ought* to have further indulgences in that trade; and *ought* to have further privileges in the woollen manufacture. From theſe premiſes, of what ſhe has, what ſhe has not, and what ſhe ought to have, he infers that Ireland will contribute £.100,000 towards the extraordinaries of the American eſtabliſhment.

* P. 35.

I ſhall

I ſhall make no objections whatſoever, logical or financial, to this reaſoning: many occur; but they would lead me from my purpoſe, from which I do not intend to be diverted, becauſe it ſeems to me of no ſmall importance. It will be juſt enough to hint, what I dare ſay many readers have before obſerved, that when any man propoſes new taxes in a country with which he is not perſonally converſant by reſidence or office, he ought to lay open its ſituation much more minutely and critically than this author has done, or than perhaps he is able to do. He ought not to content himſelf with ſaying that a ſingle article of her trade is encreaſed £.100,000 a year; he ought, if he argues from the encreaſe of trade to the encreaſe of taxes, to ſtate the whole trade, and not one branch of trade only; he ought to enter fully into the ſtate of its remittances, and the courſe of its exchange; he ought likewiſe to examine whether all its eſtabliſhments are encreaſed or diminiſhed; and whether it incurs or diſcharges debt annually. But I paſs over all this; and am content to aſk a few plain queſtions.

Does the author then ſeriouſly mean to propoſe in parliament a land tax, or any tax for £.100,000 a year upon Ireland? If he does, and if fatally, by his temerity and our weakneſs, ſhe ſhould ſucceed; then I ſay he will throw the whole empire from one end of it to the other into mortal convulſions.

vulſions. What is it that can ſatisfy the furious and perturbed mind of this man; is it not enough for him that ſuch projects have alienated our colonies from the mother country, and not to propoſe violently to tear our ſiſter kingdom alſo from our ſide, and to convince every dependent part of the empire, that, when a little money is to be raiſed, we have no ſort of regard to their antient cuſtoms, their opinions, their circumſtances, or their affections? He has however a *douceur* for Ireland in his pocket; benefits in trade, by opening the woollen manufacture to that nation. A very right idea in my opinion; but not more ſtrong in reaſon, than likely to be oppoſed by the moſt powerful and moſt violent of all local prejudices and popular paſſions. Firſt, a fire is already kindled by his ſchemes of taxation in America; he then propoſes one which will ſet all Ireland in a blaze; and his way of quenching both is by a plan which may kindle perhaps ten times a greater flame in Britain.

Will the author pledge himſelf, previouſly to his propoſal of ſuch a tax, to carry this enlargement of the Iriſh trade; if he does not, then the tax will be certain; the benefit will be leſs than problematical. In this view, his compenſation to Ireland vaniſhes into ſmoke; the tax, to their prejudices, will appear ſtark naked in the light of an act of arbitrary power and oppreſſion. But, if he

ſhould

ſhould propoſe the benefit and tax together, then the people of Ireland, a very high and ſpirited people, would think it the worſt bargain in the world. They would look upon the one as wholly vitiated and poiſoned by the other; and, if they could not be ſeparated, would infallibly reſiſt them both together. Here would be taxes indeed, amounting to an handſome ſum; £.100,000 very effectually voted, and paſſed through the beſt and moſt authentick forms; but how to be collected?—This is his perpetual manner. One of his projects depends for ſucceſs upon another project, and this upon a third, all of them equally viſionary. His finance is like the Indian philoſophy; his earth is poiſed on the horns of a bull, his bull ſtands upon an elephant, his elephant is ſupported by a tortoiſe; and ſo on for ever.

As to his American £.200,000 a year, he is ſatisfied to repeat gravely, as he has done an hundred times before, that the Americans are able to pay it. Well, and what then? does he lay open any part of his plan how they may be compelled to pay it, without plunging ourſelves into calamities that outweigh tenfold the propoſed benefit? or does he ſhew how they may be induced to ſubmit to it quietly; or does he give any ſatisfaction concerning the mode of levying it, in commercial colonies one of the moſt important and difficult of all conſiderations? Nothing like it. To the ſtamp act,

whatever

whatever its excellencies may be, I think he will not in reality recur, or even chooſe to aſſert that he means to do ſo, in caſe his miniſter ſhould come again into power. If he does, I will predict that ſome of the faſteſt friends of that miniſter will deſert him upon this point. As to port duties, he has damned them all in the lump, by declaring them * "contrary to the firſt principles of coloni-"zation, and not leſs prejudicial to the intereſts of "Great Britain than to thoſe of the colonies." Surely this ſingle obſervation of his ought to have taught him a little caution; he ought to have begun to doubt, whether there is not ſomething in the nature of commercial colonies, which renders them an unfit object of taxation; when port duties, ſo large a fund of revenue in all countries, are by himſelf found, in this caſe, not only improper, but deſtructive. However he has here pretty well narrowed the field of taxation. Stamp act, hardly to be reſumed. Port duties, miſchievous. Exciſes, I believe, he will ſcarcely think worth the collection (if any revenue ſhould be ſo) in America. Land tax (notwithſtanding his opinion of its immenſe uſe to agriculture), he will not directly propoſe, before he has thought again and again on the ſubject. Indeed he very readily recommends it for Ireland, and ſeems to think it not improper

* P. 37.

for

for America; becauſe, he obſerves, they already raiſe moſt of their taxes internally, including this tax. A moſt curious reaſon truly! becauſe their lands are already heavily burthened, he thinks it right to burthen them ſtill further. But he will recollect, for ſurely he cannot be ignorant of it, that the lands of America are not, as in England, let at a rent certain in money, and therefore cannot, as here, be taxed at a certain pound rate. They value them in groſs among themſelves; and none but themſelves in their ſeveral diſtricts can value them. Without their hearty concurrence and co-operation, it is evident, we cannot advance a ſtep in the aſſeſſing or collecting any land tax. As to the taxes which in ſome places the Americans pay by the acre, they are merely duties of regulation: they are ſmall; and to encreaſe them, notwithſtanding the ſecret virtues of a land tax, would be the moſt effectual means of preventing that cultivation they are intended to promote. Beſides, the whole country is heavily in arrear already for land taxes and quit rents. They have different methods of taxation in the different provinces, agreeable to their ſeveral local circumſtances. In New England by far the greateſt part of their revenue is raiſed by *faculty taxes* and *capitations*. Such is the method in many others. It is obvious that parliament, unaſſiſted by the colonies themſelves, cannot take ſo much as a ſingle ſtep in this mode

mode of taxation. Then what tax is it he will impoſe? Why, after all the boaſting ſpeeches and writings of his faction for theſe four years, after all the vain expectations which they have held out to a deluded publick, this their great advocate, after twiſting the ſubject every way, after writhing himſelf in every poſture, after knocking at every door, is obliged fairly to abandon every mode of taxation whatſoever in America. * He thinks it the beſt method for parliament to impoſe the ſum, and reſerve the account to itſelf, leaving the mode of taxation to the colonies. But how and in what proportion? what does the author ſay? O, not a ſingle ſyllable on this the moſt material part of the whole queſtion. Will he, in parliament, undertake to ſettle the proportions of ſuch payments from Nova Scotia to Nevis, in no fewer than ſix and twenty different countries, varying in almoſt every poſſible circumſtance one from another? if he does, I tell him, he adjourns his revenue to a very long day. If he leaves it to themſelves to ſettle theſe proportions, he adjourns it to doomſday.

Then what does he get by this method on the ſide of acquieſcence? will the people of America reliſh this courſe, of giving and granting and applying their money, the better becauſe their aſſemblies are made commiſſioners of the taxes?

* P. 37, 38.

This

This is far worſe than all his former projects; for here, if the aſſemblies ſhall refuſe, or delay, or be negligent, or fraudulent, in this new-impoſed duty, we are wholly without remedy; and neither our cuſtom-houſe officers, nor our troops, nor our armed ſhips can be of the leaſt uſe in the collection. No idea can be more contemptible (I will not call it an oppreſſive one, the harſhneſs is loſt in the folly) than that of propoſing to get any revenue from the Americans but by their freeſt and moſt chearful conſent. Moſt monied men know their own intereſt right well; and are as able as any financier, in the valuation of riſques. Yet I think this financier will ſcarcely find that adventurer hardy enough, at any premium, to advance a ſhilling upon a vote of ſuch taxes. Let him name the man, or ſet of men, that would do it. This is the only proof of the value of revenues; what would an intereſted man rate them at? His ſubſcription would be at ninety-nine *per cent.* diſcount the very firſt day of its opening. Here is our only national ſecurity from ruin; a ſecurity upon which no man in his ſenſes would venture a ſhilling of his fortune. Yet he puts down thoſe articles as gravely in his ſupply for his peace eſtabliſhment, as if the money had been all fairly lodged in the exchequer.

	£.
American revenue, - -	200,000
Ireland, - - - -	100,000

Very

Very handſome indeed! but if ſupply is to be got in ſuch a manner, farewell the lucrative myſtery of finance! If you are to be credited for ſavings, without ſhewing how, why, or with what ſafety, they are to be made; and for revenues, without ſpecifying on what articles, or by what means, or at what expence, they are to be collected; there is not a clerk in a publick office who may not outbid this author, or his friend, for the department of chancellor of the exchequer; not an apprentice in the city, that will not ſtrike out, with the ſame advantages, the ſame, or a much larger, plan of ſupply.

Here is the whole of what belongs to the author's ſcheme for ſaving us from impending deſtruction. Take it even in its moſt favourable point of view, as a thing within poſſibility; and imagine what muſt be the wiſdom of this gentleman, or his opinion of ours, who could firſt think of repreſenting this nation in ſuch a ſtate, as no friend can look upon but with horror, and ſcarce an enemy without compaſſion, and afterwards of diverting himſelf with ſuch inadequate, impracticable, puerile methods for our relief? If theſe had been the dreams of ſome unknown, unnamed, and nameleſs writer, they would excite no alarm; their weakneſs had been an antidote to their malignity. But as they are univerſally believed to be written by the hand, or, what amounts to the ſame thing,

under the immediate direction, of a perſon who has been in the management of the higheſt affairs, and may ſoon be in the ſame ſituation, I think it is not to be reckoned amongſt our greateſt conſolations, that the yet remaining power of this kingdom is to be employed in an attempt to realize notions that are at once ſo frivolous, and ſo full of danger. That conſideration will juſtify me in dwelling a little longer on the difficulties of the nation, and the ſolutions of our author.

I am then perſuaded that he cannot be in the leaſt alarmed about our ſituation, let his outcry be what he pleaſes. I will give him a reaſon for my opinion, which, I think, he cannot diſpute. All that he beſtows upon the nation, which it does not poſſeſs without him, and ſuppoſing it all ſure money, amounts to no more than a ſum of £.300,000 a year. This, he thinks, will do the buſineſs compleatly, and render us flouriſhing at home, and reſpectable abroad. If the option between glory and ſhame, if our ſalvation or deſtruction, depended on this ſum, it is impoſſible that he ſhould have been active, and made a merit of that activity, in taking off a ſhilling in the pound of the land tax, which came up to his grand deſideratum, and upwards of £.100,000 more. By this manœuvre, he left our trade, navigation, and manufactures, on the verge of deſtruction, our finances in ruin, our credit expiring, Ireland on the point of being ceded

to

to France, the colonies of being torn to pieces, the ſucceſſion of the crown at the mercy of our great rival, and the kingdom itſelf on the very point of becoming tributary to that haughty power. All this for want of £.300,000; for I defy the reader to point out any other revenue, or any other preciſe and defined ſcheme of politicks, which he aſſigns for our redemption.

I know that two things may be ſaid in his defence, as bad reaſons are always at hand in an indifferent cauſe; that he was not ſure the money would be applied as he thinks it ought to be, by the preſent miniſters. I think as ill of them as he does to the full. They have done very near as much miſchief as they can do, to a conſtitution ſo robuſt as this is. Nothing can make them more dangerous, but that, as they are already in general compoſed of his diſciples and inſtruments, they may add to the publick calamity of their own meaſures, the adoption of his projects. But be the miniſters what they may, the author knows that they could not avoid applying this £.450,000 to the ſervice of the eſtabliſhment, as faithfully as he, or any other miniſter, could do. I ſay they could not avoid it, and have no merit at all for the application. But ſuppoſing that they ſhould greatly miſmanage this revenue. Here is a good deal of room for miſtake and prodigality before you come to the edge of ruin. The difference between the

amount of that real and his imaginary revenue is, £.150,000 a year, at leaſt; a tolerable ſum for them to play with: this might compenſate the difference between the author's œconomy and their profuſion; and ſtill, notwithſtanding their vices and ignorance, the nation might be ſaved. The author ought alſo to recollect, that a good man would hardly deny, even to the worſt of miniſters, the means of doing their duty; eſpecially in a criſis when our being depended on ſupplying them with ſome means or other. In ſuch a caſe, their penury of mind, in diſcovering reſources, would make it rather the more neceſſary, not to ſtrip ſuch poor providers of the little ſtock they had in hand.

Beſides, here is another ſubject of diſtreſs, and a very ſerious one, which puts us again to a ſtand. The author may poſſibly not come into power (I only ſtate the poſſibility): he may not always continue in it; and if the contrary to all this ſhould fortunately for us happen, what inſurance on his life can be made for a ſum adequate to his loſs? Then we are thus unluckily ſituated, that the *chance* of an American and Iriſh revenue of £.300,000, to be managed by him, is to ſave us from ruin two or three years hence at beſt, to make us happy at home and glorious abroad; and the actual poſſeſſion of £.400,000 Engliſh taxes cannot ſo much as protract our ruin without him. So we are ſtaked on four chances; his power, its permanence, the

ſucceſs

ſucceſs of his projects, and the duration of his life. Any one of theſe failing, we are gone. *Propria hæc ſi dona fuiſſent!* This is no unfair repreſentation; ultimately all hangs on his life, becauſe, in his account of every ſet of men that have held or ſupported adminiſtration, he finds neither virtue nor ability in any but himſelf. Indeed he pays (through their meaſures) ſome compliments to Lord Bute and Lord Deſpenſer. But to the latter, this is, I ſuppoſe, but a civility to old acquaintance: to the former, a little ſtroke of politicks. We may therefore fairly ſay, that our only hope is his life; and he has, to make it the more ſo, taken care to cut off any reſource which we poſſeſſed independent of him.

In the next place it may be ſaid, to excuſe any appearance of inconſiſtency between the author's actions and his declarations, that he thought it right to relieve the landed intereſt, and lay the burthen where it ought to lie, on the colonies. What! to take off a revenue ſo neceſſary to our being, before any thing whatſoever was acquired in the place of it? In prudence, he ought to have waited at leaſt for the firſt quarter's receipt of the new anonymous American revenue, and Iriſh land tax. Is there ſomething ſo ſpecifick for our diſorders in American, and ſomething ſo poiſonous in Engliſh money, that one is to heal, the other to deſtroy us? To ſay that the landed intereſt *could*

not continue to pay it for a year or two longer, is more than the author will attempt to prove. To ſay that they *would* pay it no longer, is to treat the landed intereſt, in my opinion, very ſcurvily. To ſuppoſe that the gentry, clergy, and freeholders of England do not rate the commerce, the credit, the religion, the liberty, the independency of their country, and the ſucceſſion of their crown, at a ſhilling in the pound land tax! They never gave him reaſon to think ſo meanly of them. And, if I am rightly informed, when that meaſure was debated in parliament, a very different reaſon was aſſigned by the author's great friend, as well as by others, for that reduction: one very different from the critical and almoſt deſperate ſtate of our finances. Some people then endeavoured to prove, that the reduction might be made without detriment to the national credit, or the due ſupport of a proper peace eſtabliſhment; otherwiſe it is obvious that the reduction could not be defended in argument. So that this author cannot deſpair ſo much of the commonwealth, without this American and Iriſh revenue, as he pretends to do. If he does, the reader ſees how handſomely he has provided for us, by voting away one revenue, and by giving us a pamphlet on the other.

I do not mean to blame the relief which was then given by parliament to the land. It was grounded on very weighty reaſons. The adminiſtration

tration contended only for its continuance for a year, in order to have the merit of taking off the ſhilling in the pound immediately before the elections; and thus to bribe the freeholders of England with their own money.

It is true, the author, in his eſtimate of ways and means, takes credit for £.400,000 a year, *Indian revenue*. But he will not very poſitively inſiſt, that we ſhould put this revenue to the account of his plans or his power; and for a very plain reaſon: we are already near two years in poſſeſſion of it. By what means we came to that poſſeſſion, is a pretty long ſtory; however, I ſhall give nothing more than a ſhort abſtract of the proceeding, in order to ſee whether the author will take to himſelf any part in that meaſure.

The fact is this; the Eaſt India company had for a good while ſolicited the miniſtry for a negotiation, by which they propoſed to pay largely for ſome advantages in their trade, and for the renewal of their charter. This had been the former method of tranſacting with that body. Government having only leaſed the monopoly for ſhort terms, the company has been obliged to reſort to it frequently for renewals. Theſe two parties had always negociated (on the true principle of credit) not as government and ſubject, but as equal dealers, on the footing of mutual advantage. The publick had derived great benefit from ſuch deal-

ing. But at that time new ideas prevailed. The miniſtry, inſtead of liſtening to the propoſals of that company, choſe to ſet up a claim of the crown to their poſſeſſions. The original plan ſeems to have been, to get the houſe of commons to compliment the crown with a ſort of juridical declaration of a title to the company's acquiſitions in India; which the crown, on its part, with the beſt air in the world, was to beſtow upon the publick. Then it would come to the turn of the houſe of commons again to be liberal and grateful to the crown. The civil liſt debts were to be paid off; with perhaps a pretty augmentation of income. All this was to be done on the moſt publick-ſpirited principles, and with a politeneſs and mutual interchange of good offices, that could not but have charmed. But what was beſt of all, theſe civilities were to be without a farthing of charge to either of the kind and obliging parties.—The Eaſt India company was to be covered with infamy and diſgrace, and at the ſame time was to pay the whole bill.

In conſequence of this ſcheme, the terrors of a parliamentary enquiry were hung over them. A judicature was aſſerted in parliament to try this queſtion. But, leſt this judicial character ſhould chance to inſpire certain ſtubborn ideas of law and right, it was argued, that the judicature was arbitrary, and ought not to determine by the rules of law, but by their opinion of policy and expediency.

Nothing

Nothing exceeded the violence of ſome of the managers, except their impotence. They were bewildered by their paſſions, and by their want of knowledge or want of conſideration of the ſubject. The more they advanced, the further they found themſelves from their object.—All things ran into confuſion. The miniſters quarrelled among themſelves. They diſclaimed one another. They ſuſpended violence, and ſhrunk from treaty. The inquiry was almoſt at its laſt gaſp; when ſome active perſons of the company were given to underſtand, that this hoſtile proceeding was only ſet up *in terrorem*; that government was far from an intention of ſeizing upon the poſſeſſions of the company. Adminiſtration, they ſaid, was ſenſible, that the idea was in every light full of abſurdity; and that ſuch a ſeizure was not more out of their power, than remote from their wiſhes; and therefore, if the company would come in a liberal manner to the houſe, they certainly could not fail of putting a ſpeedy end to this diſagreeable buſineſs, and of opening the way to an advantageous treaty.

On this hint the company acted: they came at once to a reſolution of getting rid of the difficulties which aroſe from the complication of their trade with their revenue; a ſtep which deſpoiled them of their beſt defenſive armour, and put them at once into the power of adminiſtration. They threw their whole ſtock of every kind, the revenue,

nue, the trade, and even their debt from government, into one fund, which they computed on the ſureſt grounds would amount to £.800,000, with a large probable ſurplus for the payment of debt. Then they agreed to divide this ſum in equal portions between themſelves and the publick, £400,000 to each. This gave to the proprietors of that fund an annual augmentation of no more than £.80,000 dividend. They to ought receive from government £.120,000 for the loan of their capital. So that, in fact, the whole, which on this plan they reſerved to themſelves, from their vaſt revenues, from their extenſive trade, and in conſideration of the great riſques and mighty expences which purchaſed theſe advantages, amounted to no more than £.280,000, whilſt government was to receive, as I ſaid, £.400,000.

This propoſal was thought by themſelves liberal indeed; and they expected the higheſt applauſes for it. However, their reception was very different from their expectations. When they brought up their plan to the houſe of commons, the offer, as it was natural, of £.400,000, was very well reliſhed. But nothing could be more diſguſtful than the £.80,000 which the company had divided amongſt themſelves. A violent tempeſt of publick indignation and fury roſe againſt them. The heads of people turned. The company was held well able to pay £.400,000 a year to government; but

bankrupts,

bankrupts, if they attempted to divide the fifth part of it among themſelves. An *ex poſt facto* law was brought in with great precipitation, for annulling this dividend. In the bill was inſerted a clauſe, which ſuſpended for about a year the right, which, under the publick faith, the company enjoyed, of making their own dividends. Such was the diſpoſition and temper of the houſe, that although the plain face of facts, reaſon, arithmetick, all the authority, parts, and eloquence in the kingdom, were againſt this bill; though all the chancellors of the exchequer, who had held that office from the beginning of this reign, oppoſed it; yet a few placemen of the ſubordinate departments ſprung out of their ranks, took the lead, and, by an opinion *of ſome ſort of ſecret ſupport*, carried the bill with an high hand, leaving the then ſecretary of ſtate and the chancellor of the exchequer in a very moderate minority. In this diſtracted ſituation, the managers of the bill, notwithſtanding their triumph, did not venture to propoſe the payment of the civil liſt debt. The chancellor of the exchequer was not in good humour enough, after his late defeat by his own troops, to co-operate in ſuch a deſign; ſo they made an act, to lock up the money in the exchequer until they ſhould have time to look about them, and ſettle among themſelves what they were to do with it.

Thus ended this unparalleled tranſaction. The author,

author, I believe, will not claim any part of the glory of it: he will leave it whole and entire to the authors of the meaſure. The money was the voluntary free gift of the company; the reſcinding bill was the act of legiſlature, to which they and we owe ſubmiſſion: the author has nothing to do with the one or with the other. However, he cannot avoid rubbing himſelf againſt this ſubject merely for the pleaſure of ſtirring controverſies, and gratifying a certain pruriency of taxation that ſeems to infect his blood. It is merely to indulge himſelf in ſpeculations of taxing, that he chooſes to harangue on this ſubject. For he takes credit for no greater ſum than the publick is already in poſſeſſion of. He does not hint, that the company means, or has ever ſhewn any diſpoſition, if managed with common prudence, to pay leſs in future; and he cannot doubt that the preſent miniſtry are as well inclined to drive them, by their mock enquiries, and real reſcinding bills, as he can poſſibly be with his taxes. Beſides, it is obvious, that as great a ſum might have been drawn from that company, without affecting property, or ſhaking the conſtitution, or endangering the principle of publick credit, or running into his golden dreams of cockets on the Ganges, or viſions of ſtamp duties on *Pervanna's*, *Duſticks*, *Kiſtbundees*, and *Huſbulhookums*. For once, I will diſappoint him in this part of the diſpute; and only in a very few words

words recommend to his conſideration, how he is to get off the dangerous idea of taxing a publick fund, if he levies thoſe duties in England; and if he is to levy them in India, what proviſion he has made for a revenue eſtabliſhment there; ſuppoſing that he undertakes this new ſcheme of finance independently of the company, and againſt its inclinations.

So much for theſe revenues; which are nothing but his viſions, or already the national poſſeſſions without any act of his. It is eaſy to parade with an high talk of parliamentary rights, of the univerſality of legiſlative powers, and of uniform taxation. Men of ſenſe, when new projects come before them, always think a diſcourſe proving the mere right or mere power of acting in the manner propoſed, to be no more than a very unpleaſant way of miſ-ſpending time. They muſt ſee the object to be of proper magnitude to engage them; they muſt ſee the means of compaſſing it to be next to certain; the miſchiefs not to counterbalance the profit; they will examine how a propoſed impoſition or regulation agrees with the opinion of thoſe who are likely to be affected by it; they will not deſpiſe the conſideration even of their habitudes and prejudices. They wiſh to know how it accords or diſagrees with the true ſpirit of prior eſtabliſhments, whether of government or of finance; becauſe they well know, that in the complicated

plicated œconomy of great kingdoms, and immenſe revenues, which in a length of time, and by a variety of accidents, have coaleſced into a ſort of body, an attempt towards a compulſory equality in all circumſtances, and an exact practical definition of the ſupreme rights in every caſe, is the moſt dangerous and chimerical of all enterprizes. The old building ſtands well enough, though part Gothick, part Grecian, and part Chineſe, until an attempt is made to ſquare it into uniformity. Then it may come down upon our heads all together, in much uniformity of ruin; and great will be the fall thereof. Some people, inſtead of inclining to debate the matter, only feel a ſort of nauſea, when they are told, that "protection calls "for ſupply," and that "all the parts ought to "contribute to the ſupport of the whole." Strange argument for great and grave deliberation! As if the ſame end may not, and muſt not, be compaſſed, according to its circumſtances, by a great diverſity of ways. Thus in Great Britain ſome of our eſtabliſhments are apt for the ſupport of credit. They ſtand therefore upon a principle of their own, diſtinct from, and in ſome reſpects contrary to, the relation between prince and ſubject. It is a new ſpecies of contract ſuperinduced upon the old contract of the ſtate. The idea of power muſt as much as poſſible be baniſhed from it; for power and credit are things adverſe, incompatible; *Non bene*

bene conveniunt, nec in una ſede morantur. Such eſtabliſhments are our great *monied* companies. To tax them would be critical and dangerous, and contradictory to the very purpoſe of their inſtitution; which is credit, and cannot therefore be taxation. But the nation, when it gave up that power, did not give up the advantage; but ſuppoſed, and with reaſon, that government was overpaid in credit for what it ſeemed to loſe in authority. In ſuch a caſe, to talk of the rights of ſovereignty, is quite idle. Other eſtabliſhments ſupply other modes of publick contribution. Our *trading* companies, as well as individual importers, are a fit ſubject of revenue by cuſtoms. Some eſtabliſhments pay us by a *monopoly* of their conſumption and their produce. This, nominally no tax, in reality comprehends all taxes. Such eſtabliſhments are our colonies. To tax them, would be as erroneous in policy, as rigorous in equity. Ireland ſupplies us by furniſhing troops in war; and by bearing part of our foreign eſtabliſhment in peace. She aids us at at all times by the money that her abſentees ſpend amongſt us; which is no ſmall part of the rental of that kingdom. Thus Ireland contributes her part. Some objects bear port duties. Some are fitter for an inland exciſe. The mode varies, the object is the ſame. To ſtrain theſe from their old and inveterate leanings, might impair the old benefit, and not anſwer the end of the new project.

ject. Among all the great men of antiquity, *Procruſtes* ſhall never be my hero of legiſlation; with his iron bed, the allegory of his government, and the type of ſome modern policy, by which the long limb was to be cut ſhort, and the ſhort tortured into length. Such was the ſtate-bed of uniformity! He would, I conceive, be a very indifferent farmer, who complained that his ſheep did not plough, or his horſes yield him wool, though it would be an idea full of equality. They may think this right in ruſtick œconomy, who think it available in the politick;

Qui Bavium non odit, amet tua carmina, Mævi!
Atque idem jungat vulpes, et mulgeat hircos.

As the author has ſtated this Indian taxation for no viſible purpoſe relative to his plan of ſupply; ſo he has ſtated many other projects with as little, if any diſtinct end; unleſs perhaps to ſhew you how full he is of projects for the publick good; and what vaſt expectations may be formed of him or his friends, if they ſhould be tranſlated into adminiſtration. It is always from ſome opinion that theſe ſpeculations may one day become our publick meaſures, that I think it worth while to trouble the reader at all about them.

Two of them ſtand out in high relievo beyond the reſt. The firſt is a change in the internal repreſentation

preſentation of this country, by enlarging our number of conſtituents. The ſecond is an addition to our repreſentatives, by new American members of parliament. I paſs over here all conſiderations how far ſuch a ſyſtem will be an improvement of our conſtitution according to any ſound theory. Not that I mean to condemn ſuch ſpeculative enquiries concerning this great object of the national attention. They may tend to clear doubtful points, and poſſibly may lead, as they have often done, to real improvements. What I object to, is their introduction into a diſcourſe relating to the immediate ſtate of our affairs, and recommending plans of practical government. In this view, I ſee nothing in them but what is uſual with the author; an attempt to raiſe diſcontent in the people of England, to balance thoſe diſcontents the meaſures of his friends had already raiſed in America. What other reaſon can he have for ſuggeſting, that we are not happy enough to enjoy a ſufficient number of voters in England? I believe that moſt ſober thinkers on this ſubject are rather of opinion, that our fault is on the other ſide; and that it would be more in the ſpirit of our conſtitution, and more agreeable to the pattern of our beſt laws, by leſſening the number, to add to the weight and independency of our voters. And truly, conſidering the immenſe and dangerous charge of elections; the proſtitute and daring venality, the cor-

ruption of manners, the idleneſs and profligacy of the lower ſort of voters, no prudent man would propoſe to encreaſe ſuch an evil, if it be, as I fear it is, out of our power to adminiſter to it any remedy. The author propoſes nothing further. If he has any improvements that may balance or may leſſen this inconvenience, he has thought proper to keep them as uſual in his own breaſt. Since he has been ſo reſerved, I ſhould have wiſhed he had been as cautious with regard to the project itſelf. Firſt, becauſe he obſerves juſtly, that his ſcheme, however it might improve the platform, can add nothing to the authority of the legiſlature; much I fear, it will have a contrary operation: for, authority depending on opinion at leaſt as much as on duty, an idea circulated among the people that our conſtitution is not ſo perfect as it ought to be, before you are ſure of mending it, is a certain method of leſſening it in the publick opinion. Of this irreverent opinion of parliament, the author himſelf complains in one part of his book; and he endeavours to encreaſe it in the other.

Has he well conſidered what an immenſe operation any change in our conſtitution is? how many diſcuſſions, parties, and paſſions, it will neceſſarily excite; and, when you open it to enquiry in one part, where the enquiry will ſtop? Experience ſhews us, that no time can be fit for ſuch changes but a time of general confuſion; when good men, finding

finding every thing already broke up, think it right to take advantage of the opportunity of ſuch derangement in favour of an uſeful alteration. Perhaps a time of the greateſt ſecurity and tranquillity both at home and abroad may likewiſe be fit; but will the author affirm this to be juſt ſuch a time? Transferring an idea of military to civil prudence, he ought to know how dangerous it is to make an alteration of your diſpoſition in the face of an enemy.

Now comes his American repreſentation. Here too, as uſual, he takes no notice of any difficulty, nor ſays any thing to obviate thoſe objections that muſt naturally ariſe in the minds of his readers. He throws you his politicks as he does his revenue; do you make ſomething of them if you can. Is not the reader a little aſtoniſhed at the propoſal of an American repreſentation from that quarter? It is propoſed merely as a * project of ſpeculative improvement; not from the neceſſity in the caſe, not to add any thing to the authority of parliament, but that we may afford a greater attention to the concerns of the Americans, and give them a better opportunity of ſtating their grievances, and of obtaining redreſs. I am glad to find the author has at length diſcovered that we have not given a ſufficient attention to their concerns, or a proper re-

* P. 39, 40,

dreſs to their grievances. His great friend would once have been exceedingly diſpleaſed with any perſon, who ſhould tell him, that he did not attend ſufficiently to thoſe concerns. He thought he did ſo, when he regulated the colonies over and over again: he thought he did ſo, when he formed two general ſyſtems of revenue; one of port-duties, and the other of internal taxation. Theſe ſyſtems ſuppoſed, or ought to ſuppoſe, the greateſt attention to, and the moſt detailed information of, all their affairs. However, by contending for the American repreſentation, he ſeems at laſt driven virtually to admit, that great caution ought to be uſed in the exerciſe of *all* our legiſlative rights over an object ſo remote from our eye, and ſo little connected with our immediate feelings; that in prudence we ought not to be quite ſo ready with our taxes, until we can ſecure the deſired repreſentation in parliament. Perhaps it may be ſome time before this hopeful ſcheme can be brought to perfect maturity, although the author ſeems to be no wiſe aware of any obſtructions that lie in the way of it. He talks of his union, juſt as he does of his taxes and his ſavings, with as much *ſang froid* and eaſe, as if his wiſh and the enjoyment were exactly the ſame thing. He appears not to have troubled his head with the infinite difficulty of ſettling that repreſentation on a fair balance of wealth and numbers throughout the

ſeveral

ſeveral provinces of America and the Weſt Indies, under ſuch an infinite variety of circumſtances. It coſts him nothing to fight with nature, and to conquer the order of Providence, which manifeſtly oppoſes itſelf to the poſſibility of ſuch a parliamentary union.

But let us, to indulge his paſſion for projects and power, ſuppoſe the happy time arrived, when the author comes into the miniſtry, and is to realiſe his ſpeculations. The writs are iſſued for electing members for America and the Weſt Indies. Some provinces receive them in ſix weeks, ſome in ten, ſome in twenty. A veſſel may be loſt, and then ſome provinces may not receive them at all. But let it be, that they all receive them at once, and in the ſhorteſt time. A proper ſpace muſt be given for proclamation and for the election; ſome weeks at leaſt. But the members are choſen; and, if ſhips are ready to ſail, in about ſix more they arrive in London. In the mean time the parliament has ſat and buſineſs far advanced without American repreſentatives. Nay by this time, it may happen, that the parliament is diſſolved; and then the members ſhip themſelves again, to be again elected. The writs may arrive in America, before the poor members of a parliament in which they never ſat, can arrive at their ſeveral provinces. A new intereſt is formed, and they find other members are choſen whilſt they are on the high ſeas. But, if

the writs and members arrive together, here is at beſt a new trial of ſkill amongſt the candidates, after one ſet of them have well aired themſelves with their two voyages of 6000 miles.

However, in order to facilitate every thing to the author, we will ſuppoſe them all once more elected, and ſteering again to Old England, with a good heart, and a fair weſterly wind in their ſtern. On their arrival, they find all in a hurry and buſtle; in and out; condoleance and congratulation; the crown is demiſed. Another parliament is to be called. Away back to America again on a fourth voyage, and to a third election. Does the author mean to make our kings as immortal in their perſonal as in their politick character? or, whilſt he bountifully adds to their life, will he take from them their prerogative of diſſolving parliaments, in favour of the American union? or are the American repreſentatives to be perpetual, and to feel neither demiſes of the crown, nor diſſolutions of parliament?

But theſe things may be granted to him, without bringing him much nearer to his point. What does he think of re-election? is the American member the only one who is not to take a place, or the only one to be exempted from the ceremony of re-election? How will this great politician preſerve the rights of electors, the fairneſs of returns, and the privilege of the houſe of commons, as the ſole

ſole judge of ſuch conteſts? It would undoubtedly be a glorious ſight to have eight or ten petitions, or double returns, from Boſton and Barbadoes, from Philadelphia and Jamaica, the members returned, and the petitioners, with all their train of attornies, ſolicitors, mayors, ſelect-men, provoſt-marſhals, and above five hundred or a thouſand witneſſes, come to the bar of the houſe of commons. Poſſibly we might be interrupted in the enjoyment of this pleaſing ſpectacle, if a war ſhould break out, and our conſtitutional fleet, loaded with members of parliament, returning officers, petitioners, and witneſſes, the electors and elected, ſhould become a prize to the French or Spaniards, and be conveyed to Carthagena or to La Vera Cruz, and from thence perhaps to Mexico or Lima, there to remain until a cartel for members of parliament can be ſettled, or until the war is ended.

In truth, the author has little ſtudied this buſineſs; or he might have known, that ſome of the moſt conſiderable provinces of America, ſuch for inſtance as Connecticut and Maſſachuſetts Bay, have not in each of them two men who can afford, at a diſtance from their eſtates, to ſpend a thouſand pounds a year. How can theſe provinces be repreſented at Weſtminſter? If their province pays them, they are American agents, with ſalaries, and not independent members of parliament. It is true, that formerly in England members had ſala-

ries from their conſtituents; but they all had ſalaries, and were all, in this way, upon a par. If theſe American repreſentatives have no ſalaries, then they muſt add to the liſt of our penſioners and dependants at court, or they muſt ſtarve. There is no alternative.

Enough of this viſionary union; in which much extravagance appears without any fancy, and the judgment is ſhocked without any thing to refreſh the imagination. It looks as if the author had dropped down from the moon, without any knowledge of the general nature of this globe, of the general nature of its inhabitants, without the leaſt acquaintance with the affairs of this country. Governor Pownal has handled the ſame ſubject. To do him juſtice, he treats it upon far more rational principles of ſpeculation; and much more like a man of buſineſs. He thinks (erroneouſly, I conceive; but he does think) that our legiſlative rights are incomplete without ſuch a repreſentation. It is no wonder, therefore, that he endeavours by every means to obtain it. Not like our author, who is always on velvet, he is aware of ſome difficulties; and he propoſes ſome ſolutions. But nature is too hard for both theſe authors; and America is, and ever will be, without actual repreſentation in the houſe of commons; nor will any miniſter be wild enough even to propoſe ſuch a repreſentation in parliament; however he may chooſe to throw out

that

that project, together with others equally far from his real opinions and remote from his deſigns, merely to fall in with the different views, and captivate the affections, of different ſorts of men.

Whether theſe projects ariſe from the author's real political principles, or are only brought out in ſubſervience to his political views, they compoſe the whole of any thing that is like preciſe and definite, which the author has given us to expect from that adminiſtration which is ſo much the ſubject of his praiſes and prayers. As to his general propoſitions, that "there is a deal of differ-"ence between impoſſibilities and great difficul-"ties;" that "a great ſcheme cannot be carried, "unleſs made the buſineſs of ſucceſſive admini-"ſtrations;" that "virtuous and able men are "the fitteſt to ſerve their country;" all this I look on as no more than ſo much rubble to fill up the ſpaces between the regular maſonry. Pretty much in the ſame light I cannot forbear conſidering his detached obſervations on commerce; ſuch as, that * "the ſyſtem for colony regulations would be "very ſimple, and mutually beneficial to Great "Britain and her colonies, if the old navigation "laws were adhered to." That "the tranſporta-"tion ſhould be in all caſes in ſhips belonging to "Britiſh ſubjects." That "even Britiſh ſhips

* P. 39.

"ſhould

" ſhould not be *generally* received into the colonies " from any part of Europe, except the dominions " of Great Britain." That " it is unreaſonable " that corn and ſuch like products ſhould be re- " ſtrained to come firſt to a Britiſh port." What do all theſe fine obſervations ſignify? Some of them condemn as ill practices, things that were never practiſed at all. Some recommend to be done, things that always have been done. Others indeed convey, though obliquely and loofely, ſome inſinuations highly dangerous to our commerce. If I could prevail on myſelf to think the author meant to ground any practice upon theſe general propoſitions, I ſhould think it very neceſſary to aſk a few queſtions about ſome of them. For inſtance, what does he mean by talking of an adherence to the old navigation laws? does he mean, that the particular law, 12 Car. II. c. 19, commonly called " The Act of Navigation," is to be adhered to, and that the ſeveral ſubſequent additions, amendments, and exceptions, ought to be all repealed? If ſo, he will make a ſtrange havock in the whole ſyſtem of our trade laws, which have been univerſally acknowledged to be full as well founded in the alterations and exceptions, as the act of Charles the Second in the original proviſions; and to purſue full as wiſely the great end of that very politick law, the encreaſe of the Britiſh navigation. I fancy the writer could hardly propoſe any thing more

more alarming to thoſe immediately intereſted in that navigation than ſuch a repeal. If he does not mean this, he has got no farther than a nugatory propoſition, which nobody can contradict, and for which no man is the wiſer.

That "the regulations for the colony trade "would be few and ſimple if the old navigation-"laws were adhered to," I utterly deny as a fact. That they ought to be ſo, ſounds well enough; but this propoſition is of the ſame nugatory nature with ſome of the former. The regulations for the colony trade ought not to be more nor fewer, nor more or leſs complex, than the occaſion requires. And, as that trade is in a great meaſure a ſyſtem of art and reſtriction, they can neither be few nor ſimple. It is true, that the very principle may be deſtroyed, by multiplying to exceſs the means of ſecuring it. Never did a miniſter depart more from the author's ideas of ſimplicity, or more embarraſs the trade of America with the multiplicity and intricacy of regulations and ordinances, than his boaſted miniſter of 1764. That miniſter ſeemed to be poſſeſſed with ſomething, hardly ſhort of a rage, for regulation and reſtriction. He had ſo multiplied bonds, certificates, affidavits, warrants, ſufferances, and cockets; had ſupported them with ſuch ſevere penalties, and extended them without the leaſt conſideration of circumſtances

cumſtances to ſo many objects, that, had they all continued in their original force, commerce muſt ſpeedily have expired under them. Some of them, the miniſtry which gave them birth was obliged to deſtroy: with their own hand they ſigned the condemnation of their own regulations; confeſſing in ſo many words, in the preamble of their act of the 5th Geo. III. that ſome of theſe regulations had laid *an unneceſſary reſtraint on the trade and correſpondence of his Majeſty's American ſubjects.* This, in that miniſtry, was a candid confeſſion of a miſtake: but every alteration made in thoſe regulations by their ſucceſſors is to be the effect of envy, and American miſrepreſentation. So much for the author's ſimplicity in regulation.

I have now gone through all which I think immediately eſſential in the author's idea of war, of peace, of the comparative ſtates of England and France, of our actual ſituation; in his projects of œconomy, of finance, of commerce, and of conſtitutional improvement. There remains nothing now to be conſidered, except his heavy cenſures upon the adminiſtration which was formed in 1765; which is commonly known by the name of the Marquis of Rockingham's adminiſtration, as the adminiſtration which preceded it is by that of Mr. Grenville. Theſe cenſures relate chiefly to three heads: 1. To the repeal of the American

ſtamp

ſtamp act. 2. To the commercial regulations then made. 3. To the courſe of foreign negotiations during that ſhort period.

A perſon who knew nothing of publick affairs but from the writings of this author would be led to conclude, that, at the time of the change in June 1765, ſome well-digeſted ſyſtem of adminiſtration, founded in national ſtrength, and in the affections of the people, proceeding in all points with the moſt reverential and tender regard to the laws, and purſuing with equal wiſdom and ſucceſs every thing which could tend to the internal proſperity, and to the external honour and dignity of this country, had been all at once ſubverted, by an irruption of a ſort of wild, licentious, unprincipled invaders, who wantonly, and with a barbarous rage, had defaced a thouſand fair monuments of the conſtitutional and political ſkill of their predeceſſors. It is natural indeed that this author ſhould have ſome diſlike to the adminiſtration which was formed in 1765. Its views in moſt things were different from thoſe of his friends; in ſome, altogether oppoſite to them. It is impoſſible that both of theſe adminiſtrations ſhould be the objects of public eſteem. Their different principles compoſe ſome of the ſtrongeſt political lines which diſcriminate the parties even now ſubſiſting amongſt us. The miniſters of 1764 are not indeed followed by very many in their oppoſition: yet

yet a large part of the people now in office entertain, or pretend to entertain, ſentiments entirely conformable to theirs; whilſt ſome of the former colleagues of the miniſtry which was formed in 1765, however they may have abandoned the connexion, and contradicted by their conduct the principles of their former friends, pretend, on their parts, ſtill to adhere to the ſame maxims. All the leſſer diviſions, which are indeed rather names of perſonal attachment than of party diſtinction, fall in with the one or the other of theſe leading parties.

I intend to ſtate, as ſhortly as I am able, the general condition of publick affairs, and the diſpoſition of the minds of men, at the time of the remarkable change of ſyſtem in 1765. The reader will have thereby a more diſtinct view of the comparative merits of theſe ſeveral plans, and will receive more ſatisfaction concerning the ground and reaſon of the meaſures which were then purſued, than, I believe, can be derived from the peruſal of thoſe partial repreſentations contained in the State of the Nation, and the other writings of thoſe who have continued, for now near three years, in the undiſturbed poſſeſſion of the preſs. This will, I hope, be ſome apology for my dwelling a little on this part of the ſubject.

On the reſignation of the Earl of Bute, in 1763, our affairs had been delivered into the hands of three

three miniſters of his recommendation; Mr. Grenville, the Earl of Egremont, and the Earl of Halifax. This arrangement, notwithſtanding the retirement of Lord Bute, announced to the publick a continuance of the ſame meaſures; nor was there more reaſon to expect a change from the death of the Earl of Egremont. The Earl of Sandwich ſupplied his place. The Duke of Bedford, and the gentlemen who act in that connexion, and whoſe general character and politicks were ſufficiently underſtood, added to the ſtrength of the miniſtry, without making any alteration in their plan of conduct. Such was the conſtitution of the miniſtry which was changed in 1765.

As to their politicks, the principles of the peace of Paris governed in foreign affairs. In domeſtick, the ſame ſcheme prevailed, of contradicting the opinions, and diſgracing moſt of the perſons, who had been countenanced and employed in the late reign. The inclinations of the people were little attended to; and a diſpoſition to the uſe of forcible methods ran through the whole tenour of adminiſtration. The nation in general was uneaſy and diſſatisfied. Sober men ſaw cauſes for it, in the conſtitution of the miniſtry and the conduct of the miniſters. The miniſters, who have uſually a ſhort method on ſuch occaſions, attributed their unpopularity wholly to the efforts of faction. However this might be, the licentiouſneſs and tumults

mults of the common people, and the contempt of government, of which our author ſo often and ſo bitterly complains, as owing to the miſmanagement of the ſubſequent adminiſtrations, had at no time riſen to a greater or a more dangerous height. The meaſures taken to ſuppreſs that ſpirit were as violent and licentious as the ſpirit itſelf; injudicious, precipitate, and ſome of them illegal. Inſtead of allaying, they tended infinitely to inflame the diſtemper; and whoever will be at the leaſt pains to examine, will find thoſe meaſures, not only the cauſes of the tumults which then prevailed, but the real ſources of almoſt all the diſorders which have ariſen ſince that time. More intent on making a victim to party than an example of juſtice, they blundered in the method of purſuing their vengeance. By this means a diſcovery was made of many practices, common indeed in the office of ſecretary of ſtate, but wholly repugnant to our laws, and the genius of the Engliſh conſtitution. One of the worſt of theſe was, the wanton and indiſcriminate ſeizure of papers, even in caſes where the ſafety of the ſtate was not pretended in juſtification of ſo harſh a proceeding. The temper of the miniſtry had excited a jealouſy, which made the people more than commonly vigilant concerning every power which was exerciſed by government. The abuſe, however ſanctioned by cuſtom, was evident; but the miniſtry, inſtead of reſting

reſting in a prudent inactivity, or (what would have been ſtill more prudent) taking the lead, in quieting the minds of the people, and aſcertaining the law upon thoſe delicate points, made uſe of the whole influence of government to prevent a parliamentary reſolution againſt theſe practices of office. And leſt the colourable reaſons, offered in argument againſt this parliamentary procedure, ſhould be miſtaken for the real motives of their conduct, all the advantage of privilege, all the arts and fineſſes of pleading, and great ſums of publick money were laviſhed, to prevent any deciſion upon thoſe practices in the courts of juſtice. In the mean time, in order to weaken, ſince they could not immediately deſtroy, the liberty of the preſs, the privilege of parliament was voted away in all accuſations for a ſeditious libel. The freedom of debate in parliament itſelf was no leſs menaced. Officers of the army, of long and meritorious ſervice, and of ſmall fortunes, were choſen as victims for a ſingle vote, by an exertion of miniſterial power, which had been very rarely uſed, and which is extremely unjuſt, as depriving men not only of a place, but a profeſſion, and is indeed of the moſt pernicious example both in a civil and a military light.

Whilſt all things were managed at home with ſuch a ſpirit of diſorderly deſpotiſm; abroad there was a proportionable abatement of all ſpirit. Some

of our moſt juſt and valuable claims were in a manner abandoned. This indeed ſeemed not very inconſiſtent conduct in the miniſters who had made the treaty of Paris. With regard to our domeſtick affairs, there was no want of induſtry; but there was a great deficiency of temper and judgment, and manly comprehenſion of the publick intereſt. The nation certainly wanted relief, and government attempted to adminiſter it. Two ways were principally choſen for this great purpoſe. The firſt by regulation; the ſecond by new funds of revenue. Agreeably to this plan, a new naval eſtabliſhment was formed at a good deal of expence, and to little effect, to aid in the collection of the cuſtoms. Regulation was added to regulation; and the ſtricteſt and moſt unreſerved orders were given, for a prevention of all contraband trade here, and in every part of America. A teazing cuſtom-houſe, and a multiplicity of perplexing regulations, ever have, and ever will appear, the maſter-piece of finance to people of narrow views; as a paper againſt ſmuggling, and the importation of French finery, never fails of furniſhing a very popular column in a newſpaper.

The greateſt part of theſe regulations were made for America; and they fell ſo indiſcriminately on all ſorts of contraband, or ſuppoſed contraband, that ſome of the moſt valuable branches of trade were driven violently from our ports; which

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cauſed an univerſal conſternation throughout the colonies. Every part of the trade was infinitely diſtreſſed by them. Men of war now for the firſt time, armed with regular commiſſions of cuſtom-houſe officers, inveſted the coaſts, and gave to the collection of revenue the air of hoſtile contribution. About the ſame time that theſe regulations ſeemed to threaten the deſtruction of the only trade from whence the plantations derived any ſpecie, an act was made, putting a ſtop to the future emiſſion of paper currency, which uſed to ſupply its place among them. Hand in hand with this went another act, for obliging the colonies to provide quarters for ſoldiers. Inſtantly followed another law, for levying throughout all America new port duties, upon a vaſt variety of commodities of their conſumption, and ſome of which lay heavy upon objects neceſſary for their trade and fiſhery. Immediately upon the heels of theſe, and amidſt the uneaſineſs and confuſion produced by a crowd of new impoſitions and regulations, ſome good, ſome evil, ſome doubtful, all crude and ill-conſidered, came another act, for impoſing an univerſal ſtamp duty on the colonies; and this was declared to be little more than an experiment, and a foundation of future revenue. To render theſe proceedings the more irritating to the colonies, the principal argument uſed in favour of their ability to pay ſuch duties was the liberality of the

grants of their aſſemblies during the late war. Never could any argument be more inſulting and mortifying to a people habituated to the granting of their own money.

Taxes for the purpoſe of raiſing revenue had hitherto been ſparingly attempted in America. Without ever doubting the extent of its lawful power, parliament always doubted the propriety of ſuch impoſitions. And the Americans on their part never thought of conteſting a right by which they were ſo little affected. Their aſſemblies in the main anſwered all the purpoſes neceſſary to the internal œconomy of a free people, and provided for all the exigencies of government which aroſe amongſt themſelves. In the midſt of that happy enjoyment, they never thought of critically ſettling the exact limits of a power, which was neceſſary to their union, their ſafety, their equality, and even their liberty. Thus the two very difficult points, ſuperiority in the preſiding ſtate, and freedom in the ſubordinate, were on the whole ſufficiently, that is, practically, reconciled; without agitating thoſe vexatious queſtions, which in truth rather belong to metaphyſicks than politicks, and which can never be moved without ſhaking the foundations of the beſt governments that have ever been conſtituted by human wiſdom. By this meaſure was let looſe that dangerous ſpirit of diſquiſition, not in the coolneſs of philoſophical enquiry,

quiry, but enflamed with all the paſſions of an haughty reſentful people, who thought themſelves deeply injured, and that they were contending for every thing that was valuable in the world.

In England, our miniſters went on without the leaſt attention to theſe alarming diſpoſitions; juſt as if they were doing the moſt common things in the moſt uſual way, and among a people not only paſſive but pleaſed. They took no one ſtep to divert the dangerous ſpirit which began even then to appear in the colonies, to compromiſe with it, to mollify it, or to ſubdue it. No new arrangements were made in civil government; no new powers or inſtructions were given to governors; no augmentation was made, or new diſpoſition, of forces. Never was ſo critical a meaſure purſued with ſo little proviſion againſt its neceſſary conſequences. As if all common prudence had abandoned the miniſters, and as if they meant to plunge themſelves and us headlong into that gulph which ſtood gaping before them; by giving a year's notice of the project of their ſtamp-act, they allowed time for all the diſcontents of that country to feſter and come to a head, and for all the arrangements which factious men could make towards an oppoſition to the law. At the ſame time they carefully concealed from the eye of parliament thoſe remonſtrances which they had actually received; and which in the ſtrongeſt manner indicated the

diſcontent of ſome of the colonies, and the conſequences which might be expected; they concealed them, even in defiance of an order of council, that they ſhould be laid before parliament. Thus, by concealing the true ſtate of the caſe, they rendered the wiſdom of the nation as improvident as their own temerity, either in preventing or guarding againſt the miſchief. It has indeed, from the beginning to this hour, been the uniform policy of this ſet of men, in order at any hazard to obtain a preſent credit, to propoſe whatever might be pleaſing, as attended with no difficulty; and afterwards to throw all the diſappointment of the wild expectations they had raiſed, upon thoſe who have the hard taſk of freeing the publick from the conſequences of their pernicious projects.

Whilſt the commerce and tranquillity of the whole empire were ſhaken in this manner, our affairs grew ſtill more diſtracted by the internal diſſenſions of our miniſters. Treachery and ingratitude was charged from one ſide; deſpotiſm and tyranny from the other; the vertigo of the regency bill; the awkward reception of the ſilk bill in the houſe of commons, and the inconſiderate and abrupt rejection of it in the houſe of lords; the ſtrange and violent tumults which aroſe in conſequence, and which were rendered more ſerious, by being charged by the miniſters upon one another; the report of a groſs and brutal treatment

ment of the ——, by a miniſter at the ſame time odious to the people; all conſpired to leave the publick, at the cloſe of the ſeſſion of 1765, in as critical and perilous a ſituation, as ever the nation was, or could be, in a time when ſhe was not immediately threatened by her neighbours.

It was at this time, and in theſe circumſtances, that a new adminiſtration was formed. Profeſſing even induſtriouſly, in this publick matter, to avoid anecdotes; I ſay nothing of thoſe famous reconciliations and quarrels, which weakened the body that ſhould have been the natural ſupport of this adminiſtration. I run no riſque in affirming, that, ſurrounded as they were with difficulties of every ſpecies, nothing but the ſtrongeſt and moſt uncorrupt ſenſe of their duty to the publick could have prevailed upon ſome of the perſons who compoſed it to undertake the king's buſineſs at ſuch a time. Their preceding character, their meaſures while in power, and the ſubſequent conduct of many of them, I think, leave no room to charge this aſſertion to flattery. Having undertaken the commonwealth, what remained for them to do? to piece their conduct upon the broken chain of former meaſures? If they had been ſo inclined, the ruinous nature of thoſe meaſures, which began inſtantly to appear, would not have permitted it. Scarcely had they entered into office, when letters arrived from all parts of America, making loud complaints,

backed by ſtrong reaſons, againſt ſeveral of the principal regulations of the late miniſtry, as threatening deſtruction to many valuable branches of commerce. Theſe were attended with repreſentations from many merchants and capital manufacturers at home, who had all their intereſts involved in the ſupport of lawful trade, and in the ſuppreſſion of every ſort of contraband. Whilſt theſe things were under conſideration, that conflagration blazed out at once in North America, an univerſal diſobedience, and open reſiſtance to the ſtamp act; and, in conſequence, an univerſal ſtop to the courſe of juſtice, and to trade and navigation, throughout that great important country; an interval during which the trading intereſt of England lay under the moſt dreadful anxiety which it ever felt.

The repeal of that act was propoſed. It was much too ſerious a meaſure, and attended with too many difficulties upon every ſide, for the then miniſtry to have undertaken it, as ſome paltry writers have aſſerted, from envy and diſlike to their predeceſſors in office. As little could it be owing to perſonal cowardice, and dread of conſequences to themſelves. Miniſters, timorous from their attachment to place and power, will fear more from the conſequences of one court intrigue, than from a thouſand difficulties to the commerce and credit of their country by diſturbances at three thouſand miles diſtance. From which of theſe the miniſters had

had moſt to apprehend at that time, is known, I preſume, univerſally. Nor did they take that reſolution from a want of the fulleſt ſenſe of the inconveniencies which muſt neceſſarily attend a meaſure of conceſſion from the ſovereign to the ſubject. That it muſt increaſe the inſolence of the mutinous ſpirits in America, was but too obvious. No great meaſure indeed, at a very difficult criſis, can be purſued, which is not attended with ſome miſchief; none but conceited pretenders in publick buſineſs will hold any other language: and none but weak and unexperienced men will believe them, if they ſhould. If we were found in ſuch a criſis, let thoſe whoſe bold deſigns, and whoſe defective arrangements, brought us into it, anſwer for the conſequences. The buſineſs of the then miniſtry evidently was, to take ſuch ſteps, not as the wiſhes of our author, or as their own wiſhes dictated, but as the bad ſituation in which their predeceſſors had left them abſolutely required.

The diſobedience to this act was univerſal throughout America; nothing, it was evident, but the ſending a very ſtrong military, backed by a very ſtrong naval force, would reduce the ſeditious to obedience. To ſend it to one town, would not be ſufficient; every province of America muſt be traverſed, and muſt be ſubdued. I do not entertain the leaſt doubt but this could be done. We might, I think, without much difficulty have deſtroyed

ſtroyed our colonies. This deſtruction might be effected, probably in a year, or in two at the utmoſt. If the queſtion was upon a foreign nation, where every ſucceſsful ſtroke adds to your own power, and takes from that of a rival, a juſt war with ſuch a certain ſuperiority would be undoubtedly an adviſeable meaſure. But *four million* of debt due to our merchants, the total ceſſation of a trade annually worth *four million* more, a large foreign traffick, much home manufacture, a very capital immediate revenue ariſing from colony imports, indeed the produce of every one of our revenues greatly depending on this trade, all theſe were very weighty accumulated conſiderations, at leaſt well to be weighed, before that ſword was drawn, which even by its victories muſt produce all the evil effects of the greateſt national defeat. How publick credit muſt have ſuffered, I need not ſay. If the condition of the nation, at the cloſe of our foreign war, was what this author repreſents it, ſuch a civil war would have been a bad couch on which to repoſe our wearied virtue. Far from being able to have entered into new plans of œconomy, we muſt have launched into a new ſea, I fear a boundleſs ſea, of expence. Such an addition of debt, with ſuch a diminution of revenue and trade, would have left us in no want of a *State of the Nation* to aggravate the picture of our diſtreſſes.

Our

Our trade felt this to its vitals; and our then miniſters were not aſhamed to ſay, that they ſympathized with the feelings of our merchants. The univerſal alarm of the whole trading body of England will never be laughed at by them as an ill-grounded or a pretended panick. The univerſal deſire of that body will always have great weight with them in every conſideration connected with commerce; neither ought the opinion of that body to be ſlighted (notwithſtanding the contemptuous and indecent language of this author and his aſſociates) in any conſideration whatſoever of revenue. Nothing amongſt us is more quickly or deeply affected by taxes of any kind than trade; and if an American tax was a real relief to England, no part of the community would be ſooner, or more materially, relieved by it than our merchants. But they well know that the trade of England muſt be more burthened by one penny raiſed in America, than by three in England; and if that penny be raiſed with the uneaſineſs, the diſcontent, and the confuſion of America, more than by ten.

If the opinion and wiſh of the landed intereſt is a motive, and it is a fair and juſt one, for taking away a real and large revenue, the deſire of the trading intereſt of England ought to be a juſt ground for taking away a tax, of little better than ſpeculation, which was to be collected by a war, which was to be kept up with the perpetual diſcontent

content of thoſe who were to be affected by it, and the value of whoſe produce, even after the *ordinary* charges of collection, was very uncertain ;* after the *extraordinary*, the deareſt purchaſed revenue that ever was made by any nation.

Theſe were ſome of the motives drawn from principles of convenience for that repeal. When the object came to be more narrowly inſpected, every motive concurred. Theſe colonies were evidently founded in ſubſervience to the commerce of Great Britain. From this principle, the whole ſyſtem of our laws concerning them became a ſyſtem of reſtriction. A double monopoly was eſtabliſhed on the part of the parent country ; 1. A monopoly of their whole import, which is to be altogether from Great Britain ; 2. A monopoly of all their export, which is to be no where but to Great Britain, as far as it can ſerve any purpoſe here. On the ſame idea it was contrived that they ſhould ſend all their products to us raw, and in their firſt ſtate ; and that they ſhould take every thing from us in the laſt ſtage of manufacture.

Were ever a people under ſuch circumſtances,

* It is obſervable, that the partizans of American taxation, when they have a mind to repreſent this tax as wonderfully beneficial to England, ſtate it as worth £ 100,000 a year ; when they are to repreſent it as very light on the Americans, it dwindles to £.60,000. Indeed it is very difficult to compute what its produce might have been.

that

that is, a people who were to export raw, and to receive manufactured, and this, not a few luxurious articles, but all articles, even to thoſe of the groſſeſt, moſt vulgar, and neceſſary conſumption, a people who were in the hands of a general monopoliſt, were ever ſuch a people ſuſpected of a poſſibility of becoming a juſt object of revenue? All the ends of their foundation muſt be ſuppoſed utterly contradicted before they could become ſuch an object. Every trade-law we have made muſt have been eluded, and become uſeleſs, before they could be in ſuch a condition.

The partizans of the new ſyſtem, who, on moſt occaſions, take credit for full as much knowledge as they poſſeſs, think proper on this occaſion to counterfeit an extraordinary degree of ignorance, and in conſequence of it to aſſert, * "that the balance (between the colonies and Great Britain) "is unknown, and that no important concluſion "can be drawn from premiſes ſo very uncertain." Now to what can this ignorance be owing? were the navigation laws made, that this balance ſhould be unknown? is it from the courſe of exchange that it is unknown, which all the world knows to be greatly and perpetually againſt the colonies? is it from the doubtful nature of the trade we carry on with the colonies? are not theſe ſchemiſts well

* Conſiderations, p. 74.

apprized

apprized, that the coloniſts, particularly thoſe of the northern provinces, import more from Great Britain, ten times more, than they ſend in return to us? that a great part of their foreign balance is, and muſt be, remitted to London? I ſhall be ready to admit that the colonies ought to be taxed to the revenues of this country, when I know that they are out of debt to its commerce. This author will furniſh ſome ground to his theories, and communicate a diſcovery to the publick, if he can ſhew this by any medium. But he tells us, that* "their ſeas are covered with ſhips, and their ri-"vers floating with commerce." This is true. But it is with *our* ſhips that theſe ſeas are covered; and their rivers float with Britiſh commerce. The American merchants are our factors; all in reality, moſt even in name. The Americans trade, navigate, cultivate, with Engliſh capitals; to their own advantage, to be ſure; for without theſe capitals their ploughs would be ſtopped, and their ſhips wind-bound. But he who furniſhes the capital muſt, on the whole, be the perſon principally benefitted; the perſon who works upon it profits on his part too; but he profits in a ſubordinate way, as our colonies do; that is, as the ſervant of a wiſe and indulgent maſter, and no otherwiſe. We have all, except the *peculium*; without which, even ſlaves will not labour.

* Conſiderations, p. 79.

If

If the author's principles, which are the common notions, be right, that the price of our manufactures is ſo greatly enhanced by our taxes; then the Americans already pay in that way a ſhare of our impoſitions. He is not aſhamed to aſſert, that * "France and China may be ſaid, on the "ſame principle, to bear a part of our charges, for "they conſume our commodities." Was ever ſuch a method of reaſoning heard of? Do not the laws abſolutely confine the colonies to buy from us, whether foreign nations ſell cheaper or not? On what other idea are all our prohibitions, regulations, guards, penalties, and forfeitures, framed? To ſecure to us, not a commercial preference, which ſtands in need of no penalties to enforce it; it finds its own way; but to ſecure to us a trade, which is a creature of law and inſtitution. What has this to do with the principles of a foreign trade, which is under no monopoly, and in which we cannot raiſe the price of our goods, without hazarding the demand for them? None but the authors of ſuch meaſures could ever think of making uſe of ſuch arguments.

Whoever goes about to reaſon on any part of the policy of this country with regard to America, upon the mere abſtract principles of government, or even upon thoſe of our own antient con-

* Conſiderations, p. 74.

ſtitution,

ſtitution, will be often miſled. Thoſe who reſort for arguments to the moſt reſpectable authorities, antient or modern, or reſt upon the cleareſt maxims, drawn from the experience of other ſtates and empires, will be liable to the greateſt errors imaginable. The object is wholly new in the world. It is ſingular: it is grown up to this magnitude and importance within the memory of man; nothing in hiſtory is parallel to it. All the reaſonings about it, that are likely to be at all ſolid, muſt be drawn from its actual circumſtances. In this new ſyſtem a principle of commerce, of artificial commerce, muſt predominate. This commerce muſt be ſecured by a multitude of reſtraints very alien from the ſpirit of liberty; and a powerful authority muſt reſide in the principal ſtate, in order to enforce them. But the people who are to be the ſubjects of theſe reſtraints are deſcendants of Engliſhmen; and of an high and free ſpirit. To hold over them a government made up of nothing but reſtraints and penalties, and taxes in the granting of which they can have no ſhare, will neither be wiſe nor long practicable. People muſt be governed in a manner agreeable to their temper and diſpoſition; and men of free character and ſpirit muſt be ruled with, at leaſt, ſome condeſcenſion to this ſpirit and this character. The Britiſh coloniſt muſt ſee ſomething which will diſtinguiſh him from the coloniſts of other nations.

Thoſe

Thoſe reaſonings, which infer from the many reſtraints under which we have already laid America, to our right to lay it under ſtill more, and indeed under all manner of reſtraints, are concluſive; concluſive as to right; but the very reverſe as to policy and practice. We ought rather to infer from our having laid the colonies under many reſtraints, that it is reaſonable to compenſate them by every indulgence that can by any means be reconciled to our intereſt. We have a great empire to rule, compoſed of a vaſt maſs of heterogeneous governments, all more or leſs free and popular in their forms, all to be kept in peace, and kept out of conſpiracy, with one another, all to be held in ſubordination to this country; while the ſpirit of an extenſive and intricate and trading intereſt pervades the whole, always qualifying, and often controlling, every general idea of conſtitution and government. It is a great and difficult object; and I wiſh we may poſſeſs wiſdom and temper enough to manage it as we ought. Its importance is infinite. I believe the reader will be ſtruck, as I have been, with one ſingular fact. In the year 1704, but ſixty-five years ago, the whole trade with our plantations was but a few thouſand pounds more in the export article, and a third leſs in the import, than that which we now carry on with the ſingle iſland of Jamaica:

	Exports.	Imports.
Total Engliſh plantations	£.	£.
in 1704, - -	483,265 -	814,491
Jamaica, 1767, -	467,681 -	1,243,742

From the ſame information I find that our dealing with moſt of the European nations is but little encreaſed; theſe nations have been pretty much at a ſtand ſince that time; and we have rivals in their trade. This colony intercourſe is a new world of commerce in a manner created; it ſtands upon principles of its own; principles hardly worth endangering for any little conſideration of extorted revenue.

The reader ſees, that I do not enter ſo fully into this matter as obviouſly I might. I have already been led into greater lengths than I intended. It is enough to ſay, that before the miniſters of 1765 had determined to propoſe the repeal of the ſtamp act in parliament, they had the whole of the American conſtitution and commerce very fully before them. They conſidered maturely; they decided with wiſdom; let me add, with firmneſs. For they reſolved, as a preliminary to that repeal, to aſſert in the fulleſt and leaſt equivocal terms the unlimited legiſlative right of this country over its colonies; and, having done this, to propoſe the repeal, on principles, not of conſtitutional right,

but

but on thoſe of expediency, of equity, of lenity, and of the true intereſts preſent and future of that great object for which alone the colonies were founded, navigation and commerce. This plan, I ſay, required an uncommon degree of firmneſs, when we conſider that ſome of thoſe perſons who might be of the greateſt uſe in promoting the repeal, violently withſtood the declaratory act; and they who agreed with adminiſtration in the principles of that law, equally made, as well the reaſons on which the declaratory act itſelf ſtood, as thoſe on which it was oppoſed, grounds for an oppoſition to the repeal.

If the then miniſtry reſolved firſt to declare the right, it was not from any opinion they entertained of its future uſe in regular taxation. Their opinions were full and declared againſt the ordinary uſe of ſuch a power. But it was plain, that the general reaſonings which were employed againſt that power went directly to our whole legiſlative right; and one part of it could not be yielded to ſuch arguments, without a virtual ſurrender of all the reſt. Beſides, if that very ſpecifick power of levying money in the colonies were not retained as a ſacred truſt in the hands of Great Britain (to be uſed, not in the firſt inſtance for ſupply, but in the laſt exigence for controul), it is obvious, that the preſiding authority of Great Britain, as the head, the arbiter, and director of the whole em-

pire, would vaniſh into an empty name, without operation or energy. With the habitual exerciſe of ſuch a power in the ordinary courſe of ſupply, no trace of freedom could remain to America.* If Great Britain were ſtripped of this right, every principle of unity and ſubordination in the empire was gone for ever. Whether all this can be reconciled in legal ſpeculation, is a matter of no conſequence. It is reconciled in policy; and politicks ought to be adjuſted, not to human reaſonings, but to human nature; of which the reaſon is but a part, and by no means the greateſt part.

Founding the repeal on this baſis, it was judged proper to lay before parliament the whole detail of the American affairs, as fully as it had been laid before the miniſtry themſelves. Ignorance of thoſe affairs had miſled parliament. Knowledge alone could bring it into the right road. Every paper of office was laid upon the table of the two houſes;

* I do not here enter into the unſatisfactory diſquiſition concerning repreſentation real or preſumed. I only ſay, that a great people, who have their property, without any reſerve, in all caſes, diſpoſed of by another people at an immenſe diſtance from them, will not think themſelves in the enjoyment of freedom. It will be hard to ſhew to thoſe who are in ſuch a ſtate, which of the uſual parts of the definition or deſcription of a free people are applicable to them; and it is neither pleaſant nor wiſe to attempt to prove that they have no right to be comprehended in ſuch a deſcription.

every

every denomination of men, either of America, or connected with it by office, by reſidence, by commerce, by intereſt, even by injury; men of civil and military capacity, officers of the revenue, merchants, manufacturers of every ſpecies, and from every town in England, attended at the bar. Such evidence never was laid before parliament. If an emulation aroſe among the miniſters and members of parliament, as the author rightly obſerves,* for the repeal of this act, as well as for the other regulations, it was not on the confident aſſertions, the airy ſpeculations, or the vain promiſes, of miniſters, that it aroſe. It was the ſenſe of parliament on the evidence before them. No one ſo much as ſuſpects that miniſterial allurements or terrors had any ſhare in it.

Our author is very much diſpleaſed, that ſo much credit was given to the teſtimony of merchants. He has an habit of railing at them; and he may, if he pleaſes, indulge himſelf in it. It will not do great miſchief to that reſpectable ſet of men. The ſubſtance of their teſtimony was, that their debts in America were very great: that the Americans declined to pay them, or to renew their orders, whilſt this act continued: that, under theſe circumſtances, they deſpaired of the recovery of their debts, or the renewal of their trade in that

* P. 21.

country: that they apprehended a general failure of mercantile credit. The manufacturers depoſed to the ſame general purpoſe, with this addition, that many of them had diſcharged ſeveral of their artificers; and, if the law and the reſiſtance to it ſhould continue, muſt diſmiſs them all.

This teſtimony is treated with great contempt by our author. It muſt be, I ſuppoſe, becauſe it was contradicted by the plain nature of things. Suppoſe then that the merchants had, to gratify this author, given a contrary evidence; and had depoſed, that while America remained in a ſtate of reſiſtance, whilſt four million of debt remained unpaid, whilſt the courſe of juſtice was ſuſpended for want of ſtamped paper, ſo that no debt could be recovered, whilſt there was a total ſtop to trade, becauſe every ſhip was ſubject to ſeizure for want of ſtamped clearances, and while the colonies were to be declared in rebellion, and ſubdued by armed force, that in theſe circumſtances they would ſtill continue to trade chearfully and fearleſsly as before; would not ſuch witneſſes provoke univerſal indignation for their folly or their wickedneſs, and be deſervedly hooted from the bar;* would any human

* Here the author has a note altogether in his uſual ſtrain of reaſoning; he finds out that ſomebody, in the courſe of this multifarious evidence, had ſaid, "that a very conſiderable part "of the orders of 1765 tranſmitted from America had been af-"terwards

human faith have given credit to ſuch aſſertions? The teſtimony of the merchants was neceſſary for the detail, and to bring the matter home to the feeling

" terwards ſuſpended, but that in caſe the ſtamp act was re-
" pealed, thoſe orders were to be executed in the preſent year
" 1766;" and that, on the repeal of the ſtamp act, " the ex-
" ports to the colonies would be at leaſt double the value of the
" exports of the paſt year." He then triumphs exceedingly on their having fallen ſhort of it on the ſtate of the cuſtom-houſe entries. I do not well know what concluſion he draws applicable to his purpoſe, from theſe facts. He does not deny that all the orders which came from America ſubſequent to the diſturbances of the ſtamp act were on the condition of that act being repealed; and he does not aſſert that, notwithſtanding that act ſhould be enforced by a ſtrong hand, ſtill the orders would be executed. Neither does he quite venture to ſay that this decline of the trade in 1766 was owing to the repeal. What does he therefore infer from it, favourable to the enforcement of that law? It only comes to this, and no more; thoſe merchants, who thought our trade would be doubled in the ſubſequent year, were miſtaken in their ſpeculations. So that the ſtamp act was not to be repealed unleſs this ſpeculation of theirs was a probable event. But it was not repealed in order to double our trade in that year, as every body knows (whatever ſome merchants might have ſaid), but leſt in that year we ſhould have no trade at all. The fact is, that, during the greateſt part of the year 1765, that is, until about the month of October, when the accounts of the diſturbances came thick upon us, the American trade went on as uſual. Before this time, the ſtamp act could not affect it. Afterwards, the merchants fell into a great conſternation; a general ſtagnation in trade enſued. But as ſoon as it was known that the miniſtry favoured the repeal of the ſtamp act, ſeveral of

feeling of the houſe; as to the general reaſons, they ſpoke abundantly for themſelves.

Upon theſe principles was the act repealed, and it

the bolder merchants ventured to execute their orders; others more timid hung back, in this manner the trade continued in a ſtate of dreadful fluctuation between the fears of thoſe who had ventured, for the event of their boldneſs, and the anxiety of thoſe whoſe trade was ſuſpended, until the royal aſſent was finally given to the bill of repeal. That the trade of 1766 was not equal to that of 1765, could not be owing to the repeal; it aroſe from quite different cauſes, of which the author ſeems not to be aware: 1ſt, Our conqueſts during the war had laid open the trade of the French and Spaniſh Weſt Indies to our colonies much more largely than they had ever enjoyed it; this continued for ſome time after the peace; but at length it was extremely contracted, and in ſome places reduced to nothing. Such in particular was the ſtate of Jamaica. On the taking the Havannah all the ſtores of that iſland were emptied into that place, which produced unuſual orders for goods, for ſupplying their own conſumption, as well as for further ſpeculations of trade. Theſe ceaſing, the trade ſtood on its own bottom. This is one cauſe of the diminiſhed export to Jamaica; and not the childiſh idea of the author, of an impoſſible contraband from the opening of the ports. 2d, The war had brought a great influx of caſh into America, for the pay and proviſion of the troops; and this an unnatural encreaſe of trade; which, as its cauſe failed, muſt in ſome degree return to its antient and natural bounds. 3d, When the merchants met from all parts, and compared their accounts, they were alarmed at the immenſity of the debt due to them from America. They found that the Americans had over-traded their abilities. And, as they found too that ſeveral of them were capable of making the ſtate of political

it produced all the good effect which was expected from it: quiet was reſtored; trade generally returned to its ancient channels; time and means were furniſhed for the better ſtrengthening of government there, as well as for recovering, by judicious meaſures, the affections of the people, had that miniſtry continued, or had a miniſtry ſucceeded with diſpoſitions to improve that opportunity.

Such an adminiſtration did not ſucceed. Inſtead of profiting of that ſeaſon of tranquillity, in the very next year they choſe to return to meaſures of the very ſame nature with thoſe which had been ſo ſolemnly condemned; though upon a ſmaller ſcale. The effects have been correſpondent. America is again in diſorder; not indeed in the ſame degree as formerly, nor any thing like it. Such good effects have attended the repeal of the ſtamp act, that the colonies have actually paid the taxes; and they have fought their redreſs (upon however improper principles) not in their own violence, as

political events an excuſe for their failure in commercial punctuality, many of our merchants in ſome degree contracted their trade from that moment. However, it is idle, in ſuch an immenſe maſs of trade, ſo liable to fluctuation, to infer any thing from ſuch a deficiency as one or even two hundred thouſand pounds. In 1767, when the diſturbances ſubſided, this deficiency was made up again.

formerly;

formerly;* but in the experienced benignity of parliament. They are not eaſy indeed, nor ever will be ſo, under this author's ſchemes of taxation; but we ſee no longer the ſame general fury and confuſion, which attended their reſiſtance to the ſtamp act. The author may rail at the repeal, and thoſe who propoſed it, as he pleaſes. Thoſe honeſt men ſuffer all his obloquy with pleaſure, in the midſt of the quiet which they have been the means of giving to their country; and would think his praiſes for their perſeverance in a pernicious ſcheme, a very bad compenſation for the diſturbance of our peace, and the ruin of our commerce. Whether the return to the ſyſtem of 1764, for raiſing a revenue in America, the diſcontents which have enſued in conſequence of it, the general ſuſpenſion of the aſſemblies in conſequence of theſe diſcontents, the uſe of the military power, and the new and dangerous commiſſions which now hang over them, will produce equally good effects, is greatly to be doubted. Never, I fear, will this nation and the colonies fall back upon their true center of gravity, and natural point of repoſe, until the ideas of 1766 are reſumed, and ſteadily purſued.

* The diſturbances have been in Boſton only; and were not in conſequence of the late duties.

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As to the regulations, a great ſubject of the author's accuſation, they are of two ſorts; one of a mixed nature, of revenue and trade; the other ſimply relative to trade. With regard to the former I ſhall obſerve, that, in all deliberations concerning America, the ideas of that adminiſtration were principally theſe; to take trade as the primary end, and revenue but as a very ſubordinate conſideration. Where trade was likely to ſuffer, they did not heſitate for an inſtant to prefer it to taxes, whoſe produce at beſt was contemptible, in compariſon of the object which they might endanger. The other of their principles was, to ſuit the revenue to the object. Where the difficulty of collection, from the nature of the country, and of the revenue eſtabliſhment, is ſo very notorious, it was their policy to hold out as few temptations to ſmuggling as poſſible, by keeping the duties as nearly as they could on a balance with the riſque. On theſe principles they made many alterations in the port duties of 1764, both in the mode and in the quantity. The author has not attempted to prove them erroneous. He complains enough to ſhew that he is in an ill humour, not that his adverſaries have done amiſs.

As to the regulations which were merely relative to commerce, many were then made; and they were all made upon this principle, that many of the colonies, and thoſe ſome of the moſt abound-

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ing in people, were ſo ſituated as to have very few means of traffick with this country. It became therefore our intereſt to let them into as much foreign trade as could be given them without interfering with our own; and to ſecure by every method the returns to the mother country. Without ſome ſuch ſcheme of enlargement, it was obvious that any benefit we could expect from theſe colonies muſt be extremely limited. Accordingly many facilities were given to their trade with the foreign plantations, and with the ſouthern parts of Europe. As to the confining the returns to this country, adminiſtration ſaw the miſchief and folly of a plan of indiſcriminate reſtraint. They applied their remedy to that part where the diſeaſe exiſted, and to that only; on this idea they eſtabliſhed regulations, far more likely to check the dangerous clandeſtine trade with Hamburgh and Holland, than this author's friends, or any of their predeceſſors, had ever done.

The friends of the author have a method ſurely a little whimſical in all this ſort of diſcuſſions. They have made an innumerable multitude of commercial regulations, at which the trade of England exclaimed with one voice, and many of which have been altered on the unanimous opinion of that trade. Still they go on, juſt as before, in a ſort of droning panegyrick on themſelves, talking of theſe regulations as prodigies of wiſdom;

wiſdom; and, inſtead of appealing to thoſe who are moſt affected and the beſt judges, they turn round in a perpetual circle of their own reaſonings and pretences; they hand you over from one of their own pamphlets to another: "See," ſay they, "this demonſtrated in The Regulations of "the Colonies." "See this ſatisfactorily proved "in The Conſiderations." By and by we ſhall have another; "See for this The State of the Na- "tion." I wiſh to take another method in vindicating the oppoſite ſyſtem. I refer to the petitions of merchants for theſe regulations; to their thanks when they were obtained; and to the ſtrong and grateful ſenſe they have ever ſince expreſſed of the benefits received under that adminiſtration.

All adminiſtrations have in their commercial regulations been generally aided by the opinion of ſome merchants; too frequently by that of a few, and thoſe a ſort of favourites: they have been directed by the opinion of one or two merchants, who were to merit in flatteries, and to be paid in contracts; who frequently adviſed, not for the general good of trade, but for their private advantage. During the adminiſtration of which this author complains, the meetings of merchants upon the buſineſs of trade were numerous and publick; ſometimes at the houſe of the Marquis of Rockingham; ſometimes at Mr. Dowdeſwell's; ſometimes

times at Sir George Savile's, an houſe always open to every deliberation favourable to the liberty or the commerce of his country. Nor were theſe meetings confined to the merchants of London. Merchants and manufacturers were invited from all the conſiderable towns of England. They conferred with the miniſters and active members of parliament. No private views, no local intereſts prevailed. Never were points in trade ſettled upon a larger ſcale of information. They who attended theſe meetings well know, what miniſters they were who heard the moſt patiently, who comprehended the moſt clearly, and who provided the moſt wiſely. Let then this author and his friends ſtill continue in poſſeſſion of the practice of exalting their own abilities, in their pamphlets and in the newſpapers. They never will perſuade the publick, that the merchants of England were in a general confederacy to ſacrifice their own intereſts to thoſe of North America, and to deſtroy the vent of their own goods in favour of the manufactures of France and Holland.

Had the friends of this author taken theſe means of information, his extreme terrors of contraband in the Weſt India iſlands would have been greatly quieted, and his objections to the opening of the ports would have ceaſed. He would have learned, from the moſt ſatisfactory analyſis of the Weſt India trade, that we have the advantage in every eſ-

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ſential article of it; and that almoſt every reſtriction on our communication with our neighbours there, is a reſtriction unfavourable to ourſelves.

Such were the principles that guided, and the authority that ſanctioned, theſe regulations. No man ever ſaid, that, in the multiplicity of regulations made in the adminiſtration of their predeceſſors, none were uſeful: ſome certainly were ſo; and I defy the author to ſhew a commercial regulation of that period, which he can prove, from any authority except his own, to have a tendency beneficial to commerce, that has been repealed. So far were that miniſtry from being guided by a ſpirit of contradiction or of innovation.

The author's attack on that adminiſtration, for their neglect of our claims on foreign powers, is by much the moſt aſtoniſhing inſtance he has given, or that, I believe, any man ever did give, of an intrepid effrontery. It relates to the Manilla ranſom; to the Canada bills; and to the Ruſſian treaty. Could one imagine, that theſe very things, which he thus chooſes to object to others, have been the principal ſubjects of charge againſt his favourite miniſtry? Inſtead of clearing them of theſe charges, he appears not ſo much as to have heard of them; but throws them directly upon the adminiſtration which ſucceeded to that of his friends.

It is not always very pleaſant to be obliged to produce

produce the detail of this kind of tranſactions to the publick view. I will content myſelf therefore with giving a ſhort ſtate of facts, which, when the author chooſes to contradict, he ſhall ſee proved, more, perhaps, to his conviction, than to his liking. The firſt fact then is, that the demand for the Manilla ranſom had been, in the author's favourite adminiſtration, ſo neglected, as to appear to have been little leſs than tacitly abandoned. At home, no countenance was given to the claimants; and when it was mentioned in parliament, the then leader did not ſeem, at leaſt, *a very ſanguine advocate in favour of the claim.* Theſe things made it a matter of no ſmall difficulty to reſume and preſs that negotiation with Spain. However, ſo clear was our right, that the then miniſters reſolved to revive it; and ſo little time was loſt, that though that adminiſtration was not compleated until the ninth of July 1765, on the 20th of the following Auguſt, General Conway tranſmitted a ſtrong and full remonſtrance on that ſubject to the Earl of Rochfort. The argument, on which the court of Madrid moſt relied, was the dereliction of that claim by the preceding miniſters. However, it was ſtill puſhed with ſo much vigour, that the Spaniards, from a poſitive denial to pay, offered to refer the demand to arbitration. That propoſition was rejected; and the demand being ſtill preſſed, there was all the reaſon in the world to expect its being

being brought to a favourable iſſue; when it was thought proper to change the adminiſtration. Whether under their circumſtances, and in the time they continued in power, more could be done, the reader will judge; who will hear with aſtoniſhment a charge of remiſſneſs from thoſe very men, whoſe inactivity, to call it by no worſe a name, laid the chief difficulties in the way of the revived negotiation.

As to the Canada bills, this author thinks proper to aſſert, * "that the proprietors found themſelves "under a neceſſity of compounding their demands "upon the French court, and accepting terms "which they had often rejected, and which the "Earl of Halifax had declared he would ſooner "forfeit his hand than ſign." When I know that the Earl of Halifax ſays ſo, the Earl of Halifax ſhall have an anſwer; but I perſuade myſelf that his Lordſhip has given no authority for this ridiculous rant. In the mean time, I ſhall only ſpeak of it as a common concern of that miniſtry.

In the firſt place then I obſerve, that a convention, for the liquidation of the Canada bills, was concluded under the adminiſtration of 1766; when nothing was concluded under that of the favourites of this author.

2. This tranſaction was, in every ſtep of it, car-

* P. 24.

ried on in concert with the perſons intereſted, and was terminated to their entire ſatisfaction. They would have acquieſced perhaps in terms ſomewhat lower than thoſe which were obtained. The author is indeed too kind to them. He will, however, let them ſpeak for themſelves, and ſhew what their own opinion was of the meaſures purſued in their favour.* In what manner the execution of the convention has been ſince provided for, it is not my preſent buſineſs to examine.

3. The proprietors had abſolutely deſpaired of being paid, at any time, any proportion of their demand, until the change of that miniſtry. The merchants were checked and diſcountenanced; they had often been told, by ſome in authority, of the cheap rate at which theſe Canada bills had been procured; yet the author can talk of the

* "They are happy in having found, in your zeal for the "dignity of this nation, the means of liquidating their claims, "and of concluding with the court of France a convention for "the final ſatisfaction of their demands; and have given us "commiſſion, in their names, and on their behalf, moſt earneſtly "to entreat your acceptance of their grateful acknowledgments. "---Whether they conſider themſelves as Britons, or as men "more particularly profiting by your generous and ſpirited in-"terpoſition, they ſee great reaſons to be thankful, for having "been ſupported by a miniſter, in whoſe publick affections, in "whoſe wiſdom and activity, both the national honour, and "the intereſt of individuals, have been at once ſo well ſupported "and ſecured." Thanks of the Canada merchants to General Conway, London, April 28, 1766.

compoſition

compoſition of them as a neceſſity induced by the change in adminiſtration. They found themſelves indeed, before that change, under a neceſſity of hinting ſomewhat of bringing the matter into parliament; but they were ſoon ſilenced, and put in mind of the fate which the Newfoundland buſineſs had there met with. Nothing ſtruck them more than the ſtrong contraſt between the ſpirit, and method of proceeding, of the two adminiſtrations.

4. The Earl of Halifax never did, nor could, refuſe to ſign this convention; becauſe this convention, as it ſtands, never was before him.*

The author's laſt charge on that miniſtry, with regard to foreign affairs, is the Ruſſian treaty of commerce, which the author thinks fit to aſſert, was concluded † "on terms the Earl of Buckinghamſhire had refuſed to accept of, and which "had been deemed by former miniſters diſadvan"tageous to the nation, and by the merchants un"ſafe and unprofitable."

Both the aſſertions in this paragraph are equally groundleſs. The treaty then concluded by Sir George Macartney was not on the terms which the Earl of Buckinghamſhire had refuſed. The Earl of Buckinghamſhire never did refuſe terms, be-

* See the Convention itſelf, printed by Owen and Harriſon, Warwick-lane, 1766; particularly the articles two and thirteen.

† P. 23.

cauſe the buſineſs never came to the point of refuſal, or acceptance; all that he did was, to receive the Ruſſian project for a treaty of commerce, and to tranſmit it to England. This was in November 1764; and he left Peterſburgh the January following, before he could even receive an anſwer from his own court. The concluſion of the treaty fell to his ſucceſſor. Whoever will be at the trouble to compare it with the treaty of 1734, will, I believe, confeſs, that, if the former miniſters could have obtained ſuch terms, they were criminal in not accepting them.

But the merchants "deemed them unſafe and "unprofitable." What merchants? As no treaty ever was more maturely conſidered, ſo the opinion of the Ruſſian merchants in London was all along taken; and all the inſtructions ſent over were in exact conformity to that opinion. Our miniſter there made no ſtep without having previouſly conſulted our merchants reſident in Peterſburgh, who, before the ſigning of the treaty, gave the moſt full and unanimous teſtimony in its favour. In their addreſs to our miniſter at that court, among other things, they ſay, "It may afford ſome addi-"tional ſatisfaction to your excellency, to receive "a publick acknowledgment of *the entire and un-*"*reſerved approbation of every article* in this treaty, "from us who are ſo immediately and ſo nearly "concerned

"concerned in its conſequences." This was ſigned by the conſul general, and every Britiſh merchant in Peterſburgh.

The approbation of thoſe immediately concerned in the conſequences is nothing to this author. He and his friends have ſo much tenderneſs for peoples' intereſts, and underſtand them ſo much better than they do themſelves, that, whilſt theſe politicians are contending for the beſt of poſſible terms, the claimants are obliged to go without any terms at all.

One of the firſt and juſteſt complaints againſt the adminiſtration of the author's friends, was the want of vigour in their foreign negotiations. Their immediate ſucceſſors endeavoured to correct that error, along with others; and there was ſcarcely a foreign court, in which the new ſpirit that had ariſen was not ſenſibly felt, acknowledged, and ſometimes complained of. On their coming into adminiſtration, they found the demolition of Dunkirk entirely at a ſtand: inſtead of demolition, they found conſtruction; for the French were then at work on the repair of the jettees. On the remonſtrances of General Conway, ſome parts of theſe jettees were immediately deſtroyed. The Duke of Richmond perſonally ſurveyed the place, and obtained a fuller knowledge of its true ſtate and condition than any of our miniſters had done;

and, in conſequence, had larger offers from the Duke of Choiſeul than had ever been received. But, as theſe were ſhort of our juſt expectations under the treaty, he rejected them. Our then miniſters, knowing that, in their adminiſtration, the peoples' minds were ſet at eaſe upon all the eſſential points of publick and private liberty, and that no project of theirs could endanger the concord of the empire, were under no reſtraint from purſuing every juſt demand upon foreign nations.

The author, towards the end of this work, falls into reflections upon the ſtate of publick morals in this country: he draws uſe from this doctrine, by recommending his friend to the king and the publick, as another Duke of Sully; and he concludes the whole performance with a very devout prayer.

The prayers of politicians may ſometimes be ſincere; and as this prayer is in ſubſtance, that the author, or his friends, may be ſoon brought into power, I have great reaſon to believe it is very much from the heart. It muſt be owned too that, after he has drawn ſuch a picture, ſuch a ſhocking picture, of the ſtate of this country, he has great faith in thinking the means he prays for ſufficient to relieve us: after the character he has given of its inhabitants of all ranks and claſſes, he has great charity in caring much about them; and indeed, no leſs hope, in being of opinion, that ſuch a deteſtable

teſtable nation can ever become the care of Providence. He has not even found five good men in our devoted city.

He talks indeed of men of virtue and ability. But where are his *men* of virtue and ability to be found? Are they in the preſent adminiſtration? never were a ſet of people more blackened by this author. Are they among the party of thoſe (no ſmall body) who adhere to the ſyſtem of 1766? theſe, it is the great purpoſe of this book to calumniate. Are they the perſons who acted with his great friend, ſince the change in 1762, to his removal in 1765? ſcarcely any of theſe are now out of employment; and we are in poſſeſſion of his deſideratum. Yet I think he hardly means to ſelect, even ſome of the higheſt of them, as examples fit for the reformation of a corrupt world.

He obſerves, that the virtue of the moſt exemplary prince that ever ſwayed a ſceptre * "can "never warm or illuminate the body of his peo- "ple, if foul mirrors are placed ſo near him as "to refract and diſſipate the rays at their firſt ema- "nation." Without obſerving upon the propriety of this metaphor, or aſking how mirrors come to have loſt their old quality of reflecting, and to have acquired that of refracting, and diſſipating rays, and how far their foulneſs will ac-

* P. 46.

count for this change; the remark itſelf is common and true: no leſs true, and equally ſurprizing from him, is that which immediately precedes it; * "it is in vain to endeavour to check the "progreſs of irreligion and licentiouſneſs, by pu- "niſhing ſuch crimes in *one individual*, if others "equally culpable are rewarded with the honours "and emoluments of the ſtate." I am not in the ſecret of the author's manner of writing; but it appears to me, that he muſt intend theſe reflections as a ſatire upon the adminiſtration of his happy years. Were ever the honours and emoluments of the ſtate more laviſhly ſquandered upon perſons ſcandalous in their lives than during that period? In theſe ſcandalous lives, was there any thing more ſcandalous than the mode of puniſhing *one culpable individual?* In that individual, is any thing more culpable than his having been ſeduced by the example of ſome of thoſe very perſons by whom he was thus perſecuted?

The author is ſo eager to attack others, that he provides but indifferently for his own defence. I believe, without going beyond the page I have now before me, he is very ſenſible, that I have ſufficient matter of further, and, if poſſible, of heavier, charge againſt his friends, upon his own principle. But it is becauſe the advantage is too great,

* P. 46.

that

that I decline making uſe of it. I wiſh the author had not thought that all methods are lawful in party. Above all, he ought to have taken care not to wound his enemies through the ſides of his country. This he has done, by making that monſtrous and overcharged picture of the diſtreſſes of our ſituation. No wonder that he, who finds this country in the ſame condition with that of France at the time of Henry the Fourth, could alſo find a reſemblance between his political friend and the Duke of Sully. As to thoſe perſonal reſemblances, people will often judge of them from their affections: they may imagine in theſe clouds whatſoever figures they pleaſe; but what is the conformation of that eye which can diſcover a reſemblance of this country and theſe times to thoſe with which the author compares them? France, a country juſt recovered out of twenty-five years of the moſt cruel and deſolating civil war that perhaps was ever known. The kingdom, under the veil of momentary quiet, full of the moſt atrocious political, operating upon the moſt furious fanatical factions. Some pretenders even to the crown; and thoſe who did not pretend to the whole, aimed at the partition of the monarchy. There were almoſt as many competitors as provinces; and all abetted by the greateſt, the moſt ambitious, and moſt enterprizing power in Europe. No place ſafe from treaſon; no, not the boſoms on which the

the moſt amiable prince that ever lived repoſed his head; not his miſtreſſes; not even his queen. As to the finances, they had ſcarce an exiſtence, but as a matter of plunder to the managers, and of grants to inſatiable and ungrateful courtiers.

How can our author have the heart to deſcribe this as any ſort of parallel to our ſituation? To be ſure, an April ſhower has ſome reſemblance to a water-ſpout; for they are both wet: and there is ſome likeneſs between a ſummer evening's breeze and an hurricane; they are both wind: but who can compare our diſturbances, our ſituation, or our finances, to thoſe of France in the time of Henry? Great Britain is indeed at this time wearied, but not broken, with the efforts of a victorious foreign war; not ſufficiently relieved by an inadequate peace, but ſomewhat benefited by that peace, and infinitely by the conſequences of that war. The powers of Europe awed by our victories, and lying in ruins upon every ſide of us. Burthened indeed we are with debt, but abounding with reſources. We have a trade, not perhaps equal to our wiſhes, but more than ever we poſſeſſed. In effect, no pretender to the crown; nor nutriment for ſuch deſperate and deſtructive factions as have formerly ſhaken this kingdom.

As to our finances, the author trifles with us. When Sully came to thoſe of France, in what order was any part of the financial ſyſtem? or what

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ſyſtem was there at all? There is no man in office who muſt not be ſenſible that ours is, without the act of any parading miniſter, the moſt regular and orderly ſyſtem perhaps that was ever known; the beſt ſecured againſt all frauds in the collection, and all miſapplication in the expenditure of publick money.

I admit that, in this flouriſhing ſtate of things, there are appearances enough to excite uneaſineſs and apprehenſion. I admit there is a cankerworm in the roſe:

——— *medio de fonte leporum*
Surgit amari aliquid, quod in ipſis floribus angat.

This is nothing elſe than a ſpirit of diſconnexion, of diſtruſt, and of treachery among publick men. It is no accidental evil; nor has its effect been truſted to the uſual frailty of nature: the diſtemper has been inoculated. The author is ſenſible of it, and we lament it together. This diſtemper is alone ſufficient to take away conſiderably from the benefits of our conſtitution and ſituation, and perhaps to render their continuance precarious. If theſe evil diſpoſitions ſhould ſpread much farther, they muſt end in our deſtruction; for nothing can ſave a people deſtitute of publick and private faith. However, the author, for the preſent ſtate of things, has extended the charge by much

much too widely; as men are but too apt to take the meaſure of all mankind from their own particular acquaintance. Barren as this age may be in the growth of honour and virtue, the country does not want, at this moment, as ſtrong, and thoſe not a few examples, as were ever known, of an unſhaken adherence to principle, and attachment to connexion, againſt every allurement of intereſt. Thoſe examples are not furniſhed by the great alone; nor by thoſe whoſe activity in publick affairs may render it ſuſpected that they make ſuch a character one of the rounds in their ladder of ambition; but by men more quiet, and more in the ſhade, on whom an unmixed ſenſe of honour alone could operate. Such examples indeed are not furniſhed in great abundance amongſt thoſe who are the ſubjects of the author's panegyrick. He muſt look for them in another camp. He who complains of the ill effects of a divided and heterogeneous adminiſtration, is not juſtifiable in labouring to render odious in the eyes of the publick thoſe men, whoſe principles, whoſe maxims of policy, and whoſe perſonal character, can alone adminiſter a remedy to this capital evil of the age; neither is he conſiſtent with himſelf, in conſtantly extolling thoſe whom he knows to be the authors of the very miſchief of which he complains, and which the whole nation feels ſo deeply.

The perſons who are the objects of his diſlike and

and complaint are many of them of the firſt families, and weightieſt properties, in the kingdom; but infinitely more diſtinguiſhed for their untainted honour publick and private, and their zealous but ſober attachment to the conſtitution of their country, than they can be by any birth, or any ſtation. If they are the friends of any one great man rather than another, it is not that they make his aggrandiſement the end of their union; or becauſe they know him to be the moſt active in caballing for his connexions the largeſt and ſpeedieſt emoluments. It is becauſe they know him, by perſonal experience, to have wiſe and enlarged ideas of the publick good, and an invincible conſtancy in adhering to it; becauſe they are convinced, by the whole tenor of his actions, that he will never negotiate away their honour or his own: and that, in or out of power, change of ſituation will make no alteration in his conduct. This will give to ſuch a perſon, in ſuch a body, an authority and reſpect that no miniſter ever enjoyed among his venal dependants, in the higheſt plenitude of his power; ſuch as ſervility never can give, ſuch as ambition never can receive or reliſh.

This body will often be reproached by their adverſaries, for want of ability in their political tranſactions; they will be ridiculed for miſſing many favourable conjunctures, and not profiting of ſeveral brilliant opportunities of fortune: but they muſt

muſt be contented to endure that reproach; for they cannot acquire the reputation of *that kind* of ability without loſing all the other reputation they poſſeſs.

They will be charged too with a dangerous ſpirit of excluſion and proſcription, for being unwilling to mix in ſchemes of adminiſtration, which have no bond of union, or principle of confidence. That charge too they muſt ſuffer with patience. If the reaſon of the thing had not ſpoken loudly enough, the miſerable examples of the ſeveral adminiſtrations conſtructed upon the idea of ſyſtematick diſcord would be enough to frighten them from ſuch monſtrous and ruinous conjunctions. It is however falſe, that the idea of an united adminiſtration carries with it that of a proſcription of any other party. It does indeed imply the neceſſity of having the great ſtrong holds of government in well-united hands, in order to ſecure the predominance of right and uniform principles; of having the capital offices of deliberation and execution in thoſe who can deliberate with mutual confidence, and who will execute what is reſolved with firmneſs and fidelity. If this ſyſtem cannot be rigorouſly adhered to in practice (and what ſyſtem can be ſo?) it ought to be the conſtant aim of good men to approach as nearly to it as poſſible. No ſyſtem of that kind can be formed, which will not leave room fully ſufficient for healing coali-

tions:

tions: but no coalition, which, under the ſpecious name of independency, carries in its boſom the unreconciled principles of the original diſcord of parties, ever was, or will be, an healing coalition. Nor will the mind of our Sovereign ever know repoſe, his kingdom ſettlement, or his buſineſs order, efficiency, or grace with his people, until things are eſtabliſhed upon the baſis of ſome ſet of men, who are truſted by the publick, and who can truſt one another.

This comes rather nearer to the mark than the author's deſcription of a proper adminiſtration, under the name of *men of ability and virtue*, which conveys no definite idea at all; nor does it apply ſpecifically to our grand national diſtemper. All parties pretend to theſe qualities. The preſent miniſtry, no favourites of the author, will be ready enough to declare themſelves perſons of virtue and ability; and if they chooſe a vote for that purpoſe, perhaps it would not be quite impoſſible for them to procure it. But, if the diſeaſe be this diſtruſt and diſconnexion, it is eaſy to know who are ſound, and who are tainted; who are fit to reſtore us to health, who to continue, and to ſpread the contagion. The preſent miniſtry being made up of draughts from all parties in the kingdom, if they ſhould profeſs any adherence to the connexions they have left, they muſt convict themſelves of the blackeſt treachery. They therefore

chooſe

chooſe rather to renounce the principle itſelf, and to brand it with the name of pride and faction. This teſt with certainty diſcriminates the opinions of men. The other is a deſcription vague and unſatisfactory.

As to the unfortunate gentlemen who may at any time compoſe that ſyſtem, which, under the plauſible title of an adminiſtration, ſubſiſts but for the eſtabliſhment of weakneſs and confuſion; they fall into different claſſes, with different merits. I think the ſituation of ſome people in that ſtate may deſerve a certain degree of compaſſion; at the ſame time that they furniſh an example, which, it is to be hoped, by being a ſevere one, will have its effect, at leaſt, on the growing generation; if an original ſeduction, on plauſible but hollow pretences, into loſs of honour, friendſhip, conſiſtency, ſecurity, and repoſe, can furniſh it. It is poſſible to draw, even from the very proſperity of ambition, examples of terror, and motives to compaſſion.

I believe the inſtances are exceedingly rare of mens immediately paſſing over a clear marked line of virtue into declared vice and corruption. There are a ſort of middle tints and ſhades between the two extremes; there is ſomething uncertain on the confines of the two empires which they firſt paſs through, and which renders the change eaſy and imperceptible. There are even a ſort of ſplendid impoſitions ſo well contrived, that, at the very time

time the path of rectitude is quitted for ever, men ſeem to be advancing into ſome higher and nobler road of publick conduct. Not that ſuch impoſitions are ſtrong enough in themſelves; but a powerful intereſt, often concealed from thoſe whom it affects, works at the bottom, and ſecures the operation. Men are thus debauched away from thoſe legitimate connexions, which they had formed on a judgment, early perhaps but ſufficiently mature, and wholly unbiaſſed. They do not quit them upon any ground of complaint, for grounds of juſt complaint may exiſt, but upon the flattering and moſt dangerous of all principles, that of mending what is well. Gradually they are habituated to other company; and a change in their habitudes ſoon makes a way for a change in their opinions. Certain perſons are no longer ſo very frightful, when they come to be known and to be ſerviceable. As to their old friends, the tranſition is eaſy; from friendſhip to civility; from civility to enmity: few are the ſteps from dereliction to perſecution.

People not very well grounded in the principles of publick morality find a ſet of maxims in office ready made for them, which they aſſume as naturally and inevitably, as any of the inſignia or inſtruments of the ſituation. A certain tone of the ſolid and practical is immediately acquired. Every

former profeſſion of publick ſpirit is to be conſidered as a debauch of youth, or, at beſt, as a viſionary ſcheme of unattainable perfection. The very idea of conſiſtency is exploded. The convenience of the buſineſs of the day is to furniſh the principle for doing it. Then the whole miniſterial cant is quickly got by heart. The prevalence of faction is to be lamented. All oppoſition is to be regarded as the effect of envy and diſappointed ambition. All adminiſtrations are declared to be alike. The ſame neceſſity juſtifies all their meaſures. It is no longer a matter of diſcuſſion, who or what adminiſtration is; but that adminiſtration is to be ſupported, is a general maxim. Flattering themſelves that their power is become neceſſary to the ſupport of all order and government; every thing which tends to the ſupport of that power is ſanctified, and becomes a part of the publick intereſt.

Growing every day more formed to affairs, and better knit in their limbs, when the occaſion (now the only rule) requires it, they become capable of ſacrificing thoſe very perſons to whom they had before ſacrificed their original friends. It is now only in the ordinary courſe of buſineſs to alter an opinion, or to betray a connexion. Frequently relinquiſhing one ſet of men and adopting another, they grow into a total indifference to human feeling,

ing, as they had before to moral obligation; until, at length, no one original impreſſion remains upon their minds; every principle is obliterated; every ſentiment effaced.

In the mean time, that power, which all theſe changes aimed at ſecuring, remains ſtill as tottering and as uncertain as ever. They are delivered up into the hands of thoſe who feel neither reſpect for their perſons, nor gratitude for their favours; who are put about them in appearance to ſerve, in reality to govern them; and, when the ſignal is given, to abandon and deſtroy them in order to ſet up ſome newer dupe of ambition, who in his turn is to be abandoned and deſtroyed. Thus living in a ſtate of continual uneaſineſs and ferment, ſoftened only by the miſerable conſolation of giving now and then preferments to thoſe for whom they have no value; they are unhappy in their ſituation, yet find it impoſſible to reſign. Until, at length, ſoured in temper, and diſappointed by the very attainment of their ends, in ſome angry, in ſome haughty, or ſome negligent moment, they incur the diſpleaſure of thoſe upon whom they have rendered their very being dependent. Then *perierunt tempora longi ſervitii*; they are caſt off with ſcorn; they are turned out, emptied of all natural character, of all intrinſick worth, of all eſſential dignity, and deprived of every conſolation

of friendſhip. Having rendered all retreat to old principles ridiculous, and to old regards impracticable, not being able to counterfeit pleaſure, or to diſcharge diſcontent, nothing being ſincere, or right, or balanced in their minds, it is more than a chance, that, in the delirium of the laſt ſtage of their diſtempered power, they make an inſane political teſtament, by which they throw all their remaining weight and conſequence into the ſcale of their declared enemies, and the avowed authors of their deſtruction. Thus they finiſh their courſe. Had it been poſſible that the whole, or even a great part of theſe effects on their minds, I ſay nothing of the effect upon their fortunes, could have appeared to them in their firſt departure from the right line, it is certain they would have rejected every temptation with horror. The principle of theſe remarks, like every good principle in morality, is trite; but its frequent application is not the leſs neceſſary.

As to others, who are plain practical men, they have been guiltleſs at all times of all publick pretence. Neither the author nor any one elſe, has reaſon to be angry with them. They belonged to his friend for their intereſt; for their intereſt they quitted him; and when it is their intereſt, he may depend upon it, they will return to their former connexion. Such people ſubſiſt at all times, and, though

though the nuiſance of all, are at no time a worthy ſubject of diſcuſſion. It is falſe virtue and plauſible error that do the miſchief.

If men come to government with right diſpoſitions, they have not that unfavourable ſubject which this author repreſents to work upon. Our circumſtances are indeed critical; but then they are the critical circumſtances of a ſtrong and mighty nation. If corruption and meanneſs are greatly ſpread, they are not ſpread univerſally. Many publick men are hitherto examples of publick ſpirit and integrity. Whole parties, as far as large bodies can be uniform, have preſerved character. However they may be deceived in ſome particulars, I know of no ſet of men amongſt us, which does not contain perſons, on whom the nation, in a difficult exigence, may well value itſelf. Private life, which is the nurſery of the commonwealth, is yet in general pure, and on the whole diſpoſed to virtue; and the people at large want neither generoſity nor ſpirit. No ſmall part of that very luxury, which is ſo much the ſubject of the author's declamation, but which, in moſt parts of life, by being well balanced and diffuſed, is only decency and convenience, has perhaps as many, or more, good than evil conſequences attending it. It certainly excites induſtry, nouriſhes emulation, and inſpires ſome ſenſe of perſonal value into all ranks

of people. What we want is to eſtabliſh more fully an opinion of uniformity, and conſiſtency of character, in the leading men of the ſtate; ſuch as will reſtore ſome confidence to profeſſion and appearance, ſuch as will fix ſubordination upon eſteem. Without this, all ſchemes are begun at the wrong end. All who join in them are liable to their conſequences. All men who, under whatever pretext, take a part in the formation or the ſupport of ſyſtems conſtructed in ſuch a manner as muſt, in their nature, diſable them from the execution of their duty, have made themſelves guilty of all the preſent diſtraction, and of the future ruin, which they may bring upon their country.

It is a ſerious affair, this ſtudied diſunion in government. In caſes where union is moſt conſulted in the conſtitution of a miniſtry, and where perſons are beſt diſpoſed to promote it, differences, from the various ideas of men, will ariſe; and, from their paſſions, will often ferment into violent heats, ſo as greatly to diſorder all publick buſineſs. What muſt be the conſequence, when the very diſtemper is made the baſis of the conſtitution; and the original weakneſs of human nature is ſtill further enfeebled by art and contrivance? It muſt ſubvert government from the very foundation. It turns our publick councils into the moſt miſchievous cabals; where the conſideration is, not how the

the nation's buſineſs ſhall be carried on, but how thoſe who ought to carry it on ſhall circumvent each other. In ſuch a ſtate of things, no order, uniformity, dignity, or effect, can appear in our proceedings either at home or abroad. Nor will it make much difference, whether ſome of the conſtituent parts of ſuch an adminiſtration are men of virtue or ability, or not; ſuppoſing it poſſible that ſuch men, with their eyes open, ſhould chooſe to make a part in ſuch a body.

The effects of all human contrivances are in the hand of Providence. I do not like to anſwer, as our author ſo readily does, for the event of any ſpeculation. But ſure the nature of our diſorders, if any thing, muſt indicate the proper remedy. Men who act ſteadily on the principles I have ſtated may in all events be very ſerviceable to their country; in one caſe, by furniſhing (if their Sovereign ſhould be ſo adviſed) an adminiſtration formed upon ideas very different from thoſe which have for ſome time been unfortunately faſhionable. But, if this ſhould not be the caſe, they may be ſtill ſerviceable; for the example of a large body of men, ſteadily ſacrificing ambition to principle, can never be without uſe. It will certainly be prolifick, and draw others to an imitation. *Vera gloria radices agit, atque etiam propagatur.*

I do not think myſelf of conſequence enough to

imitate my author, in troubling the world with the prayers or wiſhes I may form for the publick: full as little am I diſpoſed to imitate his profeſſions; thoſe profeſſions are long ſince worn out in the political ſervice. If the work will not ſpeak for the author, his own declarations deſerve but little credit.

APPENDIX.

APPENDIX.

So much misplaced industry has been used by the author of The State of the Nation, as well as by other writers, to infuse discontent into the people, on account of the late war, and of the effects of our national debt; that nothing ought to be omitted which may tend to disabuse the publick upon these subjects. When I had gone through the foregoing sheets, I recollected, that, in pages 58, 59, 60, I only gave the comparative states of the duties collected by the excise at large; together with the quantities of strong beer brewed in the two periods which are there compared. It might be still thought, that some other articles of popular consumption, of general convenience, and connected with our manufactures, might possibly have declined. I therefore now think it right to lay before the reader the state of the produce of three capital duties on such articles; duties which have frequently been made the subject of popular complaint. The duty on candles; that on soap, paper, &c.; and that on hides.

Average

	£.
Average of net produce of duty on ſoap, &c. for 8 years, ending 1767 - - -	264,902
Average of ditto for 8 years, ending 1754 - - -	228,114
Average encreaſe	£. 36,788
Average of net produce of duty on candles for 8 years, ending 1767	155,789
Average of ditto for 8 years, ending 1754 - - -	136,716
Average encreaſe	£. 19,073
Average net produce of duty on hides, 8 years, ending 1767 -	189,216
Ditto 8 years, ending 1754 -	168,200
Average encreaſe	£. 21,016

This encreaſe has not ariſen from any additional duties. None have been impoſed on theſe articles during the war. Notwithſtanding the burthens of the war, and the late dearneſs of proviſions, the conſumption of all theſe articles has encreaſed, and the revenue along with it.

There is another point in The State of the Nation, to which, I fear, I have not been ſo full in my

my anſwer as I ought to have been, and as I am well warranted to be. The author has endeavoured to throw a ſuſpicion, or ſomething more, on that ſalutary, and indeed neceſſary meaſure of opening the ports in Jamaica. * "Orders were "given," ſays he, "in *Auguſt*, 1765, for the free "admiſſion of Spaniſh veſſels into all the colonies." He then obſerves, that the exports to Jamaica fell £.40,904 ſhort of thoſe of 1764; and that the exports of the ſucceeding year, 1766, fell ſhort of thoſe of 1765, about eighty pounds; from whence he wiſely infers, that, this decline of exports being *ſince* the relaxation of the laws of trade, there is a juſt ground of ſuſpicion, that the colonies have been ſupplied with foreign commodities inſtead of Britiſh.

Here, as uſual with him, the author builds on a fact which is abſolutely falſe; and which, being ſo, renders his whole hypotheſis abſurd and impoſſible. He aſſerts, that the order for admitting Spaniſh veſſels was given in *Auguſt* 1765. That order was not *ſigned at the treaſury board until the 15th day of the November following*; and therefore ſo far from affecting the exports of the year 1765, that, ſuppoſing all poſſible diligence in the commiſſioners of the cuſtoms in expediting that order, and every

* His note, p. 22.

advantage

advantage of veſſels ready to ſail, and the moſt favourable wind, it would hardly even arrive in Jamaica within the limits of that year.

This order could therefore by no poſſibility be a cauſe of the decreaſe of exports in 1765. If it had any miſchievous operation, it could not be before 1766. In that year, according to our author, the exports fell ſhort of the preceding, juſt *eighty* pounds. He is welcome to that diminution; and to all the conſequences he can draw from it.

But, as an auxiliary to account for this dreadful loſs, he brings in the Free-port act, which he obſerves (for his convenience) to have been made in ſpring, 1766; but (for his convenience likewiſe) he forgets, that, by the expreſs proviſion of the act, the regulation was not to be in force in Jamaica until the November following. Miraculous muſt be the activity of that contraband whoſe operation in America could, before the end of that year, have re-acted upon England, and checked the exportation from hence! unleſs he chooſes to ſuppoſe, that the merchants, at whoſe ſolicitation this act had been obtained, were ſo frighted at the accompliſhment of their own moſt earneſt and anxious deſire, that, before any good or evil effect from it could happen, they immediately put a ſtop to all further exportation.

It is obvious that we muſt look for the true effect

effect of that act at the time of its firſt poſſible operation, that is, in the year 1767. On this idea how ſtands the account?

	£.
1764 Exports to Jamaica - -	456,528
1765 - - - - -	415,624
1766 - - - - -	415,544
1767 (firſt year of the Free-port act)	467,681

This author, for the ſake of a preſent momentary credit, will hazard any future and permanent diſgrace. At the time he wrote, the account of 1767 could not be made up. This was the very firſt year of the trial of the Free-port act; and we find that the ſale of Britiſh commodities is ſo far from leſſened by that act, that the export of 1767 amounts to £.52,000 more than that of either of the two preceding years, and is £.11,000 above that of his ſtandard year 1764. If I could prevail on myſelf to argue in favour of a great commercial ſcheme from the appearance of things in a ſingle year, I ſhould from this encreaſe of export infer the beneficial effects of that meaſure. In truth, it is not wanting. Nothing but the thickeſt ignorance of the Jamaica trade could have made any one entertain a fancy, that the leaſt ill effect on our commerce could follow from this opening of the ports. But, if the author argues the effect of regulations

gulations in the American trade from the export of the year in which they are made, or even of the following; why did he not apply this rule to his own? He had the ſame paper before him which I have now before me. He muſt have ſeen that in his ſtandard year (the year 1764), the principal year of his new regulations, the export fell no leſs than £.128,450 ſhort of that in 1763! Did the export trade revive by theſe regulations in 1765, during which year they continued in their full force? It fell about £.40,000 ſtill lower. Here is a fall of £.168,000; to account for which, would have become the author much better than piddling for an £.80 fall in the year 1766 (the only year in which *the order* he objects to could operate), or in preſuming a fall of exports from a regulation which took place only in November 1766; whoſe effects could not appear until the following year; and which, when they do appear, utterly overthrow all his flimſy reaſons and affected ſuſpicions upon the effect of opening the ports.

This author, in the ſame paragraph, ſays, that "it was aſſerted by *the American factors and agents*, "that the commanders of our ſhips of war and "tenders, having cuſtom-houſe commiſſions, and "the ſtrict orders given in 1764 for a due exe-"cution of the laws of trade in the colonies, had "deterred the Spaniards from trading with us; "that

" that the ſale of Britiſh manufactures in the Weſt " Indies had been greatly leſſened, and the receipt " of large ſums of ſpecie prevented."

If the *American factors and agents* aſſerted this, they had good ground for their aſſertion. They knew that the Spaniſh veſſels had been driven from our ports. The author does not poſitively deny the fact. If he ſhould, it will be proved. When the factors connected this meaſure and its natural conſequences, with an actual fall in the exports to Jamaica, to no leſs an amount than £.128,450 in one year, and with a further fall in the next, is their aſſertion very wonderful? The author himſelf is full as much alarmed by a fall of only £.40.000; for, giving him the facts which he chuſes to coin, it is no more. The expulſion of the Spaniſh veſſels muſt certainly have been one cauſe, if not of the firſt declenſion of the exports, yet of their continuance in their reduced ſtate. Other cauſes had their operation, without doubt. In what degree each cauſe produced its effect, it is hard to determine. But the fact of a fall of exports upon the reſtraining plan, and of a riſe upon the taking place of the enlarging plan, is eſtabliſhed beyond all contradiction.

This author ſays, that the facts relative to the Spaniſh trade were aſſerted by *American factors and agents*; inſinuating, that the miniſtry of 1766 had no better authority for their plan of enlargement than

than ſuch aſſertions. The moment he chooſes it, he ſhall ſee the very ſame thing aſſerted by governors of provinces, by commanders of men of war, and by officers of the cuſtoms; perſons the moſt bound in duty to prevent contraband, and the moſt intereſted in the ſeizures to be made in conſequence of ſtrict regulation. I ſuppreſs them for the preſent; wiſhing that the author may not drive me to a more full diſcuſſion of this matter than it may be altogether prudent to enter into. I wiſh he had not made any of theſe diſcuſſions neceſſary.

A SHORT

A

SHORT ACCOUNT

OF A LATE

SHORT ADMINISTRATION.

1766.

A

SHORT ACCOUNT

OF A LATE

SHORT ADMINISTRATION.

THE late adminiſtration came into employment, under the mediation of the Duke of Cumberland, on the tenth day of July 1765; and was removed, upon a plan ſettled by the Earl of Chatham, on the thirtieth day of July 1766, having laſted juſt one year and twenty days.

In that ſpace of time

The diſtractions of the Britiſh empire were compoſed, by *the repeal of the American ſtamp act*;

But the conſtitutional ſuperiority of Great Britain was preſerved, by *the act for ſecuring the dependence of the colonies*.

Private houſes were relieved from the juriſdiction of the exciſe, by *the repeal of the cyder-tax*.

The perſonal liberty of the ſubject was confirmed, by *the reſolution againſt general warrants*.

The lawful ſecrets of buſineſs and friendſhip were rendered inviolable, by *the reſolution for condemning the ſeizure of papers.*

The trade of America was ſet free from injudicious and ruinous impoſitions—its revenue was improved, and ſettled upon a rational foundation—its commerce extended with foreign countries; while all the advantages were ſecured to Great Britain, by *the act for repealing certain duties, and encouraging, regulating, and ſecuring the trade of this kingdom, and the Britiſh dominions in America.*

Materials were provided and inſured to our manufactures—the ſale of theſe manufactures was encreaſed—the African trade preſerved and extended—the principles of the act of navigation purſued, and the plan improved—and the trade for bullion rendered free, ſecure, and permanent, by *the act for opening certain ports in Dominica and Jamaica.*

That adminiſtration was the firſt which propoſed and encouraged publick meetings and free conſultations of merchants from all parts of the kingdom; by which means the trueſt lights have been received; great benefits have been already derived to manufactures and commerce; and the moſt extenſive proſpects are opened for further improvement.

Under them, the intereſts of our northern and ſouthern colonies, before that time jarring and diſſonant, were underſtood, compared, adjuſted, and

and perfectly reconciled. The paſſions and animoſities of the colonies, by judicious and lenient meaſures, were allayed and compoſed, and the foundation laid for a laſting agreement amongſt them.

Whilſt that adminiſtration provided for the liberty and commerce of their country, as the true baſis of its power, they conſulted its intereſts, they aſſerted its honour abroad, with temper and with firmneſs; by making an advantageous treaty of commerce with Ruſſia; by obtaining a liquidation of the Canada bills, to the ſatisfaction of the proprietors; by reviving and raiſing from its aſhes the negociation for the Manilla ranſom, which had been extinguiſhed and abandoned by their predeceſſors.

They treated their ſovereign with decency; with reverence. They diſcountenanced, and, it is hoped, for ever aboliſhed, the dangerous and unconſtitutional practice of removing military officers for their votes in parliament. They firmly adhered to thoſe friends of liberty, who had run all hazards in its cauſe, and provided for them in preference to every other claim.

With the Earl of Bute they had no perſonal connection; no correſpondence of councils. They neither courted him nor perſecuted him. They practiſed no corruption; nor were they even ſuſpected of it. They ſold no offices. They obtained

no reverſions or penſions, either coming in or going out, for themſelves, their families, or their dependents.

In the proſecution of their meaſures they were traverſed by an oppoſition of a new and ſingular character; an oppoſition of place-men and penſioners. They were ſupported by the confidence of the nation. And having held their offices under many difficulties and diſcouragements, they left them at the expreſs command, as they had accepted them at the earneſt requeſt, of their royal maſter.

Theſe are plain facts; of a clear and publick nature; neither extended by elaborate reaſoning, or heightened by the colouring of eloquence. They are the ſervices of a ſingle year.

The removal of that adminiſtration from power, is not to them premature; ſince they were in office long enough to accompliſh many plans of publick utility; and, by their perſeverance and reſolution, rendered the way ſmooth and eaſy to their ſucceſſors; having left their king and their country in a much better condition than they found them. By the temper they manifeſt, they ſeem to have now no other wiſh, than that their ſucceſſors may do the public as real and as faithful ſervice as they have done.

THOUGHTS

THOUGHTS

ON

THE CAUSE OF THE PRESENT DISCONTENTS.

Hoc vero occultum, inteſtinum, domeſticum malum, non modo non exiſtit, verum etiam opprimit, antequam perſpicere atque explorare potueris. Cic.

1770.

THOUGHTS

ON

THE CAUSE OF THE PRESENT

DISCONTENTS.

IT is an undertaking of ſome degree of delicacy to examine into the cauſe of publick diſorders. If a man happens not to ſucceed in ſuch an enquiry, he will be thought weak and viſionary; if he touches the true grievance, there is a danger that he may come near to perſons of weight and conſequence, who will rather be exaſperated at the diſcovery of their errors, than thankful for the occaſion of correcting them. If he ſhould be obliged to blame the favourites of the people, he will be conſidered as the tool of power; if he cenſures thoſe in power, he will be looked on as an inſtrument of faction. But in all exertions of duty ſomething is to be hazarded. In caſes of tumult and diſorder, our law has inveſted every man, in ſome ſort, with the authority of a magiſtrate. When the affairs of the nation are diſtracted, private people are, by the ſpirit of that law, juſtified

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in ſtepping a little out of their ordinary ſphere. They enjoy a privilege, of ſomewhat more dignity and effect, than that of idle lamentation over the calamities of their country. They may look into them narrowly; they may reaſon upon them liberally; and if they ſhould be ſo fortunate as to diſcover the true ſource of the miſchief, and to ſuggeſt any probable method of removing it, though they may diſpleaſe the rulers for the day, they are certainly of ſervice to the cauſe of government. Government is deeply intereſted in every thing which, even through the medium of ſome temporary uneaſineſs, may tend finally to compoſe the minds of the ſubject, and to conciliate their affections. I have nothing to do here with the abſtract value of the voice of the people. But as long as reputation, the moſt precious poſſeſſion of every individual, and as long as opinion, the great ſupport of the ſtate, depend entirely upon that voice, it can never be conſidered as a thing of little conſequence either to individuals or to government. Nations are not primarily ruled by laws; leſs by violence. Whatever original energy may be ſuppoſed either in force or regulation, the operation of both is, in truth, merely inſtrumental. Nations are governed by the ſame methods, and on the ſame principles, by which an individual without authority is often able to govern thoſe who are his equals or his ſuperiors; by a knowledge

ledge of their temper, and by a judicious management of it; I mean,—when publick affairs are ſteadily and quietly conducted; not when government is nothing but a continued ſcuffle between the magiſtrate and the multitude; in which ſometimes the one and ſometimes the other is uppermoſt; in which they alternately yield and prevail, in a ſeries of contemptible victories, and ſcandalous ſubmiſſions. The temper of the people amongſt whom he preſides ought therefore to be the firſt ſtudy of a ſtateſman. And the knowledge of this temper it is by no means impoſſible for him to attain, if he has not an intereſt in being ignorant of what it is his duty to learn.

To complain of the age we live in, to murmur at the preſent poſſeſſors of power, to lament the paſt, to conceive extravagant hopes of the future, are the common diſpoſitions of the greateſt part of mankind; indeed the neceſſary effects of the ignorance and levity of the vulgar. Such complaints and humours have exiſted in all times; yet as all times have *not* been alike, true political ſagacity manifeſts itſelf, in diſtinguiſhing that complaint which only characterizes the general infirmity of human nature, from thoſe which are ſymptoms of the particular diſtemperature of our own air and ſeaſon.

Nobody, I believe, will conſider it merely as the language of ſpleen or diſappointment, if I ſay, that

that there is ſomething particularly alarming in the preſent conjuncture. There is hardly a man in or out of power who holds any other language. That government is at once dreaded and contemned; that the laws are deſpoiled of all their reſpected and ſalutary terrors; that their inaction is a ſubject of ridicule, and their exertion of abhorrence; that rank, and office, and title, and all the ſolemn plauſibilities of the world, have loſt their reverence and effect; that our foreign politicks are as much deranged as our domeſtick œconomy; that our dependencies are ſlackened in their affection, and looſened from their obedience; that we know neither how to yield nor how to inforce; that hardly any thing above or below, abroad or at home, is ſound and entire; but that diſconnexion and confuſion, in offices, in parties, in families, in parliament, in the nation, prevail beyond the diſorders of any former time; theſe are facts univerſally admitted and lamented.

This ſtate of things is the more extraordinary, becauſe the great parties which formerly divided and agitated the kingdom are known to be in a manner entirely diſſolved. No great external calamity has viſited the nation; no peſtilence or famine. We do not labour at preſent under any ſcheme of taxation new or oppreſſive in the quantity or in the mode. Nor are we engaged in unſucceſsful war; in which, our misfortunes might eaſily

eaſily pervert our judgment; and our minds, ſore from the loſs of national glory, might feel every blow of fortune as a crime in government.

It is impoſſible that the cauſe of this ſtrange diſtemper ſhould not ſometimes become a ſubject of diſcourſe. It is a compliment due, and which I willingly pay, to thoſe who adminiſter our affairs, to take notice in the firſt place of their ſpeculation. Our miniſters are of opinion, that the increaſe of our trade and manufactures, that our growth by colonization and by conqueſt, have concurred to accumulate immenſe wealth in the hands of ſome individuals; and this again being diſperſed amongſt the people, has rendered them univerſally proud, ferocious, and ungovernable; that the inſolence of ſome from their enormous wealth, and the boldneſs of others from a guilty poverty, have rendered them capable of the moſt atrocious attempts; ſo that they have trampled upon all ſubordination, and violently borne down the unarmed laws of a free government; barriers too feeble againſt the fury of a populace ſo fierce and licentious as ours. They contend, that no adequate provocation has been given for ſo ſpreading a diſcontent; our affairs having been conducted throughout with remarkable temper and conſummate wiſdom. The wicked induſtry of ſome libellers, joined to the intrigues of a few diſappointed politicians,

politicians, have, in their opinion, been able to produce this unnatural ferment in the nation.

Nothing indeed can be more unnatural than the preſent convulſions of this country, if the above account be a true one. I confeſs I ſhall aſſent to it with great reluctance, and only on the compulſion of the cleareſt and firmeſt proofs; becauſe their account reſolves itſelf into this ſhort, but diſcouraging propoſition, "That we have a very good "miniſtry, but that we are a very bad people;" that we ſet ourſelves to bite the hand that feeds us; that with a malignant inſanity we oppoſe the meaſures, and ungratefully vilify the perſons, of thoſe whoſe ſole object is our own peace and proſperity. If a few puny libellers, acting under a knot of factious politicians, without virtue, parts, or character (ſuch they are conſtantly repreſented by theſe gentlemen), are ſufficient to excite this diſturbance, very perverſe muſt be the diſpoſition of that people, amongſt whom ſuch a diſturbance can be excited by ſuch means. It is beſides no ſmall aggravation of the publick misfortune, that the diſeaſe, on this hypotheſis, appears to be without remedy. If the wealth of the nation be the cauſe of its turbulence, I imagine it is not propoſed to introduce poverty, as a conſtable to keep the peace. If our dominions abroad are the roots which feed all this rank luxuriance of ſedition, it is not intended to cut them

them off in order to famiſh the fruit. If our liberty has enfeebled the executive power, there is no deſign, I hope, to call in the aid of deſpotiſm, to fill up the deficiencies of law. Whatever may be intended, theſe things are not yet profeſſed. We ſeem therefore to be driven to abſolute deſpair; for we have no other materials to work upon, but thoſe out of which God has been pleaſed to form the inhabitants of this iſland. If theſe be radically and eſſentially vicious, all that can be ſaid is, that thoſe men are very unhappy, to whoſe fortune or duty it falls to adminiſter the affairs of this untoward people. I hear it indeed ſometimes aſſerted, that a ſteady perſeverance in the preſent meaſures, and a rigorous puniſhment of thoſe who oppoſe them, will in courſe of time infallibly put an end to theſe diſorders. But this, in my opinion, is ſaid without much obſervation of our preſent diſpoſition, and without any knowledge at all of the general nature of mankind. If the matter of which this nation is compoſed be ſo very fermentable as theſe gentlemen deſcribe it, leaven never will be wanting to work it up, as long as diſcontent, revenge, and ambition, have exiſtence in the world. Particular puniſhments are the cure for accidental diſtempers in the ſtate; they inflame rather than allay thoſe heats which ariſe from the ſettled miſmanagement of the government, or from a natural ill diſpoſition in the people. It is

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of the utmoſt moment not to make miſtakes in the uſe of ſtrong meaſures; and firmneſs is then only a virtue when it accompanies the moſt perfect wiſdom. In truth, inconſtancy is a ſort of natural corrective of folly and ignorance.

I am not one of thoſe who think that the people are never in the wrong. They have been ſo, frequently and outrageouſly, both in other countries and in this. But I do ſay, that in all diſputes between them and their rulers, the preſumption is at leaſt upon a par in favour of the people. Experience may perhaps juſtify me in going further. Where popular diſcontents have been very prevalent, it may well be affirmed and ſupported, that there has been generally ſomething found amiſs in the conſtitution, or in the conduct of government. The people have no intereſt in diſorder. When they do wrong, it is their error, and not their crime. But with the governing part of the ſtate, it is far otherwiſe. They certainly may act ill by deſign, as well as by miſtake. " *Les révolutions qui* " *arrivent dans les grands états ne ſont point un effet* " *du hazard, ni du caprice des peuples. Rien ne ré-* " *volte* les grands *d'un royaume comme* un gouverne- " ment foible et dérangé. *Pour la* populace, *ce* " *n'eſt jamais par envie d'attaquer qu'elle ſe ſoulève,* " *mais par impatience de ſouffrir.*"* Theſe are the

* Mem. de Sully, Tom. i, p. 133.

words

words of a great man; of a minister of state; and a zealous assertor of monarchy. They are applied to the *system of favouritism* which was adopted by Henry the Third of France, and to the dreadful consequences it produced. What he says of revolutions, is equally true of all great disturbances. If this presumption in favour of the subjects against the trustees of power be not the more probable, I am sure it is the more comfortable speculation; because it is more easy to change an administration than to reform a people.

Upon a supposition, therefore, that in the opening of the cause the presumptions stand equally balanced between the parties, there seems sufficient ground to entitle any person to a fair hearing, who attempts some other scheme beside that easy one which is fashionable in some fashionable companies, to account for the present discontents. It is not to be argued that we endure no grievance, because our grievances are not of the same sort with those under which we laboured formerly; not precisely those which we bore from the Tudors, or vindicated on the Stuarts. A great change has taken place in the affairs of this country. For in the silent lapse of events as material alterations have been insensibly brought about in the policy and character of governments and nations, as those which have been marked by the tumult of publick revolutions.

It is very rare indeed for men to be wrong in their feelings concerning publick miſconduct; as rare to be right in their ſpeculation upon the cauſe of it. I have conſtantly obſerved, that the generality of people are fifty years, at leaſt, behindhand in their politicks. There are but very few, who are capable of comparing and digeſting what paſſes before their eyes at different times and occaſions, ſo as to form the whole into a diſtinct ſyſtem. But in books every thing is ſettled for them, without the exertion of any conſiderable diligence or ſagacity. For which reaſon men are wiſe with but little reflection, and good with little ſelf-denial, in the buſineſs of all times except their own. We are very uncorrupt and tolerably enlightened judges of the tranſactions of paſt ages; where no paſſions deceive, and where the whole train of circumſtances, from the trifling cauſe to the tragical event, is ſet in an orderly ſeries before us. Few are the partizans of departed tyranny; and to be a Whig on the buſineſs of an hundred years ago, is very conſiſtent with every advantage of preſent ſervility. This retroſpective wiſdom, and hiſtorical patriotiſm, are things of wonderful convenience; and ſerve admirably to reconcile the old quarrel between ſpeculation and practice. Many a ſtern republican, after gorging himſelf with a full feaſt of admiration of the Grecian commonwealths and of our true Saxon conſtitution, and diſcharging all the

the ſplendid bile of his virtuous indignation on King John and King James, ſits down perfectly ſatisfied to the coarſeſt work and homelieſt job of the day he lives in. I believe there was no profeſſed admirer of Henry the Eighth among the inſtruments of the laſt King James; nor in the court of Henry the Eighth, was there, I dare ſay, to be found a ſingle advocate for the favourites of Richard the Second.

No complaiſance to our court, or to our age, can make me believe nature to be ſo changed, but that publick liberty will be among us, as among our anceſtors, obnoxious to ſome perſon or other; and that opportunities will be furniſhed, for attempting at leaſt, ſome alteration to the prejudice of our conſtitution. Theſe attempts will naturally vary in their mode according to times and circumſtances. For ambition, though it has ever the ſame general views, has not at all times the ſame means, nor the ſame particular objects. A great deal of the furniture of antient tyranny is worn to rags; the reſt is entirely out of faſhion. Beſides, there are few ſtateſmen ſo very clumſy and awkward in their buſineſs, as to fall into the identical ſnare which has proved fatal to their predeceſſors. When an arbitrary impoſition is attempted upon the ſubject, undoubtedly it will not bear on its forehead the name of *Ship-money*. There is no danger that an extenſion of the *Foreſt laws*

ſhould be the choſen mode of oppreſſion in this age. And when we hear any inſtance of miniſterial rapacity, to the prejudice of the rights of private life, it will certainly not be the exaction of two hundred pullets, from a woman of faſhion, for leave to lie with her own huſband.*

Every age has its own manners, and its politicks dependent upon them; and the ſame attempts will not be made againſt a conſtitution fully formed and matured, that were uſed to deſtroy it in the cradle, or to reſiſt its growth during its infancy.

Againſt the being of parliament, I am ſatisfied, no deſigns have ever been entertained ſince the revolution. Every one muſt perceive, that it is ſtrongly the intereſt of the court, to have ſome ſecond cauſe interpoſed between the miniſters and the people. The gentlemen of the houſe of commons have an intereſt equally ſtrong, in ſuſtaining the part of that intermediate cauſe. However they may hire out the *uſufruct* of their voices, they never will part with the *fee and inheritance*. Accordingly thoſe who have been of the moſt known devotion to the will and pleaſure of a court, have at the ſame time been moſt forward

* "Uxor Hugonis de Nevill dat Domino Regi ducentas Gal-
"linas, eo quod poſſit jacere una nocte cum Domino ſuo Hu-
"gone de Nevill." Maddox, Hiſt. Exch. c. xiii. p. 326.

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in aſſerting an high authority in the houſe of commons. When they knew who were to uſe that authority, and how it was to be employed, they thought it never could be carried too far. It muſt be always the wiſh of an unconſtitutional ſtateſman, that an houſe of commons who are entirely dependent upon him, ſhould have every right of the people entirely dependent upon their pleaſure. It was ſoon diſcovered, that the forms of a free, and the ends of an arbitrary government, were things not altogether incompatible.

The power of the crown, almoſt dead and rotten as Prerogative, has grown up anew, with much more ſtrength, and far leſs odium, under the name of Influence. An influence, which operated without noiſe and without violence; an influence which converted the very antagoniſt, into the inſtrument, of power; which contained in itſelf a perpetual principle of growth and renovation; and which the diſtreſſes and the proſperity of the country equally tended to augment, was an admirable ſubſtitute for a prerogative, that, being only the offspring of antiquated prejudices, had moulded in its original ſtamina irreſiſtible principles of decay and diſſolution. The ignorance of the people is a bottom but for a temporary ſyſtem; the intereſt of active men in the ſtate is a foundation perpetual and infallible. However, ſome circumſtances, ariſing, it muſt be confeſſed, in a great de-

gree from accident, prevented the effects of this influence for a long time from breaking out in a manner capable of exciting any ſerious apprehenſions. Although government was ſtrong and flouriſhed exceedingly, the *court* had drawn far leſs advantage than one would imagine from this great ſource of power.

At the revolution, the crown, deprived, for the ends of the revolution itſelf, of many prerogatives, was found too weak to ſtruggle againſt all the difficulties which preſſed ſo new and unſettled a government. The court was obliged therefore to delegate a part of its powers to men of ſuch intereſt as could ſupport, and of ſuch fidelity as would adhere to, its eſtabliſhment. Such men were able to draw in a greater number to a concurrence in the common defence. This connexion, neceſſary at firſt, continued long after convenient; and properly conducted might indeed, in all ſituations, be an uſeful inſtrument of government. At the ſame time, through the intervention of men of popular weight and character, the people poſſeſſed a ſecurity for their juſt portion of importance in the ſtate. But as the title to the crown grew ſtronger by long poſſeſſion, and by the conſtant increaſe of its influence, theſe helps have of late ſeemed to certain perſons no better than incumbrances. The powerful managers for government were not ſufficiently ſubmiſſive to the pleaſure of the poſſeſſors

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of immediate and perſonal favour, ſometimes from a confidence in their own ſtrength natural and acquired; ſometimes from a fear of offending their friends, and weakening that lead in the country, which gave them a conſideration independent of the court. Men acted as if the court could receive, as well as confer, an obligation. The influence of government, thus divided in appearance between the court and the leaders of parties, became in many caſes an acceſſion rather to the popular than to the royal ſcale; and ſome part of that influence which would otherwiſe have been poſſeſſed as in a ſort of mortmain and unalienable domain, returned again to the great ocean from whence it aroſe, and circulated among the people. This method therefore of governing, by men of great natural intereſt or great acquired conſideration, was viewed in a very invidious light by the true lovers of abſolute monarchy. It is the nature of deſpotiſm to abhor power held by any means but its own momentary pleaſure; and to annihilate all intermediate ſituations between boundleſs ſtrength on its own part, and total debility on the part of the people.

To get rid of all this intermediate and independent importance and *to ſecure to the court the unlimited and uncontrouled uſe of its own vaſt influence, under the ſole direction of its own private favour*, has for ſome years paſt been the great object of policy.

If

If this were compaſſed, the influence of the crown muſt of courſe produce all the effects which the moſt ſanguine partizans of the court could poſſibly deſire. Government might then be carried on without any concurrence on the part of the people; without any attention to the dignity of the greater, or to the affections of the lower ſorts. A new project was therefore deviſed, by a certain ſet of intriguing men, totally different from the ſyſtem of adminiſtration which had prevailed ſince the acceſſion of the Houſe of Brunſwick. This project, I have heard, was firſt conceived by ſome perſons in the court of Frederick Prince of Wales.

The earlieſt attempt in the execution of this deſign was to ſet up for miniſter, a perſon, in rank indeed reſpectable, and very ample in fortune; but who, to the moment of this vaſt and ſudden elevation, was little known or conſidered in the kingdom. To him the whole nation was to yield an immediate and implicit ſubmiſſion. But whether it was for want of firmneſs to bear up againſt the firſt oppoſition; or that things were not yet fully ripened, or that this method was not found the moſt eligible; that idea was ſoon abandoned. The inſtrumental part of the project was a little altered, to accommodate it to the time, and to bring things more gradually and more ſurely to the one great end propoſed.

The firſt part of the reformed plan was to draw

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a line which ſhould ſeparate the court from the miniſtry. Hitherto theſe names had been looked upon as ſynonymous; but for the future, court and adminiſtration were to be conſidered as things totally diſtinct. By this operation, two ſyſtems of adminiſtration were to be formed; one which ſhould be in the real ſecret and confidence; the other merely oſtenſible, to perform the official and executory duties of government. The latter were alone to be reſponſible; whilſt the real adviſers, who enjoyed all the power, were effectually removed from all the danger.

Secondly, *A party under theſe leaders was to be formed in favour of the court againſt the miniſtry:* this party was to have a large ſhare in the emoluments of government, and to hold it totally ſeparate from, and independent of, oſtenſible adminiſtration.

The third point, and that on which the ſucceſs of the whole ſcheme ultimately depended, was *to bring parliament to an acquieſcence in this project.* Parliament was therefore to be taught by degrees a total indifference to the perſons, rank, influence, abilities, connexions, and character, of the miniſters of the crown. By means of a diſcipline, on which I ſhall ſay more hereafter, that body was to be habituated to the moſt oppoſite intereſts, and the moſt diſcordant politicks. All connexions and dependencies among ſubjects were to be entirely diſſolved. As hitherto buſineſs had gone through the

the hands of leaders of Whigs or Tories, men of talents to conciliate the people, and engage to their confidence, now the method was to be altered; and the lead was to be given to men of no ſort of conſideration or credit in the country. This want of natural importance was to be their very title to delegated power. Members of parliament were to be hardened into an inſenſibility to pride as well as to duty. Thoſe high and haughty ſentiments, which are the great ſupport of independence, were to be let down gradually. Point of honour and precedence were no more to be regarded in parliamentary decorum, than in a Turkiſh army. It was to be avowed as a conſtitutional maxim, that the king might appoint one of his footmen, or one of your footmen, for miniſter; and that he ought to be, and that he would be, as well followed as the firſt name for rank or wiſdom in the nation. Thus parliament was to look on, as if perfectly unconcerned, while a cabal of the cloſet and backſtairs was ſubſtituted in the place of a national adminiſtration.

With ſuch a degree of acquieſcence, any meaſure of any court might well be deemed thoroughly ſecure. The capital objects, and by much the moſt flattering characteriſticks of arbitrary power, would be obtained. Every thing would be drawn from its holdings in the country to the perſonal favour and inclination of the prince. This favour would be

be the ſole introduction to power, and the only tenure by which it was to be held: ſo that no perſon looking towards another, and all looking towards the court, it was impoſſible but that the motive which ſolely influenced every man's hopes muſt come in time to govern every man's conduct; till at laſt the ſervility became univerſal, in ſpite of the dead letter of any laws or inſtitutions whatſoever.

How it ſhould happen that any man could be tempted to venture upon ſuch a project of government, may at firſt view appear ſurprizing. But the fact is, that opportunities very inviting to ſuch an attempt have offered; and the ſcheme itſelf was not deſtitute of ſome arguments not wholly unplauſible to recommend it. Theſe opportunities and theſe arguments, the uſe that has been made of both, the plan for carrying this new ſcheme of government into execution, and the effects which it has produced, are in my opinion worthy of our ſerious conſideration.

His majeſty came to the throne of theſe kingdoms with more advantages than any of his predeceſſors ſince the revolution. Fourth in deſcent, and third in ſucceſſion of his royal family, even the zealots of hereditary right, in him, ſaw ſomething to flatter their favourite prejudices; and to juſtify a transfer of their attachments, without a change in their principles. The perſon and cauſe of the Pretender were become contemptible; his title diſowned

owned throughout Europe, his party diſbanded in England. His majeſty came indeed to the inheritance of a mighty war; but, victorious in every part of the globe, peace was always in his power, not to negociate, but to dictate. No foreign habitudes or attachments withdrew him from the cultivation of his power at home. His revenue for the civil eſtabliſhment, fixed (as it was then thought) at a large, but definite ſum, was ample, without being invidious. His influence, by additions from conqueſt, by an augmentation of debt, by an increaſe of military and naval eſtabliſhment, much ſtrengthened and extended. And coming to the throne in the prime and full vigour of youth, as from affection there was a ſtrong diſlike, ſo from dread there ſeemed to be a general averſeneſs, from giving any thing like offence to a monarch, againſt whoſe reſentment oppoſition could not look for a refuge in any ſort of reverſionary hope.

Theſe ſingular advantages inſpired his majeſty only with a more ardent deſire to preſerve unimpaired the ſpirit of that national freedom, to which he owed a ſituation ſo full of glory. But to others it ſuggeſted ſentiments of a very different nature. They thought they now beheld an opportunity (by a certain ſort of ſtateſmen never long undiſcovered or unemployed) of drawing to themſelves, by the aggrandiſement of a court faction, a degree of power

power which they could never hope to derive from natural influence or from honourable ſervice; and which it was impoſſible they could hold with the leaſt ſecurity, whilſt the ſyſtem of adminiſtration reſted upon its former bottom. In order to facilitate the execution of their deſign, it was neceſſary to make many alterations in political arrangement, and a ſignal change in the opinions, habits, and connexions of the greateſt part of thoſe who at that time acted in publick.

In the firſt place, they proceeded gradually, but not ſlowly, to deſtroy every thing of ſtrength which did not derive its principal nouriſhment from the immediate pleaſure of the court. The greateſt weight of popular opinion and party connexion were then with the duke of Newcaſtle and Mr. Pitt. Neither of theſe held their importance by the *new tenure* of the court; they were not therefore thought to be ſo proper as others for the ſervices which were required by that tenure. It happened very favourably for the new ſyſtem, that under a forced coalition there rankled an incurable alienation and diſguſt between the parties which compoſed the adminiſtration. Mr. Pitt was firſt attacked. Not ſatisfied with removing him from power, they endeavoured by various artifices to ruin his character. The other party ſeemed rather pleaſed to get rid of ſo oppreſſive a ſupport; not perceiving, that their own fall was prepared

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by his, and involved in it. Many other reaſons prevented them from daring to look their true ſituation in the face. To the great Whig families it was extremely diſagreeable, and ſeemed almoſt unnatural, to oppoſe the adminiſtration of a prince of the houſe of Brunſwick. Day after day they heſitated, and doubted, and lingered, expecting that other counſels would take place; and were ſlow to be perſuaded, that all which had been done by the cabal, was the effect not of humour, but of ſyſtem. It was more ſtrongly and evidently the intereſt of the new court faction, to get rid of the great Whig connexions, than to deſtroy Mr. Pitt. The power of that gentleman was vaſt indeed and merited; but it was in a great degree perſonal, and therefore tranſient. Theirs was rooted in the country. For, with a good deal leſs of popularity, they poſſeſſed a far more natural and fixed influence. Long poſſeſſion of government; vaſt property; obligations of favours given and received; connexion of office; ties of blood, of alliance, of friendſhip (things at that time ſuppoſed of ſome force); the name of Whig, dear to the majority of the people; the zeal early begun and ſteadily continued to the royal family: all theſe together formed a body of power in the nation, which was criminal and devoted. The great ruling principle of the cabal, and that which animated and harmonized all their proceedings, how various ſoever they

they may have been, was to ſignify to the world, that the court would proceed upon its own proper forces only; and that the pretence of bringing any other into its ſervice was an affront to it, and not a ſupport. Therefore, when the chiefs were removed, in order to go to the root, the whole party was put under a proſcription, ſo general and ſevere as to take their hard-earned bread from the loweſt officers, in a manner which had never been known before, even in general revolutions. But it was thought neceſſary effectually to deſtroy all dependencies but one; and to ſhew an example of the firmneſs and rigour with which the new ſyſtem was to be ſupported.

Thus for the time were pulled down, in the perſons of the Whig leaders and of Mr. Pitt (in ſpite of the ſervices of the one at the acceſſion of the royal family, and the recent ſervices of the other in the war) the *two only ſecurities for the importance of the people*; *power ariſing from popularity*; *and power ariſing from connexion.* Here and there indeed a few individuals were left ſtanding, who gave ſecurity for their total eſtrangement from the odious principles of party connexion and perſonal attachment; and it muſt be confeſſed that moſt of them have religiouſly kept their faith. Such a change could not however be made without a mighty ſhock to government.

To reconcile the minds of the people to all theſe movements,

movements, principles correſpondent to them had been preached up with great zeal. Every one muſt remember that the cabal ſet out with the moſt aſtoniſhing prudery, both moral and political. Thoſe who in a few months after ſouſed over head and ears into the deepeſt and dirtieſt pits of corruption, cried out violently againſt the indirect practices in the electing and managing of parliaments, which had formerly prevailed. This marvellous abhorrence which the court had ſuddenly taken to all influence, was not only circulated in converſation through the kingdom, but pompouſly announced to the publick, with many other extraordinary things, in a pamphlet* which had all the appearance of a manifeſto preparatory to ſome conſiderable enterprize. Throughout, it was a ſatire, though in terms managed and decent enough, on the politicks of the former reign. It was indeed written with no ſmall art and addreſs.

In this piece appeared the firſt dawning of the new ſyſtem; there firſt appeared the idea (then only in ſpeculation) of *ſeparating the court from the adminiſtration*; of carrying every thing from national connexion to perſonal regards; and of forming a regular party for that purpoſe, under the name of *king's men*.

To recommend this ſyſtem to the people, a per-

* Sentiments of an honeſt Man.

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ſpective view of the court gorgeouſly painted, and ſinely illuminated from within, was exhibited to the gaping multitude. Party was to be totally done away, with all its evil works. Corruption was to be caſt down from court, as *Atè* was from heaven. Power was thenceforward to be the choſen reſidence of publick ſpirit; and no one was to be ſuppoſed under any ſiniſter influence, except thoſe who had the misfortune to be in diſgrace at court, which was to ſtand in lieu of all vices and all corruptions. A ſcheme of perfection to be realized in a monarchy far beyond the viſionary republick of Plato. The whole ſcenery was exactly diſpoſed to captivate thoſe good ſouls, whoſe credulous morality is ſo invaluable a treaſure to crafty politicians. Indeed there was wherewithal to charm every body, except thoſe few who are not much pleaſed with profeſſions of ſupernatural virtue, who know of what ſtuff ſuch profeſſions are made, for what purpoſes they are deſigned, and in what they are ſure conſtantly to end. Many innocent gentlemen, who had been talking proſe all their lives without knowing any thing of the matter, began at laſt to open their eyes upon their own merits, and to attribute their not having been lords of the treaſury and lords of trade many years before, merely to the prevalence of party, and to the miniſterial power, which had fruſtrated the good intentions of the court in favour of their abilities.

Now was the time to unlock the ſealed fountain of royal bounty, which had been infamouſly monopolized and huckſtered, and to let it flow at large upon the whole people. The time was come, to reſtore royalty to its original ſplendour. *Mettre le Roy hors de page*, became a ſort of watch-word. And it was conſtantly in the mouths of all the runners of the court, that nothing could preſerve the balance of the conſtitution from being overturned by the rabble, or by a faction of the nobility, but to free the ſovereign effectually from that miniſterial tyranny under which the royal dignity had been oppreſſed in the perſon of his majeſty's grandfather.

Theſe were ſome of the many artifices uſed to reconcile the people to the great change which was made in the perſons who compoſed the miniſtry, and the ſtill greater which was made and avowed in its conſtitution. As to individuals, other methods were employed with them; in order ſo thoroughly to diſunite every party, and even every family, that *no concert, order, or effect, might appear in any future oppoſition.* And in this manner an adminiſtration without connexion with the people, or with one another, was firſt put in poſſeſſion of government. What good conſequences followed from it, we have all ſeen; whether with regard to virtue, publick or private; to the eaſe and happineſs of the ſovereign; or to the real ſtrength of government.

government. But as ſo much ſtreſs was then laid on the neceſſity of this new project, it will not be amiſs to take a view of the effects of this royal ſervitude and vile durance, which was ſo deplored in the reign of the late monarch, and was ſo carefully to be avoided in the reign of his ſucceſſor. The effects were theſe.

In times full of doubt and danger to his perſon and family, George the Second maintained the dignity of his crown connected with the liberty of his people, not only unimpaired, but improved, for the ſpace of thirty-three years. He overcame a dangerous rebellion, abetted by foreign force, and raging in the heart of his kingdoms; and thereby deſtroyed the ſeeds of all future rebellion that could ariſe upon the ſame principle. He carried the glory, the power, the commerce of England, to an height unknown even to this renowned nation in the times of its greateſt proſperity; and he left his ſucceſſion reſting on the true and only true foundations of all national and all regal greatneſs; affection at home, reputation abroad, truſt in allies, terror in rival nations. The moſt ardent lover of his country cannot wiſh for Great Britain an happier fate than to continue as ſhe was then left. A people emulous as we are in affection to our preſent ſovereign, know not how to form a prayer to heaven for a greater bleſſing upon his virtues, or an higher ſtate of felicity and glory, than that he

ſhould live, and ſhould reign, and, when Providence ordains it, ſhould die, exactly like his illuſtrious predeceſſor.

A great prince may be obliged (though ſuch a thing cannot happen very often) to ſacrifice his private inclination to his publick intereſt. A wiſe prince will not think that ſuch a reſtraint implies a condition of ſervility; and truly, if ſuch was the condition of the laſt reign, and the effects were alſo ſuch as we have deſcribed, we ought, no leſs for the ſake of the ſovereign whom we love, than for our own, to hear arguments convincing indeed, before we depart from the maxims of that reign, or fly in the face of this great body of ſtrong and recent experience.

One of the principal topicks which was then, and has been ſince, much employed by that political * ſchool, is an affected terror of the growth of an ariſtocratick power, prejudicial to the rights of the crown, and the balance of the conſtitution. Any new powers exerciſed in the houſe of lords, or in the houſe of commons, or by the crown, ought certainly to excite the vigilant and anxious jealouſy of a free people. Even a new and unprecedented courſe of action in the whole legiſlature, without great and evident reaſon, may be a ſubject

* See the political writings of the late Dr. Brown, and many others.

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of juſt uneaſineſs. I will not affirm, that there may not have lately appeared in the houſe of lords a diſpoſition to ſome attempts derogatory to the legal rights of the ſubject. If any ſuch have really appeared, they have ariſen, not from a power properly ariſtocratick, but from the ſame influence which is charged with having excited attempts of a ſimilar nature in the houſe of commons; which houſe, if it ſhould have been betrayed into an unfortunate quarrel with its conſtituents, and involved in a charge of the very ſame nature, could have neither power nor inclination to repel ſuch attempts in others. Thoſe attempts in the houſe of lords can no more be called ariſtocratick proceedings, than the proceedings with regard to the county of Middleſex in the houſe of commons can with any ſenſe be called democratical.

It is true, that the peers have a great influence in the kingdom, and in every part of the publick concerns. While they are men of property, it is impoſſible to prevent it, except by ſuch means as muſt prevent all property from its natural operation: an event not eaſily to be compaſſed, while property is power; nor by any means to be wiſhed, while the leaſt notion exiſts of the method by which the ſpirit of liberty acts, and of the means by which it is preſerved. If any particular peers, by their uniform, upright, conſtitutional conduct, by their publick and their private virtues, have ac-

quired an influence in the country; the people, on whoſe favour that influence depends, and from whom it aroſe, will never be duped into an opinion, that ſuch greatneſs in a peer is the deſpotiſm of an ariſtocracy, when they know and feel it to be the effect and pledge of their own importance.

I am no friend to ariſtocracy, in the ſenſe at leaſt in which that word is uſually underſtood. If it were not a bad habit to moot caſes on the ſuppoſed ruin of the conſtitution, I ſhould be free to declare, that if it muſt periſh, I would rather by far ſee it reſolved into any other form, than loſt in that auſtre and inſolent domination. But, whatever my diſlikes may be, my fears are not upon that quarter. The queſtion, on the influence of a court, and of a peerage, is not, which of the two dangers is the moſt eligible, but which is the moſt imminent. He is but a poor obſerver, who has not ſeen, that the generality of peers, far from ſupporting themſelves in a ſtate of independent greatneſs, are but too apt to fall into an oblivion of their proper dignity, and to run headlong into an abject ſervitude. Would to God it were true, that the fault of our peers were too much ſpirit? It is worthy of ſome obſervation, that theſe gentlemen, ſo jealous of ariſtocracy, make no complaints of the power of thoſe peers (neither few nor inconſiderable) who are always in the train of a court, and whoſe whole weight muſt be conſidered

fidered as a portion of the ſettled influence of the crown. This is all ſafe and right; but if ſome peers (I am very ſorry they are not as many as they ought to be) ſet themſelves, in the great concern of peers and commons, againſt a back-ſtairs influence and clandeſtine government, then the alarm begins; then the conſtitution is in danger of being forced into an ariſtocracy.

I reſt a little the longer on this court topick, becauſe it was much inſiſted upon at the time of the great change, and has been ſince frequently revived by many of the agents of that party: for, whilſt they are terrifying the great and opulent with the horrors of mob-government, they are by other managers attempting (though hitherto with little ſucceſs) to alarm the people with a phantom of tyranny in the nobles. All this is done upon their favourite principle of diſunion, of ſowing jealouſies amongſt the different orders of the ſtate, and of disjointing the natural ſtrength of the kingdom; that it may be rendered incapable of reſiſting the ſiniſter deſigns of wicked men, who have engroſſed the royal power.

Thus much of the topicks choſen by the courtiers to recommend their ſyſtem; it will be neceſſary to open a little more at large the nature of that party which was formed for its ſupport. Without this, the whole would have been no better than a

viſionary amuſement, like the ſcheme of Harrington's political club, and not a buſineſs in which the nation had a real concern. As a powerful party, and a party conſtructed on a new principle, it is a very inviting object of curioſity.

It muſt be remembered, that ſince the revolution, until the period we are ſpeaking of, the influence of the crown had been always employed in ſupporting the miniſters of ſtate, and in carrying on the publick buſineſs according to their opinions. But the party now in queſtion is formed upon a very different idea. It is to intercept the favour, protection and confidence of the crown in the paſſage to its miniſters; it is to come between them and their importance in parliament; it is to ſeparate them from all their natural and acquired dependencies; it is intended as the controul, not the ſupport, of adminiſtration. The machinery of this ſyſtem is perplexed in its movements, and falſe in its principle. It is formed on a ſuppoſition that the king is ſomething external to his government; and that he may be honoured and aggrandized, even by its debility and diſgrace. The plan proceeds expreſsly on the idea of enfeebling the regular executory power. It proceeds on the idea of weakening the ſtate in order to ſtrengthen the court. The ſcheme depending entirely on diſtruſt, on diſconnexion, on mutability by principle, on ſyſtema-

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tick weakneſs in every particular member; it is impoſſible that the total reſult ſhould be ſubſtantial ſtrength of any kind.

As a foundation of their ſcheme, the cabal have eſtabliſhed a ſort of *rota* in the court. All ſorts of parties, by this means, have been brought into adminiſtration, from whence few have had the good fortune to eſcape without diſgrace; none at all without conſiderable loſſes. In the beginning of each arrangement no profeſſions of confidence and ſupport are wanting, to induce the leading men to engage. But while the miniſters of the day appear in all the pomp and pride of power, while they have all their canvas ſpread out to the wind, and every ſail filled with the fair and proſperous gale of royal favour, in a ſhort time they find, they know not how, a current, which ſets directly againſt them; which prevents all progreſs; and even drives them backwards. They grow aſhamed and mortified in a ſituation, which, by its vicinity to power, only ſerves to remind them the more ſtrongly of their inſignificance. They are obliged either to execute the orders of their inferiors, or to ſee themſelves oppoſed by the natural inſtruments of their office. With the loſs of their dignity they loſe their temper. In their turn they grow troubleſome to that cabal which, whether it ſupports or oppoſes, equally diſgraces and equally betrays them. It is ſoon found neceſſary to get rid

rid of the heads of adminiſtration; but it is of the heads only. As there always are many rotten members belonging to the beſt connexions, it is not hard to perſuade ſeveral to continue in office without their leaders. By this means the party goes out much thinner than it came in; and is only reduced in ſtrength by its temporary poſſeſſion of power. Beſides, if by accident, or in courſe of changes, that power ſhould be recovered, the junto have thrown up a retrenchment of theſe carcaſes, which may ſerve to cover themſelves in a day of danger. They conclude, not unwiſely, that ſuch rotten members will become the firſt objects of diſguſt and reſentment to their antient connexions.

They contrive to form in the outward adminiſtration two parties at the leaſt; which, whilſt they are tearing one another to pieces, are both competitors for the favour and protection of the cabal; and, by their emulation, contribute to throw every thing more and more into the hands of the interior managers.

A miniſter of ſtate will ſometimes keep himſelf totally eſtranged from all his colleagues; will differ from them in their councils, will privately traverſe, and publickly oppoſe, their meaſures. He will, however, continue in his employment. Inſtead of ſuffering any mark of diſpleaſure, he will be diſtinguiſhed by an unbounded profuſion of

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court rewards and careſſes; becauſe he does what is expected, and all that is expected, from men in office. He helps to keep ſome form of adminiſtration in being, and keeps it at the ſame time as weak and divided as poſſible.

However, we muſt take care not to be miſtaken, or to imagine that ſuch perſons have any weight in their oppoſition. When, by them, adminiſtration is convinced of its inſignificancy, they are ſoon to be convinced of their own. They never are ſuffered to ſucceed in their oppoſition. They and the world are to be ſatisfied, that, neither office, nor authority, nor property, nor ability, eloquence, counſel, ſkill, or union, are of the leaſt importance; but that the mere influence of the court, naked of all ſupport, and deſtitute of all management, is abundantly ſufficient for all its own purpoſes.

When any adverſe connexion is to be deſtroyed, the cabal ſeldom appear in the work themſelves. They find out ſome perſon of whom the party entertains an high opinion. Such a perſon they endeavour to delude with various pretences. They teach him firſt to diſtruſt, and then to quarrel with his friends; among whom, by the ſame arts, they excite a ſimilar diffidence of him; ſo that, in this mutual fear and diſtruſt, he may ſuffer himſelf to be employed as the inſtrument in the change which is brought about. Afterwards they are ſure to deſtroy him in his turn, by ſetting up in his place

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ſome perſon in whom he had himſelf repoſed the greateſt confidence, and who ſerves to carry off a conſiderable part of his adherents.

When ſuch a perſon has broke in this manner with his connexions, he is ſoon compelled to commit ſome flagrant act of iniquitous perſonal hoſtility againſt ſome of them (ſuch as an attempt to ſtrip a particular friend of his family eſtate), by which the cabal hope to render the parties utterly irreconcileable. In truth, they have ſo contrived matters, that people have a greater hatred to the ſubordinate inſtruments than to the principal movers.

As in deſtroying their enemies they make uſe of inſtruments not immediately belonging to their corps, ſo in advancing their own friends they purſue exactly the ſame method. To promote any of them to conſiderable rank or emolument, they commonly take care that the recommendation ſhall paſs through the hands of the oſtenſible miniſtry: ſuch a recommendation might however appear to the world, as ſome proof of the credit of miniſters, and ſome means of increaſing their ſtrength. To prevent this, the perſons ſo advanced are directed, in all companies, induſtriouſly to declare, that they are under no obligations whatſoever to adminiſtration; that they have received their office from another quarter; that they are totally free and independent.

When the faction has any job of lucre to obtain,

or

or of vengeance to perpetrate, their way is, to ſelect, for the execution, thoſe very perſons to whoſe habits, friendſhips, principles, and declarations, ſuch proceedings are publickly known to be the moſt adverſe; at once to render the inſtruments the more odious, and therefore the more dependent, and to prevent the people from ever repoſing a confidence in any appearance of private friendſhip, or publick principle.

If the adminiſtration ſeem now and then, from remiſſneſs, or from fear of making themſelves diſagreeable, to ſuffer any popular exceſſes to go unpuniſhed, the cabal immediately ſets up ſome creature of theirs to raiſe a clamour againſt the miniſters, as having ſhamefully betrayed the dignity of government. Then they compel the miniſtry to become active in conferring rewards and honours on the perſons who have been the inſtruments of their diſgrace; and, after having firſt vilified them with the higher orders for ſuffering the laws to ſleep over the licentiouſneſs of the populace, they drive them (in order to make amends for their former inactivity) to ſome act of atrocious violence, which renders them completely abhorred by the people. They who remember the riots which attended the Middleſex election; the opening of the preſent parliament; and the tranſactions relative to Saint George's Fields, will not be at a loſs for an application of theſe remarks.

That

That this body may be enabled to compaſs all the ends of its inſtitution, its members are ſcarcely ever to aim at the high and reſponſible offices of the ſtate. They are diſtributed with art and judgment through all the ſecondary, but efficient, departments of office, and through the houſeholds of all the branches of the royal family: ſo as on one hand to occupy all the avenues to the throne; and on the other to forward or fruſtrate the execution of any meaſure, according to their own intereſts. For with the credit and ſupport which they are known to have, though for the greater part in places which are only a genteel excuſe for ſalary, they poſſeſs all the influence of the higheſt poſts; and they dictate publickly in almoſt every thing, even with a parade of ſuperiority. Whenever they diſſent (as it often happens) from their nominal leaders, the trained part of the ſenate, inſtinctively in the ſecret, is ſure to follow them; provided the leaders, ſenſible of their ſituation, do not of themſelves recede in time from their moſt declared opinions. This latter is generally the caſe. It will not be conceivable to any one who has not ſeen it, what pleaſure is taken by the cabal in rendering theſe heads of office thoroughly contemptible and ridiculous. And when they are become ſo, they have then the beſt chance for being well ſupported.

The members of the court faction are fully indemnified

demnified for not holding places on the ſlippery heights of the kingdom, not only by the lead in all affairs, but alſo by the perfect ſecurity in which they enjoy leſs conſpicuous, but very advantageous ſituations. Their places are, in expreſs legal tenure, or in effect, all of them for life. Whilſt the firſt and moſt reſpectable perſons in the kingdom are toſſed about like tennis balls, the ſport of a blind and inſolent caprice, no miniſter dares even to caſt an oblique glance at the loweſt of their body. If an attempt be made upon one of this corps, immediately he flies to ſanctuary, and pretends to the moſt inviolable of all promiſes. No conveniency of publick arrangement is available to remove any one of them from the ſpecifick ſituation he holds; and the ſlighteſt attempt upon one of them, by the moſt powerful miniſter, is a certain preliminary to his own deſtruction.

Conſcious of their independence, they bear themſelves with a lofty air to the exterior miniſters. Like Janiſſaries, they derive a kind of freedom from the very condition of their ſervitude. They may act juſt as they pleaſe; provided they are true to the great ruling principle of their inſtitution. It is, therefore, not at all wonderful, that people ſhould be ſo deſirous of adding themſelves to that body, in which they may poſſeſs and reconcile ſatisfactions the moſt alluring, and ſeemingly the moſt contradictory; enjoying at once all the

the ſpirited pleaſure of independence, and all the groſs lucre and fat emoluments of ſervitude.

Here is a ſketch, though a ſlight one, of the conſtitution, laws, and policy, of this new court corporation. The name by which they chuſe to diſtinguiſh themſelves, is that of *king's men*, or the *king's friends*, by an invidious excluſion of the reſt of his Majeſty's moſt loyal and affectionate ſubjects. The whole ſyſtem, comprehending the exterior and interior adminiſtrations, is commonly called in the technical language of the court, *double cabinet*; in French or Engliſh, as you chuſe to pronounce it.

Whether all this be a viſion of a diſtracted brain, or the invention of a malicious heart, or a real faction in the country, muſt be judged by the appearances which things have worn for eight years paſt. Thus far I am certain, that there is not a ſingle publick man, in or out of office, who has not, at ſome time or other, borne teſtimony to the truth of what I have now related. In particular, no perſons have been more ſtrong in their aſſertions, and louder and more indecent in their complaints, than thoſe who compoſe all the exterior part of the preſent adminiſtration; in whoſe time that faction has arrived at ſuch an height of power, and of boldneſs in the uſe of it, as may, in the end, perhaps bring about its total deſtruction.

It is true, that about four years ago, during the adminiſtration

adminiſtration of the Marquis of Rockingham, an attempt was made to carry on government without their concurrence. However, this was only a tranſient cloud; they were hid but for a moment; and their conſtellation blazed out with greater brightneſs, and a far more vigorous influence, ſome time after it was blown over. An attempt was at that time made (but without any idea of proſcription) to break their corps, to diſcountenance their doctrines, to revive connexions of a different kind, to reſtore the principles and policy of the Whigs, to reanimate the cauſe of liberty by miniſterial countenance; and then for the firſt time were men ſeen attached in office to every principle they had maintained in oppoſition. No one will doubt, that ſuch men were abhorred and violently oppoſed by the court faction, and that ſuch a ſyſtem could have but a ſhort duration.

It may appear ſomewhat affected, that in ſo much diſcourſe upon this extraordinary party, I ſhould ſay ſo little of the Earl of Bute, who is the ſuppoſed head of it. But this was neither owing to affectation nor inadvertence. I have carefully avoided the introduction of perſonal reflexions of any kind. Much the greater part of the topicks which have been uſed to blacken this nobleman, are either unjuſt or frivolous. At beſt, they have a tendency to give the reſentment of this bitter calamity a wrong direction, and to turn a publick

grievance into a mean, perſonal, or a dangerous national quarrel. Where there is a regular ſcheme of operations carried on, it is the ſyſtem, and not any individual perſon who acts in it, that is truly dangerous. This ſyſtem has not ariſen ſolely from the ambition of Lord Bute, but from the circumſtances which favoured it, and from an indifference to the conſtitution which had been for ſome time growing among our gentry. We ſhould have been tried with it, if the Earl of Bute had never exiſted; and it will want neither a contriving head nor active members, when the Earl of Bute exiſts no longer. It is not, therefore, to rail at Lord Bute, but firmly to embody againſt this court party and its practices, which can afford us any proſpect of relief in our preſent condition.

Another motive induces me to put the perſonal conſideration of Lord Bute, wholly out of the queſtion. He communicates very little in a direct manner with the greater part of our men of buſineſs. This has never been his cuſtom. It is enough for him that he ſurrounds them with his creatures. Several imagine, therefore, that they have a very good excuſe for doing all the work of this faction, when they have no perſonal connexion with Lord Bute. But whoever becomes a party to an adminiſtration, compoſed of inſulated individuals, without faith plighted, tie, or common principle; an adminiſtration conſtitutionally impotent,

potent, becauſe ſupported by no party in the nation; he who contributes to deſtroy the connexions of men and their truſt in one another, or in any ſort to throw the dependence of publick counſels upon private will and favour, poſſibly may have nothing to do with the Earl of Bute. It matters little whether he be the friend or the enemy of that particular perſon. But let him be who or what he will, he abets a faction that is driving hard to the ruin of his country. He is ſapping the foundation of its liberty, diſturbing the ſources of its domeſtick tranquillity, weakening its government over its dependencies, degrading it from all its importance in the ſyſtem of Europe.

It is this unnatural infuſion of a *ſyſtem of favouritiſm* into a government which in a great part of its conſtitution is popular, that has raiſed the preſent ferment in the nation. The people, without entering deeply into its principles, could plainly perceive its effects, in much violence, in a great ſpirit of innovation, and a general diſorder in all the functions of government. I keep my eye ſolely on this ſyſtem; if I ſpeak of thoſe meaſures which have ariſen from it, it will be ſo far only as they illuſtrate the general ſcheme. This is the fountain of all thoſe bitter waters of which, through an hundred different conduits, we have drunk until we are ready to burſt. The diſcretionary power of the crown in the formation of miniſtry,

abuſed by bad or weak men, has given riſe to a ſyſtem, which, without directly violating the letter of any law, operates againſt the ſpirit of the whole conſtitution.

A plan of favouritiſm for our executory government is eſſentially at variance with the plan of our legiſlature. One great end undoubtedly of a mixed government like ours, compoſed of monarchy, and of controuls, on the part of the higher people and the lower, is that the prince ſhall not be able to violate the laws. This is uſeful indeed and fundamental. But this, even at firſt view, is no more than a negative advantage; an armour merely defenſive. It is therefore next in order, and equal in importance, *that the diſcrstionary powers which are neceſſarily veſted in the monarch, whether for the execution of the laws, or for the nomination to magiſtracy and office, or for conducting the affairs of peace and war, or for ordering the revenue, ſhould all be exerciſed upon publick principles and national grounds, and not on the likings or prejudices, the intrigues or policies, of a court.* This, I ſaid, is equal in importance to the ſecuring a government according to law. The laws reach but a very little way. Conſtitute government how you pleaſe, infinitely the greater part of it muſt depend upon the exerciſe of the powers which are left at large to the prudence and uprightneſs of miniſters of ſtate. Even all the uſe and potency of the laws depends upon them.

them. Without them, your commonwealth is no better than a ſcheme upon paper; and not a living, acting, effective conſtitution. It is poſſible, that through negligence, or ignorance, or deſign artfully conducted, miniſters may ſuffer one part of government to languiſh, another to be perverted from its purpoſes, and every valuable intereſt of the country to fall into ruin and decay, without poſſibility of fixing any ſingle act on which a criminal proſecution can be juſtly grounded. The due arrangement of men in the active part of the ſtate, far from being foreign to the purpoſes of a wiſe government, ought to be among its very firſt and deareſt objects. When, therefore, the abettors of the new ſyſtem tell us, that between them and their oppoſers there is nothing but a ſtruggle for power, and that therefore we are no ways concerned in it; we muſt tell thoſe who have the impudence to inſult us in this manner, that of all things we ought to be the moſt concerned, who and what ſort of men they are, that hold the truſt of every thing that is dear to us. Nothing can render this a point of indifference to the nation, but what muſt either render us totally deſperate, or ſoothe us into the ſecurity of ideots. We muſt ſoften into a credulity below the milkineſs of infancy, to think all men virtuous. We muſt be tainted with a malignity truly diabolical, to believe all the world to be equally wicked and corrupt.

Men are in publick life as in private, ſome good, ſome evil. The elevation of the one, and the depreſſion of the other, are the firſt objects of all true policy. But that form of government, which, neither in its direct inſtitutions, nor in their immediate tendency, has contrived to throw its affairs into the moſt truſt-worthy hands, but has left its whole executory ſyſtem to be diſpoſed of agreeably to the uncontrouled pleaſure of any one man, however excellent or virtuous, is a plan of polity defective not only in that member, but conſequentially erroneous in every part of it.

In arbitrary governments, the conſtitution of the miniſtry follows the conſtitution of the legiſlature. Both the law and the magiſtrate are the creatures of will. It muſt be ſo. Nothing, indeed, will appear more certain, on any tolerable conſideration of this matter, than that *every ſort of government ought to have its adminiſtration correſpondent to its legiſlature.* If it ſhould be otherwiſe, things muſt fall into an hideous diſorder. The people of a free commonwealth, who have taken ſuch care that their laws ſhould be the reſult of general conſent, cannot be ſo ſenſeleſs as to ſuffer their executory ſyſtem to be compoſed of perſons on whom they have no dependence, and whom no proofs of the publick love and confidence have recommended to thoſe powers, upon the uſe of which the very being of the ſtate depends.

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The popular election of magiſtrates, and popular diſpoſition of rewards and honours, is one of the firſt advantages of a free ſtate. Without it, or ſomething equivalent to it, perhaps the people cannot long enjoy the ſubſtance of freedom; certainly none of the vivifying energy of good government. The frame of our commonwealth did not admit of ſuch an actual election: but it provided as well, and (while the ſpirit of the conſtitution is preſerved) better for all the effects of it than by the method of ſuffrage in any democratick ſtate whatſoever. It had always, until of late, been held the firſt duty of Parliament, *to refuſe to ſupport Government, until power was in the hands of perſons who were acceptable to the people, or while factions predominated in the Court in which the nation had no confidence.* Thus all the good effects of popular election were ſuppoſed to be ſecured to us, without the miſchiefs attending on perpetual intrigue, and a diſtinct canvaſs for every particular office throughout the body of the people. This was the moſt noble and refined part of our conſtitution. The people, by their repreſentatives and grandees, were intruſted with a deliberative power in making laws; the king with the controul of his negative. The king was intruſted with the deliberative choice and the election to office; the people had the negative in a parliamentary refuſal to ſupport. Formerly this power of con-

troul was what kept miniſters in awe of parliaments, and parliaments in reverence with the people. If the uſe of this power of controul on the ſyſtem and perſons of adminiſtration is gone, every thing is loſt, parliament and all. We may aſſure ourſelves, that if parliament will tamely ſee evil men take poſſeſſion of all the ſtrong holds of their country, and allow them time and means to fortify themſelves, under a pretence of giving them a fair trial, and upon a hope of diſcovering, whether they will not be reformed by power, and whether their meaſures will not be better than their morals; ſuch a parliament will give countenance to their meaſures alſo, whatever that parliament may pretend, and whatever thoſe meaſures may be.

Every good political inſtitution muſt have a preventive operation as well as a remedial. It ought to have a natural tendency to exclude bad men from government, and not to truſt for the ſafety of the ſtate to ſubſequent puniſhment alone: puniſhment, which has ever been tardy and uncertain; and which, when power is ſuffered in bad hands, may chance to fall rather on the injured than the criminal.

Before men are put forward into the great truſts of the ſtate, they ought by their conduct to have obtained ſuch a degree of eſtimation in their country, as may be ſome ſort of pledge and ſecurity

to

to the publick, that they will not abuſe thoſe truſts. It is no mean ſecurity for a proper uſe of power, that a man has ſhewn by the general tenor of his actions, that the affection, the good opinion, the confidence, of his fellow citizens have been among the principal objects of his life; and that he has owed none of the gradations of his power or fortune to a ſettled contempt, or occaſional forfeiture of their eſteem.

That man who before he comes into power has no friends, or who coming into power is obliged to deſert his friends, or who loſing it has no friends to ſympathize with him; he who has no ſway among any part of the landed or commercial intereſt, but whoſe whole importance has begun with his office, and is ſure to end with it; is a perſon who ought never to be ſuffered by a controuling parliament to continue in any of thoſe ſituations which confer the lead and direction of all our publick affairs; becauſe ſuch a man *has no connexion with the intereſt of the people.*

Thoſe knots or cabals of men who have got together, avowedly without any publick principle, in order to ſell their conjunct iniquity at the higher rate, and are therefore univerſally odious, ought never to be ſuffered to domineer in the ſtate; becauſe they have *no connexion with the ſentiments and opinions of the people.*

Theſe are conſiderations which in my opinion enforce

enforce the neceſſity of having ſome better reaſon, in a free country, and a free parliament, for ſupporting the miniſters of the crown, than that ſhort one, *That the king has thought proper to appoint them.* There is ſomething very courtly in this. But it is a principle pregnant with all ſorts of miſchief, in a conſtitution like ours, to turn the views of active men from the country to the court. Whatever be the road to power, that is the road which will be trod. If the opinion of the country be of no uſe as a means of power or conſideration, the qualities which uſually procure that opinion will be no longer cultivated. And whether it will be right, in a ſtate ſo popular in its conſtitution as ours, to leave ambition without popular motives, and to truſt all to the operation of pure virtue in the minds of kings and miniſters, and publick men, muſt be ſubmitted to the judgment and good ſenſe of the people of England.

Cunning men are here apt to break in, and, without directly controverting the principle, to raiſe objections from the difficulty under which the ſovereign labours, to diſtinguiſh the genuine voice and ſentiments of his people, from the clamour of a faction, by which it is ſo eaſily counterfeited. The nation, they ſay, is generally divided into parties, with views and paſſions utterly irreconcileable. If the king ſhould put his affairs into the hands of any one of them, he is ſure to diſguſt

diſguſt the reſt; if he ſelect particular men from among them all, it is an hazard that he diſguſts them all. Thoſe who are left out, however divided before, will ſoon run into a body of oppoſition; which, being a collection of many diſcontents into one focus, will without doubt be hot and violent enough. Faction will make its cries reſound through the nation, as if the whole were in an uproar, when by far the majority, and much the better part, will ſeem for a while as it were annihilated by the quiet in which their virtue and moderation incline them to enjoy the bleſſings of government. Beſides that the opinion of the mere vulgar is a miſerable rule even with regard to themſelves, on account of their violence and inſtability. So that if you were to gratify them in their humour to-day, that very gratification would be a ground of their diſſatisfaction on the next. Now as all theſe rules of publick opinion are to be collected with great difficulty, and to be applied with equal uncertainty as to the effect, what better can a king of England do, than to employ ſuch men as he finds to have views and inclinations moſt conformable to his own; who are leaſt infected with pride and ſelf-will, and who are leaſt moved by ſuch popular humours as are perpetually traverſing his deſigns, and diſturbing his ſervice; truſting that, when he means no ill to his people, he will be ſupported in his appointments, whether

he

he chooſes to keep or to change, as his private judgment or his pleaſure leads him? He will find a ſure reſource in the real weight and influence of the crown, when it is not ſuffered to become an inſtrument in the hands of a faction.

I will not pretend to ſay that there is nothing at all in this mode of reaſoning; becauſe I will not aſſert that there is no difficulty in the art of government. Undoubtedly the very beſt adminiſtration muſt encounter a great deal of oppoſition; and the very worſt will find more ſupport than it deſerves. Sufficient appearances will never be wanting to thoſe who have a mind to deceive themſelves. It is a fallacy in conſtant uſe with thoſe who would level all things, and confound right with wrong, to inſiſt upon the inconveniencies which are attached to every choice, without taking into conſideration the different weight and conſequence of thoſe inconveniencies. The queſtion is not concerning *abſolute* diſcontent or *perfect* ſatisfaction in government; neither of which can be pure and unmixed at any time, or upon any ſyſtem. The controverſy is about that degree of good-humour in the people, which may poſſibly be attained, and ought certainly to be looked for. While ſome politicians may be waiting to know whether the ſenſe of every individual be againſt them, accurately diſtinguiſhing the vulgar from the better ſort, drawing lines between the enterprizes of

of a faction and the efforts of a people, they may chance to ſee the government, which they are ſo nicely weighing and dividing, and diſtinguiſhing, tumble to the ground in the midſt of their wiſe deliberation. Prudent men, when ſo great an object as the ſecurity of government, or even its peace, is at ſtake, will not run the riſque of a deciſion which may be fatal to it. They who can read the political ſky will ſee an hurricane in a cloud no bigger than an hand at the very edge of the horizon, and will run into the firſt harbour. No lines can be laid down for civil or political wiſdom. They are a matter incapable of exact definition. But, though no man can draw a ſtroke between the confines of day and night, yet light and darkneſs are upon the whole tolerably diſtinguiſhable. Nor will it be impoſſible for a prince to find out ſuch a mode of government, and ſuch perſons to adminiſter it, as will give a great degree of content to his people; without any curious and anxious reſearch for that abſtract, univerſal, perfect harmony, which while he is ſeeking, he abandons thoſe means of ordinary tranquillity which are in his power without any reſearch at all.

It is not more the duty than it is the intereſt of a prince, to aim at giving tranquillity to his government. But thoſe who adviſe him may have an intereſt in diſorder and confuſion. If the opinion of the people is againſt them, they will naturally

rally wiſh that it ſhould have no prevalence. Here it is that the people muſt on their part ſhew themſelves ſenſible of their own value. Their whole importance, in the firſt inſtance, and afterwards their whole freedom, is at ſtake. Their freedom cannot long ſurvive their importance. Here it is that the natural ſtrength of the kingdom, the great peers, the leading landed gentlemen, the opulent merchants and manufacturers, the ſubſtantial yeomanry, muſt interpoſe, to reſcue their prince, themſelves, and their poſterity.

We are at preſent at iſſue upon this point. We are in the great criſis of this contention; and the part which men take one way or other, will ſerve to diſcriminate their characters and their principles. Until the matter is decided, the country will remain in its preſent confuſion. For while a ſyſtem of adminiſtration is attempted, entirely repugnant to the genius of the people, and not conformable to the plan of their government, every thing muſt neceſſarily be diſordered for a time, until this ſyſtem deſtroys the conſtitution, or the conſtitution gets the better of this ſyſtem.

There is, in my opinion, a peculiar venom and malignity in this political diſtemper beyond any that I have heard or read of. In former times the projectors of arbitrary government attacked only the liberties of their country; a deſign ſurely miſchievous enough to have ſatisfied a mind of the moſt

moſt unruly ambition. But a ſyſtem unfavourable to freedom may be ſo formed, as conſiderably to exalt the grandeur of the ſtate; and men may find in the pride and ſplendor of that proſperity ſome ſort of conſolation for the loſs of their ſolid privileges. Indeed the increaſe of the power of the ſtate has often been urged by artful men, as a pretext for ſome abridgement of the publick liberty. But the ſcheme of the junto under conſideration, not only ſtrikes a palſy into every nerve of our free conſtitution, but in the ſame degree benumbs and ſtupifies the whole executive power; rendering government in all its grand operations languid, uncertain, ineffective; making miniſters fearful of attempting, and incapable of executing, any uſeful plan of domeſtick arrangement, or of foreign politicks. It tends to produce neither the ſecurity of a free government, nor the energy of a monarchy that is abſolute. Accordingly the crown has dwindled away, in proportion to the unnatural and turgid growth of this excreſcence on the court.

The interior miniſtry are ſenſible, that war is a ſituation which ſets in its full light the value of the hearts of a people; and they well know, that the beginning of the importance of the people muſt be the end of theirs. For this reaſon they diſcover upon all occaſions the utmoſt fear of every thing, which by poſſibility may lead to ſuch an event. I do not mean that they manifeſt any of that

that pious fear which is backward to commit the ſafety of the country to the dubious experiment of war. Such a fear, being the tender ſenſation of virtue, excited, as it is regulated, by reaſon, frequently ſhews itſelf in a ſeaſonable boldneſs, which keeps danger at a diſtance, by ſeeming to deſpiſe it. Their fear betrays to the firſt glance of the eye, its true cauſe, and its real object. Foreign powers, confident in the knowledge of their character, have not ſcrupled to violate the moſt ſolemn treaties; and, in defiance of them, to make conqueſts in the midſt of a general peace, and in the heart of Europe. Such was the conqueſt of Corſica, by the profeſſed enemies of the freedom of mankind, in defiance of thoſe who were formerly its profeſſed defenders. We have had juſt claims upon the ſame powers; rights which ought to have been ſacred to them as well as to us, as they had their origin in our lenity and generoſity towards France and Spain in the day of their great humiliation. Such I call the ranſom of Manilla, and the demand on France for the Eaſt India priſoners. But theſe powers put a juſt confidence in their reſource of the *double cabinet*. Theſe demands (one of them at leaſt) are haſtening faſt towards an acquittal by preſcription. Oblivion begins to ſpread her cobwebs over all our ſpirited remonſtrances. Some of the moſt valuable branches of our trade are alſo on the point of periſhing from

from the ſame cauſe. I do not mean thoſe branches which bear without the hand of the vine-dreſſer; I mean thoſe which the policy of treaties had formerly ſecured to us; I mean to mark and diſtinguiſh the trade of Portugal, the loſs of which, and the power of the cabal, have one and the ſame æra.

If, by any chance, the miniſters who ſtand before the curtain poſſeſs or affect any ſpirit, it makes little or no impreſſion. Foreign courts and miniſters, who were among the firſt to diſcover and to profit by this invention of the *double cabinet*, attend very little to their remonſtrances. They know that thoſe ſhadows of miniſters have nothing to do in the ultimate diſpoſal of things. Jealouſies and animoſities are ſedulouſly nouriſhed in the outward adminiſtration, and have been even conſidered as a *cauſa ſine qua non* in its conſtitution: thence foreign courts have a certainty, that nothing can be done by common counſel in this nation. If one of thoſe miniſters officially takes up a buſineſs with ſpirit, it ſerves only the better to ſignalize the meanneſs of the reſt, and the diſcord of them all. His colleagues in office are in haſte to ſhake him off, and to diſclaim the whole of his proceedings. Of this nature was that aſtoniſhing tranſaction, in which Lord Rochford, our ambaſſador at Paris, remonſtrated againſt the attempt upon Corſica, in conſequence of a direct authority

from Lord Shelburne. This remonſtrance the French miniſter treated with the contempt that was natural; as he was aſſured, from the ambaſſador of his court to ours, that theſe orders of Lord Shelburne were not ſupported by the reſt of the (I had like to have ſaid Britiſh) adminiſtration. Lord Rochford, a man of ſpirit, could not endure this ſituation. The conſequences were, however, curious. He returns from Paris, and comes home full of anger. Lord Shelburne, who gave the orders, is obliged to give up the ſeals. Lord Rochford, who obeyed theſe orders, receives them. He goes, however, into another department of the ſame office, that he might not be obliged officially to acquieſce in one ſituation under what he had officially remonſtrated againſt in another. At Paris, the Duke of Choiſeul conſidered this office arrangement as a compliment to him: here it was ſpoke of as an attention to the delicacy of Lord Rochford. But whether the compliment was to one or both, to this nation it was the ſame. By this tranſaction the condition of our court lay expoſed in all its nakedneſs. Our office correſpondence has loſt all pretence to authenticity; Britiſh policy is brought into deriſion in thoſe nations, that a while ago trembled at the power of our arms, whilſt they looked up with confidence to the equity, firmneſs, and candour, which ſhone in all

our

our negotiations. I repreſent this matter exactly in the light in which it has been univerſally received.

Such has been the aſpect of our foreign politicks, under the influence of a *double cabinet*. With ſuch an arrangement at court, it is impoſſible it ſhould have been otherwiſe. Nor is it poſſible that this ſcheme ſhould have a better effect upon the government of our dependencies, the firſt, the deareſt, and moſt delicate objects, of the interior policy of this empire. The colonies know, that adminiſtration is ſeparated from the court, divided within itſelf, and deteſted by the nation. The *double cabinet* has, in both the parts of it, ſhewn the moſt malignant diſpoſitions towards them, without being able to do them the ſmalleſt miſchief.

They are convinced, by ſufficient experience, that no plan, either of lenity or rigour, can be purſued with uniformity and perſeverance. Therefore they turn their eyes entirely from Great Britain, where they have neither dependence on friendſhip, nor apprehenſion from enmity. They look to themſelves, and their own arrangements. They grow every day into alienation from this country; and whilſt they are becoming diſconnected with our government, we have not the conſolation to find, that they are even friendly in their new independence. Nothing can equal the futility, the weakneſs, the raſhneſs, the timidity, the per-

petual contradiction, in the management of our affairs in that part of the world. A volume might be written on this melancholy ſubject; but it were better to leave it entirely to the reflexions of the reader himſelf than not to treat it in the extent it deſerves.

In what manner our domeſtick œconomy is affected by this ſyſtem, it is needleſs to explain. It is the perpetual ſubject of their own complaints.

The court party reſolve the whole into faction. Having ſaid ſomething before upon this ſubject, I ſhall only obſerve here, that when they give this account of the prevalence of faction, they preſent no very favourable aſpect of the confidence of the people in their own government. They may be aſſured, that however they amuſe themſelves with a variety of projects for ſubſtituting ſomething elſe in the place of that great and only foundation of government, the confidence of the people, every attempt will but make their condition worſe. When men imagine that their food is only a cover for poiſon, and when they neither love nor truſt the hand that ſerves it, it is not the name of the roaſt beef of Old England, that will perſuade them to ſit down to the table that is ſpread for them. When the people conceive that laws, and tribunals, and even popular aſſemblies, are perverted from the ends of their inſtitution, they find in thoſe names of degenerated eſtabliſhments only new motives

tives to diſcontent. Thoſe bodies, which, when full of life and beauty, lay in their arms, and were their joy and comfort, when dead and putrid, become but the more loathſome from remembrance of former endearments. A ſullen gloom, and furious diſorder, prevail by fits; the nation loſes its reliſh for peace and proſperity, as it did in that ſeaſon of fulneſs which opened our troubles in the time of Charles the Firſt. A ſpecies of men to whom a ſtate of order would become a ſentence of obſcurity, are nouriſhed into a dangerous magnitude by the heat of inteſtine diſturbances; and it is no wonder that, by a ſort of ſiniſter piety, they cheriſh, in their turn, the diſorders which are the parents of all their conſequence. Superficial obſervers conſider ſuch perſons as the cauſe of the publick uneaſineſs, when, in truth, they are nothing more than the effect of it. Good men look upon this diſtracted ſcene with ſorrow and indignation. Their hands are tied behind them. They are deſpoiled of all the power which might enable them to reconcile the ſtrength of government with the rights of the people. They ſtand in a moſt diſtreſſing alternative. But in the election among evils they hope better things from temporary confuſion, than from eſtabliſhed ſervitude. In the mean time, the voice of law is not to be heard. Fierce licentiouſneſs begets violent reſtraints. The military arm is the ſole reliance; and then, call

your conſtitution what you pleaſe, it is the ſword that governs. The civil power, like every other that calls in the aid of an ally ſtronger than itſelf, periſhes by the aſſiſtance it receives. But the contrivers of this ſcheme of government will not truſt ſolely to the military power; becauſe they are cunning men. Their reſtleſs and crooked ſpirit drives them to rake in the dirt of every kind of expedient. Unable to rule the multitude, they endeavour to raiſe diviſions amongſt them. One mob is hired to deſtroy another; a procedure which at once encourages the boldneſs of the populace, and juſtly increaſes their diſcontent. Men become penſioners of ſtate on account of their abilities in the array of riot, and the diſcipline of confuſion. Government is put under the diſgraceful neceſſity of protecting from the ſeverity of the laws that very licentiouſneſs, which the laws had been before violated to repreſs. Every thing partakes of the original diſorder. Anarchy predominates without freedom, and ſervitude without ſubmiſſion or ſubordination. Theſe are the conſequences inevitable to our publick peace, from the ſcheme of rendering the executory government at once odious and feeble; of freeing adminiſtration from the conſtitutional and ſalutary controul of parliament, and inventing for it a *new controul*, unknown to the conſtitution, an *interior cabinet*; which brings the whole body of government into confuſion and contempt.

After

After having ſtated, as ſhortly as I am able, the effects of this ſyſtem on our foreign affairs, on the policy of our government with regard to our dependencies, and on the interior œconomy of the commonwealth; there remains only, in this part of my deſign, to ſay ſomething of the grand principle which firſt recommended this ſyſtem at court. The pretence was, to prevent the king from being enſlaved by a faction, and made a priſoner in his cloſet. This ſcheme might have been expected to anſwer at leaſt its own end, and to indemnify the king, in his perſonal capacity, for all the confuſion into which it has thrown his government. But has it in reality anſwered this purpoſe? I am ſure, if it had, every affectionate ſubject would have one motive for enduring with patience all the evils which attend it.

In order to come at the truth in this matter, it may not be amiſs to conſider it ſomewhat in detail. I ſpeak here of the king, and not of the crown; the intereſts of which we have already touched. Independent of that greatneſs which a king poſſeſſes merely by being a repreſentative of the national dignity, the things in which he may have an individual intereſt ſeem to be theſe;—wealth accumulated; wealth ſpent in magnificence, pleaſure, or beneficence; perſonal reſpect and attention; and above all, private eaſe and repoſe of mind. Theſe compoſe the inventory of proſperous circumſtances,

cumſtances, whether they regard a prince or a ſubject; their enjoyments differing only in the ſcale upon which they are formed.

Suppoſe then we were to aſk, whether the king has been richer than his predeceſſors in accumulated wealth, ſince the eſtabliſhment of the plan of favouritiſm? I believe it will be found that the picture of royal indigence which our court has preſented until this year, has been truly humiliating. Nor has it been relieved from this unſeemly diſtreſs, but by means which have hazarded the affection of the people, and ſhaken their confidence in parliament. If the publick treaſures had been exhauſted in magnificence and ſplendour, this diſtreſs would have been accounted for, and in ſome meaſure juſtified. Nothing would be more unworthy of this nation, than with a mean and mechanical rule, to mete out the ſplendour of the crown. Indeed I have found very few perſons diſpoſed to ſo ungenerous a procedure. But the generality of people, it muſt be confeſſed, do feel a good deal mortified, when they compare the wants of the court with its expences. They do not behold the cauſe of this diſtreſs in any part of the apparatus of royal magnificence. In all this, they ſee nothing but the operations of parſimony, attended with all the conſequences of profuſion. Nothing expended, nothing ſaved. Their wonder is increaſed by their knowledge, that beſides the

revenue

revenue ſettled on his majeſty's civil liſt to the amount of 800,000*l.* a year, he has a farther aid, from a large penſion liſt, near 90,000*l.* a year, in Ireland, from the produce of the dutchy of Lancaſter (which we are told has been greatly improved); from the revenue of the dutchy of Cornwall; from the American quit-rents; from the four and a half *per cent.* duty in the Leeward Iſlands; this laſt worth to be ſure conſiderably more than 40,000*l.* a year. The whole is certainly not much ſhort of a million annually.

Theſe are revenues within the knowledge and cognizance of our national councils. We have no direct right to examine into the receipts from his majeſty's German dominions, and the biſhoprick of Oſnabrug. This is unqueſtionably true. But that which is not within the province of parliament, is yet within the ſphere of every man's own reflexion. If a foreign prince reſided amongſt us, the ſtate of his revenues could not fail of becoming the ſubject of our ſpeculation. Filled with an anxious concern for whatever regards the welfare of our ſovereign, it is impoſſible, in conſidering the miſerable circumſtances into which he has been brought, that this obvious topick ſhould be entirely paſſed over. There is an opinion univerſal, that theſe revenues produce ſomething not inconſiderable, clear of all charges and eſtabliſhments. This produce the people do not believe to be hoarded,

hoarded, nor perceive to be ſpent. It is accounted for in the only manner it can, by ſuppoſing that it is drawn away, for the ſupport of that court faction, which, whilſt it diſtreſſes the nation, impoveriſhes the prince in every one of his reſources. I once more caution the reader, that I do not urge this conſideration concerning the foreign revenue, as if I ſuppoſed we had a direct right to examine into the expenditure of any part of it; but ſolely for the purpoſe of ſhewing how little this ſyſtem of favouritiſm has been advantageous to the monarch himſelf; which, without magnificence, has ſunk him into a ſtate of unnatural poverty; at the ſame time that he poſſeſſed every means of affluence, from ample revenues, both in this country, and in other parts of his dominions.

Has this ſyſtem provided better for the treatment becoming his high and ſacred character, and ſecured the king from thoſe diſguſts attached to the neceſſity of employing men who are not perſonally agreeable? This is a topick upon which for many reaſons I could wiſh to be ſilent; but the pretence of ſecuring againſt ſuch cauſes of uneaſineſs, is the corner-ſtone of the court party. It has however ſo happened, that if I were to fix upon any one point, in which this ſyſtem has been more particularly and ſhamefully blameable, the effects which it has produced would juſtify me in chooſing for that point its tendency to degrade the perſonal dignity of

of the ſovereign, and to expoſe him to a thouſand contradictions and mortifications. It is but too evident in what manner theſe projectors of royal greatneſs have fulfilled all their magnificent promiſes. Without recapitulating all the circumſtances of the reign, every one of which is more or leſs a melancholy proof of the truth of what I have advanced, let us conſider the language of the court but a few years ago, concerning moſt of the perſons now in the external adminiſtration: let me aſk, whether any enemy to the perſonal feelings of the ſovereign, could poſſibly contrive a keener inſtrument of mortification, and degradation of all dignity, than almoſt every part and member of the preſent arrangement? nor, in the whole courſe of our hiſtory, has any compliance with the will of the people ever been known to extort from any prince a greater contradiction to all his own declared affections and diſlikes than that which is now adopted, in direct oppoſition to every thing the people approve and deſire.

An opinion prevails, that greatneſs has been more than once adviſed to ſubmit to certain condeſcenſions towards individuals, which have been denied to the entreaties of a nation. For the meaneſt and moſt dependent inſtrument of this ſyſtem knows, that there are hours when its exiſtence may depend upon his adherence to it; and he takes his advantage accordingly. Indeed it is a

law

law of nature, that whoever is neceſſary to what we have made our object, is ſure in ſome way, or in ſome time or other, to become our maſter. All this however is ſubmitted to, in order to avoid that monſtrous evil of governing in concurrence with the opinion of the people. For it ſeems to be laid down as a maxim, that a king has ſome ſort of intereſt in giving uneaſineſs to his ſubjects: that all who are pleaſing to them, are to be of courſe diſagreeable to him: that as ſoon as the perſons who are odious at court are known to be odious to the people, it is ſnatched at as a lucky occaſion of ſhowering down upon them all kinds of emoluments and honours. None are conſidered as well-wiſhers to the crown, but thoſe who adviſe to ſome unpopular courſe of action; none capable of ſerving it, but thoſe who are obliged to call at every inſtant upon all its power for the ſafety of their lives. None are ſuppoſed to be fit prieſts in the temple of government, but the perſons who are compelled to fly into it for ſanctuary. Such is the effect of this refined project; ſuch is ever the reſult of all the contrivances which are uſed to free men from the ſervitude of their reaſon, and from the neceſſity of ordering their affairs according to their evident intereſts. Theſe contrivances oblige them to run into a real and ruinous ſervitude, in order to avoid a ſuppoſed reſtraint that might be attended with advantage.

If

If therefore this ſyſtem has ſo ill anſwered its own grand pretence of ſaving the king from the neceſſity of employing perſons diſagreeable to him, has it given more peace and tranquillity to his majeſty's private hours? No, moſt certainly. The father of his people cannot poſſibly enjoy repoſe, while his family is in ſuch a ſtate of diſtraction. Then what has the crown or the king profited by all this fine-wrought ſcheme? Is he more rich, or more ſplendid, or more powerful, or more at his eaſe, by ſo many labours and contrivances? Have they not beggared his exchequer, tarniſhed the ſplendour of his court, ſunk his dignity, galled his feelings, diſcompoſed the whole order and happineſs of his private life?

It will be very hard, I believe, to ſtate in what reſpect the king has profited by that faction which preſumptuouſly chooſe to call themſelves *his friends*.

If particular men had grown into an attachment, by the diſtinguiſhed honour of the ſociety of their ſovereign; and, by being the partakers of his amuſements, came ſometimes to prefer the gratification of his perſonal inclinations to the ſupport of his high character, the thing would be very natural, and it would be excuſable enough. But the pleaſant part of the ſtory is, that theſe *king's friends* have no more ground for uſurping ſuch a title, than a reſident freeholder in Cumberland or in Cornwall. They are only known to their ſove-

reign

reign by kiſſing his hand, for the offices, penſions, and grants, into which they have deceived his benignity. May no ſtorm ever come, which will put the firmneſs of their attachment to the proof; and which, in the midſt of confuſions, and terrors, and ſufferings, may demonſtrate the eternal difference between a true and ſevere friend to the monarchy, and a ſlippery ſycophant of the court! *Quantum infido ſcurræ diſtabit amicus.*

So far I have conſidered the effect of the court ſyſtem, chiefly as it operates upon the executive government, on the temper of the people, and on the happineſs of the ſovereign. It remains, that we ſhould conſider, with a little attention, its operation upon parliament.

Parliament was indeed the great object of all theſe politicks, the end at which they aimed, as well as the inſtrument by which they were to operate. But, before parliament could be made ſubſervient to a ſyſtem, by which it was to be degraded from the dignity of a national council, into a mere member of the court, it muſt be greatly changed from its original character.

In ſpeaking of this body, I have my eye chiefly on the houſe of commons. I hope I ſhall be indulged in a few obſervations on the nature and character of that aſſembly; not with regard to its *legal form and power*, but to its *ſpirit*, and to the purpoſes it is meant to anſwer in the conſtitution.

The

The houſe of commons was ſuppoſed originally to be *no part of the ſtanding government of this country*. It was conſidered as a *controul*, iſſuing *immediately* from the people, and ſpeedily to be reſolved into the maſs from whence it aroſe. In this reſpect it was in the higher part of government what juries are in the lower. The capacity of a magiſtrate being tranſitory, and that of a citizen permanent, the latter capacity it was hoped would of courſe preponderate in all diſcuſſions, not only between the people and the ſtanding authority of the crown, but between the people and the fleeting authority of the houſe of commons itſelf. It was hoped that, being of a middle nature between ſubject and government, they would feel with a more tender and a nearer intereſt every thing that concerned the people, than the other remoter and more permanent parts of legiſlature.

Whatever alterations time and the neceſſary accommodation of buſineſs may have introduced, this character can never be ſuſtained, unleſs the houſe of commons ſhall be made to bear ſome ſtamp of the actual diſpoſition of the people at large. It would (among publick misfortunes) be an evil more natural and tolerable, that the houſe of commons ſhould be infected with every epidemical phrenſy of the people, as this would indicate ſome conſanguinity, ſome ſympathy of nature with their conſtituents, than that they ſhould in all caſes be wholly

wholly untouched by the opinions and feelings of the people out of doors. By this want of ſympathy they would ceaſe to be an houſe of commons. For it is not the derivation of the power of that houſe from the people, which makes it in a diſtinct ſenſe their repreſentative. The king is the repreſentative of the people; ſo are the lords; ſo are the judges. They all are truſtees for the people, as well as the commons; becauſe no power is given for the ſole ſake of the holder; and although government certainly is an inſtitution of divine authority, yet its forms, and the perſons who adminiſter it, all originate from the people.

A popular origin cannot therefore be the characteriſtical diſtinction of a popular repreſentative. This belongs equally to all parts of government, and in all forms. The virtue, ſpirit, and eſſence of a houſe of commons conſiſts in its being the expreſs image of the feelings of the nation. It was not inſtituted to be a controul *upon* the people, as of late it has been taught, by a doctrine of the moſt pernicious tendency. It was deſigned as a controul *for* the people. Other inſtitutions have been formed for the purpoſe of checking popular exceſſes; and they are, I apprehend, fully adequate to their object. If not, they ought to be made ſo. The houſe of commons, as it was never intended for the ſupport of peace and ſubordination, is miſerably appointed for that ſervice; having no

ſtronger

ſtronger weapon than its mace, and no better officer than its ſerjeant at arms, which it can command of its own proper authority. A vigilant and jealous eye over executory and judicial magiſtracy; an anxious care of publick money, an openneſs, approaching towards facility, to publick complaint: theſe ſeem to be the true characteriſticks of an houſe of commons. But an addreſſing houſe of commons, and a petitioning nation; an houſe of commons full of confidence, when the nation is plunged in deſpair; in the utmoſt harmony with miniſters, whom the people regard with the utmoſt abhorrence; who vote thanks, when the publick opinion calls upon them for impeachments; who are eager to grant, when the general voice demands account; who, in all diſputes between the people and adminiſtration, preſume againſt the people; who puniſh their diſorders, but refuſe even to enquire into the provocations to them; this is an unnatural, a monſtrous ſtate of things in this conſtitution. Such an aſſembly may be a great, wiſe, awful ſenate; but it is not to any popular purpoſe an houſe of commons. This change from an immediate ſtate of procuration and delegation to a courſe of acting as from original power, is the way in which all the popular magiſtracies in the world have been perverted from their purpoſes. It is indeed their greateſt and ſometimes their incurable corruption. For there is a material diſ-

tinction between that corruption by which particular points are carried againſt reaſon, (this is a thing which cannot be prevented by human wiſdom, and is of leſs conſequence) and the corruption of the principle itſelf. For then the evil is not accidental, but ſettled. The diſtemper becomes the natural habit.

For my part, I ſhall be compelled to conclude the principle of parliament to be totally corrupted, and therefore its ends entirely defeated, when I ſee two ſymptoms; firſt, a rule of indiſcriminate ſupport to all miniſters; becauſe this deſtroys the very end of parliament as a controul, and is a general previous ſanction to miſgovernment; and ſecondly, the ſetting up any claims adverſe to the right of free election; for this tends to ſubvert the legal authority by which the houſe of commons ſits.

I know that, ſince the Revolution, along with many dangerous, many uſeful powers of government have been weakened. It is abſolutely neceſſary to have frequent recourſe to the legiſlature. Parliaments muſt therefore ſit every year, and for great part of the year. The dreadful diſorders of frequent elections have alſo neceſſitated a ſeptennial inſtead of a triennial duration. Theſe circumſtances, I mean the conſtant habit of authority, and the unfrequency of elections, have tended very much to draw the houſe of commons towards the

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character of a ſtanding ſenate. It is a diſorder which has ariſen from the cure of greater diſorders; it has ariſen from the extreme difficulty of reconciling liberty under a monarchial government, with external ſtrength and with internal tranquillity.

It is very clear that we cannot free ourſelves entirely from this great inconvenience; but I would not increaſe an evil, becauſe I was not able to remove it; and becauſe it was not in my power to keep the houſe of commons religiouſly true to its firſt principles, I would not argue for carrying it to a total oblivion of them. This has been the great ſcheme of power in our time. They who will not conform their conduct to the publick good, and cannot ſupport it by the prerogative of the crown, have adopted a new plan. They have totally abandoned the ſhattered and old-faſhioned fortreſs of prerogative, and made a lodgement in the ſtrong hold of parliament itſelf. If they have any evil deſign to which there is no ordinary legal power commenſurate, they bring it into parliament. In parliament the whole is executed from the beginning to the end. In parliament the power of obtaining their object is abſolute; and the ſafety in the proceeding perfect; no rules to confine, no after-reckonings to terrify. Parliament cannot with any great propriety puniſh others, for things in which they themſelves have been accomplices.

Thus the controul of parliament upon the executory power is loſt; becauſe parliament is made to partake in every conſiderable act of government. *Impeachment, that great guardian of the purity of the conſtitution, is in danger of being loſt, even to the idea of it.*

By this plan ſeveral important ends are anſwered to the cabal. If the authority of parliament ſupports itſelf, the credit of every act of government which they contrive, is ſaved; but if the act be ſo very odious that the whole ſtrength of parliament is inſufficient to recommend it, then parliament is itſelf diſcredited; and this diſcredit increaſes more and more that indifference to the conſtitution, which it is the conſtant aim of its enemies, by their abuſe of parliamentary powers, to render general among the people. Whenever parliament is perſuaded to aſſume the offices of executive government, it will loſe all the confidence, love, and veneration, which it has ever enjoyed whilſt it was ſuppoſed the *corrective and controul* of the acting powers of the ſtate. This would be the event, though its conduct in ſuch a perverſion of its functions ſhould be tolerably juſt and moderate; but if it ſhould be iniquitous, violent, full of paſſion, and full of faction, it would be conſidered as the moſt intolerable of all the modes of tyranny.

For a conſiderable time this ſeparation of the repreſentatives

preſentatives from their conſtituents went on with a ſilent progreſs; and had thoſe, who conducted the plan for their total ſeparation, been perſons of temper and abilities any way equal to the magnitude of their deſign, the ſucceſs would have been infallible: but by their precipitancy they have laid it open in all its nakedneſs; the nation is alarmed at it: and the event may not be pleaſant to the contrivers of the ſcheme. In the laſt ſeſſion, the corps called the *king's friends* made an hardy attempt all at once, *to alter the right of election itſelf*; to put it into the power of the houſe of commons to diſable any perſon diſagreeable to them from ſitting in parliament, without any other rule than their own pleaſure; to make incapacities, either general for deſcriptions of men, or particular for individuals; and to take into their body, perſons who avowedly had never been choſen by the majority of legal electors, nor agreeably to any known rule of law.

The arguments upon which this claim was founded and combated, are not my buſineſs here. Never has a ſubject been more amply and more learnedly handled, nor upon one ſide in my opinion more ſatisfactorily; they who are not convinced by what is already written would not receive conviction *though one aroſe from the dead.*

I too have thought on this ſubject: but my purpoſe here, is only to conſider it as a part of the fa-

vourite project of government; to obſerve on the motives which led to it; and to trace its political conſequences.

A violent rage for the puniſhment of Mr. Wilkes was the pretence of the whole. This gentleman, by ſetting himſelf ſtrongly in oppoſition to the court cabal, had become at once an object of their perſecution, and of the popular favour. The hatred of the court party purſuing, and the countenance of the people protecting him, it very ſoon became not at all a queſtion on the man, but a trial of ſtrength between the two parties. The advantage of the victory in this particular conteſt was the preſent, but not the only, nor by any means the principal, object. Its operation upon the character of the houſe of commons was the great point in view. The point to be gained by the cabal was this; that a precedent ſhould be eſtabliſhed, tending to ſhew, *That the favour of the people was not ſo ſure a road as the favour of the court even to popular honours and popular truſts.* A ſtrenuous reſiſtance to every appearance of lawleſs power; a ſpirit of independence carried to ſome degree of enthuſiaſm; an inquiſitive character to diſcover, and a bold one to diſplay, every corruption and every error of government; theſe are the qualities which recommend a man to a ſeat in the houſe of commons, in open and merely popular elections. An indolent and ſubmiſſive diſpoſition; a diſpoſition

ſition to think charitably of all the actions of men in power, and to live in a mutual intercourſe of favours with them; an inclination rather to countenance a ſtrong uſe of authority, than to bear any ſort of licentiouſneſs on the part of the people; theſe are unfavourable qualities in an open election for members of parliament.

The inſtinct which carries the people towards the choice of the former, is juſtified by reaſon; becauſe a man of ſuch a character, even in its exorbitances, does not directly contradict the purpoſes of a truſt, the end of which is a controul on power. The latter character, even when it is not in its extreme, will execute this truſt but very imperfectly; and, if deviating to the leaſt exceſs, will certainly fruſtrate inſtead of forwarding the purpoſes of a controul on government. But when the houſe of commons was to be new modelled, this principle was not only to be changed but reverſed. Whilſt any errors committed in ſupport of power were left to the law, with every advantage of favourable conſtruction, of mitigation, and finally of pardon; all exceſſes on the ſide of liberty, or in purſuit of popular favour, or in defence of popular rights and privileges, were not only to be puniſhed by the rigour of the known law, but by a *diſcretionary* proceeding which brought on *the loſs of the popular object itſelf.* Popularity was to be rendered, if not directly penal, at leaſt highly dangerous.

The favour of the people might lead even to a diſqualification of repreſenting them. Their odium might become, ſtrained through the medium of two or three conſtructions, the means of ſitting as the truſtee of all that was dear to them. This is puniſhing the offence in the offending part. Until this time, the opinion of the people, through the power of an aſſembly, ſtill in ſome ſort popular, led to the greateſt honours and emoluments in the gift of the crown. Now the principle is reverſed; and the favour of the court is the only ſure way of obtaining and holding thoſe honours which ought to be in the diſpoſal of the people.

It ſignifies very little how this matter may be quibbled away. Example, the only argument of effect in civil life, demonſtrates the truth of my propoſition. Nothing can alter my opinion concerning the pernicious tendency of this example, until I ſee ſome man for his indiſcretion in the ſupport of power, for his violent and intemperate ſervility, rendered incapable of ſitting in parliament. For as it now ſtands, the fault of overſtraining popular qualities, and, irregularly if you pleaſe, aſſerting popular privileges, has led to diſqualification; the oppoſite fault never has produced the ſlighteſt puniſhment. Reſiſtance to power, has ſhut the door of the houſe of commons to one man; obſequiouſneſs and ſervility, to none.

Not that I would encourage popular diſorder, or

or any diſorder. But I would leave ſuch offences to the law, to be puniſhed in meaſure and proportion. The laws of this country are for the moſt part conſtituted, and wiſely ſo, for the general ends of government, rather than for the preſervation of our particular liberties. Whatever therefore is done in ſupport of liberty, by perſons not in publick truſt, or not acting merely in that truſt, is liable to be more or leſs out of the ordinary courſe of the law; and the law itſelf is ſufficient to animadvert upon it with great ſeverity. Nothing indeed can hinder that ſevere letter from cruſhing us, except the temperaments it may receive from a trial by jury. But if the habit prevails of *going beyond the law*, and ſuperſeding this judicature, of carrying offences, real or ſuppoſed, into the legiſlative bodies, who ſhall eſtabliſh themſelves into *courts of criminal equity* (ſo the *ſtar chamber* has been called by Lord Bacon), all the evils of the *ſtar chamber* are revived. A large and liberal conſtruction in aſcertaining offences, and a diſcretionary power in puniſhing them, is the idea of *criminal equity*; which is in truth a monſter in juriſprudence. It ſignifies nothing whether a court for this purpoſe be a committee of council, or an houſe of commons, or an houſe of lords; the liberty of the ſubject will be equally ſubverted by it. The true end and purpoſe of that houſe of parliament

parliament which entertains ſuch a juriſdiction will be deſtroyed by it.

I will not believe, what no other man living believes, that Mr. Wilkes was puniſhed for the indecency of his publications, or the impiety of his ranſacked cloſet. If he had fallen in a common ſlaughter of libellers and blaſphemers, I could well believe that nothing more was meant than was pretended. But when I ſee that, for years together, full as impious, and perhaps more dangerous writings to religion and virtue and order, have not been puniſhed, nor their authors diſcountenanced; that the moſt audacious libels on royal majeſty have paſſed without notice; that the moſt treaſonable invectives againſt the laws, liberties, and conſtitution of the country, have not met with the ſlighteſt animadverſion; I muſt conſider this as a ſhocking and ſhameleſs pretence. Never did an envenomed ſcurrility againſt every thing ſacred and civil, publick and private, rage through the kingdom with ſuch a furious and unbridled licence. All this while the peace of the nation muſt be ſhaken, to ruin one libeller, and to tear from the populace a ſingle favourite.

Nor is it that vice merely ſkulks in an obſcure and contemptible impunity. Does not the publick behold with indignation, perſons not only generally ſcandalous in their lives, but the identical perſons

perſons who, by their ſociety, their inſtruction, their example, their encouragement, have drawn this man into the very faults which have furniſhed the cabal with a pretence for his perſecution, loaded with every kind of favour, honour, and diſtinction, which a court can beſtow? Add but the crime of ſervility (the *fœdum crimen ſervitutis*) to every other crime, and the whole maſs is immediately tranſmuted into virtue, and becomes the juſt ſubject of reward and honour. When therefore I reflect upon this method purſued by the cabal in diſtributing rewards and puniſhments, I muſt conclude that Mr. Wilkes is the object of perſecution, not on account of what he has done in common with others who are the objects of reward, but for that in which he differs from many of them: that he is purſued for the ſpirited diſpoſitions which are blended with his vices; for his unconquerable firmneſs, for his reſolute, indefatigable, ſtrenuous reſiſtance againſt oppreſſion.

In this caſe, therefore, it was not the man that was to be puniſhed, nor his faults that were to be diſcountenanced. Oppoſition to acts of power was to be marked by a kind of civil proſcription. The popularity which ſhould ariſe from ſuch an oppoſition was to be ſhewn unable to protect it. The qualities by which court is made to the people, were to render every fault inexpiable, and every error irretrievable. The qualities by which court is made

made to power, were to cover and to ſanctify every thing. He that will have a ſure and honourable ſeat in the houſe of commons, muſt take care how he adventures to cultivate popular qualities; otherwiſe he may remember the old maxim, *Breves et infauſtos populi Romani amores*. If, therefore, a purſuit of popularity expoſe a man to greater dangers than a diſpoſition to ſervility, the principle which is the life and ſoul of popular elections will periſh out of the conſtitution.

It behoves the people of England to conſider how the houſe of commons, under the operation of theſe examples muſt of neceſſity be conſtituted. On the ſide of the court will be, all honours, offices, emoluments; every ſort of perſonal gratification to avarice or vanity; and what is of more moment to moſt gentlemen, the means of growing, by innumerable petty ſervices to individuals, into a ſpreading intereſt in their country. On the other hand, let us ſuppoſe a perſon unconnected with the court, and in oppoſition to its ſyſtem. For his own perſon, no office, or emolument, or title; no promotion eccleſiaſtical, or civil, or military, or naval, for children, or brothers, or kindred. In vain an expiring intereſt in a borough calls for offices, or ſmall livings, for the children of mayors, and aldermen, and capital burgeſſes. His court rival has them all. He can do an infinite number of acts of generoſity and kindneſs, and

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even of publick ſpirit. He can procure indemnity from quarters. He can procure advantages in trade. He can get pardons for offences. He can obtain a thouſand favours, and avert a thouſand evils. He may, while he betrays every valuable intereſt of the kingdom, be a benefactor, a patron, a father, a guardian angel, to his borough. The unfortunate independent member has nothing to offer, but harſh refuſal, or pitiful excuſe, or deſpondent repreſentation of an hopeleſs intereſt. Except from his private fortune, in which he may be equalled, perhaps exceeded, by his court competitor, he has no way of ſhewing any one good quality, or of making a ſingle friend. In the houſe, he votes for ever in a diſpirited minority. If he ſpeaks, the doors are locked. A body of loquacious place-men go out to tell the world, that all he aims at, is to get into office. If he has not the talent of elocution, which is the caſe of many as wiſe and knowing men as any in the houſe, he is liable to all theſe inconveniencies, without the eclat which attends upon any tolerably ſucceſsful exertion of eloquence. Can we conceive a more diſcouraging poſt of duty than this? Strip it of the poor reward of popularity; ſuffer even the exceſſes committed in defence of the popular intereſt, to become a ground for the majority of that houſe to form a diſqualification out of the line of the law, and at their pleaſure, attended not only with the

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loſs of the franchiſe, but with every kind of perſonal diſgrace.—If this ſhall happen, the people of this kingdom may be aſſured that they cannot be firmly or faithfully ſerved by any man. It is out of the nature of men and things that they ſhould; and their preſumption will be equal to their folly, if they expect it. The power of the people, within the laws, muſt ſhew itſelf ſufficient to protect every repreſentative in the animated performance of his duty, or that duty cannot be performed. The houſe of commons can never be a controul on other parts of government unleſs they are controuled themſelves by their conſtituents; and unleſs theſe conſtituents poſſeſs ſome right in the choice of that houſe, which it is not in the power of that houſe to take away. If they ſuffer this power of arbitrary incapacitation to ſtand, they have utterly perverted every other power of the houſe of commons. The late proceeding, I will not ſay, *is* contrary to law; it *muſt* be ſo; for the power which is claimed cannot, by any poſſibility, be a legal power in any limited member of government.

The power which they claim, of declaring incapacities, would not be above the juſt claims of a final judicature, if they had not laid it down as a leading principle, that they had no rule in the exerciſe of this claim, but their own *diſcretion*. Not one of their abettors has ever undertaken to aſſign

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the principle of unfitneſs, the ſpecies or degree of delinquency, on which the houſe of commons will expel, nor the mode of proceeding upon it, nor the evidence upon which it is eſtabliſhed. The direct conſequence of which is, that the firſt franchiſe of an Engliſhman, and that on which all the reſt vitally depend, is to be forfeited for ſome offence which no man knows, and which is to be proved by no known rule whatſoever of legal evidence. This is ſo anomalous to our whole conſtitution, that I will venture to ſay, the moſt trivial right which the ſubject claims, never was, nor can be, forfeited in ſuch a manner.

The whole of their uſurpation is eſtabliſhed upon this method of arguing. We do not *make* laws. No; we do not contend for this power. We only *declare* law; and, as we are a tribunal both competent and ſupreme, what we declare to be law becomes law, although it ſhould not have been ſo before. Thus the circumſtance of having no *appeal* from their juriſdiction is made to imply that they have no *rule* in the exerciſe of it; the judgment does not derive its validity from its conformity to the law; but prepoſterouſly the law is made to attend on the judgment; and the rule of the judgment is no other than the *occaſional will of the houſe*. An arbitrary diſcretion leads, legality follows; which is juſt the very nature and deſcription of a legiſlative act.

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This claim in their hands was no barren theory. It was purfued into its utmoſt conſequences; and a dangerous principle has begot a correſpondent practice. A ſyſtematick ſpirit has been ſhewn upon both ſides. The electors of Middleſex choſe a perſon whom the houſe of commons had voted incapable; and the houſe of commons has taken in a member whom the electors of Middleſex had not choſen. By a conſtruction on that legiſlative power which had been aſſumed, they declared that the true legal ſenſe of the county was contained in the minority, on that occaſion; and might, on a reſiſtance to a vote of incapacity, be contained in any minority.

When any conſtruction of law goes againſt the ſpirit of the privilege it was meant to ſupport, it is a vicious conſtruction. It is material to us to be repreſented really and *bona fide*, and not in forms, in types, and ſhadows, and fictions of law. The right of election was not eſtabliſhed merely as a *matter of form*, to ſatisfy ſome method and rule of technical reaſoning; it was not a principle which might ſubſtitute a *Titius* or a *Maevius*, a *John Doe* or *Richard Roe*, in the place of a man ſpecially choſen; not a principle which was juſt as well ſatisfied with one man as with another. It is a right, the effect of which is to give to the people, that man, and *that man only*, whom by their voices, actually, not conſtructively given, they declare that

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they know, eſteem, love, and truſt. This right is a matter within their own power of judging and feeling; not an *ens rationis* and creature of law: nor can thoſe devices, by which any thing elſe is ſubſtituted in the place of ſuch an actual choice, anſwer in the leaſt degree the end of repreſentation.

I know that the courts of law have made as ſtrained conſtructions in other caſes. Such is the conſtruction in common recoveries. The method of conſtruction which in that caſe gives to the perſons in remainder, for their ſecurity and repreſentative, the door-keeper, cryer, or ſweeper of the court, or ſome other ſhadowy being without ſubſtance or effect, is a fiction of a very coarſe texture. This was however ſuffered, by the acquieſcence of the whole kingdom, for ages, becauſe the evaſion of the old ſtatute of Weſtminſter, which authoriſed perpetuities, had more ſenſe and utility than the law which was evaded. But an attempt to turn the right of election into ſuch a farce and mockery as a fictitious fine and recovery, will, I hope, have another fate; becauſe the laws which give it are infinitely dear to us, and the evaſion is infinitely contemptible.

The people indeed have been told, that this power of diſcretionary diſqualification is veſted in hands that they may truſt, and who will be ſure not to abuſe it to their prejudice. Until I find ſomething in this argument differing from that on

which every mode of deſpotiſm has been defended, I ſhall not be inclined to pay it any great compliment. The people are ſatisfied to truſt themſelves with the exerciſe of their own privileges, and do not deſire this kind intervention of the houſe of commons to free them from the burthen. They are certainly in the right. They ought not to truſt the houſe of commons with a power over their franchiſes: becauſe the conſtitution, which placed two other co-ordinate powers to controul it, repoſed no ſuch confidence in that body. It were a folly well deſerving ſervitude for its puniſhment, to be full of confidence where the laws are full of diſtruſt; and to give to an houſe of commons, arrogating to its ſole reſolution the moſt harſh and odious part of legiſlative authority, that degree of ſubmiſſion which is due only to the legiſlature itſelf.

When the houſe of commons, in an endeavour to obtain new advantages at the expence of the other orders of the ſtate, for the benefit of the *commons at large*, have purſued ſtrong meaſures; if it were not juſt, it was at leaſt natural, that the conſtituents ſhould connive at all their proceedings; becauſe we were ourſelves ultimately to profit. But when this ſubmiſſion is urged to us, in a conteſt between the repreſentatives and ourſelves, and where nothing can be put into their ſcale which is not taken from ours, they fancy us to be

children

children when they tell us they are our repre-ſentatives, our own fleſh and blood, and that all the ſtripes they give us are for our good. The very deſire of that body to have ſuch a truſt contrary to law repoſed in them, ſhews that they are not worthy of it. They certainly will abuſe it; becauſe all men poſſeſſed of an uncontrouled diſcretionary power leading to the aggrandiſement and profit of their own body have always abuſed it: and I ſee no particular ſanctity in our times, that is at all likely, by a miraculous operation, to overrule the courſe of nature.

But we muſt purpoſely ſhut our eyes, if we conſider this matter merely as a conteſt between the houſe of commons and the electors. The true conteſt is between the electors of the kingdom and the crown; the crown acting by an inſtrumental houſe of commons. It is preciſely the ſame, whether the miniſters of the crown can diſqualify by a dependent houſe of commons, or by a dependent court of *ſtar chamber*, or by a dependent court of king's bench. If once members of parliament can be practically convinced, that they do not depend on the affection or opinion of the people for their political being, they will give themſelves over, without even an appearance of reſerve, to the influence of the court.

Indeed, a parliament unconnected with the people, is eſſential to a miniſtry unconnected with the

people; and therefore thoſe who ſaw through what mighty difficulties the interior miniſtry waded, and the exterior were dragged, in this buſineſs, will conceive of what prodigious importance, the new corps of *king's men* held this principle of occaſional and perſonal incapacitation, to the whole body of their deſign.

When the houſe of commons was thus made to conſider itſelf as the maſter of its conſtituents, there wanted but one thing to ſecure that houſe againſt all poſſible future deviation towards popularity; an *unlimited* fund of money to be laid out according to the pleaſure of the court.

To complete the ſcheme of bringing our court to a reſemblance to the neighbouring monarchies, it was neceſſary, in effect, to deſtroy thoſe appropriations of revenue, which ſeem to limit the property, as the other laws had done the powers, of the crown. An opportunity for this purpoſe was taken, upon an application to parliament for payment of the debts of the civil liſt; which in 1769 had amounted to 513,000*l*. Such application had been made upon former occaſions; but to do it in the former manner would by no means anſwer the preſent purpoſe.

Whenever the crown had come to the commons to deſire a ſupply for the diſcharging of debts due on the civil liſt; it was always aſked and granted with one of the three following qualifications; ſometimes

ſometimes with all of them. Either it was ſtated, that the revenue had been diverted from its purpoſes by parliament; or that thoſe duties had fallen ſhort of the ſum for which they were given by parliament, and that the intention of the legiſlature had not been fulfilled; or that the money required to diſcharge the civil liſt debt, was to be raiſed chargeable on the civil liſt duties. In the reign of Queen Anne, the crown was found in debt. The leſſening and granting away ſome part of her revenue by parliament was alledged as the cauſe of that debt, and pleaded as an equitable ground, ſuch it certainly was, for diſcharging it. It does not appear that the duties which were then applied to the ordinary government produced clear above 580,000*l.* a year; becauſe, when they were afterwards granted to George the Firſt, 120,000*l.* was added, to complete the whole to 700,000*l.* a year. Indeed it was then aſſerted, and, I have no doubt, truly, that for many years the net produce did not amount to above 550,000*l.* The Queen's extraordinary charges were beſides very conſiderable; equal, at leaſt, to any we have known in our time. The application to parliament was not for an abſolute grant of money; but to empower the Queen to raiſe it by borrowing upon the civil liſt funds.

The civil liſt debt was twice paid in the reign of George the Firſt. The money was granted

upon the ſame plan which had been followed in the reign of Queen Anne. The civil liſt revenues were then mortgaged for the ſum to be raiſed, and ſtood charged with the ranſom of their own deliverance.

George the Second received an addition to his civil liſt. Duties were granted for the purpoſe of raiſing 800,000*l.* a year. It was not until he had reigned nineteen years, and after the laſt rebellion, that he called upon parliament for a diſcharge of the civil liſt debt. The extraordinary charges brought on by the rebellion, account fully for the neceſſities of the crown. However, the extraordinary charges of government were not thought a ground fit to be relied on.

A deficiency of the civil liſt duties for ſeveral years before, was ſtated as the principal, if not the ſole, ground on which an application to parliament could be juſtified. About this time the produce of theſe duties had fallen pretty low; and even upon an average of the whole reign they never produced 800,000*l.* a year clear to the treaſury.

That prince reigned fourteen years afterwards: not only no new demands were made; but with ſo much good order were his revenues and expences regulated, that, although many parts of the eſtabliſhment of the court were upon a larger and more liberal ſcale than they have been ſince, there

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was a conſiderable ſum in hand, on his deceaſe, amounting to about 170,000*l.* applicable to the ſervice of the civil liſt of his preſent majeſty. So that, if this reign commenced with a greater charge than uſual, there was enough, and more than enough, abundantly to ſupply all the extraordinary expence. That the civil liſt ſhould have been exceeded in the two former reigns, eſpecially in the reign of George the Firſt, was not at all ſurprizing. His revenue was but 700,000*l.* annually; if it ever produced ſo much clear. The prodigious and dangerous diſaffection to the very being of the eſtabliſhment, and the cauſe of a pretender then powerfully abetted from abroad, produced many demands of an extraordinary nature both abroad and at home. Much management and great expences were neceſſary. But the throne of no prince has ſtood upon more unſhaken foundations than that of his preſent majeſty.

To have exceeded the ſum given for the civil liſt, and to have incurred a debt without ſpecial authority of parliament, was, *prima facie*, a criminal act: as ſuch, miniſters ought naturally rather to have withdrawn it from the inſpection, than to have expoſed it to the ſcrutiny, of parliament. Certainly they ought, of themſelves, officially to have come armed with every ſort of argument, which, by explaining, could excuſe, a matter in itſelf

ſelf of preſumptive guilt. But the terrors of the houſe of commons are no longer for miniſters.

On the other hand, the peculiar character of the houſe of commons, as truſtee of the publick purſe, would have led them to call with a punctilious ſolicitude for every publick account, and to have examined into them with the moſt rigorous accuracy.

The capital uſe of an account is, that the reality of the charge, the reaſon of incurring it, and the juſtice and neceſſity of diſcharging it, ſhould all appear antecedent to the payment. No man ever pays firſt, and calls for his account afterwards; becauſe he would thereby let out of his hands the principal, and indeed only effectual, means of compelling a full and fair one. But, in national buſineſs, there is an additional reaſon for a previous production of every account. It is a check, perhaps the only one, upon a corrupt and prodigal uſe of publick money. An account after payment is to no rational purpoſe an account. However, the houſe of commons thought all theſe to be antiquated principles; they were of opinion, that the moſt parliamentary way of proceeding was, to pay firſt what the court thought proper to demand, and to take its chance for an examination into accounts at ſome time of greater leiſure.

The nation had ſettled 800,000*l.* a year on the crown, as ſufficient for the ſupport of its dignity,

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upon the eſtimate of its own miniſters. When miniſters came to parliament, and ſaid that this allowance had not been ſufficient for the purpoſe, and that they had incurred a debt of 500,000*l.* would it not have been natural for parliament firſt to have aſked, how, and by what means, their appropriated allowance came to be inſufficient? Would it not have ſavoured of ſome attention to juſtice, to have ſeen in what periods of adminiſtration this debt had been originally incurred; that they might diſcover, and, if need were, animadvert on the perſons who were found the moſt culpable? To put their hands upon ſuch articles of expenditure as they thought improper or exceſſive, and to ſecure, in future, againſt ſuch miſapplication or exceeding? Accounts for any other purpoſes are but a matter of curioſity, and no genuine parliamentary object. All the accounts which could anſwer any parliamentary end were refuſed, or poſtponed by previous queſtions. Every idea of prevention was rejected, as conveying an improper ſuſpicion of the miniſters of the crown.

When every leading account had been refuſed, many others were granted with ſufficient facility.

But with great candour alſo, the houſe was informed, that hardly any of them could be ready until the next ſeſſion; ſome of them perhaps not ſo ſoon. But, in order firmly to eſtabliſh the precedent of *payment previous to account*, and to form

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it into a ſettled rule of the houſe, the god in the machine was brought down, nothing leſs than the wonder-working *law of parliament*. It was alledged, that it is the law of parliament, when any demand comes from the crown, that the houſe muſt go immediately into the committee of ſupply; in which committee it was allowed, that the production and examination of accounts would be quite proper and regular. It was therefore carried, that they ſhould go into the committee without delay, and without accounts, in order to examine with great order and regularity things that could not poſſibly come before them. After this ſtroke of orderly and parliamentary wit and humour, they went into the committee; and very generouſly voted the payment.

There was a circumſtance in that debate too remarkable to be overlooked. This debt of the civil liſt was all along argued upon the ſame footing as a debt of the ſtate, contracted upon national authority. Its payment was urged as equally preſſing upon the publick faith and honour: and when the whole year's account was ſtated, in what is called *the budget*, the miniſtry valued themſelves on the payment of ſo much publick debt, juſt as if they had diſcharged 500,000*l.* of navy or exchequer bills. Though, in truth, their payment, from the ſinking fund, of debt which was never contracted by parliamentary authority, was, to all intents

intents and purpoſes, ſo much debt incurred. But ſuch is the preſent notion of publick credit, and payment of debt. No wonder that it produces ſuch effects.

Nor was the houſe at all more attentive to a provident ſecurity againſt future, than it had been to a vindictive retroſpect to paſt, miſmanagements. I ſhould have thought indeed that a miniſterial promiſe, during their own continuance in office, might have been given, though this would have been but a poor ſecurity for the publick. Mr. Pelham gave ſuch an aſſurance, and he kept his word. But nothing was capable of extorting from our miniſters any thing which had the leaſt reſemblance to a promiſe of confining the expences of the civil liſt within the limits which had been ſettled by parliament. This reſerve of theirs I look upon to be equivalent to the cleareſt declaration, that they were reſolved upon a contrary courſe.

However, to put the matter beyond all doubt, in the ſpeech from the throne, after thanking parliament for the relief ſo liberally granted, the miniſters inform the two houſes, that they will *endeavour* to confine the expences of the civil government—within what limits, think you? thoſe which the law had preſcribed? Not in the leaſt—"ſuch limits as the *honour of the crown* can poſ-"ſibly admit."

Thus they eſtabliſhed an *arbitrary* ſtandard for that

that dignity which parliament had defined and limited to a *legal* ſtandard. They gave themſelves, under the lax and indeterminate idea of the *honour of the crown*, a full looſe for all manner of diſſipation, and all manner of corruption. This arbitrary ſtandard they were not afraid to hold out to both houſes; while an idle and unoperative act of parliament, eſtimating the dignity of the crown at 800,000*l.* and confining it to that ſum, adds to the number of obſolete ſtatutes which load the ſhelves of libraries without any ſort of advantage to the people.

After this proceeding, I ſuppoſe that no man can be ſo weak as to think that the crown is limited to any ſettled allowance whatſoever. For if the miniſtry has 800,000*l.* a year by the law of the land; and if by the law of parliament all the debts which exceed it are to be paid previous to the production of any account; I preſume that this is equivalent to an income with no other limits than the abilities of the ſubject and the moderation of the court; that is to ſay, it is ſuch an income as is poſſeſſed by every abſolute monarch in Europe. It amounts, as a perſon of great ability ſaid in the debate, to an unlimited power of drawing upon the ſinking fund. Its effect on the publick credit of this kingdom muſt be obvious; for in vain is the ſinking fund the great buttreſs of all the reſt, if it be in the power of the miniſtry to

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reſort to it for the payment of any debts which they may chooſe to incur, under the name of the civil liſt, and through the medium of a committee, which thinks itſelf obliged by law to vote ſupplies without any other account than that of the mere exiſtence of the debt.

Five hundred thouſand pounds is a ſerious ſum. But it is nothing to the prolifick principle upon which the ſum was voted: a principle that may be well called, *the fruitful mother of an hundred more.* Neither is the damage to publick credit of very great conſequence, when compared with that which reſults to publick morals and to the ſafety of the conſtitution, from the exhauſtleſs mine of corruption opened by the precedent, and to be wrought by the principle, of the late payment of the debts of the civil liſt. The power of diſcretionary diſqualification by one law of parliament, and the neceſſity of paying every debt of the civil liſt by another law of parliament, if ſuffered to paſs unnoticed, muſt eſtabliſh ſuch a fund of rewards and terrors as will make parliament the beſt appendage and ſupport of arbitrary power that ever was invented by the wit of man. This is felt. The quarrel is begun between the repreſentatives and the people. The court faction have at length committed them.

In ſuch a ſtrait the wiſeſt may well be perplexed, and the boldeſt ſtaggered. The circumſtances are

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in a great meaſure new. We have hardly any land-marks from the wiſdom of our anceſtors, to guide us. At beſt we can only follow the ſpirit of their proceeding in other caſes. I know the diligence with which my obſervations on our publick diſorders have been made; I am very ſure of the integrity of the motives on which they are publiſhed: I cannot be equally confident in any plan for the abſolute cure of thoſe diſorders, or for their certain future prevention. My aim is to bring this matter into more publick diſcuſſion. Let the ſagacity of others work upon it. It is not uncommon for medical writers to deſcribe hiſtories of diſeaſes very accurately, on whoſe cure they can ſay but very little.

The firſt ideas which generally ſuggeſt themſelves, for the cure of parliamentary diſorders, are, to ſhorten the duration of parliaments; and to diſqualify all, or a great number of placemen, from a ſeat in the houſe of commons. Whatever efficacy there may be in thoſe remedies, I am ſure in the preſent ſtate of things it is impoſſible to apply them. A reſtoration of the right of free election is a preliminary indiſpenſable to every other reformation. What alterations ought afterwards to be made in the conſtitution, is a matter of deep and difficult reſearch.

If I wrote merely to pleaſe the popular palate, it would indeed be as little troubleſome to me as

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to another, to extol theſe remedies, ſo famous in ſpeculation, but to which their greateſt admirers have never attempted ſeriouſly to reſort in practice. I confeſs then, that I have no ſort of reliance upon either a triennial parliament, or a place-bill. With regard to the former, perhaps it might rather ſerve to counteract, than to promote the ends that are propoſed by it. To ſay nothing of the horrible diſorders among the people attending frequent elections, I ſhould be fearful of committing, every three years, the independent gentlemen of the country into a conteſt with the treaſury. It is eaſy to ſee which of the contending parties would be ruined firſt. Whoever has taken a careful view of publick proceedings, ſo as to endeavour to ground his ſpeculations on his experience, muſt have obſerved how prodigiouſly greater the power of miniſtry is in the firſt and laſt ſeſſion of a parliament, than it is in the intermediate period, when members ſit a little firm on their ſeats. The perſons of the greateſt parliamentary experience, with whom I have converſed, did conſtantly, in canvaſſing the fate of queſtions, allow ſomething to the court ſide, upon account of the elections depending or imminent. The evil complained of, if it exiſts in the preſent ſtate of things, would hardly be removed by a triennial parliament: for, unleſs the influence of government in elections can be entirely taken away, the more

more frequently they return, the more they will harraſs private independence; the more generally men will be compelled to fly to the ſettled ſyſtematick intereſt of government, and to the reſources of a boundleſs civil liſt. Certainly ſomething may be done, and ought to be done, towards leſſening that influence in elections; and this will be neceſſary upon a plan either of longer or ſhorter duration of parliament. But nothing can ſo perfectly remove the evil, as not to render ſuch contentions, too frequently repeated, utterly ruinous, firſt to independence of fortune, and then to independence of ſpirit. As I am only giving an opinion on this point, and not at all debating it in an adverſe line, I hope I may be excuſed in another obſervation. With great truth I may aver, that I never remember to have talked on this ſubject with any man much converſant with publick buſineſs, who conſidered ſhort parliaments as a real improvement of the conſtitution. Gentlemen, warm in a popular cauſe, are ready enough to attribute all the declarations of ſuch perſons to corrupt motives. But the habit of affairs, if, on one hand, it tends to corrupt the mind, furniſhes it, on the other, with the means of better information. The authority of ſuch perſons will always have ſome weight. It may ſtand upon a par with the ſpeculations of thoſe who are leſs practiſed in buſineſs; and who, with perhaps purer intentions,

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have not ſo effectual means of judging. It is, beſides, an effect of vulgar and puerile malignity to imagine, that every ſtateſman is of courſe corrupt; and that his opinion, upon every conſtitutional point, is ſolely formed upon ſome ſiniſter intereſt.

The next favourite remedy is a place-bill. The ſame principle guides in both; I mean, the opinion which is entertained by many, of the infallibility of laws and regulations, in the cure of publick diſtempers. Without being as unreaſonably doubtful as many are unwiſely confident, I will only ſay, that this alſo is a matter very well worthy of ſerious and mature reflexion. It is not eaſy to foreſee, what the effect would be, of diſconnecting with parliament, the greateſt part of thoſe who hold civil employments, and of ſuch mighty and important bodies as the military and naval eſtabliſhments. It were better, perhaps, that they ſhould have a corrupt intereſt in the forms of the conſtitution, than that they ſhould have none at all. This is a queſtion altogether different from the diſqualification of a particular deſcription of revenue officers from ſeats in parliament; or, perhaps, of all the lower ſorts of them from votes in elections. In the former caſe, only the few are affected; in the latter, only the inconſiderable. But a great official, a great profeſſional, a great military and naval intereſt, all neceſſarily comprehending many people of the firſt weight, ability, wealth, and ſpirit, has

been gradually formed in the kingdom. Theſe new intereſts muſt be let into a ſhare of repreſentation, elſe poſſibly they may be inclined to deſtroy thoſe inſtitutions of which they are not permitted to partake. This is not a thing to be trifled with; nor is it every well-meaning man, that is fit to put his hands to it. Many other ſerious conſiderations occur. I do not open them here, becauſe they are not directly to my purpoſe; propoſing only to give the reader ſome taſte of the difficulties that attend all capital changes in the conſtitution; juſt to hint the uncertainty, to ſay no worſe, of being able to prevent the court, as long as it has the means of influence abundantly in its power, of applying that influence to parliament; and perhaps, if the publick method were precluded, of doing it in ſome worſe and more dangerous method. Underhand and oblique ways would be ſtudied. The ſcience of evaſion, already tolerably underſtood, would then be brought to the greateſt perfection. It is no inconſiderable part of wiſdom, to know how much of an evil ought to be tolerated; leſt, by attempting a degree of purity impracticable in degenerate times and manners, inſtead of cutting off the ſubſiſting ill practices, new corruptions might be produced for the concealment and ſecurity of the old. It were better, undoubtedly, that no influence at all could affect the mind of a member of parliament. But of all modes of influence,

influence, in my opinion, a place under the government is the leaſt diſgraceful to the man who holds it, and by far the moſt ſafe to the country. I would not ſhut out that ſort of influence which is open and viſible, which is connected with the dignity and the ſervice of the ſtate, when it is not in my power to prevent the influence of contracts, of ſubſcriptions, of direct bribery, and thoſe innumerable methods of clandeſtine corruption, which are abundantly in the hands of the court, and which will be applied as long as theſe means of corruption, and the diſpoſition to be corrupted, have exiſtence amongſt us. Our conſtitution ſtands on a nice equipoiſe, with ſteep precipices and deep waters upon all ſides of it. In removing it from a dangerous leaning towards one ſide, there may be a riſque of overſetting it on the other. Every project of a material change in a government ſo complicated as ours, combined at the ſame time with external circumſtances ſtill more complicated, is a matter full of difficulties; in which a conſiderate man will not be too ready to decide; a prudent man too ready to undertake; or an honeſt man too ready to promiſe. They do not reſpect the publick nor themſelves, who engage for more, than they are ſure that they ought to attempt, or that they are able to perform. Theſe are my ſentiments, weak perhaps, but honeſt and unbiaſſed; and ſubmitted entirely to the opinion of grave

men, well affected to the conſtitution of their country, and of experience in what may beſt promote or hurt it.

Indeed, in the ſituation in which we ſtand, with an immenſe revenue, an enormous debt, mighty eſtabliſhments, government itſelf a great banker and a great merchant, I ſee no other way for the preſervation of a decent attention to publick intereſt in the repreſentatives, but *the interpoſition of the body of the people itſelf*, whenever it ſhall appear, by ſome flagrant and notorious act, by ſome capital innovation, that theſe repreſentatives are going to over-leap the fences of the law, and to introduce an arbitrary power. This interpoſition is a moſt unpleaſant remedy. But, if it be a legal remedy, it is intended on ſome occaſion to be uſed; to be uſed then only, when it is evident that nothing elſe can hold the conſtitution to its true principles.

The diſtempers of monarchy were the great ſubjects of apprehenſion and redreſs, in the laſt century; in this, the diſtempers of parliament. It is not in parliament alone that the remedy for parliamentary diſorders can be compleated; hardly indeed can it begin there. Until a confidence in government is re-eſtabliſhed, the people ought to be excited to a more ſtrict and detailed attention to the conduct of their repreſentatives. Standards, for judging more ſyſtematically upon their conduct,

duct, ought to be ſettled in the meetings of counties and corporations. Frequent and correct liſts of the voters in all important queſtions ought to be procured.

By ſuch means ſomething may be done. By ſuch means it may appear who thoſe are, that, by an indiſcriminate ſupport of all adminiſtrations, have totally baniſhed all integrity and confidence out of publick proceedings; have confounded the beſt men with the worſt; and weakened and diſſolved, inſtead of ſtrengthening and compacting, the general frame of government. If any perſon is more concerned for government and order, than for the liberties of his country; even he is equally concerned to put an end to this courſe of indiſcriminate ſupport. It is this blind and undiſtinguiſhing ſupport, that feeds the ſpring of thoſe very diſorders, by which he is frighted into the arms of the faction which contains in itſelf the ſource of all diſorders, by enfeebling all the viſible and regular authority of the ſtate. The diſtemper is increaſed by his injudicious and prepoſterous endeavours, or pretences, for the cure of it.

An exterior adminiſtration, choſen for its impotency, or after it is choſen purpoſely rendered impotent, in order to be rendered ſubſervient, will not be obeyed. The laws themſelves will not be reſpected, when thoſe who execute them are deſpiſed; and they will be deſpiſed, when their power

is not immediate from the crown, or natural in the kingdom. Never were miniſters better ſupported in parliament. Parliamentary ſupport comes and goes with office, totally regardleſs of the man, or the merit. Is government ſtrengthened? It grows weaker and weaker. The popular torrent gains upon it every hour. Let us learn from our experience. It is not ſupport that is wanting to government, but reformation. When miniſtry reſts upon publick opinion, it is not indeed built upon a rock of adamant; it has, however, ſome ſtability. But when it ſtands upon private humour, its ſtructure is of ſtubble, and its foundation is on quickſand. I repeat it again—He that ſupports every adminiſtration, ſubverts all government. The reaſon is this: The whole buſineſs in which a court uſually takes an intereſt goes on at preſent equally well, in whatever hands, whether high or low, wiſe or fooliſh, ſcandalous or reputable; there is nothing therefore to hold it firm to any one body of men, or to any one conſiſtent ſcheme of politicks. Nothing interpoſes, to prevent the full operation of all the caprices and all the paſſions of a court upon the ſervants of the publick. The ſyſtem of adminiſtration is open to continual ſhocks and changes, upon the principles of the meaneſt cabal, and the moſt contemptible intrigue. Nothing can be ſolid and permanent. All good men at length fly with horror from ſuch a ſervice. Men of rank and abi-

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lity, with the ſpirit which ought to animate ſuch men in a free ſtate, while they decline the juriſdiction of dark cabal on their actions and their fortunes, will, for both, chearfully put themſelves upon their country. They will truſt an inquiſitive and diſtinguiſhing parliament; becauſe it does enquire, and does diſtinguiſh. If they act well, they know, that in ſuch a parliament, they will be ſupported againſt any intrigue; if they act ill, they know that no intrigue can protect them. This ſituation, however awful, is honourable. But in one hour, and in the ſelf-ſame aſſembly, without any aſſigned or aſſignable cauſe, to be precipitated from the higheſt authority to the moſt marked neglect, poſſibly into the greateſt peril of life and reputation, is a ſituation full of danger, and deſtitute of honour. It will be ſhunned equally by every man of prudence, and every man of ſpirit.

Such are the conſequences of the diviſion of court from the adminiſtration; and of the diviſion of publick men among themſelves. By the former of theſe, lawful government is undone; by the latter, all oppoſition to lawleſs power is rendered impotent. Government may in a great meaſure be reſtored, if any conſiderable bodies of men have honeſty and reſolution enough never to accept adminiſtration, unleſs this garriſon of *king's men*, which is ſtationed, as in a citadel, to controul and enſlave it, be entirely broken and diſ-

banded, and every work they have thrown up be levelled with the ground. The diſpoſition of publick men to keep this corps together, and to act under it, or to co-operate with it, is a touch-ſtone by which every adminiſtration ought in future to be tried. There has not been one which has not ſufficiently experienced the utter incompatibility of that faction with the publick peace, and with all the ends of good government: ſince, if they oppoſed it, they ſoon loſt every power of ſerving the crown; if they ſubmitted to it, they loſt all the eſteem of their country. Until miniſters give to the publick a full proof of their entire alienation from that ſyſtem, however plauſible their pretences, we may be ſure they are more intent on the emoluments than the duties of office. If they refuſe to give this proof, we know of what ſtuff they are made. In this particular, it ought to be the electors buſineſs to look to their repreſentatives. The electors ought to eſteem it no leſs culpable in their member to give a ſingle vote in parliament to ſuch an adminiſtration, than to take an office under it; to endure it, than to act in it. The notorious infidelity and verſatility of members of parliament, in their opinions of men and things, ought in a particular manner to be conſidered by the electors in the enquiry which is recommended to them. This is one of the principal holdings of that deſtructive ſyſtem, which has endeavoured to unhinge

hinge all the virtuous, honourable, and uſeful connexions in the kingdom.

This cabal has, with great ſucceſs, propagated a doctrine which ſerves for a colour to thoſe acts of treachery; and whilſt it receives any degree of countenance, it will be utterly ſenſeleſs to look for a vigorous oppoſition to the court party. The doctrine is this: That all political connexions are in their nature factious, and as ſuch ought to be diſſipated and deſtroyed; and that the rule for forming adminiſtrations is mere perſonal ability, rated by the judgment of this cabal upon it, and taken by draughts from every diviſion and denomination of publick men. This decree was ſolemnly promulgated by the head of the court corps, the Earl of Bute himſelf, in a ſpeech which he made, in the year 1766, againſt the then adminiſtration, the only adminiſtration which he has ever been known directly and publickly to oppoſe.

It is indeed in no way wonderful, that ſuch perſons ſhould make ſuch declarations. That connexion and faction are equivalent terms, is an opinion which has been carefully inculcated at all times by unconſtitutional ſtateſmen. The reaſon is evident. Whilſt men are linked together, they eaſily and ſpeedily communicate the alarm of any evil deſign. They are enabled to fathom it with common counſel, and to oppoſe it with united ſtrength. Whereas, when they lie diſperſed, without concert, order,

order, or diſcipline, communication is uncertain, counſel difficult, and reſiſtance impracticable. Where men are not acquainted with each other's principles nor experienced in each other's talents, nor at all practiſed in their mutual habitudes and diſpoſitions by joint efforts in buſineſs; no perſonal confidence, no friendſhip, no common intereſt, ſubſiſting among them; it is evidently impoſſible that they can act a publick part with uniformity, perſeverance or efficacy. In a connexion, the moſt inconſiderable man, by adding to the weight of the whole, has his value, and his uſe; out of it, the greateſt talents are wholly unſerviceable to the publick. No man, who is not inflamed by vain-glory into enthuſiaſm, can flatter himſelf that his ſingle, unſupported, deſultory, unſyſtematick endeavours are of power to defeat the ſubtle deſigns and united cabals of ambitious citizens. When bad men combine, the good muſt aſſociate; elſe they will fall, one by one, an unpitied ſacrifice in a contemptible ſtruggle.

It is not enough in a ſituation of truſt in the commonwealth, that a man means well to his country; it is not enough that in his ſingle perſon he never did an evil act, but always voted according to his conſcience, and even harangued againſt every deſign which he apprehended to be prejudicial to the intereſts of his country. This innoxious and ineffectual character, that ſeems formed upon

upon a plan of apology and diſculpation, falls miſerably ſhort of the mark of publick duty. That duty demands and requires, that what is right ſhould not only be made known, but made prevalent; that what is evil ſhould not only be detected, but defeated. When the publick man omits to put himſelf in a ſituation of doing his duty with effect, it is an omiſſion that fruſtrates the purpoſes of his truſt almoſt as much as if he had formally betrayed it. It is ſurely no very rational account of a man's life, that he has always acted right; but has taken ſpecial care, to act in ſuch a manner that his endeavours could not poſſibly be productive of any conſequence.

I do not wonder that the behaviour of many parties ſhould have made perſons of tender and ſcrupulous virtue ſomewhat out of humour with all ſorts of connexion in politicks. I admit that people frequently acquire in ſuch confederacies a narrow, bigotted, and proſcriptive ſpirit; that they are apt to ſink the idea of the general good in this circumſcribed and partial intereſt. But, where duty renders a critical ſituation a neceſſary one, it is our buſineſs to keep free from the evils attendant upon it; and not to fly from the ſituation itſelf. If a fortreſs is ſeated in an unwholeſome air, an officer of the garriſon is obliged to be attentive to his health, but he muſt not deſert his ſtation. Every profeſſion, not excepting the glorious one of a ſoldier,

dier, or the ſacred one of a prieſt, is liable to its own particular vices; which, however, form no argument againſt thoſe ways of life; nor are the vices themſelves inevitable to every individual in thoſe profeſſions. Of ſuch a nature are connexions in politicks; eſſentially neceſſary for the full performance of our publick duty, accidentally liable to degenerate into faction. Commonwealths are made of families, free commonwealths of parties alſo; and we may as well affirm, that our natural regards and ties of blood tend inevitably to make men bad citizens, as that the bonds of our party weaken thoſe by which we are held to our country.

Some legiſlators went ſo far as to make neutrality in party a crime againſt the ſtate. I do not know whether this might not have been rather to overſtrain the principle. Certain it is, the beſt patriots in the greateſt commonwealths have always commended and promoted ſuch connexions. *Idem ſentire de republica*, was with them a principal ground of friendſhip and attachment; nor do I know any other capable of forming firmer, dearer, more pleaſing, more honourable, and more virtuous habitudes. The Romans carried this principle a great way. Even the holding of offices together, the diſpoſition of which aroſe from chance not ſelection, gave riſe to a relation which continued for life. It was called *neceſſitudo ſortis*; and it was looked upon with a ſacred reverence.

Breaches

Breaches of any of these kinds of civil relation were considered as acts of the most distinguished turpitude. The whole people was distributed into political societies, in which they acted in support of such interests in the state as they severally affected. For it was then thought no crime, to endeavour by every honest means to advance to superiority and power those of your own sentiments and opinions. This wise people was far from imagining that those connexions had no tie, and obliged to no duty; but that men might quit them without shame, upon every call of interest. They believed private honour to be the great foundation of publick trust; that friendship was no mean step towards patriotism; that he who, in the common intercourse of life, shewed he regarded somebody besides himself, when he came to act in a publick situation, might probably consult some other interest than his own. Never may we become *plus sages que les sages*, as the French comedian has happily expressed it, wiser than all the wise and good men who have lived before us. It was their wish, to see publick and private virtues, not dissonant and jarring, and mutually destructive, but harmoniously combined, growing out of one another in a noble and orderly gradation, reciprocally supporting and supported. In one of the most fortunate periods of our history this country was governed by a *connexion*; I mean the great connexion

nexion of Whigs in the reign of Queen Anne. They were complimented upon the principle of this connexion by a poet who was in high eſteem with them. Addiſon, who knew their ſentiments, could not praiſe them for what they conſidered as no proper ſubject of commendation. As a poet who knew his buſineſs, he could not applaud them for a thing which in general eſtimation was not highly reputable. Addreſſing himſelf to Britain,

Thy favourites grow not up by fortune's ſport,
Or from the crimes or follies of a court.
On the firm baſis of deſert they riſe,
From long-try'd faith, and friendſhip's holy ties.

The Whigs of thoſe days believed that the only proper method of riſing into power was through hard eſſays of practiſed friendſhip and experimented fidelity. At that time it was not imagined, that patriotiſm was a bloody idol, which required the ſacrifice of children and parents, or deareſt connexions in private life, and of all the virtues that riſe from thoſe relations. They were not of that ingenious paradoxical morality, to imagine that a ſpirit of moderation was properly ſhewn in patiently bearing the ſufferings of your friends; or that diſintereſtedneſs was clearly manifeſted at the expence of other peoples fortune. They believed that no men could act with effect, who did not act

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in concert; that no men could act in concert, who did not act with confidence; that no men could act with confidence, who were not bound together by common opinions, common affections, and common intereſts.

Theſe wiſe men, for ſuch I muſt call Lord Sunderland, Lord Godolphin, Lord Sommers, and Lord Marlborough, were too well principled in theſe maxims upon which the whole fabrick of publick ſtrength is built, to be blown off their ground by the breath of every childiſh talker. They were not afraid that they ſhould be called an ambitious Junto; or that their reſolution to ſtand or fall together ſhould, by placemen, be interpreted into a ſcuffle for places.

Party is a body of men united, for promoting by their joint endeavours the national intereſt, upon ſome particular principle in which they are all agreed. For my part, I find it impoſſible to conceive, that any one believes in his own politicks, or thinks them to be of any weight, who refuſes to adopt the means of having them reduced into practice. It is the buſineſs of the ſpeculative philoſopher to mark the proper ends of government. It is the buſineſs of the politician, who is the philoſopher in action, to find out proper means towards thoſe ends, and to employ them with effect. Therefore every honourable connexion will avow it is their firſt purpoſe, to purſue every juſt method

method to put the men who hold their opinions into such a condition as may enable them to carry their common plans into execution, with all the power and authority of the state. As this power is attached to certain situations, it is their duty to contend for these situations. Without a proscription of others, they are bound to give to their own party the preference in all things; and by no means, for private considerations, to accept any offers of power in which the whole body is not included; nor to suffer themselves to be led, or to be controuled, or to be over-balanced, in office or in council, by those who contradict the very fundamental principles on which their party is formed, and even those upon which every fair connexion must stand. Such a generous contention for power, on such manly and honourable maxims, will easily be distinguished from the mean and interested struggle for place and emolument. The very stile of such persons will serve to discriminate them from those numberless impostors, who have deluded the ignorant with professions incompatible with human practice, and have afterwards incensed them by practices below the level of vulgar rectitude.

It is an advantage to all narrow wisdom and narrow morals, that their maxims have a plausible air; and, on a cursory view, appear equal to first principles. They are light and portable. They

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are as current as copper coin; and about as valuable. They ſerve equally the firſt capacities and the loweſt; and they are, at leaſt, as uſeful to the worſt men as the beſt. Of this ſtamp is the cant of *Not men, but meaſures*; a ſort of charm, by which many people get looſe from every honourable engagement. When I ſee a man acting this deſultory and diſconnected part, with as much detriment to his own fortune as prejudice to the cauſe of any party, I am not perſuaded that he is right; but I am ready to believe he is in earneſt. I reſpect virtue in all its ſituations; even when it is found in the unſuitable company of weakneſs. I lament to ſee qualities, rare and valuable, ſquandered away without any publick utility. But when a gentleman with great viſible emoluments abandons the party in which he has long acted, and tells you, it is becauſe he proceeds upon his own judgment; that he acts on the merits of the ſeveral meaſures as they ariſe; and that he is obliged to follow his own conſcience, and not that of others; he gives reaſons which it is impoſſible to controvert, and diſcovers a character which it is impoſſible to miſtake. What ſhall we think of him who never differed from a certain ſet of men until the moment they loſt their power, and who never agreed with them in a ſingle inſtance afterwards? Would not ſuch a coincidence of intereſt and opinion be rather fortunate? Would it not be

an extraordinary caſt upon the dice, that a man's connexions ſhould degenerate into faction, preciſely at the critical moment when they loſe their power, or he accepts a place? When people deſert their connexions, the deſertion is a manifeſt *fact*, upon which a direct ſimple iſſue lies, triable by plain men. Whether a *meaſure* of government be right or wrong, is *no matter of fact*, but a mere affair of opinion, on which men may, as they do, diſpute and wrangle without end. But whether the individual *thinks* the meaſure right or wrong, is a point at ſtill a greater diſtance from the reach of all human deciſion. It is therefore very convenient to politicians, not to put the judgment of their conduct on overt-acts, cognizable in any ordinary court, but upon ſuch matter as can be triable only in that ſecret tribunal, where they are ſure of being heard with favour, or where at worſt the ſentence will be only private whipping.

I believe the reader would wiſh to find no ſubſtance in a doctrine which has a tendency to deſtroy all teſt of character as deduced from conduct. He will therefore excuſe my adding ſomething more, towards the further clearing up a point, which the great convenience of obſcurity to diſhoneſty has been able to cover with ſome degree of darkneſs and doubt.

In order to throw an odium on political connexion, theſe politicians ſuppoſe it a neceſſary in-

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cident to it, that you are blindly to follow the opinions of your party, when in direct oppoſition to your own clear ideas; a degree of ſervitude that no worthy man could bear the thought of ſubmitting to; and ſuch as, I believe, no connexions (except ſome court factions) ever could be ſo ſenſeleſsly tyrannical as to impoſe. Men thinking freely, will, in particular inſtances, think differently. But ſtill, as the greater part of the meaſures which ariſe in the courſe of publick buſineſs are related to, or dependent on, ſome great *leading general principles in government*, a man muſt be peculiarly unfortunate in the choice of his political company if he does not agree with them at leaſt nine times in ten. If he does not concur in theſe general principles upon which the party is founded, and which neceſſarily draw on a concurrence in their application, he ought from the beginning to have choſen ſome other, more conformable to his opinions. When the queſtion is in its nature doubtful, or not very material, the modeſty which becomes an individual, and (in ſpite of our court moraliſts) that partiality which becomes a well-choſen friendſhip, will frequently bring on an acquieſcence in the general ſentiment. Thus the diſagreement will naturally be rare; it will be only enough to indulge freedom, without violating concord, or diſturbing arrangement. And this is all that ever was required for a character of the greateſt uniformity and ſteadi-

neſs in connexion. How men can proceed without any connexion at all, is to me utterly incomprehenſible. Of what ſort of materials muſt that man be made, how muſt he be tempered and put together, who can ſit whole years in parliament, with five hundred and fifty of his fellow citizens, amidſt the ſtorm of ſuch tempeſtuous paſſions, in the ſharp conflict of ſo many wits, and tempers, and characters, in the agitation of ſuch mighty queſtions, in the diſcuſſion of ſuch vaſt and ponderous intereſts, without ſeeing any one ſort of men, whoſe character, conduct, or diſpoſition, would lead him to aſſociate himſelf with them, to aid and be aided, in any one ſyſtem of publick utility?

I remember an old ſcholaſtick aphoriſm, which ſays, "that the man who lives wholly detached "from others, muſt be either an angel or a devil." When I ſee in any of theſe detached gentlemen of our times the angelick purity, power, and beneficence, I ſhall admit them to be angels. In the mean time we are born only to be men. We ſhall do enough if we form ourſelves to be good ones. It is therefore our buſineſs carefully to cultivate in our minds, to rear to the moſt perfect vigour and maturity, every ſort of generous and honeſt feeling that belongs to our nature. To bring the diſpoſitions that are lovely in private life into the ſervice and conduct of the commonwealth; ſo to be patriots,

triots, as not to forget we are gentlemen. To cultivate friendſhips, and to incur enmities. To have both ſtrong, but both ſelected: in the one, to be placable; in the other, immoveable. To model our principles to our duties and our ſituation. To be fully perſuaded, that all virtue which is impracticable is ſpurious; and rather to run the riſque of falling into faults in a courſe which leads us to act with effect and energy, than to loiter out our days without blame, and without uſe. Publick life is a ſituation of power and energy; he treſpaſſes againſt his duty who ſleeps upon his watch, as well as he that goes over to the enemy.

There is, however, a time for all things. It is not every conjuncture which calls with equal force upon the activity of honeſt men; but critical exigencies now and then ariſe; and I am miſtaken, if this be not one of them. Men will ſee the neceſſity of honeſt combination; but they may ſee it when it is too late. They may embody, when it will be ruinous to themſelves, and of no advantage to the country; when, for want of ſuch a timely union as may enable them to oppoſe in favour of the laws, with the laws on their ſide, they may, at length, find themſelves under the neceſſity of conſpiring, inſtead of conſulting. The law, for which they ſtand, may become a weapon in the hands of its bittereſt enemies; and they will be caſt, at length, into that miſerable alternative, be-

tween ſlavery and civil confuſion, which no good man can look upon without horror; an alternative in which it is impoſſible he ſhould take either part, with a conſcience perfectly at repoſe. To keep that ſituation of guilt and remorſe at the utmoſt diſtance, is, therefore, our firſt obligation. Early activity may prevent late and fruitleſs violence. As yet we work in the light. The ſcheme of the enemies of publick tranquillity has diſarranged, it has not deſtroyed us.

If the reader believes that there really exiſts ſuch a faction as I have deſcribed; a faction ruling by the private inclinations of a court, againſt the general ſenſe of the people; and that this faction, whilſt it purſues a ſcheme for undermining all the foundations of our freedom, weakens (for the preſent at leaſt) all the powers of executory government, rendering us abroad contemptible, and at home diſtracted; he will believe alſo, that nothing but a firm combination of publick men againſt this body, and that, too, ſupported by the hearty concurrence of the people at large, can poſſibly get the better of it. The people will ſee the neceſſity of reſtoring publick men to an attention to the publick opinion, and of reſtoring the conſtitution to its original principles. Above all, they will endeavour to keep the houſe of commons from aſſuming a character which does not belong to it. They will endeavour to keep that houſe, for its exiſtence,

exiſtence, for its powers, and its privileges, as independent of every other, and as dependent upon themſelves, as poſſible. This ſervitude is to an houſe of commons (like obedience to the divine law) "perfect freedom." For if they once quit this natural, rational, and liberal obedience, having deſerted the only proper foundation of their power, they muſt ſeek a ſupport in an abject and unnatural dependence ſomewhere elſe. When, through the medium of this juſt connexion with their conſtituents, the genuine dignity of the houſe of commons is reſtored, it will begin to think of caſting from it, with ſcorn, as badges of ſervility, all the falſe ornaments of illegal power, with which it has been, for ſome time, diſgraced. It will begin to think of its old office of CONTROUL. It will not ſuffer, that laſt of evils, to predominate in the country; men without popular confidence, publick opinion, natural connexion, or mutual truſt, inveſted with all the powers of government.

When they have learned this leſſon themſelves, they will be willing and able to teach the court, that it is the true intereſt of the prince to have but one adminiſtration; and that one compoſed of thoſe who recommend themſelves to their ſovereign through the opinion of their country, and not by their obſequiouſneſs to a favourite. Such men will ſerve their ſovereign with affection and fidelity; becauſe his choice of them, upon ſuch

principles, is a compliment to their virtue. They will be able to ſerve him effectually; becauſe they will add the weight of the country to the force of the executory power. They will be able to ſerve their king with dignity; becauſe they will never abuſe his name to the gratification of their private ſpleen or avarice. This, with allowances for human frailty, may probably be the general character of a miniſtry, which thinks itſelf accountable to the houſe of commons; when the houſe of commons thinks itſelf accountable to its conſtituents. If other ideas ſhould prevail, things muſt remain in their preſent confuſion; until they are hurried into all the rage of civil violence; or until they ſink into the dead repoſe of deſpotiſm.

MR.

MR. BURKE's SPEECH

ON

AMERICAN TAXATION.

1774.

PREFACE.

THE following ſpeech has been much the ſubject of converſation; and the deſire of having it printed was laſt ſummer very general. The means of gratifying the publick curioſity were obligingly furniſhed from the notes of ſome gentlemen, members of the laſt parliament.

This piece has been for ſome months ready for the preſs. But a delicacy, poſſibly over ſcrupulous, has delayed the publication to this time. The friends of adminiſtration have been uſed to attribute a great deal of the oppoſition to their meaſures in America to the writings publiſhed in England. The editor of this ſpeech kept it back, until all the meaſures of government have had their full operation, and can be no longer affected, if ever they could have been affected, by any publication.

Moſt readers will recollect the uncommon pains taken at the beginning of the laſt ſeſſion of the laſt parliament, and indeed during the whole courſe of it, to aſperſe the characters, and decry the meaſures, of thoſe who were ſuppoſed to be friends to America; in order to weaken the effect of their

oppoſition

oppoſition to the acts of rigour then preparing againſt the colonies. The ſpeech contains a full refutation of the charges againſt that party with which Mr. Burke has all along acted. In doing this, he has taken a review of the effects of all the ſchemes which have been ſucceſſively adopted in the government of the plantations. The ſubject is intereſting; the matters of information various, and important; and the publication at this time, the editor hopes, will not be thought unſeaſonable.

SPEECH,

SPEECH, &c.

DURING the laſt ſeſſion of the laſt Parliament, on the 19th of April, 1774, Mr. Roſe Fuller, member for Rye, made the following motion; That an act made in the ſeventh year of the reign of his preſent majeſty, intituled, "An act for "granting certain duties in the Britiſh colonies "and plantations in America; for allowing a "drawback of the duties of cuſtoms upon the ex- "portation from this kingdom of coffee and cocoa "nuts, of the produce of the ſaid colonies or plan- "tations; for diſcontinuing the drawbacks pay- "able on china earthen ware exported to Ame- "rica; and for more effectually preventing the "clandeſtine running of goods in the ſaid colonies "and plantations;" might be read.

And the ſame being read accordingly; he moved, "That this houſe will, upon this day ſeven- "night, reſolve itſelf into a committee of the "whole houſe, to take into conſideration the duty "of *3d. per* pound weight upon tea, payable in all "his majeſty's dominions in America, impoſed by "the ſaid act; and alſo the appropriation of the "ſaid duty."

On

On this latter motion a warm and intereſting debate aroſe, in which Mr. Burke ſpoke as follows:

SIR,

I agree with the honourable gentleman * who ſpoke laſt, that this ſubject is not new in this houſe. Very diſagreeably to this houſe, very unfortunately to this nation, and to the peace and proſperity of this whole empire, no topic has been more familiar to us. For nine long years, ſeſſion after ſeſſion, we have been laſhed round and round this miſerable circle of occaſional arguments and temporary expedients. I am ſure our heads muſt turn, and our ſtomachs nauſeate with them. We have had them in every ſhape; we have looked at them in every point of view. Invention is exhauſted; reaſon is fatigued; experience has given judgment; but obſtinacy is not yet conquered.

The honourable gentleman has made one endeavour more to diverſify the form of this diſguſting argument. He has thrown out a ſpeech compoſed almoſt entirely of challenges. Challenges are ſerious things; and as he is a man of prudence as well as reſolution, I dare ſay he has very well weighed thoſe challenges before he delivered them. I had long the happineſs to ſit at the ſame ſide of the

* Charles Wolfran Cornwall, Eſq. lately appointed one of the lords of the treaſury.

houſe,

houſe, and to agree with the honourable gentleman on all the American queſtions. My ſentiments, I am ſure, are well known to him; and I thought I had been perfectly acquainted with his. Though I find myſelf miſtaken, he will ſtill permit me to uſe the privilege of an old friendſhip, he will permit me to apply myſelf to the houſe under the ſanction of his authority; and, on the various grounds he has meaſured out, to ſubmit to you the poor opinions which I have formed, upon a matter of importance enough to demand the fulleſt conſideration I could beſtow upon it.

He has ſtated to the houſe two grounds of deliberation; one narrow and ſimple, and merely confined to the queſtion on your paper: the other more large and more complicated; comprehending the whole ſeries of the parliamentary proceedings with regard to America, their cauſes, and their conſequences. With regard to the latter ground, he ſtates it as uſeleſs, and thinks it may be even dangerous, to enter into ſo extenſive a field of enquiry. Yet, to my ſurprize, he had hardly laid down this reſtrictive propoſition, to which his authority would have given ſo much weight, when directly, and with the ſame authority, he condemns it; and declares it abſolutely neceſſary to enter into the moſt ample hiſtorical detail. His zeal has thrown him a little out of his uſual accuracy. In this perplexity what ſhall we do, Sir, who are willing to ſubmit to the law he gives us? He has reprobated

probated in one part of his ſpeech the rule he had laid down for debate in the other; and, after narrowing the ground for all thoſe who are to ſpeak after him, he takes an excurſion himſelf, as unbounded as the ſubject and the extent of his great abilities.

Sir, When I cannot obey all his laws, I will do the beſt I can. I will endeavour to obey ſuch of them as have the ſanction of his example; and to ſtick to that rule, which, though not conſiſtent with the other, is the moſt rational. He was certainly in the right when he took the matter largely. I cannot prevail on myſelf to agree with him in his cenſure of his own conduct. It is not, he will give me leave to ſay, either uſeleſs or dangerous. He aſſerts, that retroſpect is not wiſe; and the proper, the only proper, ſubject of enquiry is, "not how we got into this difficulty, but how we "are to get out of it." In other words, we are, according to him, to conſult our invention, and to reject our experience. The mode of deliberation he recommends is diametrically oppoſite to every rule of reaſon, and every principle of good ſenſe eſtabliſhed amongſt mankind. For, that ſenſe and that reaſon, I have always underſtood, abſolutely to preſcribe, whenever we are involved in difficulties from the meaſures we have purſued, that we ſhould take a ſtrict review of thoſe meaſures, in order to correct our errors if they ſhould be corrigible; or at leaſt to avoid a dull uniformity in miſchief,

miſchief, and the unpitied calamity of being repeatedly caught in the ſame ſnare.

Sir, I will freely follow the honourable gentleman in his hiſtorical diſcuſſion, without the leaſt management for men or meaſures, further than as they ſhall ſeem to me to deſerve it. But before I go into that large conſideration, becauſe I would omit nothing that can give the houſe ſatisfaction, I wiſh to tread the narrow ground to which alone the honourable gentleman, in one part of his ſpeech, has ſo ſtrictly confined us.

He deſires to know, whether, if we were to repeal this tax, agreeably to the propoſition of the honourable gentleman who made the motion, the Americans would not take poſt on this conceſſion, in order to make a new attack on the next body of taxes; and whether they would not call for a repeal of the duty on wine as loudly as they do now for the repeal of the duty on tea? Sir, I can give no ſecurity on this ſubject. But I will do all that I can, and all that can be fairly demanded. To the *experience* which the honourable gentleman reprobates in one inſtant, and reverts to in the next; to that experience, without the leaſt wavering or heſitation on my part, I ſteadily appeal; and would to God there was no other arbiter to decide on the vote with which the houſe is to conclude this day!

When parliament repealed the ſtamp act in the

year 1766, I affirm, firſt, that the Americans did *not* in conſequence of this meaſure call upon you to give up the former parliamentary revenue which ſubſiſted in that country; or even any one of the articles which compoſe it. I affirm alſo, that when, departing from the maxims of that repeal, you revived the ſcheme of taxation, and thereby filled the minds of the coloniſts with new jealouſy, and all ſorts of apprehenſions, then it was that they quarrelled with the old taxes, as well as the new; then it was, and not till then, that they queſtioned all the parts of your legiſlative power; and by the battery of ſuch queſtions have ſhaken the ſolid ſtructure of this empire to its deepeſt foundations.

Of thoſe two propoſitions I ſhall, before I have done, give ſuch convincing, ſuch damning proof, that however the contrary may be whiſpered in circles, or bawled in newſpapers, they never more will dare to raiſe their voices in this houſe. I ſpeak with great confidence. I have reaſon for it. The miniſters are with me. *They* at leaſt are convinced that the repeal of the ſtamp act had not, and that no repeal can have, the conſequences which the honourable gentleman who defends their meaſures is ſo much alarmed at. To their conduct, I refer him for a concluſive anſwer to his objection. I carry my proof irreſiſtibly into the very body of both miniſtry and parliament; not on any general reaſoning growing out of collateral matter, but on the

the conduct of the honourable gentleman's miniſterial friends on the new revenue itſelf.

The act of 1767, which grants this tea duty, ſets forth in its preamble, that it was expedient to raiſe a revenue in America, for the ſupport of the civil government there, as well as for purpoſes ſtill more extenſive. To this ſupport the act aſſigns ſix branches of duties. About two years after this act paſſed, the miniſtry, I mean the preſent miniſtry, thought it expedient to repeal five of the duties, and to leave (for reaſons beſt known to themſelves) only the ſixth ſtanding. Suppoſe any perſon, at the time of that repeal, had thus addreſſed the miniſter,* "Condemning, as you do, the repeal "of the ſtamp act, why do you venture to repeal "the duties upon glaſs, paper, and painters co-"lours? Let your pretence for the repeal be what "it will, are you not thoroughly convinced, that "your conceſſions will produce, not ſatisfaction, "but inſolence in the Americans; and that the "giving up theſe taxes will neceſſitate the giving "up of all the reſt?" This objection was as palpable then as it is now; and it was as good for preſerving the five duties as for retaining the ſixth. Beſides, the miniſter will recollect, that the repeal of the ſtamp act had but juſt preceded his repeal; and the ill policy of that meaſure (had it been ſo

* Lord North, then chancellor of the exchequer.

impolitick as it has been repreſented), and the miſchiefs it produced, were quite recent. Upon the principles therefore of the honourable gentleman, upon the principles of the miniſter himſelf, the miniſter has nothing at all to anſwer. He ſtands condemned by himſelf, and by all his aſſociates old and new, as a deſtroyer, in the firſt truſt of finance, of the revenues; and in the firſt rank of honour, as a betrayer of the dignity of his country.

Moſt men, eſpecially great men, do not always know their well-wiſhers. I come to reſcue that noble lord out of the hands of thoſe he calls his friends; and even out of his own. I will do him the juſtice he is denied at home. He has not been this wicked or imprudent man. He knew that a repeal had no tendency to produce the miſchiefs which give ſo much alarm to his honourable friend. His work was not bad in its principle, but imperfect in its execution; and the motion on your paper preſſes him only to compleat a proper plan, which, by ſome unfortunate and unaccountable error, he had left unfiniſhed.

I hope, Sir, the honourable gentleman who ſpoke laſt, is thoroughly ſatisfied, and ſatisfied out of the proceedings of miniſtry on their own favourite act, that his fears from a repeal are groundleſs. If he is not, I leave him, and the noble lord who ſits by him, to ſettle the matter, as well as they can, together; for if the repeal of American taxes deſtroys

ſtroys all our government in America—He is the man!—and he is the worſt of all the repealers, becauſe he is the laſt.

But I hear it rung continually in my ears, now and formerly,—"the preamble! what will become "of the preamble, if you repeal this tax?"—I am ſorry to be compelled ſo often to expoſe the calamities and diſgraces of parliament. The preamble of this law, ſtanding as it now ſtands, has the lie direct given to it by the proviſionary part of the act; if that can be called proviſionary which makes no proviſion. I ſhould be afraid to expreſs myſelf in this manner, eſpecially in the face of ſuch a formidable array of ability as is now drawn up before me, compoſed of the antient houſehold troops of that ſide of the houſe, and the new recruits from this, if the matter were not clear and indiſputable. Nothing but truth could give me this firmneſs; but plain truth and clear evidence can be beat down by no ability. The clerk will be ſo good as to turn to the act, and to read this favourite preamble:

Whereas it is expedient *that a revenue ſhould be raiſed in your majeſty's dominions in America, for making a more* certain *and* adequate *proviſion for defraying the charge of the* adminiſtration of juſtice, and ſupport of civil government, *in ſuch provinces where it ſhall be found neceſſary*; *and towards* further de-

fraying *the expences of* defending, protecting, and ſecuring the ſaid dominions.

You have heard this pompous performance. Now where is the revenue which is to do all theſe mighty things? Five ſixths repealed—abandoned —ſunk—gone—loſt for ever. Does the poor ſolitary tea duty ſupport the purpoſes of this preamble? Is not the ſupply there ſtated as effectually abandoned as if the tea duty had periſhed in the general wreck? Here, Mr. Speaker, is a precious mockery—a preamble without an act—taxes granted in order to be repealed—and the reaſons of the grant ſtill carefully kept up! This is raiſing a revenue in America! This is preſerving dignity in England! If you repeal this tax in compliance with the motion, I readily admit that you loſe this fair preamble. Eſtimate your loſs in it. The object of the act is gone already; and all you ſuffer is the purging the ſtatute-book of the opprobrium of an empty, abſurd, and falſe recital.

It has been ſaid again and again, that the five taxes were repealed on commercial principles. It is ſo ſaid in the paper in my hand;* a paper which I conſtantly carry about; which I have often uſed, and ſhall often uſe again. What is got by this

* Lord Hillſborough's circular letter to the governors of the colonies concerning the repeal of ſome of the duties laid in the act of 1767.

paltry

paltry pretence of commercial principles I know not; for, if your government in America is deſtroyed by the *repeal of taxes*, it is of no conſequence upon what ideas the repeal is grounded. Repeal this tax too upon commercial principles if you pleaſe. Theſe principles will ſerve as well now as they did formerly. But you know that, either your objection to a repeal from theſe ſuppoſed conſequences has no validity, or that this pretence never could remove it. This commercial motive never was believed by any man, either in America, which this letter is meant to ſoothe, or in England, which it is meant to deceive. It was impoſſible it ſhould. Becauſe every man, in the leaſt acquainted with the detail of commerce, muſt know, that ſeveral of the articles on which the tax was repealed were fitter objects of duties than almoſt any other articles that could poſſibly be choſen; without compariſon more ſo, than the tea that was left taxed; as infinitely leſs liable to be eluded by contraband. The tax upon red and white lead was of this nature. You have, in this kingdom, an advantage in lead, that amounts to a monopoly. When you find yourſelf in this ſituation of advantage, you ſometimes venture to tax even your own export. You did ſo, ſoon after the laſt war; when, upon this principle, you ventured to impoſe a duty on coals. In all the articles of American contraband trade, who ever heard of the ſmug-

gling of red lead, and white lead? You might, therefore, well enough, without danger of contraband, and without injury to commerce (if this were the whole conſideration) have taxed theſe commodities. The ſame may be ſaid of glaſs. Beſides, ſome of the things taxed were ſo trivial, that the loſs of the objects themſelves and their utter annihilation out of American commerce, would have been comparatively as nothing. But is the article of tea ſuch an object in the trade of England, as not to be felt, or felt but ſlightly, like white lead, and red led, and painters colours? Tea is an object of far other importance. Tea is perhaps the moſt important object, taking it with its neceſſary connections, of any in the mighty circle of our commerce. If commercial principles had been the true motives to the repeal, or had they been at all attended to, tea would have been the laſt article we ſhould have left taxed for a ſubject of controverſy.

Sir, It is not a pleaſant conſideration; but nothing in the world can read ſo awful and ſo inſtructive a leſſon, as the conduct of miniſtry in this buſineſs, upon the miſchief of not having large and liberal ideas in the management of great affairs. Never have the ſervants of the ſtate looked at the whole of your complicated intereſts in one connected view. They have taken things, by bits and ſcraps, ſome at one time and one pretence, and

ſome

ſome at another, juſt as they preſſed, without any ſort of regard to their relations or dependencies. They never had any kind of ſyſtem, right or wrong; but only invented occaſionally ſome miſerable tale for the day, in order meanly to ſneak out of difficulties, into which they had proudly ſtrutted. And they were put to all theſe ſhifts and devices, full of meanneſs and full of miſchief, in order to pilfer piecemeal a repeal of an act, which they had not the generous courage, when they found and felt their error, honourably and fairly to diſclaim. By ſuch management, by the irreſiſtible operation of feeble councils, ſo paltry a ſum as three-pence in the eyes of a financier, ſo inſignificant an article as tea in the eyes of a philoſopher, have ſhaken the pillars of a commercial empire that circled the whole globe.

Do you forget that, in the very laſt year, you ſtood on the precipice of general bankruptcy? Your danger was indeed great. You were diſtreſſed in the affairs of the Eaſt India company; and you well know what ſort of things are involved in the comprehenſive energy of that ſignificant appellation. I am not called upon to enlarge to you on that danger, which you thought proper yourſelves to aggravate, and to diſplay to the world with all the parade of indiſcreet declamation. The monopoly of the moſt lucrative trades, and the poſſeſſion of imperial revenues, had brought you to the verge

verge of beggary and ruin. Such was your repreſentation—ſuch, in ſome meaſure, was your caſe. The vent of ten millions of pounds of this commodity, now locked up by the operation of an injudicious tax, and rotting in the warehouſes of the company, would have prevented all this diſtreſs, and all that ſeries of deſperate meaſures which you thought yourſelves obliged to take in conſequence of it. America would have furniſhed that vent, which no other part of the world can furniſh but America; where tea is next to a neceſſary of life; and where the demand grows upon the ſupply. I hope our dear-bought Eaſt India committees have done us at leaſt ſo much good, as to let us know, that without a more extenſive ſale of that article our Eaſt India revenues and acquiſitions can have no certain connection with this country. It is through the American trade of tea that your Eaſt India conqueſts are to be prevented from cruſhing you with their burthen. They are ponderous indeed; and they muſt have that great country to lean upon, or they tumble upon your head. It is the ſame folly that has loſt you at once the benefit of the weſt and of the eaſt. This folly has thrown open folding-doors to contraband; and will be the means of giving the profits of the trade of your colonies, to every nation but yourſelves. Never did a people ſuffer ſo much for the empty words of a preamble.

amble. It muſt be given up. For on what principle does it ſtand? This famous revenue ſtands, at this hour, on all the debate, as a deſcription of revenue not as yet known in all the comprehenſive (but too comprehenſive!) vocabulary of finance—*a preambulary tax*. It is indeed a tax of ſophiſtry, a tax of pedantry, a tax of diſputation, a tax of war and rebellion, a tax for any thing but benefit to the impoſers, or ſatisfaction to the ſubject.

Well! but whatever it is, gentlemen will force the coloniſts to take the teas. You will force them? has ſeven years ſtruggle been yet able to force them? O but it ſeems "we are in the right.—The tax is "trifling—in effect it is rather an exoneration than "an impoſition; three-fourths of the duty for-"merly payable on teas exported to America is "taken off; the place of collection is only ſhifted; "inſtead of the retention of a ſhilling from the "draw-back here, it is three-pence cuſtom paid in "America." All this, Sir, is very true. But this is the very folly and miſchief of the act. Incredible as it may ſeem, you know that you have deliberately thrown away a large duty which you held ſecure and quiet in your hands, for the vain hope of getting one three-fourths leſs, through every hazard, through certain litigation, and poſſibly through war.

The manner of proceeding in the duties on paper and glaſs impoſed by the ſame act, was exactly in the

the ſame ſpirit. There are heavy exciſes on thoſe articles when uſed in England. On export, theſe exciſes are drawn back. But inſtead of withholding the draw-back, which might have been done, with eaſe, without charge, without poſſibility of ſmuggling; and inſtead of applying the money (money already in your hands) according to your pleaſure, you began your operations in finance by flinging away your revenue; you allowed the whole draw-back on export, and then you charged the duty (which you had before diſcharged), payable in the colonies; where it was certain the collection would devour it to the bone; if any revenue were ever ſuffered to be collected at all. One ſpirit pervades and animates the whole maſs.

Could any thing be a ſubject of more juſt alarm to America, than to ſee you go out of the plain high road of finance, and give up your moſt certain revenues and your cleareſt intereſt, merely for the ſake of inſulting your colonies? No man ever doubted that the commodity of tea could bear an impoſition of three-pence. But no commodity will bear three-pence, or will bear a penny, when the general feelings of men are irritated, and two millions of people are reſolved not to pay. The feelings of the colonies were formerly the feelings of Great Britain. Theirs were formerly the feelings of Mr. Hampden when called upon for the payment of twenty ſhillings. Would twenty

ſhillings

ſhillings have ruined Mr. Hampden's fortune? No! but the payment of half twenty ſhillings, on the principle it was demanded, would have made him a ſlave. It is the weight of that preamble, of which you are ſo fond, and not the weight of the duty, that the Americans are unable and unwilling to bear.

It is then, Sir, upon the *principle* of this meaſure, and nothing elſe, that we are at iſſue. It is a principle of political expediency. Your act of 1767 aſſerts, that it is expedient to raiſe a revenue in America; your act of 1769, which takes away that revenue, contradicts the act of 1767; and, by ſomething much ſtronger than words, aſſerts, that it is not expedient. It is a reflexion upon your wiſdom to perſiſt in a ſolemn parliamentary declaration of the expediency of any object, for which, at the ſame time, you make no ſort of proviſion. And pray, Sir, let not this circumſtance eſcape you; it is very material; that the preamble of this act, which we wiſh to repeal, is not *declaratory of a right*, as ſome gentlemen ſeem to argue it; it is only a recital of the *expediency* of a certain exerciſe of a right ſuppoſed already to have been aſſerted; an exerciſe you are now contending for by ways and means, which you confeſs, though they were obeyed, to be utterly inſufficient for their purpoſe. You are therefore at this moment in the aukward ſituation of fighting for a phantom;

tom; a quiddity; a thing that wants, not only a ſubſtance, but even a name; for a thing, which is neither abſtract right, nor profitable enjoyment.

They tell you, Sir, that your dignity is tied to it. I know not how it happens, but this dignity of yours is a terrible incumbrance to you; for it has of late been ever at war with your intereſt, your equity, and every idea of your policy. Shew the thing you contend for to be reaſon; ſhew it to be common ſenſe; ſhew it to be the means of attaining ſome uſeful end; and then I am content to allow it what dignity you pleaſe. But what dignity is derived from the perſeverance in abſurdity is more than ever I could diſcern. The honourable gentleman has ſaid well—indeed, in moſt of his *general* obſervations I agree with him—he ſays, that this ſubject does not ſtand as it did formerly. Oh, certainly not! every hour you continue on this ill-choſen ground, your difficulties thicken on you; and therefore my concluſion is, remove from a bad poſition as quickly as you can. The diſgrace, and the neceſſity of yielding, both of them, grow upon you every hour of your delay.

But will you repeal the act, ſays the honourable gentleman, at this inſtant when America is in open reſiſtance to your authority, and that you have juſt revived your ſyſtem of taxation? He thinks he has driven us into a corner. But thus pent up, I

am

am content to meet him; becauſe I enter the liſts ſupported by my old authority, his new friends, the miniſters themſelves. The honourable gentleman remembers, that about five years ago as great diſturbances as the preſent prevailed in America on account of the new taxes. The miniſters repreſented theſe diſturbances as treaſonable; and this houſe thought proper, on that repreſentation, to make a famous addreſs for a revival, and for a new application, of a ſtatute of Henry VIII. We beſought the king, in that well-conſidered addreſs, to enquire into treaſons, and to bring the ſuppoſed traitors from America to Great Britain for trial. His majeſty was pleaſed graciouſly to promiſe a compliance with our requeſt. All the attempts from this ſide of the houſe to reſiſt theſe violences, and to bring about a repeal, were treated with the utmoſt ſcorn. An apprehenſion of the very conſequences now ſtated by the honourable gentleman, was then given as a reaſon for ſhutting the door againſt all hope of ſuch an alteration. And ſo ſtrong was the ſpirit for ſupporting the new taxes, that the ſeſſion concluded with the following remarkable declaration. After ſtating the vigorous meaſures which had been purſued, the ſpeech from the throne proceeds:

You have aſſured me of your firm *ſupport in the* proſecution *of them. Nothing, in my opinion, could be more likely to enable the well diſpoſed among my ſubjects in*

in that part of the world, effectually to diſcourage and defeat the deſigns of the factious and ſeditious, than the hearty concurrence of every branch of the legiſlature, in maintaining the execution of the laws in every *part of my dominions.*

After this no man dreamt that a repeal under this miniſtry could poſſibly take place. The honourable gentleman knows as well as I, that the idea was utterly exploded by thoſe who ſway the houſe. This ſpeech was made on the ninth day of May, 1769. Five days after this ſpeech, that is, on the 13th of the ſame month, the publick circular letter, a part of which I am going to read to you, was written by Lord Hillſborough, ſecretary of ſtate for the colonies. After reciting the ſubſtance of the king's ſpeech, he goes on thus:

" *I can take upon me to aſſure you, notwithſtanding* " *inſinuations to the contrary, from men with* factious " and ſeditious views, *that his majeſty's* preſent ad- " miniſtration have at no time entertained a de- " ſign to propoſe to parliament to lay any further " taxes upon America, for the purpoſe of RAISING " A REVENUE; *and that it is at preſent their in-* " *tention to propoſe, the next ſeſſion of parliament, to* " *take off the duties upon glaſs, paper, and colours, upon* " *conſideration of ſuch duties* having been laid con- " trary to the true principles of commerce.

" *Theſe have* always *been, and* ſtill are, *the ſenti-* " *ments of his* majeſty's preſent ſervants; *and by*

" *which*

" *which their conduct in* reſpect to America has been " governed. *And* his majeſty *relies upon your pru-* " *dence and fidelity for ſuch an explanation of* his *mea-* " *ſures, as may tend to remove the prejudices which* " *have been excited by the miſrepreſentations of thoſe* " *who are enemies to the peace and proſperity of Great* " *Britain and her colonies; and to re-eſtabliſh that* " *mutual* confidence and affection, *upon which the* " *glory and ſafety of the Britiſh empire depend.*"

Here, Sir, is a canonical book of miniſterial ſcripture; the general epiſtle to the Americans. What does the gentleman ſay to it? Here a repeal is promiſed; promiſed without condition; and while your authority was actually reſiſted. I paſs by the publick promiſe of a peer relative to the repeal of taxes by this houſe. I paſs by the uſe of the king's name in a matter of ſupply, that ſacred and reſerved right of the Commons. I conceal the ridiculous figure of parliament, hurling its thunders at the gigantick rebellion of America; and then five days after, proſtrate at the feet of thoſe aſſemblies we affected to deſpiſe; begging them, by the intervention of our miniſterial ſureties, to receive our ſubmiſſion; and heartily promiſing amendment. Theſe might have been ſerious matters formerly; but we are grown wiſer than our fathers. Paſſing, therefore, from the conſtitutional conſideration to the mere policy, does not this letter imply, that the idea of taxing America for the purpoſe of revenue

is an abominable project; when the miniſtry ſuppoſe none but *factious* men, and with ſeditious views could charge them with it? does not this letter adopt and ſanctify the American diſtinction of *taxing for a revenue?* does it not formally reject all future taxation on that principle? does it not ſtate the miniſterial rejection of ſuch principle of taxation, not as the occaſional, but the conſtant opinion of the king's ſervants? does it not ſay (I care not how conſiſtently), but does it not ſay, that their conduct with regard to America has been *always* governed by this policy? It goes a great deal further. Theſe excellent and truſty ſervants of the king, juſtly fearful leſt they themſelves ſhould have loſt all credit with the world, bring out the image of their gracious ſovereign from the inmoſt and moſt ſacred ſhrine, and they pawn him as a ſecurity for their promiſes.—"*His majeſty* relies on "your prudence and fidelity for ſuch an expla- "nation of *his* meaſures." Theſe ſentiments of the miniſter, and theſe meaſures of his majeſty, can only relate to the principle and practice of taxing for a revenue; and accordingly Lord Botetourt, ſtating it as ſuch, did, with great propriety, and in the exact ſpirit of his inſtructions, endeavour to remove the fears of the Virginian aſſembly, leſt the ſentiments, which it ſeems (unknown to the world) had *always* been thoſe of the miniſters, and by which *their* conduct in *reſpect to America had been governed*,

governed, ſhould by ſome poſſible revolution, favourable to wicked American taxers, be hereafter counteracted. He addreſſes them in this manner:

It may poſſibly be objected, that, as his Majeſty's preſent adminiſtration are not immortal, *their ſucceſſors may be inclined to attempt to undo what the preſent miniſters ſhall have attempted to perform; and to that objection I can give but this anſwer; that it is my firm opinion, that the plan I have ſtated to you will certainly take place, and that it will never be departed from; and ſo determined am I for ever to abide by it, that I will be content to be declared infamous, if I do not, to the laſt hour of my life, at all times, in all places, and upon all occaſions, exert every power with which I either am, or ever ſhall be legally inveſted, in order to obtain and* maintain *for the continent of America that* ſatisfaction *which I have been authoriſed to promiſe this day, by the* confidential *ſervants of our gracious ſovereign, who to my certain knowledge rates his honour ſo high*, that he would rather part with his crown, than preſerve it by deceit.*

A glorious

* A material point is omitted by Mr. Burke in this ſpeech, viz. *the manner in which the continent received this royal aſſurance.* The aſſembly of Virginia, in their addreſs in anſwer to lord Botetourt's ſpeech, expreſs themſelves thus: "We will not "ſuffer our preſent hopes, ariſing from the pleaſing proſpect "your lordſhip hath ſo kindly opened and diſplayed to us, to "be daſhed by the bitter reflection that any *future* adminiſtra-"tion will entertain a wiſh to depart from that *plan*, which af-

A glorious and true character! which (ſince we ſuffer his miniſters with impunity to anſwer for his ideas of taxation) we ought to make it our buſineſs to enable his majeſty to preſerve in all its luſtre. Let him have character, ſince ours is no more! Let ſome part of government be kept in reſpect!

This epiſtle was not the letter of lord Hillſborough ſolely; though he held the official pen. It was the letter of the noble lord upon the floor,* and of all the king's then miniſters, who (with I think the exception of two only) are his miniſters at this hour. The very firſt news that a Britiſh parliament heard of what it was to do with the duties which it had given and granted to the king, was by the publication of the votes of American aſſemblies. It was in America that your reſolutions were pre-declared. It was from thence that we knew to a certainty, how much exactly, and not a ſcruple more nor leſs, we were to repeal. We were unworthy to be let into the ſecret of our

" fords the ſureſt and moſt permanent foundation of publick " tranquillity and happineſs: No, my lord, we are ſure *our* " *moſt gracious ſovereign*, under whatever changes may happen " in his confidential ſervants, will remain immutable in the " ways of truth and juſtice, and that he is *incapable of deceiving* " *his faithful ſubjects*; and we eſteem your lordſhip's information " not only as warranted, but even ſanctified *by the royal word.*"

* Lord North.

own

own conduct. The aſſemblies had *confidential* communications from his majeſty's *confidential* ſervants. We were nothing but inſtruments. Do you, after this, wonder, that you have no weight and no reſpect in the colonies? After this, are you ſurprized, that parliament is every day and every where loſing (I feel it with ſorrow, I utter it with reluctance) that reverential affection, which ſo endearing a name of authority ought ever to carry with it; that you are obeyed ſolely from reſpect to the bayonet; and that this houſe, the ground and pillar of freedom, is itſelf held up only by the treacherous under-pinning and clumſy buttreſſes of arbitrary power?

If this dignity, which is to ſtand in the place of juſt policy and common ſenſe, had been conſulted, there was a time for preſerving it, and for reconciling it with any conceſſion. If in the ſeſſion of 1768, that ſeſſion of idle terror and empty menaces, you had, as you were often preſſed to do, repealed theſe taxes; then your ſtrong operations would have come juſtified and enforced, in caſe your conceſſions had been returned by outrages. But, prepoſterouſly, you began with violence; and before terrors could have any effect, either good or bad, your miniſters immediately begged pardon, and promiſed that repeal to the obſtinate Americans which they had refuſed in an eaſy, good-natured, complying Britiſh parliament. The aſ-

ſemblies, which had been publickly and avowedly diſſolved for *their* contumacy, are called together to receive *your* ſubmiſſion. Your miniſterial directors bluſtered like tragick tyrants here; and then went mumping with a ſore leg in America, canting, and whining, and complaining of faction, which repreſented them as friends to a revenue from the colonies. I hope nobody in this houſe will hereafter have the impudence to defend American taxes in the name of miniſtry. The moment they do, with this letter of attorney in my hand, I will tell them, in the authoriſed terms, they are wretches, "with "factious and ſeditious views; enemies to the "peace and proſperity of the mother country and "the colonies," and ſubverters "of the mutual "affection and confidence on which the glory and "ſafety of the Britiſh empire depend."

After this letter, the queſtion is no more on propriety or dignity. They are gone already. The faith of your ſovereign is pledged for the political principle. The general declaration in the letter goes to the whole of it. You muſt therefore either abandon the ſcheme of taxing; or you muſt ſend the miniſters tarred and feathered to America, who dared to hold out the royal faith for a renunciation of all taxes for revenue. Them you muſt puniſh, or this faith you muſt preſerve. The preſervation of this faith is of more conſequence than the duties on *red lead*, or *white lead*,

or

or on broken *glaſs*, or *atlas-ordinary*, or *demy-fine*, or *blue-royal*, or *baſtard*, or *fool's-cap*, which you have given up; or the three-pence on tea which you retained. The letter went ſtampt with the publick authority of this kingdom. The inſtructions for the colony government go under no other ſanction; and America cannot believe, and will not obey you, if you do not preſerve this channel of communication ſacred. You are now puniſhing the colonies for acting on diſtinctions, held out by that very miniſtry which is here ſhining in riches, in favour, and in power; and urging the puniſhment of the very offence to which they had themſelves been the tempters.

Sir, if reaſons reſpecting ſimply your own commerce, which is your own convenience, were the ſole grounds of the repeal of the five duties; why does lord Hillſborough, in diſclaiming in the name of the king and miniſtry their ever having had an intent to tax for revenue, mention it as the means "of re-eſtabliſhing the confidence and af-"fection of the colonies?" Is it a way of ſoothing *others*, to aſſure them that you will take good care of *yourſelf?* The medium, the only medium, for regaining their affection and confidence, is, that you will take off ſomething oppreſſive to their minds. Sir, the letter ſtrongly enforces that idea: for though the repeal of the taxes is promiſed on commercial principles, yet the means of counter-

acting "the inſinuations of men with factious and "ſeditious views," is by a diſclaimer of the intention of taxing for revenue, as a conſtant invariable ſentiment and rule of conduct in the government of America.

I remember that the noble lord on the floor, not in a former debate to be ſure (it would be diſorderly to refer to it, I ſuppoſe I read it ſomewhere), but the noble lord was pleaſed to ſay, that he did not conceive how it could enter into the head of man to impoſe ſuch taxes as thoſe of 1767; I mean thoſe taxes which he voted for impoſing, and voted for repealing; as being taxes, contrary to all the principles of commerce, laid on *Britiſh manufactures.*

I dare ſay the noble lord is perfectly well read, becauſe the duty of his particular office requires he ſhould be ſo, in all our revenue laws; and in the policy which is to be collected out of them. Now, Sir, when he had read this act of American revenue, and a little recovered from his aſtoniſhment, I ſuppoſe he made one ſtep retrograde (it is but one) and looked at the act which ſtands juſt before in the ſtatute book. The American revenue act is the forty-fifth chapter; the other to which I refer is the forty-fourth of the ſame ſeſſion. Theſe two acts are both to the ſame purpoſe; both revenue acts; both taxing out of the kingdom; and both taxing Britiſh manufactures exported. As the 45th

is

is an act for raiſing a revenue in America, the 44th is an act for raiſing a revenue in the Iſle of Man. The two acts perfectly agree in all reſpects, except one. In the act for taxing the Iſle of Man, the noble lord will find (not, as in the American act, four or five articles) but almoſt the *whole body* of Britiſh manufactures, taxed from two and a half to fifteen *per cent.* and ſome articles, ſuch as that of ſpirits, a great deal higher. You did not think it uncommercial to tax the whole maſs of your manufactures, and, let me add, your agriculture too; for, I now recollect, Britiſh corn is there alſo taxed up to ten *per cent.* and this too in the very head-quarters, the very citadel of ſmuggling, the Iſle of Man. Now will the noble lord condeſcend to tell me why he repealed the taxes on your manufactures ſent out to America, and not the taxes on the manufactures exported to the Iſle of Man? The principle was exactly the ſame, the objects charged infinitely more extenſive, the duties without compariſon higher. Why? why, notwithſtanding all his childiſh pretexts, becauſe the taxes were quietly ſubmitted to in the Iſle of Man; and becauſe they raiſed a flame in America. Your reaſons were political, not commercial. The repeal was made, as lord Hillſborough's letter well expreſſes it, to regain "the confidence and affec-"tion of the colonies, on which the glory and "ſafety of the Britiſh empire depend." A wiſe and

and juſt motive ſurely, if ever there was ſuch. But the miſchief and diſhonour is, that you have not done what you had given the colonies juſt cauſe to expect, when your miniſters diſclaimed the idea of taxes for a revenue. There is nothing ſimple, nothing manly, nothing ingenuous, open, deciſive, or ſteady, in the proceeding, with regard either to the continuance or the repeal of the taxes. The whole has an air of littleneſs and fraud. The article of tea is ſlurred over in the circular letter, as it were by accident—nothing is ſaid of a reſolution either to keep that tax, or to give it up. There is no fair dealing in any part of the tranſaction.

If you mean to follow your true motive and your publick faith, give up your tax on tea for raiſing a revenue, the principle of which has, in effect, been diſclaimed in your name; and which produces you no advantage; no, not a penny. Or, if you chooſe to go on with a poor pretence inſtead of a ſolid reaſon, and will ſtill adhere to your cant of commerce, you have ten thouſand times more ſtrong commercial reaſons for giving up this duty on tea, than for abandoning the five others that you have already renounced.

The American conſumption of teas is annually, I believe, worth 300,000l. at the leaſt farthing. If you urge the American violence as a juſtification of your perſeverance in enforcing this tax,

you

you know that you can never anſwer this plain queſtion—Why did you repeal the others given in the ſame act, whilſt the very ſame violence ſubſiſted?—But you did not find the violence ceaſe upon that conceſſion.—No! becauſe the conceſſion was far ſhort of ſatisfying the principle which lord Hillſborough had abjured; or even the pretence on which the repeal of the other taxes was announced: and becauſe, by enabling the Eaſt India company to open a ſhop for defeating the American reſolution not to pay that ſpecifick tax, you manifeſtly ſhewed a hankering after the principle of the act which you formerly had renounced. Whatever road you take leads to a compliance with this motion. It opens to you at the end of every viſto. Your commerce, your policy, your promiſes, your reaſons, your pretences, your conſiſtency, your inconſiſtency—all jointly oblige you to this repeal.

But ſtill it ſticks in our throats, if we go ſo far, the Americans will go farther.—We do not know that. We ought, from experience, rather to preſume the contrary. Do we not know for certain, that the Americans are going on as faſt as poſſible, whilſt we refuſe to gratify them? can they do more, or can they do worſe, if we yield this point? I think this conceſſion will rather fix a turnpike to prevent their further progreſs. It is impoſſible to anſwer for bodies of men. But I am ſure the natural

natural effect of fidelity, clemency, kindneſs in governors, is peace, good-will, order, and eſteem, on the part of the governed. I would certainly, at leaſt, give theſe fair principles a fair trial; which, ſince the making of this act to this hour, they never have had.

Sir, the honourable gentleman having ſpoken what he thought neceſſary upon the narrow part of the ſubject, I have given him, I hope, a ſatisfactory anſwer. He next preſſes me by a variety of direct challenges and oblique reflexions to ſay ſomething on the hiſtorical part. I ſhall therefore, Sir, open myſelf fully on that important and delicate ſubject; not for the ſake of telling you a long ſtory (which, I know, Mr. Speaker, you are not particularly fond of), but for the ſake of the weighty inſtruction that, I flatter myſelf, will neceſſarily reſult from it. It ſhall not be longer, if I can help it, than ſo ſerious a matter requires.

Permit me then, Sir, to lead your attention very far back; back to the act of navigation; the corner-ſtone of the policy of this country with regard to its colonies. Sir, that policy was, from the beginning, purely commercial; and the commercial ſyſtem was wholly reſtrictive. It was the ſyſtem of a monopoly. No trade was let looſe from that conſtraint, but merely to enable the coloniſts to diſpoſe of what, in the courſe of your trade, you could not take; or to enable them to diſpoſe of

ſuch

ſuch articles as we forced upon them, and for which, without ſome degree of liberty, they could not pay. Hence all your ſpecifick and detailed enumerations: hence the innumerable checks and counterchecks: hence that infinite variety of paper chains by which you bind together this complicated ſyſtem of the colonies. This principle of commercial monopoly runs through no leſs than twenty-nine acts of parliament, from the year 1660 to the unfortunate period of 1764.

In all thoſe acts the ſyſtem of commerce is eſtabliſhed, as that, from whence alone you propoſed to make the colonies contribute (I mean directly and by the operation of your ſuperintending legiſlative power) to the ſtrength of the empire. I venture to ſay, that during that whole period, a parliamentary revenue from thence was never once in contemplation. ' Accordingly, in all the number of laws paſſed with regard to the plantations, the words which diſtinguiſh revenue laws, ſpecifically as ſuch, were, I think, premeditately avoided. I do not ſay, Sir, that a form of words alters the nature of the law, or abridges the power of the lawgiver. It certainly does not. However, titles and formal preambles are not always idle words; and the lawyers frequently argue from them. I ſtate theſe facts to ſhew, not what was your right, but what has been your ſettled policy. Our revenue laws have uſually a *title*, purporting their being

being *grants*; and the words *give and grant* usually precede the enacting parts. Although duties were imposed on America in acts of King Charles the Second, and in acts of King William, no one title of giving "an aid to his majesty," or any other of the usual titles to revenue acts, was to be found in any of them till 1764; nor were the words "give and grant" in any preamble until the 6th of George the Second. However the title of this act of George the Second, notwithstanding the words of donation, considers it merely as a regulation of trade, "an act for the better securing of the trade "of his majesty's sugar colonies in America." This act was made on a compromise of all, and at the express desire of a part, of the colonies themselves. It was therefore in some measure with their consent; and having a title directly purporting only a *commercial regulation*, and being in truth nothing more, the words were passed by, at a time when no jealousy was entertained, and things were little scrutinized. Even Governor Bernard, in his second printed letter, dated in 1763, gives it at his opinion, that "it was an act of *prohibition*, not of revenue." This is certainly true, that no act avowedly for the purpose of revenue, and with the ordinary title and recital taken together, is found in the statute book until the year I have mentioned; that is, the year 1764. All before this period stood on commercial regulation and restraint.

ſtraint. The ſcheme of a colony revenue by Britiſh authority appeared therefore to the Americans in the light of a great innovation; the words of Governor Bernard's ninth letter, written in Nov. 1765, ſtate this idea very ſtrongly; "it muſt," ſays he, "have been ſuppoſed, *ſuch an innovation* "*as a parliamentary taxation*, would cauſe a great "*alarm*, and meet with much *oppoſition* in moſt "parts of America; it was *quite new* to the people, "and had no *viſible bounds* ſet to it." After ſtating the weakneſs of government there, he ſays, "was this a time to introduce *ſo great a novelty* as "a parliamentary inland taxation in America?" Whatever the right might have been, this mode of uſing it was abſolutely new in policy and practice.

Sir, they who are friends to the ſchemes of American revenue ſay, that the commercial reſtraint is full as hard a law for America to live under. I think ſo too. I think it, if uncompenſated, to be a condition of as rigorous ſervitude as men can be ſubject to. But America bore it from the fundamental act of navigation until 1764.—Why? Becauſe men do bear the inevitable conſtitution of their original nature with all its infirmities. The act of navigation attended the colonies from their infancy, grew with their growth, and ſtrengthened with their ſtrength. They were confirmed in obedience to it, even more by uſage than by law. They ſcarcely had remembered a time when

when they were not ſubject to ſuch reſtraint. Beſides, they were indemnified for it by a pecuniary compenſation. Their monopoliſt happened to be one of the richeſt men in the world. By his immenſe capital (primarily employed, not for their benefit, but his own) they were enabled to proceed with their fiſheries, their agriculture, their ſhip-building (and their trade too within the limits), in ſuch a manner as got far the ſtart of the ſlow languid operations of unaſſiſted nature. This capital was a hot-bed to them. Nothing in the hiſtory of mankind is like their progreſs. For my part, I never caſt an eye on their flouriſhing commerce, and their cultivated and commodious life, but they ſeem to me rather antient nations grown to perfection through a long ſeries of fortunate events, and a train of ſucceſsful induſtry, accumulating wealth in many centuries, than the colonies of yeſterday; than a ſet of miſerable out-caſts, a few years ago, not ſo much ſent as thrown out, on the bleak and barren ſhore of a deſolate wilderneſs three thouſand miles from all civilized intercourſe.

All this was done by England, whilſt England purſued trade, and forgot revenue. You not only acquired commerce, but you actually created the very objects of trade in America; and by that creation you raiſed the trade of this kingdom at leaſt four-fold. America had the compenſation of

your

your capital, which made her bear her ſervitude. She had another compenſation, which you are now going to take away from her. She had, except the commercial reſtraint, every characteriſtick mark of a free people in all her internal concerns. She had the image of the Britiſh conſtitution. She had the ſubſtance. She was taxed by her own repreſentatives. She choſe moſt of her own magiſtrates. She paid them all. She had in effect the ſole diſpoſal of her own internal government. This whole ſtate of commercial ſervitude and civil liberty, taken together, is certainly not perfect freedom; but comparing it with the ordinary circumſtances of human nature, it was an happy and a liberal condition.

I know, Sir, that great and not unſucceſsful pains have been taken to inflame our minds by an outcry, in this houſe and out of it, that in America the act of navigation neither is, or ever was, obeyed. But if you take the colonies through, I affirm, that its authority never was diſputed; that it was no where diſputed for any length of time; and on the whole, that it was well obſerved. Wherever the act preſſed hard, many individuals indeed evaded it. This is nothing. Theſe ſcattered individuals never denied the law, and never obeyed it. Juſt as it happens whenever the laws of trade, whenever the laws of revenue, preſs hard upon the people in England; in that caſe all

your ſhores are full of contraband. Your right to give a monopoly to the Eaſt India company, your right to lay immenſe duties on French brandy, are not diſputed in England. You do not make this charge on any man. But you know that there is not a creek from Pentland Frith to the Iſle of Wight, in which they do not ſmuggle immenſe quantities of teas, Eaſt India goods, and brandies. I take it for granted, that the authority of Governor Bernard in this point is indiſputable. Speaking of theſe laws, as they regarded that part of America now in ſo unhappy a condition, he ſays, "I believe they are no where better ſupported "than in this province; I do not pretend that it "is entirely free from a breach of theſe laws; but "that ſuch a breach, if diſcovered, is juſtly pu-"niſhed." What more can you ſay of the obedience to any laws in any country? An obedience to theſe laws formed the acknowledgment, inſtituted by yourſelves, for your ſuperiority; and was the payment you originally impoſed for your protection.

Whether you were right or wrong in eſtabliſhing the colonies on the principles of commercial monopoly, rather than on that of revenue, is at this day a problem of mere ſpeculation. You cannot have both by the ſame authority. To join together the reſtraints of an univerſal internal and external monopoly, with an univerſal internal and external

external taxation, is an unnatural union; perfect uncompenſated ſlavery. You have long ſince decided for yourſelf and them; and you and they have proſpered exceedingly under that deciſion.

This nation, Sir, never thought of departing from that choice until the period immediately on the cloſe of the laſt war. Then a ſcheme of government new in many things ſeemed to have been adopted. I ſaw, or thought I ſaw, ſeveral ſymptoms of a great change, whilſt I ſat in your gallery, a good while before I had the honour of a ſeat in this houſe. At that period the neceſſity was eſtabliſhed of keeping up no leſs than twenty new regiments, with twenty colonels capable of ſeats in this houſe. This ſcheme was adopted with very general applauſe from all ſides, at the very time that, by your conqueſts in America, your danger from foreign attempts in that part of the world was much leſſened, or indeed rather quite over. When this huge encreaſe of military eſtabliſhment was reſolved on, a revenue was to be found to ſupport ſo great a burthen. Country gentlemen, the great patrons of œconomy, and the great reſiſters of a ſtanding armed force, would not have entered with much alacrity into the vote for ſo large and ſo expenſive an army, if they had been very ſure that they were to continue to pay for it. But hopes of another kind were held out to them; and in particular, I well remember, that

Mr. Townſhend, in a brilliant harangue on this ſubject, did dazzle them, by playing before their eyes the image of a revenue to be raiſed in America.

Here began to dawn the firſt glimmerings of this new colony ſyſtem. It appeared more diſtinctly afterwards, when it was devolved upon a perſon to whom, on other accounts, this country owes very great obligations. I do believe, that he had a very ſerious deſire to benefit the publick. But with no ſmall ſtudy of the detail, he did not ſeem to have his view, at leaſt equally, carried to the total circuit of our affairs. He generally conſidered his objects in lights that were rather too detached. Whether the buſineſs of an American revenue was impoſed upon him altogether; whether it was entirely the reſult of his own ſpeculation; or, what is more probable, that his own ideas rather coincided with the inſtructions he had received; certain it is, that, with the beſt intentions in the world, he firſt brought this fatal ſcheme into form, and eſtabliſhed it by act of parliament.

No man can believe, that at this time of day I mean to lean on the venerable memory of a great man, whoſe loſs we deplore in common. Our little party-differences have been long ago compoſed; and I have acted more with him, and certainly with more pleaſure with him, than ever I acted againſt him. Undoubtedly Mr. Grenville

was

was a firſt-rate figure in this country. With a maſculine underſtanding, and a ſtout and reſolute heart, he had an application undiſſipated and unwearied. He took publick buſineſs, not as a duty which he was to fulfil, but as a pleaſure he was to enjoy; and he ſeemed to have no delight out of this houſe, except in ſuch things as ſome way related to the buſineſs that was to be done within it. If he was ambitious, I will ſay this for him, his ambition was of a noble and generous ſtrain. It was to raiſe himſelf, not by the low pimping politicks of a court, but to win his way to power, through the laborious gradations of publick ſervice; and to ſecure himſelf a well-earned rank in parliament, by a thorough knowledge of its conſtitution, and a perfect practice in all its buſineſs.

Sir, if ſuch a man fell into errors, it muſt be from defects not intrinſical; they muſt be rather ſought in the particular habits of his life; which, though they do not alter the ground-work of character, yet tinge it with their own hue. He was bred in a profeſſion. He was bred to the law, which is, in my opinion, one of the firſt and nobleſt of human ſciences; a ſcience which does more to quicken and invigorate the underſtanding, than all the other kinds of learning put together; but it is not apt, except in perſons very happily born, to open and to liberalize the mind exactly in the ſame proportion. Paſſing from that ſtudy he did

not go very largely into the world; but plunged into buſineſs; I mean into the buſineſs of office; and the limited and fixed methods and forms eſtabliſhed there. Much knowledge is to be had undoubtedly in that line; and there is no knowledge which is not valuable. But it may be truly ſaid, that men too much converſant in office, are rarely minds of remarkable enlargement. Their habits of office are apt to give them a turn to think the ſubſtance of buſineſs not to be much more important than the forms in which it is conducted. Theſe forms are adapted to ordinary occaſions; and therefore perſons who are nurtured in office do admirably well, as long as things go on in their common order; but when the high roads are broken up, and the waters out, when a new and troubled ſcene is opened, and the file affords no precedent, then it is that a greater knowledge of mankind, and a far more extenſive comprehenſion of things is requiſite than ever office gave, or than office can ever give. Mr. Grenville thought better of the wiſdom and power of human legiſlation than in truth it deſerves. He conceived, and many conceived along with him, that the flouriſhing trade of this country was greatly owing to law and inſtitution, and not quite ſo much to liberty; for but too many are apt to believe regulation to be commerce, and taxes to be revenue. Among regulations, that which ſtood firſt in reputation

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was his idol. I mean the act of navigation. He has often profeſſed it to be ſo. The policy of that act is, I readily admit, in many reſpects well underſtood. But I do ſay, that if the act be ſuffered to run the full length of its principle, and is not changed and modified according to the change of times and the fluctuation of circumſtances, it muſt do great miſchief, and frequently even defeat its own purpoſe.

After the war, and in the laſt years of it, the trade of America had encreaſed far beyond the ſpeculations of the moſt ſanguine imaginations. It ſwelled out on every ſide. It filled all its proper channels to the brim. It overflowed with a rich redundance, and breaking its banks on the right and on the left, it ſpread out upon ſome places, where it was indeed improper, upon others where it was only irregular. It is the nature of all greatneſs not to be exact; and great trade will always be attended with conſiderable abuſes. The contraband will always keep pace in ſome meaſure with the fair trade. It ſhould ſtand as a fundamental maxim, that no vulgar precaution ought to be employed in the cure of evils, which are cloſely connected with the cauſe of our proſperity. Perhaps this great perſon turned his eye ſomewhat leſs than was juſt, towards the incredible increaſe of the fair trade; and looked with ſomething of too exquiſite a jealouſy towards the contraband. He

certainly felt a ſingular degree of anxiety on the ſubject; and even began to act from that paſſion earlier than is commonly imagined. For whilſt he was firſt lord of the admiralty, though not ſtrictly called upon in his official line, he preſented a very ſtrong memorial to the lords of the treaſury (my Lord Bute was then at the head of the board); heavily complaining of the growth of the illicit commerce in America. Some miſchief happened even at that time from this over-earneſt zeal. Much greater happened afterwards when it operated with greater power in the higheſt department of the finances. The bonds of the act of navigation were ſtraitened ſo much, that America was on the point of having no trade, either contraband or legitimate. They found, under the conſtruction and execution then uſed, the act no longer tying but actually ſtrangling them. All this coming with new enumerations of commodities; with regulations which in a manner put a ſtop to the mutual coaſting intercourſe of the colonies; with the appointment of courts of admiralty under various improper circumſtances; with a ſudden extinction of the paper currencies; with a compulſory proviſion for the quartering of ſoldiers; the people of America thought themſelves proceeded againſt as delinquents, or at beſt as people under ſuſpicion of delinquency; and in ſuch a manner, as they imagined, their recent ſervices in the

the war did not at all merit. Any of theſe innumerable regulations, perhaps, would not have alarmed alone; ſome might be thought reaſonable; the multitude ſtruck them with terror.

But the grand manœuvre in that buſineſs of new regulating the colonies, was the 15th act of the fourth of George III; which, beſides containing ſeveral of the matters to which I have juſt alluded, opened a new principle: and here properly began the ſecond period of the policy of this country with regard to the colonies; by which the ſcheme of a regular plantation parliamentary revenue was adopted in theory, and ſettled in practice. A revenue not ſubſtituted in the place of, but ſuperadded to, a monopoly; which monopoly was enforced at the ſame time with additional ſtrictneſs, and the execution put into military hands.

This act, Sir, had for the firſt time the title of "granting duties in the colonies and plantations "of America;" and for the firſt time it was aſſerted in the preamble, "that it was *juſt* and *ne*-"*ceſſary* that a revenue ſhould be raiſed there." Then came the technical words of "giving and "granting" and thus a complete American revenue act was made in all the forms, and with a full avowal of the right, equity, policy, and even neceſſity of taxing the colonies, without any formal conſent of theirs. There are contained alſo in the preamble to that act theſe very remarkable words —the

—the commons, &c.—" being deſirous to make " *ſome* proviſion in the *preſent* ſeſſion of parliament " *towards* raiſing the ſaid revenue." By theſe words it appeared to the colonies, that this act was but a beginning of ſorrows; that every ſeſſion was to produce ſomething of the ſame kind; that we were to go on from day to day, in charging them with ſuch taxes as we pleaſed, for ſuch a military force as we ſhould think proper. Had this plan been purſued, it was evident that the provincial aſſemblies, in which the Americans felt all their portion of importance, and beheld their ſole image of freedom, were *ipſo facto* annihilated. This ill proſpect before them ſeemed to be boundleſs in extent, and endleſs in duration. Sir, they were not miſtaken. The miniſtry valued themſelves when this act paſſed, and when they gave notice of the ſtamp act, that both of the duties came very ſhort of their ideas of American taxation. Great was the applauſe of this meaſure here. In England we cried out for new taxes on America, whilſt they cried out that they were nearly cruſhed with thoſe which the war and their own grants had brought upon them.

Sir, it has been ſaid in the debate, that when the firſt American revenue act (the act in 1764, impoſing the port duties) paſſed, the Americans did not object to the principle. It is true they touched it but very tenderly. It was not a direct attack.

tack. They were, it is true, as yet novices; as yet unaccuſtomed to direct attacks upon any of the rights of parliament. The duties were port duties, like thoſe they had been accuſtomed to bear; with this difference, that the title was not the ſame, the preamble not the ſame, and the ſpirit altogether unlike. But of what ſervice is this obſervation to the cauſe of thoſe that make it? It is a full refutation of the pretence for their preſent cruelty to America; for it ſhews, out of their own mouths, that our colonies were backward to enter into the preſent vexatious and ruinous controverſy.

There is alſo another circulation abroad, (ſpread with a malignant intention, which I cannot attribute to thoſe who ſay the ſame thing in this houſe) that Mr. Grenville gave the colony agents an option for their aſſemblies to tax themſelves, which they had refuſed. I find that much ſtreſs is laid on this, as a fact. However, it happens neither to be true nor poſſible. I will obſerve firſt, that Mr. Grenville never thought fit to make this apology for himſelf in the innumerable debates that were had upon the ſubject. He might have propoſed to the colony agents, that they ſhould agree in ſome mode of taxation as the ground of an act of parliament. But he never could have propoſed that they ſhould tax themſelves on requiſition, which is the aſſertion of the day. Indeed, Mr. Grenville well

well knew, that the colony agents could have no general powers to conſent to it; and they had no time to conſult their aſſemblies for particular powers, before he paſſed his firſt revenue act. If you compare dates, you will find it impoſſible. Burthened as the agents knew the colonies were at that time, they could not give the leaſt hope of ſuch grants. His own favourite governor was of opinion that the Americans were not then taxable objects:

"*Nor was the time leſs favourable to the* equity *of ſuch a taxation. I don't mean to diſpute the reaſonableneſs of America contributing to the charges of Great Britain* when ſhe is able; *nor, I believe, would the Americans themſelves have diſputed it, at a* proper time and ſeaſon. *But it ſhould be conſidered, that the American governments themſelves have, in the proſecution of the late war, contracted very large debts; which it will take ſome years to pay off, and in the mean time occaſion very* burdenſome taxes for that purpoſe *only. For inſtance, this government, which is as much before-hand as any, raiſes every year* 37,500*l. ſterling for ſinking their debt, and muſt continue it for four years longer at leaſt before it will be clear.*"

Theſe are the words of Governor Bernard's letter to a member of the old miniſtry, and which he has ſince printed. Mr. Grenville could not have made this propoſition to the agents, for another reaſon. He was of opinion, which he has declared

clared in this houſe an hundred times, that the colonies could not legally grant any revenue to the crown; and that infinite miſchiefs would be the conſequence of ſuch a power. When Mr. Grenville had paſſed the firſt revenue act, and in the ſame ſeſſion had made this houſe come to a reſolution for laying a ſtamp-duty on America, between that time and the paſſing the ſtamp-act into a law, he told a conſiderable and moſt reſpectable merchant, a member of this houſe, whom I am truly ſorry I do not now ſee in his place, when he repreſented againſt this proceeding, that if the ſtamp-duty was diſliked, he was willing to exchange it for any other equally productive; but that, if he objected to the Americans being taxed by parliament, he might ſave himſelf the trouble of the diſcuſſion, as he was determined on the meaſure. This is the fact, and, if you pleaſe, I will mention a very unqueſtionable authority for it.

Thus, Sir, I have diſpoſed of this falſehood. But falſehood has a perennial ſpring. It is ſaid, that no conjecture could be made of the diſlike of the colonies to the principle. This is as untrue as the other. After the reſolution of the houſe, and before the paſſing of the ſtamp-act, the colonies of Maſſachuſet's Bay and New York did ſend remonſtrances, objecting to this mode of parliamentary taxation. What was the conſequence? They were ſuppreſſed; they were put under the table;

table; notwithſtanding an order of council to the contrary, by the miniſtry which compoſed the very council that had made the order; and thus the houſe proceeded to its buſineſs of taxing without the leaſt regular knowledge of the objections which were made to it. But to give that houſe its due, it was not over deſirous to receive information, or to hear remonſtrance. On the 15th of February 1765, whilſt the ſtamp-act was under deliberation, they refuſed with ſcorn even ſo much as to receive four petitions preſented from ſo reſpectable colonies as Connecticut, Rhode Iſland, Virginia, and Carolina; beſides one from the traders of Jamaica. As to the colonies, they had no alternative left to them, but to diſobey; or to pay the taxes impoſed by that parliament which was not ſuffered, or did not ſuffer itſelf, even to hear them remonſtrate upon the ſubject.

This was the ſtate of the colonies before his majeſty thought fit to change his miniſters. It ſtands upon no authority of mine. It is proved by uncontrovertible records. The honourable gentleman has deſired ſome of us to lay our hands upon our hearts, and anſwer to his queries upon the hiſtorical part of this conſideration; and by his manner (as well as my eyes could diſcern it) he ſeemed to addreſs himſelf to me.

Sir, I will anſwer him as clearly as I am able, and with great openneſs; I have nothing to conceal.

ceal. In the year ſixty-five, being in a very private ſtation, far enough from any line of buſineſs, and not having the honour of a ſeat in this houſe, it was my fortune, unknowing and unknown to the then miniſtry, by the intervention of a common friend, to become connected with a very noble perſon, and at the head of the treaſury department. It was indeed in a ſituation of little rank and no conſequence, ſuitable to the mediocrity of my talents and pretenſions. But a ſituation near enough to enable me to ſee, as well as others, what was going on; and I did ſee in that noble perſon ſuch ſound principles, ſuch an enlargement of mind, ſuch clear and ſagacious ſenſe, and ſuch unſhaken fortitude, as have bound me, as well as others much better than me, by an inviolable attachment to him from that time forward. Sir, Lord Rockingham very early in that ſummer received a ſtrong repreſentation from many weighty Engliſh merchants and manufacturers, from governors of provinces and commanders of men of war, againſt almoſt the whole of the American commercial regulations: and particularly with regard to the total ruin which was threatened to the Spaniſh trade. I believe, Sir, the noble lord ſoon ſaw his way in this buſineſs. But he did not raſhly determine againſt acts which it might be ſuppoſed were the reſult of much deliberation. However, Sir, he ſcarcely began to open the ground, when the

the whole veteran body of office took the alarm. A violent outcry of all (except thoſe who knew and felt the miſchief) was raiſed againſt any alteration. On one hand, his attempt was a direct violation of treaties and publick law.—On the other, the act of navigation and all the corps of trade laws were drawn up in array againſt it.

The firſt ſtep the noble lord took, was to have the opinion of his excellent, learned, and ever lamented friend the late Mr. Yorke, then attorney general, on the point of law. When he knew that formally and officially, which in ſubſtance he had known before, he immediately diſpatched orders to redreſs the grievance. But I will ſay it for the then miniſter, he is of that conſtitution of mind, that I know he would have iſſued, on the ſame critical occaſion, the very ſame orders, if the acts of trade had been, as they were not, directly againſt him; and would have chearfully ſubmitted to the equity of parliament for his indemnity.

On the concluſion of this buſineſs of the Spaniſh trade, the news of the troubles, on account of the ſtamp-act, arrived in England. It was not until the end of October that theſe accounts were received. No ſooner had the ſound of that mighty tempeſt reached us in England, than the whole of the then oppoſition, inſtead of feeling humbled by the unhappy iſſue of their meaſures, ſeemed to be infinitely elated, and cried out, that the miniſtry, from

from envy to the glory of their predeceſſors, were prepared to repeal the ſtamp-act. Near nine years after, the honourable gentleman takes quite oppoſite ground, and now challenges me to put my hand to my heart, and ſay, whether the miniſtry had reſolved on the repeal till a conſiderable time after the meeting of parliament. Though I do not very well know what the honourable gentleman wiſhes to infer from the admiſſion, or from the denial, of this fact, on which he ſo earneſtly adjures me; I do put my hand on my heart, and aſſure him, that they did *not* come to a reſolution directly to repeal. They weighed this matter as its difficulty and importance required. They conſidered maturely among themſelves. They conſulted with all who could give advice or information. It was not determined until a little before the meeting of parliament; but it was determined, and the main lines of their own plan marked out, before that meeting. Two queſtions aroſe (I hope I am not going into a narrative troubleſome to the houſe)

[A cry of, go on, go on.]

The firſt of the two conſiderations was, whether the repeal ſhould be total, or whether only partial; taking out every thing burthenſome and productive, and reſerving only an empty acknowledgement, ſuch as a ſtamp on cards or dice. The other queſtion was, on what principle the act ſhould be

repealed? On this head alſo two principles were ſtarted. One, that the legiſlative rights of this country, with regard to America, were not entire, but had certain reſtrictions and limitations. The other principle was, that taxes of this kind were contrary to the fundamental principles of commerce on which the colonies were founded; and contrary to every idea of political equity; by which equity we are bound, as much as poſſible to extend the ſpirit and benefit of the Britiſh conſtitution to every part of the Britiſh dominions. The option, both of the meaſure, and of the principle of repeal, was made before the ſeſſion; and I wonder how any one can read the king's ſpeech at the opening of that ſeſſion, without ſeeing in that ſpeech both the repeal and the declaratory act very ſufficiently crayoned out. Thoſe who cannot ſee this can ſee nothing.

Surely the honourable gentleman will not think that a great deal leſs time than was then employed, ought to have been ſpent in deliberation; when he conſiders that the news of the troubles did not arrive till towards the end of October. The parliament ſat to fill the vacancies on the 14th day of December, and on buſineſs the 14th of the following January.

Sir, a partial repeal, or, as the *bon ton* of the court then was, a *modification*, would have ſatisfied a timid, unſyſtematick, procraſtinating miniſtry, as

as ſuch a meaſure has ſince done ſuch a miniſtry. A modification is the conſtant reſource of weak undeciding minds. To repeal by a denial of our right to tax in the preamble (and this too did not want adviſers), would have cut, in the heroick ſtyle, the Gordian knot with a ſword. Either meaſure would have coſt no more than a day's debate. But when the total repeal was adopted; and adopted on principles of policy, of equity, and of commerce; this plan made it neceſſary to enter into many and difficult meaſures. It became neceſſary to open a very large field of evidence commenſurate to theſe extenſive views. But then this labour did knights ſervice. It opened the eyes of ſeveral to the true ſtate of the American affairs; it enlarged their ideas; it removed prejudices; and it conciliated the opinions and affections of men. The noble lord, who then took the lead in adminiſtration, my honourable friend * under me, and a right honourable gentleman † (if he will not reject his ſhare, and it was a large one, of this buſineſs) exerted the moſt laudable induſtry in bringing before you the fulleſt, moſt impartial, and leaſt-garbled body of evidence that ever was produced to this houſe. I think the enquiry laſted in the committee for ſix weeks; and at its concluſion this houſe, by an independent, noble, ſpirited, and

* Mr. Dowdeſwell. † General Conway.

unexpected majority; by a majority that will redeem all the acts ever done by majorities in parliament; in the teeth of all the old mercenary Swiſs of ſtate, in deſpite of all the ſpeculators and augurs of political events, in defiance of the whole embattled legion of veteran penſioners and practiſed inſtruments of a court, gave a total repeal to the ſtamp-act, and (if it had been ſo permitted) a laſting peace to this whole empire.

I ſtate, Sir, theſe particulars, becauſe this act of ſpirit and fortitude has lately been, in the circulation of the ſeaſon, and in ſome hazarded declamations in this houſe, attributed to timidity. If, Sir, the conduct of miniſtry, in propoſing the repeal, had ariſen from timidity with regard to themſelves, it would have been greatly to be condemned. Intereſted timidity diſgraces as much in the cabinet, as perſonal timidity does in the field. But timidity, with regard to the well-being of our country, is heroick virtue. The noble lord who then conducted affairs, and his worthy colleagues, whilſt they trembled at the proſpect of ſuch diſtreſſes as you have ſince brought upon yourſelves, were not afraid ſteadily to look in the face that glaring and dazzling influence at which the eyes of eagles have blenched. He looked in the face one of the ableſt, and, let me ſay, not the moſt ſcrupulous oppoſitions, that perhaps ever was in this houſe, and withſtood it, unaided by, even one of the uſual

ſupports

ſupports of adminiſtration. He did this when he repealed the ſtamp-act. He looked in the face a perſon he had long reſpected and regarded, and whoſe aid was then particularly wanting; I mean lord Chatham. He did this when he paſſed the declaratory act.

It is now given out, for the uſual purpoſes, by the uſual emiſſaries, that lord Rockingham did not conſent to the repeal of this act until he was bullied into it by lord Chatham; and the reporters have gone ſo far as publickly to aſſert, in an hundred companies, that the honourable gentleman under the gallery,* who propoſed the repeal in the American committee, had another ſet of reſolutions in his pocket directly the reverſe of thoſe he moved. Theſe artifices of a deſperate cauſe are, at this time, ſpread abroad, with incredible care, in every part of the town, from the higheſt to the loweſt companies; as if the induſtry of the circulation were to make amends for the abſurdity of the report.

Sir, whether the noble lord is of a complexion to be bullied by lord Chatham, or by any man, I muſt ſubmit to thoſe who know him. I confeſs, when I look back to that time, I conſider him as placed in one of the moſt trying ſituations in which, perhaps, any man ever ſtood. In the houſe

* General Conway.

of peers there were very few of the miniſtry, out of the noble lord's own particular connexion, (except lord Egmont, who acted, as far as I could diſcern, an honourable and manly part,) that did not look to ſome other future arrangement, which warped his politicks. There were in both houſes new and menacing appearances, that might very naturally drive any other, than a moſt reſolute miniſter, from his meaſure or from his ſtation. The houſehold troops openly revolted. The allies of miniſtry, (thoſe, I mean, who ſupported ſome of their meaſures, but refuſed reſponſibility for any) endeavoured to undermine their credit, and to take ground that muſt be fatal to the ſucceſs of the very cauſe which they would be thought to countenance. The queſtion of the repeal was brought on by miniſtry in the committee of this houſe, in the very inſtant when it was known that more than one court negotiation was carrying on with the heads of the oppoſition. Every thing, upon every ſide, was full of traps and mines. Earth below ſhook; heaven above menaced; all the elements of miniſterial ſafety were diſſolved. It was in the midſt of this chaos of plots and counterplots; it was in the midſt of this complicated warfare againſt publick oppoſition and private treachery, that the firmneſs of that noble perſon was put to the proof. He never ſtirred from his ground; no, not an inch. He remained fixed and determined,

mined, in principle, in meaſure, and in conduct. He practiſed no managements. He ſecured no retreat. He ſought no apology.

I will likewiſe do juſtice, I ought to do it, to the honourable gentleman who led us in this houſe.* Far from the duplicity wickedly charged on him, he acted his part with alacrity and reſolution. We all felt inſpired by the example he gave us, down even to myſelf, the weakeſt in that phalanx. I declare for one, I knew well enough (it could not be concealed from any body) the true ſtate of things; but, in my life, I never came with ſo much ſpirits into this houſe. It was a time for a *man* to act in. We had powerful enemies; but we had faithful and determined friends; and a glorious cauſe. We had a great battle to fight; but we had the means of fighting; not as now, when our arms are tied behind us. We did fight that day and conquer.

I remember, Sir, with a melancholy pleaſure, the ſituation of the honourable gentleman * who made the motion for the repeal; in that criſis, when the whole trading intereſt of this empire, crammed into your lobbies, with a trembling and anxious expectation, waited, almoſt to a winter's return of light, their fate from your reſolutions. When, at length you had determined in their fa-

* General Conway.

vour, and your doors, thrown open, ſhewed them the figure of their deliverer in the well-earned triumph of his important victory, from the whole of that grave multitude there aroſe an involuntary burſt of gratitude and tranſport. They jumped upon him like children on a long abſent father. They clung about him as captives about their redeemer. All England, all America, joined to his applauſe. Nor did he ſeem inſenſible to the beſt of all earthly rewards, the love and admiration of his fellow citizens. *Hope elevated and joy brightened his creſt.* I ſtood near him; and his face, to uſe the expreſſion of the ſcripture of the firſt martyr, "his face was as if it had been the face of an "angel." I do not know how others feel; but if I had ſtood in that ſituation, I never would have exchanged it for all that kings in their profuſion could beſtow. I did hope, that that day's danger and honour would have been a bond to hold us all together for ever. But, alas! that, with other pleaſing viſions, is long ſince vaniſhed.

Sir, this act of ſupreme magnanimity has been repreſented, as if it had been a meaſure of an adminiſtration, that, having no ſcheme of their own, took a middle line, pilfered a bit from one ſide and a bit from the other. Sir, they took *no* middle lines. They differed fundamentally from the ſchemes of both parties; but they preſerved the objects of both. They preſerved the authority of

Great

Great Britain. They preſerved the equity of Great Britain. They made the declaratory-act; they repealed the ſtamp-act. They did both *fully*; becauſe the declaratory-act was *without qualification*; and the repeal of the ſtamp-act *total*. This they did in the ſituation I have deſcribed.

Now, Sir, what will the adverſary ſay to both theſe acts? If the principle of the declaratory-act was not good, the principle we are contending for this day is monſtrous. If the principle of the repeal was not good, why are we not at war for a real ſubſtantial effective revenue? If both were bad; why has this miniſtry incurred all the inconveniencies of both and of all ſchemes? Why have they enacted, repealed, enforced, yielded, and now attempt to enforce again?

Sir, I think I may as well now, as at any other time, ſpeak to a certain matter of fact, not wholly unrelated to the queſtion under your conſideration. We, who would perſuade you to revert to the antient policy of this kingdom, labour under the effect of this ſhort current phraſe, which the court leaders have given out to all their corps, in order to take away the credit of thoſe who would prevent you from that frantick war you are going to wage upon your colonies. Their cant is this; "All the diſturbances in America have been created "by the repeal of the ſtamp-act." I ſuppreſs for a moment my indignation at the falſehood, baſeneſs,

neſs, and abſurdity of this moſt audacious aſſertion. Inſtead of remarking on the motives and character of thoſe who have iſſued it for circulation, I will clearly lay before you the ſtate of America, antecedently to that repeal; after the repeal; and ſince the renewal of the ſchemes of American taxation.

It is ſaid, that the diſturbances, if there were any, before the repeal, were ſlight; and without difficulty or inconvenience might have been ſuppreſſed. For an anſwer to this aſſertion I will ſend you to the great author and patron of the ſtamp-act, who certainly meaning well to the authority of this country, and fully apprized of the ſtate of that, made, before a repeal was ſo much as agitated in this houſe, the motion which is on your journals; and which, to ſave the clerk the trouble of turning to it, I will now read to you. It was for an amendment to the addreſs of the 17th of December, 1765:

" *To expreſs our juſt reſentment and indignation at* " *the* outrageous tumults and inſurrections *which* " *have been excited and carried on in North America*; " *and at the reſiſtance given by* open *and* rebellious " *force to the execution of the laws in that part of his* " *majeſty's dominions. And to aſſure his majeſty, that* " *his faithful commons, animated with the warmeſt* " *duty and attachment to his royal perſon and govern-* " *ment, will firmly and effectually ſupport his majeſty*

" *in*

" *in all ſuch meaſures as ſhall be neceſſary for preſerv-*
" *ing and ſupporting the legal dependence of the colonies*
" *on the mother country*, &c. &c."

Here was certainly a diſturbance preceding the repeal; ſuch a diſturbance as Mr. Grenville thought neceſſary to qualify by the name of an *inſurrection*, and the epithet of a *rebellious* force: terms much ſtronger than any, by which, thoſe who then ſupported his motion, have ever ſince thought proper to diſtinguiſh the ſubſequent diſturbances in America. They were diſturbances which ſeemed to him and his friends to juſtify as ſtrong a promiſe of ſupport, as hath been uſual to give in the beginning of a war with the moſt powerful and declared enemies. When the accounts of the American governors came before the houſe, they appeared ſtronger even than the warmth of publick imagination had painted them; ſo much ſtronger, that the papers on your table bear me out in ſaying, that all the late diſturbances, which have been at one time the miniſter's motives for the repeal of five out of ſix of the new court taxes, and are now his pretences for refuſing to repeal that ſixth, did not amount—why do I compare them? no, not to a tenth part of the tumults and violence which prevailed long before the repeal of that act.

Miniſtry cannot refuſe the authority of the commander in chief general Gage, who, in his letter of the 4th of November, from New York, thus repreſents the ſtate of things:

" *It*

" *It is difficult to ſay, from the* higheſt to the low-
" eſt, *who has not been* acceſſory *to this* inſurrection,
" *either by writing or* mutual agreements *to oppoſe*
" *the act, by what they are pleaſed to term all legal*
" *oppoſition to it. Nothing effectual has been propoſed,*
" *either to prevent or quell the tumult.* The reſt of
" the provinces are in the ſame ſituation *as to a*
" *poſitive refuſal to take the ſtamps; and threatening*
" *thoſe who ſhall take them*, to plunder and murder
" them; *and this affair ſtands* in all the provinces,
" *that unleſs the act, from its own nature, enforce it-*
" *ſelf, nothing but* a very *conſiderable military force*
" *can do it.*"

It is remarkable, Sir, that the perſons who formerly trumpeted forth the moſt loudly, the violent reſolutions of aſſemblies; the univerſal inſurrections; the ſeizing and burning the ſtamped papers; the forcing ſtamp officers to reſign their commiſſions under the gallows; the rifling and pulling down of the houſes of magiſtrates; and the expulſion from their country of all who dared to write or ſpeak a ſingle word in defence of the powers of parliament; theſe very trumpeters are now the men that repreſent the whole as a mere trifle; and chooſe to date all the diſturbances from the repeal of the ſtamp-act, which put an end to them. Hear your officers abroad, and let them refute this ſhameleſs falſehood, who, in all their correſpondence, ſtate the diſturbances as owing to their true cauſes, the diſcontent of the people, from

the

the taxes. You have this evidence in your own archives—and it will give you compleat ſatisfaction; if you are not ſo far loſt to all parliamentary ideas of information, as rather to credit the lye of the day, than the records of your own houſe.

Sir, this vermin of court reporters, when they are forced into day upon one point, are ſure to burrow in another; but they ſhall have no refuge: I will make them bolt out of all their holes. Conſcious that they muſt be baffled, when they attribute a precedent diſturbance to a ſubſequent meaſure, they take other ground, almoſt as abſurd, but very common in modern practice, and very wicked; which is, to attribute the ill effect of ill-judged conduct to the arguments which had been uſed to diſſuade us from it. They ſay, that the oppoſition made in parliament to the ſtamp-act at the time of its paſſing, encouraged the Americans to their reſiſtance. This has even formally appeared in print in a regular volume, from an advocate of that faction, a Dr. Tucker. This Dr. Tucker is already a dean, and his earneſt labours in this vineyard will, I ſuppoſe, raiſe him to a biſhoprick. But this aſſertion too, juſt like the reſt, is falſe. In all the papers which have loaded your table; in all the vaſt crowd of verbal witneſſes that appeared at your bar, witneſſes which were indiſcriminately produced from both ſides of the houſe; not the leaſt hint of ſuch a cauſe of diſturbance has ever appeared.

appeared. As to the fact of a ſtrenuous oppoſition to the ſtamp-act, I ſat as a ſtranger in your gallery when the act was under conſideration. Far from any thing inflammatory, I never heard a more languid debate in this houſe. No more than two or three gentlemen, as I remember, ſpoke againſt the act, and that with great reſerve and remarkable temper. There was but one diviſion in the whole progreſs of the bill; and the minority did not reach to more than 39 or 40. In the houſe of lords I do not recollect that there was any debate or diviſion at all. I am ſure there was no proteſt. In fact, the affair paſſed with ſo very, very little noiſe, that in town they ſcarcely knew the nature of what you were doing. The oppoſition to the bill in England never could have done this miſchief, becauſe there ſcarcely ever was leſs of oppoſition to a bill of conſequence.

Sir, the agents and diſtributors of falſehoods have, with their uſual induſtry, circulated another lye of the ſame nature with the former. It is this, that the diſturbances aroſe from the account which had been received in America of the change in the miniſtry. No longer awed, it ſeems, with the ſpirit of the former rulers, they thought themſelves a match for what our calumniators chooſe to qualify by the name of ſo feeble a miniſtry as ſucceeded. Feeble in one ſenſe theſe men certainly may be called; for with all their efforts, and they have made

made many, they have not been able to reſiſt the diſtempered vigour, and inſane alacrity with which you are ruſhing to your ruin. But it does ſo happen, that the falſity of this circulation is (like the reſt) demonſtrated by indiſputable dates and records.

So little was the change known in America, that the letters of your governors, giving an account of theſe diſturbances long after they had arrived at their higheſt pitch, were all directed to the *old miniſtry*, and particularly to the *earl of Halifax*, the ſecretary of ſtate correſponding with the colonies, without once in the ſmalleſt degree intimating the ſlighteſt ſuſpicion of any miniſterial revolution whatſoever. The miniſtry was not changed in England until the 10th day of July 1765. On the 14th of the preceding June, governor Fauquier from Virginia writes thus; and writes thus to the earl of Halifax: "*Government is ſet at* defiance, *not* "*having ſtrength enough in her hands to enforce obe-*"*dience to the laws of the community. The private* "*diſtreſs, which every man feels, encreaſes the* general "diſſatisfaction *at the duties laid by the* ſtamp-act, "*which breaks out, and ſhews itſelf upon every trifling* "*occaſion.*" The general diſſatisfaction had produced ſome time before, that is, on the 29th of May, ſeveral ſtrong publick reſolves againſt the ſtamp-act; and thoſe reſolves are aſſigned by governor Bernard, as the cauſe of the *inſurrections* in Maſſachuſet's

Maſſachuſet's Bay, in his letter of the 15th of Auguſt, ſtill addreſſed to the Earl of Halifax; and he continued to addreſs ſuch accounts to that miniſter quite to the 7th of September of the ſame year. Similar accounts, and of as late a date, were ſent from other governors, and all directed to Lord Halifax. Not one of theſe letters indicates the ſlighteſt idea of a change, either known, or even apprehended.

Thus are blown away the inſect race of courtly falſehoods! thus periſh the miſerable inventions of the wretched runners for a wretched cauſe, which they have fly-blown into every weak and rotten part of the country, in vain hopes that when their maggots had taken wing, their importunate buzzing might found ſomething like the publick voice!

Sir, I have troubled you ſufficiently with the ſtate of America before the repeal. Now I turn to the honourable gentleman who ſo ſtoutly challenges us, to tell, whether, after the repeal, the provinces were quiet? This is coming home to the point. Here I meet him directly; and anſwer moſt readily, *They were quiet.* And I, in my turn, challenge him to prove when, and where, and by whom, and in what numbers, and with what violence, the other laws of trade, as gentlemen aſſert, were violated in conſequence of your conceſſion? or that even your other revenue laws were attacked?

ed? But I quit the vantage ground on which I ſtand, and where I might leave the burthen of the proof upon him: I walk down upon the open plain, and undertake to ſhew, that they were not only quiet, but ſhewed many unequivocal marks of acknowledgment and gratitude. And to give him every advantage, I ſelect the obnoxious colony of Maſſachuſet's Bay, which at this time (but without hearing her) is ſo heavily a culprit before parliament—I will ſelect their proceedings even under circumſtances of no ſmall irritation. For, a little imprudently, I muſt ſay, Governor Bernard mixed in the adminiſtration of the lenitive of the repeal no ſmall acrimony ariſing from matters of a ſeparate nature. Yet ſee, Sir; the effect of that lenitive, though mixed with theſe bitter ingredients; and how this rugged people can expreſs themſelves on a meaſure of conceſſion.

"*If it is not in our power,*" (ſay they in their addreſs to Governor Bernard) "*in ſo full a manner* "*as will be expected, to ſhew our reſpectful gratitude* "*to the mother country, or to make a dutiful and affec-* "*tionate return to the indulgence of the king and par-* "*liament, it ſhall be no fault of ours; for this we in-* "*tend, and hope we ſhall be able fully to effect.*"

Would to God that this temper had been cultivated, managed, and ſet in action! other effects than thoſe which we have ſince felt would have reſulted from it. On the requiſition for compenſation to thoſe who had ſuffered from the violence

of the populace, in the ſame addreſs they ſay, "*The recommendation enjoined by Mr. Secretary Conway's letter, and in conſequence thereof made to us, we will embrace the firſt convenient opportunity to conſider and act upon.*" They did conſider; they did act upon it. They obeyed the requiſition. I know the mode has been chicaned upon; but it was ſubſtantially obeyed; and much better obeyed, than I fear the parliamentary requiſition of this ſeſſion will be, though enforced by all your rigour, and backed with all your power. In a word, the damages of popular fury were compenſated by legiſlative gravity. Almoſt every other part of America in various ways demonſtrated their gratitude. I am bold to ſay, that ſo ſudden a calm recovered after ſo violent a ſtorm is without parallel in hiſtory. To ſay that no other diſturbance ſhould happen from any other cauſe, is folly. But as far as appearances went, by the judicious ſacrifice of one law, you procured an acquieſcence in all that remained. After this experience, nobody ſhall perſuade me, when an whole people are concerned, that acts of lenity are not means of conciliation.

I hope the honourable gentleman has received a fair and full anſwer to his queſtion.

I have done with the third period of your policy; that of your repeal; and the return of your ancient ſyſtem, and your ancient tranquillity and concord. Sir, this period was not as long as it was happy. Another ſcene was opened, and other actors

actors appeared on the ſtage. The ſtate, in the condition I have deſcribed it, was delivered into the hands of Lord Chatham—a great and celebrated name; a name that keeps the name of this country reſpectable in every other on the globe. It may be truly called,

Clarum et venerabile nomen
Gentibus, et multum noſtræ quod proderat urbi.

Sir, the venerable age of this great man, his merited rank, his ſuperior eloquence, his ſplendid qualities, his eminent ſervices, the vaſt ſpace he fills in the eye of mankind; and, more than all the reſt, his fall from power, which, like death, canonizes and ſanctifies a great character, will not ſuffer me to cenſure any part of his conduct. I am afraid to flatter him; I am ſure I am not diſpoſed to blame him. Let thoſe who have betrayed him by their adulation, inſult him with their malevolence. But what I do not preſume to cenſure, I may have leave to lament. For a wiſe man, he ſeemed to me at that time, to be governed too much by general maxims. I ſpeak with the freedom of hiſtory, and I hope without offence. One or two of theſe maxims, flowing from an opinion not the moſt indulgent to our unhappy ſpecies, and ſurely a little too general, led him into meaſures that were greatly miſchievous to himſelf; and for that reaſon, among others, perhaps fatal to

his country; meaſures, the effects of which, I am afraid, are for ever incurable. He made an adminiſtration, ſo checkered and ſpeckled; he put together a piece of joinery, ſo croſsly indented and whimſically dovetailed; a cabinet ſo variouſly inlaid; ſuch a piece of diverſified Moſaick; ſuch a teſſelated pavement without cement; here a bit of black ſtone, and there a bit of white; patriots and courtiers, king's friends and republicans; whigs and tories; treacherous friends and open enemies: that it was indeed a very curious ſhow; but utterly unſafe to touch, and unſure to ſtand on. The colleagues whom he had afforted at the ſame boards, ſtared at each other, and were obliged to aſk; "Sir, your name?—Sir, you have the advan-"tage of me—Mr. Such-a-one—I beg a thouſand "pardons—" I venture to ſay, it did ſo happen, that perſons had a ſingle office divided between them, who had never ſpoke to each other in their lives; until they found themſelves, they knew not how, pigging together, heads and points, in the ſame truckle-bed.*

Sir, in conſequence of this arrangement, having put ſo much the larger part of his enemies and oppoſers into power, the confuſion was ſuch, that his own principles could not poſſibly have any effect

* Suppoſed to allude to the Right Honourable Lord North, and George Cooke, Eſq. who were made joint paymaſters in the ſummer of 1766, on the removal of the Rockingham adminiſtration.

or

or influence in the conduct of affairs. If ever he fell into a fit of the gout, or if any other cauſe withdrew him from publick cares, principles directly the contrary were ſure to predominate. When he had executed his plan, he had not an inch of ground to ſtand upon. When he had accompliſhed his ſcheme of adminiſtration, he was no longer a miniſter.

When his face was hid but for a moment, his whole ſyſtem was on a wide ſea, without chart or compaſs. The gentlemen, his particular friends, who, with the names of various departments of miniſtry, were admitted, to ſeem, as if they acted a part under him, with a modeſty that becomes all men, and with a confidence in him, which was juſtified even in its extravagance by his ſuperior abilities, had never, in any inſtance, preſumed upon any opinion of their own. Deprived of his guiding influence, they were whirled about, the ſport of every guſt, and eaſily driven into any port; and as thoſe who joined with them in manning the veſſel were the moſt directly oppoſite to his opinions, meaſures, and character, and far the moſt artful and moſt powerful of the ſet, they eaſily prevailed, ſo as to ſeize upon the vacant, unoccupied, and derelict minds of his friends; and inſtantly they turned the veſſel wholly out of the courſe of his policy. As if it were to inſult as well as to betray him, even long before the cloſe of the firſt ſeſſion of his adminiſtration, when every thing

was publickly tranſacted, and with great parade, in his name, they made an act, declaring it highly juſt and expedient to raiſe a revenue in America. For even then, Sir, even before this ſplendid orb was entirely ſet, and while the weſtern horizon was in a blaze with his deſcending glory, on the oppoſite quarter of the heavens aroſe another luminary, and, for his hour, became lord of the aſcendant.

This light too is paſſed and ſet for ever. You underſtand, to be ſure, that I ſpeak of Charles Townſhend, officially the re-producer of this fatal ſcheme; whom I cannot even now remember without ſome degree of ſenſibility. In truth, Sir, he was the delight and ornament of this houſe, and the charm of every private ſociety which he honoured with his preſence. Perhaps there never aroſe in this country, nor in any country, a man of a more pointed and finiſhed wit; and (where his paſſions were not concerned) of a more refined, exquiſite, and penetrating judgment. If he had not ſo great a ſtock, as ſome have had who flouriſhed formerly, of knowledge long treaſured up, he knew better by far, than any man I ever was acquainted with, how to bring together within a ſhort time, all that was neceſſary to eſtabliſh, to illuſtrate, and to decorate that ſide of the queſtion he ſupported. He ſtated his matter ſkilfully and powerfully. He particularly excelled in a moſt luminous explanation, and diſplay of his ſubject.

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His ſtyle of argument was neither trite and vulgar, nor ſubtle and abſtruſe. He hit the houſe juſt between wind and water.—And not being troubled with too anxious a zeal for any matter in queſtion, he was never more tedious, or more earneſt, than the pre-conceived opinions, and preſent temper of his hearers required; to whom he was always in perfect uniſon. He conformed exactly to the temper of the houſe; and he ſeemed to guide, becauſe he was always ſure to follow it.

I beg pardon, Sir, if when I ſpeak of this and of other great men, I appear to digreſs in ſaying ſomething of their characters. In this eventful hiſtory of the revolutions of America, the characters of ſuch men are of much importance. Great men are the guide-poſts and land-marks in the ſtate. The credit of ſuch men at court, or in the nation, is the ſole cauſe of all the publick meaſures. It would be an invidious thing, (moſt foreign I truſt to what you think my diſpoſition) to remark the errors into which the authority of great names has brought the nation, without doing juſtice at the ſame time to the great qualities, whence that authority aroſe. The ſubject is inſtructive to thoſe who wiſh to form themſelves on whatever of excellence has gone before them. There are many young members in the houſe (ſuch of late has been the rapid ſucceſſion of publick men) who never ſaw that prodigy Charles Townſhend; nor of courſe know what a ferment he was able to excite

in every thing by the violent ebullition of his mixed virtues and failings. For failings he had undoubtedly—many of us remember them; we are this day conſidering the effect of them. But he had no failings which were not owing to a noble cauſe; to an ardent, generous, perhaps an immoderate paſſion for fame; a paſſion which is the inſtinct of all great ſouls. He worſhipped that goddeſs whereſoever ſhe appeared; but he paid his particular devotions to her in her favourite habitation, in her choſen temple, the houſe of commons. Beſides the characters of the individuals that compoſe our body, it is impoſſible, Mr. Speaker, not to obſerve, that this houſe has a collective character of its own. That character too, however imperfect, is not unamiable. Like all great publick collections of men, you poſſeſs a marked love of virtue, and an abhorrence of vice. But among vices, there is none, which the houſe abhors in the ſame degree with *obſtinacy*. Obſtinacy, Sir, is certainly a great vice; and in the changeful ſtate of political affairs it is frequently the cauſe of great miſchief. It happens, however, very unfortunately, that almoſt the whole line of the great and maſculine virtues, conſtancy, gravity, magnanimity, fortitude, fidelity, and firmneſs, are cloſely allied to this diſagreeable quality, of which you have ſo juſt an abhorrence; and in their exceſs, all theſe virtues very eaſily fall into it. He, who paid ſuch a punctilious attention to all your feelings, certainly took

took care not to ſhock them by that vice which is the moſt diſguſtful to you.

That fear of diſpleaſing thoſe who ought moſt to be pleaſed, betrayed him ſometimes into the other extreme. He had voted, and in the year 1765, had been an advocate for the ſtamp-act. Things and the diſpoſition of men's minds were changed. In ſhort, the ſtamp-act began to be no favourite in this houſe. He therefore attended at the private meeting, in which the reſolutions moved by a right honourable gentleman were ſettled; reſolutions leading to the repeal. The next day he voted for that repeal; and he would have ſpoken for it too, if an illneſs, (not as was then given out a political) but to my knowledge, a very real illneſs, had not prevented it.

The very next ſeſſion, as the faſhion of this world paſſeth away, the repeal began to be in as bad an odour in this houſe as the ſtamp-act had been in the ſeſſion before. To conform to the temper which began to prevail, and to prevail moſtly amongſt thoſe moſt in power, he declared, very early in the winter, that a revenue muſt be had out of America. Inſtantly he was tied down to his engagements by ſome, who had no objection to ſuch experiments, when made at the coſt of perſons for whom they had no particular regard. The whole body of courtiers drove him onward. They always talked as if the king ſtood in a ſort

a ſort of humiliated ſtate, until ſomething of the kind ſhould be done.

Here this extraordinary man, then chancellor of the exchequer found himſelf in great ſtraits. To pleaſe univerſally was the object of his life; but to tax and to pleaſe, no more than to love and to be wiſe, is not given to men. However he attempted it. To render the tax palatable to the partizans of American revenue, he made a preamble ſtating the neceſſity of ſuch a revenue. To cloſe with the American diſtinction, this revenue was *external* or port-duty; but again, to ſoften it to the other party, it was a duty of *ſupply*. To gratify the *coloniſts*, it was laid on Britiſh manufactures; to ſatisfy the *merchants of Britain*, the duty was trivial, and (except that on tea, which touched only the devoted Eaſt India company) on none of the grand objects of commerce. To counterwork the American contraband, the duty on tea was reduced from a ſhilling to three-pence. But to ſecure the favour of thoſe who would tax America, the ſcene of collection was changed, and, with the reſt, it was levied in the colonies. What need I ſay more? This fine-ſpun ſcheme had the uſual fate of all exquiſite policy. But the original plan of the duties, and the mode of executing that plan, both aroſe ſingly and ſolely from a love of our applauſe. He was truly the child of the houſe. He never thought, did, or ſaid any thing but with a view to you.

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He every day adapted himſelf to your diſpoſition; and adjuſted himſelf before it as at a looking-glaſs.

He had obſerved (indeed it could not eſcape him) that ſeveral perſons, infinitely his inferiors in all reſpects, had formerly rendered themſelves conſiderable in this houſe by one method alone. They were a race of men (I hope in God the ſpecies is extinct) who, when they roſe in their place, no man living could divine, from any known adherence to parties, to opinions, or to principles; from any order or ſyſtem in their politicks; or from any ſequel or connection in their ideas, what part they were going to take in any debate. It is aſtoniſhing how much this uncertainty, eſpecially at critical times, called the attention of all parties on ſuch men. All eyes were fixed on them, all ears open to hear them; each party gaped, and looked alternately for their vote, almoſt to the end of their ſpeeches. While the houſe hung in this uncertainty, now the *hear-hims* roſe from this ſide—now they rebellowed from the other; and that party to whom they fell at length from their tremulous and dancing balance, always received them in a tempeſt of applauſe. The fortune of ſuch men was a temptation too great to be reſiſted by one, to whom, a ſingle whiff of incenſe withheld gave much greater pain, than he received delight, in the clouds of it, which daily roſe about him from the prodigal ſuperſtition of innumerable admirers. He was a candidate for contradictory honours; and

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his great aim was to make thoſe agree in admiration of him who never agreed in any thing elſe.

Hence aroſe this unfortunate act, the ſubject of this day's debate; from a diſpoſition which, after making an American revenue to pleaſe one, repealed it to pleaſe others, and again revived it in hopes of pleaſing a third, and of catching ſomething in the ideas of all.

This revenue act of 1767, formed the fourth period of American policy. How we have fared ſince then—what woeful variety of ſchemes have been adopted; what enforcing, and what repealing; what bullying, and what ſubmitting; what doing, and undoing; what ſtraining, and what relaxing; what aſſemblies diſſolved for not obeying, and called again without obedience; what troops ſent out to quell reſiſtance, and on meeting that reſiſtance, recalled; what ſhiftings, and changes, and jumblings of all kinds of men at home, which left no poſſibility of order, conſiſtency, vigour, or even ſo much as a decent unity of colour in any one publick meaſure.—It is a tedious, irkſome taſk. My duty may call me to open it out ſome other time;* on a former occaſion I tried your temper on a part of it; for the preſent I ſhall forbear.

After all theſe changes and agitations, your immediate ſituation upon the queſtion on your paper

* Reſolutions in May 1770.

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is at length brought to this. You have an act of parliament, ſtating, that "it is *expedient* to raiſe a revenue in America." By a partial repeal you annihilated the greateſt part of that revenue, which this preamble declares to be ſo expedient. You have ſubſtituted no other in the place of it. A ſecretary of ſtate has diſclaimed, in the king's name, all thoughts of ſuch a ſubſtitution in future. The principle of this diſclaimer goes to what has been left, as well as what has been repealed. The tax which lingers after its companions, (under a preamble declaring an American revenue expedient, and for the ſole purpoſe of ſupporting the theory of that preamble) militates with the aſſurance authentically conveyed to the colonies; and is an exhauſtleſs ſource of jealouſy and animoſity. On this ſtate, which I take to be a fair one; not being able to diſcern any grounds of honour, advantage, peace, or power, for adhering, either to the act or to the preamble, I ſhall vote for the queſtion which leads to the repeal of both.

If you do not fall in with this motion, then ſecure ſomething to fight for, conſiſtent in theory and valuable in practice. If you muſt employ your ſtrength, employ it to uphold you in ſome honourable right, or ſome profitable wrong. If you are apprehenſive that the conceſſion recommended to you, though proper, ſhould be a means of drawing on you further but unreaſonable claims,—why then employ your force in ſupporting that reaſonable

able conceſſion againſt thoſe unreaſonable demands. You will employ it with more grace; with better effect; and with great probable concurrence of all the quiet and rational people in the provinces; who are now united with, and hurried away by, the violent; having indeed different diſpoſitions, but a common intereſt. If you apprehend that on a conceſſion you ſhall be puſhed by metaphyſical proceſs to the extreme lines, and argued out of your whole authority, my advice is this; when you have recovered your old, your ſtrong, your tenable poſition, then face about—ſtop ſhort—do nothing more—reaſon not at all—oppoſe the antient policy and practice of the empire, as a rampart againſt the ſpeculations of innovators on both ſides of the queſtion; and you will ſtand on great, manly, and ſure ground. On this ſolid baſis fix your machines, and they will draw worlds towards you.

Your miniſters, in their own and his majeſty's name, have already adopted the American diſtinction of internal and external duties. It is a diſtinction, whatever merit it may have, that was originally moved by the Americans themſelves; and I think they will acquieſce in it, if they are not puſhed with too much logick and too little ſenſe, in all the conſequences. That is, if external taxation be underſtood, as they and you underſtand it when you pleaſe, to be not a diſtinction of geography, but of policy; that it is a power for regulating trade, and not for ſupporting eſtabliſhments. The

diſtinction,

diſtinction, which is as nothing with regard to right, is of moſt weighty conſideration in practice. Recover your old ground, and your old tranquillity—try it—I am perſuaded the Americans will compromiſe with you. When confidence is once reſtored, the odious and ſuſpicious *ſummum jus* will periſh of courſe. The ſpirit of practicability, of moderation, and mutual convenience, will never call in geometrical exactneſs as the arbitrator of an amicable ſettlement. Conſult and follow your experience. Let not the long ſtory with which I have exerciſed your patience, prove fruitleſs to your intereſts.

For my part, I ſhould chooſe (if I could have my wiſh) that the propoſition of the * honourable gentleman for the repeal, could go to America without the attendance of the penal bills. Alone I could almoſt anſwer for its ſucceſs. I cannot be certain of its reception in the bad company it may keep. In ſuch heterogeneous aſſortments, the moſt innocent perſon will loſe the effect of his innocency. Though you ſhould ſend out this angel of peace, yet you are ſending out a deſtroying angel too; and what would be the effect of the conflict of theſe two adverſe ſpirits, or which would predominate in the end, is what I dare not ſay: whether the lenient meaſures would cauſe American paſſion to ſubſide, or the ſevere would increaſe

* Mr. Fuller.

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its fury—All this is in the hand of Providence; yet now, even now, I ſhould confide in the prevailing virtue, and efficacious operation of lenity, though working in darkneſs, and in chaos, in the midſt of all this unnatural and turbid combination. I ſhould hope it might produce order and beauty in the end.

Let us, Sir, embrace ſome ſyſtem or other before we end this ſeſſion. Do you mean to tax America, and to draw a productive revenue from thence? If you do, ſpeak out: name, fix, aſcertain this revenue; ſettle its quantity; define its objects; provide for its collection; and then fight when you have ſomething to fight for. If you murder—rob! If you kill, take poſſeſſion: and do not appear in the character of madmen, as well as aſſaſſins, violent, vindictive, bloody, and tyrannical, without an object. But may better counſels guide you!

Again, and again, revert to your old principles—ſeek peace and enſue it—leave America, if ſhe has taxable matter in her, to tax herſelf. I am not here going into the diſtinctions of rights, nor attempting to mark their boundaries. I do not enter into theſe metaphyſical diſtinctions; I hate the very ſound of them. Leave the Americans as they anciently ſtood, and theſe diſtinctions, born of our unhappy conteſt, will die along with it. They and we, and their and our anceſtors, have been happy under that ſyſtem. Let the memory of all actions,

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in contradiction to that good old mode, on both ſides, be extinguiſhed for ever. Be content to bind America by laws of trade; you have always done it. Let this be your reaſon for binding their trade. Do not burthen them by taxes; you were not uſed to do ſo from the beginning. Let this be your reaſon for not taxing. Theſe are the arguments of ſtates and kingdoms. Leave the reſt to the ſchools; for there only they may be diſcuſſed with ſafety. But if, intemperately, unwiſely, fatally, you ſophiſticate and poiſon the very ſource of government, by urging ſubtle deductions, and conſequences odious to thoſe you govern, from the unlimited and illimitable nature of ſupreme ſovereignty, you will teach them by theſe means to call that ſovereignty itſelf in queſtion. When you drive him hard, the boar will ſurely turn upon the hunters. If that ſovereignty and their freedom cannot be reconciled, which will they take? They will caſt your ſovereignty in your face. No body will be argued into ſlavery. Sir, let the gentlemen on the other ſide call forth all their ability; let the beſt of them get up, and tell me, what one character of liberty the Americans have, and what one brand of ſlavery they are free from, if they are bound in their property and induſtry, by all the reſtraints you can imagine on commerce, and at the ſame time are made pack-horſes of every tax you chooſe to impoſe, without the leaſt ſhare in granting them. When they bear the burthens

of unlimited monopoly, will you bring them to bear the burthens of unlimited revenue too? The Engliſhman in America will feel that this is ſlavery—that it is *legal* ſlavery, will be no compenſation, either to his feelings or his underſtanding.

A noble lord*, who ſpoke ſome time ago, is full of the fire of ingenuous youth; and when he has modelled the ideas of a lively imagination by further experience, he will be an ornament to his country in either houſe. He has ſaid, that the Americans are our children, and how can they revolt againſt their parent? He ſays, that if they are not free in their preſent ſtate, England is not free; becauſe Mancheſter, and other conſiderable places, are not repreſented. So then, becauſe ſome towns in England are not repreſented, America is to have no repreſentative at all. They are "our chil-"dren;" but when children aſk for bread, we are not to give a ſtone. Is it becauſe the natural reſiſtance of things, and the various mutations of time, hinders our government, or any ſcheme of government, from being any more than a ſort of approximation to the right, is it therefore that the colonies are to recede from it infinitely? When this child of ours wiſhes to aſſimilate to its parent, and to reflect with a true filial reſemblance the beauteous countenance of Britiſh liberty; are we to turn to them the ſhameful parts of our conſti-

* Lord Carmarthen.

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tution? are we to give them our weakneſs for their ſtrength; our opprobrium for their glory; and the ſlough of ſlavery, which we are not able to work off, to ſerve them for their freedom?

If this be the caſe, aſk yourſelves this queſtion, Will they be content in ſuch a ſtate of ſlavery? If not, look to the conſequences. Reflect how you are to govern a people, who think they ought to be free, and think they are not. Your ſcheme yields no revenue; it yields nothing but diſcontent, diſorder, diſobedience; and ſuch is the ſtate of America, that after wading up to your eyes in blood, you could only end juſt where you begun; that is, to tax where no revenue is to be found, to—my voice fails me; my inclination indeed carries me no further—all is confuſion beyond it.

Well, Sir, I have recovered a little, and before I ſit down I muſt ſay ſomething to another point with which gentlemen urge us. What is to become of the declaratory act aſſerting the entireneſs of Britiſh legiſlative authority, if we abandon the practice of taxation?

For my part I look upon the rights ſtated in that act, exactly in the manner in which I viewed them on its very firſt propoſition, and which I have often taken the liberty, with great humility, to lay before you. I look, I ſay, on the imperial rights of Great Britain, and the privileges which the coloniſts ought to enjoy under theſe rights, to be juſt the moſt reconcileable things in the world. The

parliament of Great Britain ſits at the head of her extenſive empire in two capacities: one as the local legiſlature of this iſland, providing for all things at home, immediately, and by no other inſtrument than the executive power.—The other, and I think her nobler capacity, is what I call her *imperial character*; in which, as from the throne of heaven, ſhe ſuperintends all the ſeveral inferior legiſlatures, and guides, and controuls them all without annihilating any. As all theſe provincial legiſlatures are only co-ordinate to each other, they ought all to be ſubordinate to her; elſe they can neither preſerve mutual peace, nor hope for mutual juſtice, nor effectually afford mutual aſſiſtance. It is neceſſary to coerce the negligent, to reſtrain the violent, and to aid the weak and deficient, by the over-ruling plenitude of her power. She is never to intrude into the place of the others, whilſt they are equal to the common ends of their inſtitution. But in order to enable parliament to anſwer all theſe ends of provident and beneficent ſuperintendance, her powers muſt be boundleſs. The gentlemen who think the powers of parliament limited, may pleaſe themſelves to talk of requiſitions. But ſuppoſe the requiſitions are not obeyed? What! Shall there be no reſerved power in the empire, to ſupply a deficiency which may weaken, divide, and diſſipate the whole? We are engaged in war—the ſecretary of ſtate calls upon the colonies to contribute—ſome would do it, I think

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moſt would chearfully furniſh whatever is demanded—one or two, ſuppoſe, hang back, and, eaſing themſelves, let the ſtreſs of the draft lie on the others—ſurely it is proper, that ſome authority might legally ſay—"Tax yourſelves for the com-"mon ſupply, or parliament will do it for you." This backwardneſs was, as I am told, actually the caſe of Pennſylvannia for ſome ſhort time towards the beginning of the laſt war, owing to ſome internal diſſentions in the colony. But, whether the fact were ſo, or otherwiſe, the caſe is equally to be provided for by a competent ſovereign power. But then this ought to be no ordinary power; nor ever uſed in the firſt inſtance. This is what I meant, when I have ſaid at various times, that I conſider the power of taxing in parliament as an inſtrument of empire, and not as a means of ſupply.

Such, Sir, is my idea of the conſtitution of the Britiſh empire, as diſtinguiſhed from the conſtitution of Britain; and on theſe grounds I think ſubordination and liberty may be ſufficiently reconciled through the whole; whether to ſerve a refining ſpeculatiſt, or a factious demagogue, I know not; but enough ſurely for the eaſe and happineſs of man.

Sir, whilſt we held this happy courſe, we drew more from the colonies than all the impotent violence of deſpotiſm ever could extort from them. We did this abundantly in the laſt war. It has never been once denied—and what reaſon have we

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to imagine that the colonies would not have proceeded in ſupplying government as liberally, if you had not ſtepped in and hindered them from contributing, by interrupting the channel in which their liberality flowed with ſo ſtrong a courſe; by attempting to take, inſtead of being ſatisfied to receive? Sir William Temple ſays, that Holland has loaded itſelf with ten times the impoſitions which it revolted from Spain, rather than ſubmit to. He ſays true. Tyranny is a poor provider. It knows neither how to accumulate, nor how to extract.

I charge therefore to this new and unfortunate ſyſtem the loſs not only of peace, of union, and of commerce, but even of revenue, which its friends are contending for.—It is morally certain, that we have loſt at leaſt a million of free grants ſince the peace. I think we have loſt a great deal more; and that thoſe who look for a revenue from the provinces, never could have purſued, even in that light, a courſe more directly repugnant to their purpoſes.

Now, Sir, I truſt I have ſhewn, firſt on that narrow ground which the honourable gentleman meaſured, that you are like to loſe nothing by complying with the motion, except what you have loſt already. I have ſhewn afterwards, that in time of peace you flouriſhed in commerce, and when war required it, had ſufficient aid from the colonies, while you purſued your antient policy; that you threw every thing into confuſion when you made

made the ſtamp act; and that you reſtored every thing to peace and order when you repealed it. I have ſhewn that the revival of the ſyſtem of taxation has produced the very worſt effects; and that the partial repeal has produced, not partial good, but univerſal evil. Let theſe conſiderations, founded on facts, not one of which can be denied, bring us back to our reaſon by the road of our experience.

I cannot, as I have ſaid, anſwer for mixed meaſures; but ſurely this mixture of lenity would give the whole a better chance of ſucceſs. When you once regain confidence, the way will be clear before you. Then you may enforce the act of navigation when it ought to be enforced. You will yourſelves open it where it ought ſtill further to be opened. Proceed in what you do, whatever you do, from policy, and not from rancour. Let us act like men, let us act like ſtateſmen. Let us hold ſome ſort of conſiſtent conduct.—It is agreed that a revenue is not to be had in America. If we loſe the profit, let us get rid of the odium.

On this buſineſs of America, I confeſs I am ſerious, even to ſadneſs. I have had but one opinion concerning it ſince I ſat, and before I ſat in parliament. The noble lord* will, as uſual, probably, attribute the part taken by me and my friends in this buſineſs, to a deſire of getting his places. Let him enjoy this happy and original idea. If I deprived him of it, I ſhould take away moſt of his

* Lord North.

wit,

wit, and all his argument. But I had rather bear the brunt of all his wit, and indeed blows much heavier, than ſtand anſwerable to God for embracing a ſyſtem that tends to the deſtruction of ſome of the very beſt and faireſt of his works. But I know the map of England, as well as the noble lord, or as any other perſon; and I know that the way I take is not the road to preferment. My excellent and honourable friend under me on the floor*, has trod that road with great toil for upwards of twenty years together. He is not yet arrived at the noble lord's deſtination. However, the tracks of my worthy friend are thoſe I have ever wiſhed to follow; becauſe I know they lead to honour. Long may we tread the ſame road together; whoever may accompany us, or whoever may laugh at us on our journey! I honeſtly and ſolemnly declare, I have in all ſeaſons adhered to the ſyſtem of 1766, for no other reaſon, than that I think it laid deep in your trueſt intereſts—and that, by limiting the exerciſe, it fixes on the firmeſt foundations, a real, conſiſtent, well-grounded authority in parliament. Until you come back to that ſyſtem, there will be no peace for England.

* Mr. Dowdeſwell.

THE END OF THE SECOND VOLUME.

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